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INTHODUCTION 
The central problem for this dissertation has the 
follow:Lng dimensions. Nineteenth-century historians and 
philosopherr:i of history produced individually successful 
but diverse accounts of both historiographical procedures 
and historical events. Not only were the accounts diverse, 
in some cases they were mutually exclusive. The crisis of 
historicism occurred when historians recognized that no 
adequate theoretical basis was available for comparing the 
diverse accounts and settling the disputes among them.. In 
contemporary terms, the conflicting accounts presented 
effectively closed systems of thought; their differences 
appeared fundamental and U..'1.resoJvable. 
We identify the crisis of historicism with a series 
of problems concerning historical objectivity, the relation 
of history to science, and historical realism. The dispar-
ity between the expectations and the actual achievements o:f 
historians produced the crisis. The general expectations 
were that the aforementioned probleras could be solved. But 
nineteenth-century historians achieved something less than 
consensus on these basic problems. Throughout the centur-
ies, the lack of consensus among philosophers and philoso-
phies has been the breeding ground of scepticism. The 
1 
2 
scandal of disunity repeated itself among historians. 
Thus, historical works written durj ng the a~;-~yet-u...rire-
solved crisis manifest an uneasiness over the foundational 
issues of historical practice. 
We distinguish the crisis of historicism from histor-
icism itself. The latter is identified with two basic 
theses: the content of the historical field is composed of 
unique life forms, and these life forms can be explained in 
terms of their historical development. Historicism itself 
we will treat as a special instance of the thesis of per-
spectivism elaborated jn Chapter Two. The crisis of his-
toricism is the main issue in the five subsequent chapters. 
Each of those chapters viill consider some aspect of the 
crisis-problems which first confronted and eventually dis-
illusioned members of the historicist tradition. 
The literature both on hi~toricism and on the crisis 
is extensive. Georg G. Iggers has provided a survey of 
1 h . t . . 1 wares on is or1c1sm. Since our concern is w5.th the cri-
sis period, we are· chiefly interested in the methodologi-
cal problems usually identified with the analytical tradi-
tion in the philosophy of history. Numerous historians 
have reflected on those problems. We will be making re-
peated references to the works of R. G. Collingwood, 2 
1 The German Conception of J~story (Middleto~n, Con-
necticu-:C:~./esleyar1-Univ8rsi ty ri~es8-;-TI68), pp. 287-290. 
2The Idea of History (London: Oxford ·University l1rcss, 
1971). 
3 
- · I'>' r.,...ou 3 ·1/ '1rc ·~ 1 l 4 ··~ 0 5 i C J B , 6 henri l'-"·.... , •' v oc1, £. • .t::.. vc.rr, anc ar .. J:ec~c:er. 
severo..1 antho1oc-;i. er:> of pri m<:..ry source material will be 
consulted on the wide-ranging issues of historical meth-
od. 7 The problems of objectivity and of the relation be-
tween science and history have been discussed at length 
by philosophers of history. A.':'.long the sources to be used 
are works by Patrick Gardiner, 8 W. H. Walsh,9 Arthur Dan-
to,10 Morton Wh"ite, 11 and D. H. Fischer. 12 
The various methodological issues treated in the pre-
ceding literature are relevant to the crisis of histori-
cism. For, in the first place, this crisis proceeds from 
7, 
.?The Meaning of History (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966). 
4 The Historian's Craft (New York: Alfred A. I~opf, 
1953). -
5\r.lhat Is I2_stor;z? (New York: Random House, 1961). 
6 Tl1:_E_: HeavenlJ: City ££.__the 3:iJ;JJteenth-C_cmtl_!r;z PhiHlos-
oDhers {New Haven: Yale University J..>t"'ess, 19?1). 
7pa trick Gardiner, ed. , Theor:J-es of Ei s:i::or;z (:New York: 
Free Pres;.;;, 1965). Hans Meyerhofi', ed., '.I1he }).i.1iloscDhY of [~~-.t12-Qur ?iS~ (Garden City, IJew ~oJ.:1{! .. D~:.l~eJ:a:y;~ 
1959). GGorge n • .i1Iadel, ed., Stud:i.es J_n the J:-n:i_losophy of 
Histor~t (New York: Harper and i{ow, 106)): J:!'ritz Steri'-1~ ed., 
7I'he-Tar~:._~:Les of }Iistor;y (Cleveland: Horld Publ i.shing Com-
pany, 195~ 
81
.I'he Nature of Historical Explanation (Oxford: Ox-
ford University J?l'e;Js, 196:~ 
0 7Philos~;y:_._of Histo:c:;z:: An In~roduction (New York: 
Harper and How, 19b8). 
lO L~l_aly.:tt_cal_Fhilosoph;y of Histor,y (Ne\·J' York: Cam-
bridge Univers:L ty Press, rc)60). 
11!£.~!?-da ti ons :?f Historical Kn owl e£G~ (New York: 
Harper and Rov1, '"T967 j. 
1 ':) 
'-Historians' Fallac:i_es: Toward a Logic of JUstorical 
Thour:ht (l\ei·.r ·York: Harp~rand n.0W;-1970 ):------·-------
_ .. __ ....__ 
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a lack of profess~on~l consensus on basic issues, and ques-
tions of mGthodology involve public controls over jndividu-
al effort;J wj thin a professional conmuni ty. In the second 
place, the crisis oi' historicism is marked by a recurrent 
sce_;J-Cicis:m tov.mrd attemnts to provide critical fou.,'IJ.dations 
for historical knowledge. The analytical philosophers of 
history have been particularly interested in clarifying 
the foundations of historical inquiry and narration. 
However, the previously mentioned works will be used 
as secondary resoui·ces for this dissertation. Our primary 
sources will be ·works by Hayden Whi te13 and Bernard Loner-
gan.1~ The basic justification for this narrowed focus 
will emerge only in subsequent chapters. To anticipate 
our defense of this selection--both White and Lonergan ap-
preach the crisis of historicism in a novel recognition of 
two levels in the hist;orical text. Hayden White uses the 
l3Hayden ~1ite's major work is Metahistory: The His-
t ,. ' 1 T"o:i~· 't•o · -\1 -in t ..... -:., +·h ('f n't .., ...... '"'"r ·-.,.,I\. "'·-~(·T)~11 t··'Mr-re· 01J_Ca. ,ll~c~;"lTid ·l. n J.n .!_;_ ... 8 t;(.:oDv ..• -ve ,1J.-'-,Y .!'..1u. Op,-, ,Du..J.. ..L.w.v • 
j "o1:fr:L8""Tiopki_ i1i~ "-~Dili ve rs { t~/?.r es 3-;-1 <]7:))-~--(B ei:;-eaf t er we ·wi 11 
ref er to this work simply as 1-lctahl_~tor__;z.) We will also 
mal\::e use of his transl a tor's introclucti on, "On History and 
Historicisms~" in From.Ristory to .Soc:iolor;y, by Carlo An-
toni (Detroit: Wayne ,St~e uniVersity '?Tess, 1959). 
14LonerG;an 1 s latest work, Method j_n Theolog:z (New 
York: Herder and Herder, 1972), provides his most extensive 
remarks on historical method and on the probler.:is belonging 
to the crisis i)eriod. On issues more di.stinctively philo-
sophical, we will consult his earlier work, Insi~ht: A · 
St-~1y _(ff H"~~;i Unde:r:.§_~'.~nd:!_n5, Second ( studen~B 1 ·]°-edi t:L°on, 
revised, (l~ei,.,r York: L'nilosophical L:t brary, 1958). (Here-
after we will refer to this i'TOrk simply as Ins:~ght.) Use 
will also be made of articles published -in an ant1iology o.f 
Lonergan' s 1..;orks, ColJ::...~ct:ton: P~::_:~ b;z_ Bernard,;__±i..£~~, 
edited by F. E. Crmve (Rew York: Herder and Herder, ..L';;!of). 
In subsequ0nt pages we will simply refer to this work as 
CoJ.lectiont 
5 
techniques of structuralism to investigate the linguistic 
deep-structure of historical narratives. Lonergan elab-
orates the connections between his transcendental method 
and. the proceduxes of historical inqujry. Both ap1n·oaches 
move from the frequently discussed surface elements to the 
often overlooked foundations of those surface elements. 
Our argument is that, in the midst of continued dis-
agrc<3JJLent over problems on the surface level of historical 
works, an inquirer who investigates what lies "deeper" may 
discover an exit from the theoretical labyrinth through 
which those d'3bating the crisis appear to be wandering. 
Both authors view their own works as contributing to a 
resolution of the crisis. As a preliminary note, we should 
remark that neither author proposes a historical monism; 
mul tiI>le perspectives on the past are required if one ac-
cepts the first thesis of historicism. 1 5 Their proposed 
solutions, rather, envision some satisfactory antidote to 
the prevailing scepticism which characterizes works of the 
crisis period~ 
Chapter One will work out the details of White's 
attempted solution to the crisis. For reasons to be given 
there, we will argue that his attempt is insufficient. In 
subsequent chapters Bernard Lonergan's attempted solution 
l5Again, the first thesis {s that the content of the 
historical field is composed of unique life forms. The 
"uniqueness" of these forms discourages the generalizing 
ambition of the system-builder. Consequently, multiple 
historical perspectives are to be expected. 
6 
will be studied. The primary connection between the two 
different approaches to the problems of the crisis is found 
in their focus on the deep level of historical inquiry. 
Their.primary difference is found in the absence of a cog-
nitional element on the deep level for White and in the 
presence of such an element for Lonergan. Gradually this 
difference will be shown to be crucial. Nevertheless, our 
agreement with Lonergan's inclusion of a cognittonal ele-
ment in the deep level does not require that we disparage 
White's analysis of' historical works. There are barriers 
in his analysis which hinder a satisfactory resolution of 
the crisis. These we will challenge. But his analysts 
of' the historjcal imagination provides insights which com-
plement Lonergan's analysis. A thesis yet to be estab-
lished is that Lonergan provides a higher viewpoint which 
incorporates much of what White discovers about nineteenth-
century historiography. 
Our position, then, is that Hayden White's Metahis-
tory is a significant study of the crisis of historicism. 
His insightful summations of the problems of' the crisis 
will be used in this dissertation to specify particular 
issues and to focus our own inquiry. That inquiry will 
largely be given over to a study of' Lonergan's transcen-
dental method. Our transition from White's structuralist 
analysis to Lonergan's transcendental method will be jus-
tified: (1) if our arguments in Chapter One are valid, name-
ly, that White's attempted solution to the crisis is in fact 
7 
insufficient; and (2) if in subsequen~ chapters we demon-
strate that Lonergan's app~oach yields ffiore successful 
results. 
Earlier we stated that the crisis of historjcism is 
identified with a series of problems concerning historical 
objectivity, the relation of history to science, and his-
torical realism. In most instances we will be considering 
these problems as distinctively historical difficulties. 
However, the problems have implications beyond the histor-
ical field, e.g., a denial of the possibility of historical 
knowledge may be 1)art of a more t;eneral epistemoloe;ical 
thesis of scepticism. Therefore, our treatment of these 
problems, while it will be cast in historical terms, will 
also have implications for more Beneral epistemological 
issues. 16 
\.,'hen we seek to relate White's metahistorical inquiry 
to Lonergan's, an initial difficulty presents itself in 
defining what history is. 17 There are multiple types of 
16chapter J?i ve in particular will expand beyond the 
issue of historical objectivity to consider a complex no-
tion of objectivity applicable to many distinct fields of 
inquiry. 
17It is perhaps unnecessary to point out the arnbigu-
i t;y of the Eng1ish word "history." It can refer both to 
the past events which are studied and to the study of those 
events. "Historiography" is sometimes used to distinguish 
the latter from the former. However, the term is frequently 
used to distinguish one's study of historians and their 
works from the study of the past events referred to in 
those enrlier works. Rather than further compounding these 
ambiguities by adding yet more terms (e.g. historiology), 
we will take care to ensure that the rneaning of "history" 
is apparent from the context. Where some doubt may arise, 
8 
history: Precritical accounts which mix fact and fable, 
chronicles which assign dates to events without offering 
to explain the latter, autobiographies and biographies 
which focus on indiv~dual lives and de-emphasize the his-
tory of the group, and cri_ ttcal history which has developed 
its m·m professional standards and scholarly community 
since the nineteenth century. Among these multiple types, 
we will focus our attention on critical history. Our sel-
cction is justified on two grounds: first, it is the type 
of history which was expected to resolve the basic problems 
characterizing the crisis of historicism; second, it is the 
type of history which requires methodical inqui:cy and veri-
fiable results. That is, critical history is not a pri-
vate undertaking but an established discipline with its 
own scholarly forums, university curricula, and separate 
educational faculties. Since the crisis of historicism 
occurred within a professional community, the t;ype of his-
tory practiced by that community should be our primary 
focus. 
Even though one characterizes critical history as an 
independent scholarly discipline, its definition requj_res 
that one introduce the methodj_cal procedures settine; it 
apart from other types. We will not take up those proced-
ures in any detail until Chapter Four. Consequently, we 
we will use "historiography" to refer to the scholarly 
practice of historians. 
9 
will only gradually introduce a meanin3 for critical his-
tory. That meaning will depend upon hm·.r we understand his-
torjcal procedures. In turn, our understanding of such 
procedures rests upon our understanding of human knowing--
its limits and specialized functions in regard to past 
events. 3till, we can anticipate this later conclusion. 
Crit~cal history is a methodical inquiry into the past, 
yielding interpreta t:i ons subj e~ t to the cri t:icism of a 
~~u-~E~c 0 1"on°J b~ 0 +or·~c~ 1 c·om~un~+~y J!...r- .L .,,, ... )v_ a~ ·~L.kl v .1 _,.,.,,......l.. .1.LJ.J,i. .L.L '.I• • 
Our problen, then, is how to resolve the crisis of 
historicism which occurred within the practice of critical 
history. Our purpose :is to investigate hm'l well Lonergan' s 
transcendental method supplies both a critical bas:1-s for 
that practice and satisfactory answers to the basic prob-
lems of the crisis. 
Some explanation of how we intend to explore these 
problems should be given here. We have identified the 
crisis of historicism with certain disputed questions about 
historical objectivity, the relation of history to science, 
and historical realism. We will rely chiefly on Hayden 
White's Metahistory to formulate the various aspects of 
these disputed questions. Other historians and philosophers 
of history will be used to exemplify in historical practice 
the various theses which White formulates. Our strategy, 
then, will be to show a way around the theoretical impasse 
of the crisis by resolving the problems of historical 
10 
objectivity, of the relation between history and scjence, 
and of historical realism. 
These problems properly belong to a formal study in 
epistemology. Conditions for the possibility of historical 
knowlodge are the general subject matter. But, again, our 
focus is narrowed by the specific issues formulated by Hay-
den \.jhi te. Lonergan' s arguments and positions will be con-
sidered insofar as they are applicable to these specific 
issues. 
To anticipate how our envisioned strategy will devel-
op in subsequent chapters, we can foresee four objectives. 
First, adopting White's metaphor of surface and deep levels 
in the historical text, we wjll search for a point of tran-
sition between them. Chapter Two makes use of the notions 
of relative and basic horizons to understand the connec-
tions between pre-critical preconceptions about history and 
the surface procedures of the historian. Once the link is 
made between surface and deep levels, our second objective 
is to clarify the cognitional element belonging to basic 
horizons. Chapter Three suggests that the cognitional 
structure contained within basic horizons may provide the 
metahistorical grounds for mediating the disputes of the 
crisis period. For the structure of cognitional perform-
ance is presupposed by all precritical and critical views 
of historical knowing. 
As a third. objective, we must work out the implica-
11 
tions of this structure for historical procedures. Chap-
ter :Four argc;_es, ar11onr; other points, that the formulated 
expression of this structure can be considered part of the 
"deep structure" of the histor1cal text. This forJt.ulated 
expression is transcendental method. The claims advanced 
on its behalf are three in number: transcendental method 
(1) provides eritical r;rounds for evaluating components 
of the deep 3tructure, (2) is a precondition to detachment 
from bias in historical inquiry, and (3) sanctions the sur-
face procedures of critical history. 
'l'he fourth objective is pursued in Chapter Five: to 
discover how adequate Lonergan's metahistorical method is 
for resolving the aforementioned problems of the crisis 
of historicism. The claim is that transcendental method 
allows for the elaboration of a universal viewpoint from 
which to mediate among the conflicting theories and prac-
tices in history. Convincing resolutions of these basic 
problems could open a way beyond the theoretical impasse 
of the crisis. 
There is a need to state clearly the limitations 
placed on these five chapters. First, no attempt will be 
made to single out a particular historjcal perspective as 
the sole legitimate one. The thesis of perspectivism de-
fended in Chapter Two implies that such a privileged per-
spective is not available. Our later defense of this the-
sis will also imply the rejection of the ideal of a single 
12 
comprehensive historical interpretation. More positively, 
tJ.H:: thesis of" perspecti vism will im2)ly the acce1itance of 
an irreducible diversity in historical perspectives and 
+. 18 prac 0:. ces. 
A notable absence from this dissertatton is the issue 
of value judg~ents in history. The possibility of objec-
tive value judgments on historical achievements has re-
ceived attention from nwnerouG historians and philosophers 
of history. Lonergan offers rather brief remarks on this 
issue under the heading of moral convorsion. 19 As Hayden 
White and other historians argue, aesthetic and moral val-
ues belong to the predeterminants of historical perspec-
tives. Yet the present study nust have some limits, and 
epistemological concerns have been selected as our general 
focus. Consequently, aesthetic and moral problems in his-
torical inquiry will not receive any extensive considera-
ti on. 
18we should note in advance that irreducible diver-
sity does not necessarily entail incompatibility among his-
torical viewpoints and procedureso As we will discuss 
subsequentl;y, not all differences are -:incom:oatible or 
dialectical differences. 
l9r·Iethod in ·Theolorz:y, p. 217, and pp. 240-2L~3. A 
---... :>--~- . -·"'--~~ 
recently puo1ishea aoc~oral dissertation interrelates Lon-
ergan' s views on three types of conversion: intellectual, 
moral and rel~gious. Bernard 11yrrell, Bernard. Lonerf\an' s 
J?hi1osophy of God (New York: He:cder and·-nerd.e:r·, """1973). In 
"Gll:Is' diss'GrtU:-Gion we will be concerned only with the first 
two types of conversion. For additional but briefer re-
marks on Lonergan's notion of conversion, see David Tracy's 
'l'he Achiev?2'!ent of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and 
Herder, lV/0 / • 
13 
At the sa~e time we cannot entirely overlook those 
aesthetic and moral problems. In the first place, the 
intellectual perfornance of historians nanifests aesthe-
tic and moral concerns. Ha~lclen White's analysj s of nine-
teenth-century hir;torians reveals the centrclity of aes-
thetic and moral preferences in the decisions guiding 
historics.l perfor:r:iance. In Chapter One we will be linking 
these preferences to other components of historians' rel-
ative horizons. Aesthetic concerns show· up in the selec-
tivity process necessary to every historical inquiry. 
Chapters Two and Four will give special attention to this 
process. Moral concerns will receive a limited treatnent 
in Chapters Four and Five when the problems of historical 
bias and intellectual responsibility are considered. 
Therefore, although our focus is on the intellectual side 
of historical performance, we still will make some refer-
ences to the concomitant but distinct moral and aesthetic 
aspe~ts of that perfornance. 
Is it legitimate to allow only a subordinate role 
to historical value judgments? Are not these value judg-
ments inseparable from historical inquiries? One can only 
reply "Yes" to the latter question if one grants that 
evaluation occurs in the selectivity process and if one 
acknowledges the selectivity process as a requisite to 
historical inquiry. However, our defense of the secondary 
place gi.vei1 in this dissertation to value judgments requires 
a more co~plex reply to the first question. 
ences in isolution from the cognitional perfor~ance of 
In the second chapter we will argue that 
a historian's views on his own intellectual/cognitional 
abilities take their place alongside of and interact with 
the moral and aesthetic convictions belonging to his his-
toric3l perspective. Tn the third chapter we will intro-
duce a metahistorical basis for criticizing precritical 
elements of historical perspectives. On this metahistor-
ical basis, the remaining two chapters will seek to answer 
a distincti vel;y epistemological question: Is it possible 
to elaborate a critical method which can mediate conflicts 
concerning historical objectivity and historical realism? 
Our answer to this questj_on will rest on a priori grounds 
supplied by the structure of hum.an knowint;. Given such 
grounds, our answer will not owe its validity to subjective 
prcferences--even if these preferences transcend themselves 
in objective value judgments. In other words, if an epis-
temological position has an a £r!ori basis in cognitional 
performance, then, although valui.ng is part of that per-
forma~~' the structure of that performance will be 
20That is, the former preferences are predetermin-
ants of epistemological positions belonging to the surface 
elements of historical texts. The latter theoretical po-
sitions are determined by, but do not determine or re-
quire, modif1 cations in the formeI· elements of the deep 
level. Cf. the Preface to I"Ietahictory, p. x. 
• 1-
f 
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invo.rj_ant across specific differences in valuing. There-
fore, one can elaborate an epistemological position with-
out explicit reference to the content of specific value 
judgments. 
We can expand this conclusion to defend our exclu-
sion of certain topics treated at length by Lonergan. He 
quite obviously can claim both the title of philosopher 
and the title of theologian. Is it possible to consider 
his cognitional theory and epistenology without referring 
to the religious topics which form a large part of his 
work? More directly, can this be done without damaging 
the integrity of his thought? Or are there moral and 
religious positions presupposed by his cogniti.onal theory 
and epistemology? 
This last question requires a disti.nction between 
the historical 1)reced~ to the development of a position 
and the logical-evidential precedents to the validity of 
that position. The former type of precedent is exempli-
fied in Lonergan's article, "The Origins of Christian Real-
Religious positions gave impetus to the develop-
ment of an epistemology consistent with them. But ques-
tions about the validity of that epistemology (i.e. ques-
tions for reflection) are not answered by a genetic ac-
count- of its development (i.e. by a response to questions 
for 5-ntellit;ence). Rather, it must be weighed on its own 
21Regis College, Toronto, September 1961. (Mimeo-
graphed). 
r 
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merits as a philosophically arguable position. 
Similarly, in doing history one does not accept or 
reject a previous historian's conclusions simply because 
he belonged to one political party rather than another. 
1r11e conclusions must be defensible on the basj s of avail-
able evidence. If they are found faulty, then a considera-
tion of the author's political affiliation may be relevan-t. 
But "relevant" not to the truth or falsity of his conclu-
sions but to the question for intelligence: \.Jhy did he 
assert something without adequate proof? 
With the preceding distinction in mind, 1ve can jus-
tifiably limit our study to cognitional and epistemological 
positions in Lonergan' s thought. Particularly si_nce our 
general topic is historical methodology, we can exclude 
issues which do not directly pertai_n to the validi.ty of 
results reached in a methodical way. Furthermore, trans-
cendental method is said to cut across cultural differ-
ences. Prior to any theorizin(S about one's ability to 
knm,r, and therefore _prior to any opinions formed under the 
influence of personal moral or aesthetic beliefs, there is 
said to be an invariant pattern in one's actual cognitional 
performance. This performance as it actually occurs is 
the measure of all subsequent theories about human know-· 
ing. Thus, the ver·;f claim to provide a critical and ~ 
priori position based on this performance implies the pos-
sibility of abstracting from issues of an extra-epistemo-
logical sort. Of course, this claim and others are yet 
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to be established. But what we are selecting as a limi-
ted focus for our study docs not appear at this point to 
do daEage to the j_ntegri ty of Lonersan' s thought. 
Finally, this dissertation is written from a phil-
osophical viewpoint. It is not immediately apparent that 
this is a licitation. However, sjnce our concern is for 
methodological problems, it would be possible to expand 
our discussion to methodological problems within the 
social and physical sciences. In fact, Chapters Four and 
Five will briefly touch on such a wider range of issues. 
But, in order to avoid lengthy digressions, we will main-
tain a narrowed focus on problems in historical method. 
Our philosophical viewpoint (based on the cognitional per-
formance presupposed by every discipline) will allow us 
access to other methods. However, our concern for those 
other methods will be guided by what they contribute to 
the clarity and effectiveness of historical procedures. 
With this understanding of both our strategy and 
limitations, we are now ready to explore more adequately 
Hayden White's attempted solution to the crisis of histor-
icism as well as Lonergan's alternate approach to the basic 
problems of the crisis. 
CHAPTER I 
THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM 
This dissertation investigates the claims made by 
Bernard Lonergan to the effect that transcendental method 
offers a critical basis for (1) understanding and evaluat-
ing the procedures used by the historian, (2) thematizing 
and evaluating the historian's epistemological presuppo-
sitions, (3) locating the sources of conflicts within the 
historical field which gave rise to the "crisis of histor-
icism. 11 The first two claims can be assimilated to the 
third. The "crisis of historicism" consists in the recoe;-
nition that no adequate theoretical grounds are available 
for choosing among the different ways of doing and of 
viewing history. 1 What is lacking is a critical metahis-
torical basis for mediating both the disputes over histor-
ical procedures and the conflicting claims regarding what 
constitutes historical "realism." This dj_ssertation inves-
tigates the claim made by Bernard Lonergan to supply the 
needed metahistorical basis. An appraisal of his elabor-
ated arguments will be the central purpose of this work. 
1This formulation of the "crisis" is given by Hay-
den White in his l"Ietahistory, p. 432. 
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Hayden White's Study of the Crisis of Historicism 
By using the insights and method of structuralism, 
Hayden White's 1'1etahistory: The Historical Imagination in 
Nineteenth-Centurl Europe offers a contemporary analysis 
of the crisis of historicism. The problems which he out-
lines will be used in this dissertation to specify the 
particular issues of the cr:i.sis. It will be argued in 
this introductory section that White's structuralist ap-
proach leaves the central problem of the crisis unresolved. 
In subsequent chapters I will investigate Lonergan's claim 
that transcendental method yields more successful results. 
White's study of nineteenth-century historians and 
their works documents the widespread success enjoyed by 
plausible, but (in some cases) mutually exclusive, ways 
of viewing history. 2 Significant advances in the techni-
cal areas of research seemed to promise an increasingly 
accurate and definitive account of past events. Yet the 
great labors of nineteenth-century historians yielded pro-
found, but often incompatible, systems of thought. The 
disunity within the historical field was a scandal to 
those who expected consensus and collaboration. Coinci-
dent with this disunity was a loss of confidence in the 
possibility of achieving objectivity in history.3 
2 Ibid., p. 41. 
3As Nietzsche remarked in regard to the tradttional 
metaphysics and Christian philosophy of the West, the scan-
dal of disunity is t~e breeding ground of scepticism. 
,. 
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For the historiographer the problem p~esented by 
the crisis is twofold: (1) to account for the recurrent 
disunity in historical studies, and (2) to discover whe-
ther the obvious conflicts are reducible, i.e. whether 
some basis for mediating the disputes is available. Hay-
den White applies the insights and method of structural-
ism to both of these tasks. He argues that conflicts in 
the ways of doing and of viewing history are ultimately 
traceable to differences in the moral or aesthetic aspir-
t . f h. t . 4 a ions o is or1ans. Ultimately one adopts a perspec-
tive on history for moral or aesthetic reasons. Consequent-
ly, the disunity in historical studies reflects a prior 
diversity in the moral and aesthetic preferences of dif-
ferent historian9. 
Are there grounds for mediati.ng the disputes which 
originate in these variable preferences? Such grounds 
were sought by nineteenth-century historians. It was ex-
pected that unequivocal answers could be given to the 
questions: "What does it mean to think historically, and 
what are the unique characteristics of a specifically 
historical method of inquiry?"5 In fact, no consensus 
Indeed the works of historians in the crisis period are 
characterized by the ironic attitude with its inherent 
scepticism and moral agnosticism. Ibid., p. 433. 
4Ibid. 
-
5 Ibid., p. 1. 
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was reached in replying to these questions. Instead, mul-
tiple claims were put forward as to the form historical 
explanations should take. Even prior to such claims, there 
were disputes over what should count as historical data. 
This disunity on the basic level of the content (data) of 
the historical field and of the form which an explanation 
of the content should take indicates that historical per-
spectj_ves are discontinuous. That is, rather than gradu-
ally and cumulatively advancing toward a single definitive 
account of the past, historians are engaged in different 
and sometimes contradictory presentations of past events. 6 
In White's terms, they are operating with different his-
torical "paradigms." 
In White's analysis the term "paradigm" has a single 
general reference and multiple secondary references. Most 
generally the term refers to the historian's expectations 
of what an explanation of historical events should be. 
These expectations are said to be basically moral or aes-
thetic beliefs. The secondary references of "paradigm" 
further specify the strategies to be followed in meeting 
6That some historians were convinced of history's 
gradual movement toward a comprehensive understanding of 
the past, no matter how remote the completion date, is 
evident in Lord Acton's remark: "'Ultimate history we 
cannot have in this generation; but we can dispose of 
conventional history, and show the point we have reached 
on the road from one to the other, now that all information 
is within reach, and every problem has become capable of 
solution.'" Quoted in Edward Hallett Carr's What Is His-
tort? p. 3. A similar viewpoint is present in Fustel de 
anges' Inaugural Address, in The Varieties of History, 
p. 181. 
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these expectations, in concretely expressing one's moral 
or aesthetic beliefs. Thus, Hegel, who believed in the· 
ultimate rationality and moral significance of historical 
events, expressed his historical conception in terms remi-
niscent of Greek drama. The tragedies which are undeniable 
and which seem to require an absurdist view of historical 
processes are incorporated by Hegel into a larger frame-
work of advance-through-conflict. The historical trage-
dies are not denied, but they are "data" which a higher 
viewpoint, in retrospect, evaluates as steps in the pro-
gressive elevation of humanity.7 
7For White's illuminating remarks on the implicit 
structure of Hegel's philosophy of history, see Metahis-
tolt' pp. 81-131. Hegel's critics have often ignored the 
iple levels on which his philosophy operates. The 
value of White's structuralist analysis is its ability to 
penetrate beyond the surface features wh:i.ch critics find 
objectionable, to the deep structure from which those sur-
face features derive. 
The paradigm theory implies two levels of historical 
operations: The explicit research and theorizing of the 
historian is guided by im£licit expectations and ideal 
types. The historical work not only manifests (1) data 
ordered by (2) theoretical concepts for explaining the 
data and (3) a narrative structure for unifying the data 
and theore·!iical concepts, it also contains a "deep struc-
ture." 
Hayden White investigates this deep structure in an 
attempt to find some element of unity in the midst of the 
disunity of historical styles. Since documents and arti-
facts are not given in some unambiguous order, the his-
torian must employ a model (or set of models) for organiz-
ing them. The choice among possible models is said to be 
a poetic act which prefigures the historical field; i.e. 
an act which formally anticipates what can be counted as 
evidence and as acceptable modes of argumentation. The 
formalization of this poetic act can take a variety of 
forms, and White distinguishes them according to the four 
traditional tropes of' poetic language: Metaphor, Metonymy, 
Synecdoche, Irony. These tropes classify the deep 
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White~s thesis is that the operative paradigm (e.g. 
-
Hegel's higher viewpoint) determines the outline of the 
field of research and the form which is to be given to the 
structural content of the historical imagination in the 
nineteenth century. The explicit assumption behind White's 
use of the four tropes is that, "in any field of study not 
yet reduced (or elevated) to the status of a genuine sci-
ence, thought remains the captive of the linguistic mode 
in which it seeks to grasp the outline of objects j_nhabi t-
ing its field of perception." (Preface to I"Ietahistory, p. 
xi.) Thus a poetic act (based on moral or aesthetic 
grounds) leads to the employment of one of the tropes as 
the dominant mode of historical consciousness in an au-
thor's subsequent research and expression. The irreduci-
ble metahistorical basis of the historian's work will. be 
(1) the grounds for choosing this dominant mode and (2) the 
linguistic :form which the choice imposes on his subsequent 
work. The particular moral or aesthetic grounds for the 
choice and the adopted trope commit the author to a basic 
perspective on history. This basic perspective, or para-
digm, will be what he "expects" historical processes and 
their explanations to be. 
Secondary uses of the term "paradigm" will refer to 
the particular strategies adopted for meeting his expecta-
tions. White distinguishes three levels of historical ex-
planation: explanation by formal argument, by emplotment, 
by ideological implication. On each of these levels, there 
are at least four possible modes of articulating one's 
Views of historical processes: 
Emplotment: Romantic, Tragic, Comic, Satirical; 
Formal Argument: Formist, Mechanistic, Organicist, 
Ideological Contextualist; 
Implication: Anarchist, Radical, Conservative, 
Liberal. 
Every historical work will contain some mixture of modes 
drawn :from the three levels. This mixture will be indica-
tive of the author's expectations of what form historical 
explanations and historical processes can be said to take. 
The combination of the modes also yields the distinctive 
style of the particular historian. Each mode employed 
will, in the secondary sense, be a'~aradigm," i.e. a 
model guiding his development of and expression of his-
torical understanding. In both the general and secondary 
senses, "paradigm" refers to a model setting out the form 
of subsequent historical inquiry and narration. 
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historian's insights. Among nineteenth-century historians, 
disputes over what constituted primary historical data and 
what order they were to be given indicated that different 
paradigms were being used. In othe.r words, the field of 
history was not unambiguously defined. A plurality of 
outlines of the field resulted, each outline being part of 
a paradigm adopted on moral or aesthetic grounds. One re-
sult was that, with a variance in historical paradigms, 
there was also a variance in what counted as evidence. 
One then was in a position of measuring the validity of a 
historical work, not on the basis of its use of evidence, 
but on the basis of the coherence and illuminative power 
of the author's vision of the historical field. 8 Any the-
oretical concern for evidence will follow upon a prior 
determination of the historical field and of explanatory 
strategies for ordering the content of the field. Any sub-
sequent appeal to newly discovered data will fall within 
this prior determination. As a consequence, the admission 
of new evidence cannot provide grounds for radically modi-
fying the prior model which had been previously governing 
historical research and representation. 
In accounting for the diversity of historical models 
or paradigms, White emphasizes the role of language in 
determining the outlines of the historical field. His 
linguistic study is based on a number of facts. First, 
8Metahistory, p. 4. 
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history suffers from conceptual anarchy, i.e. there is no 
commonly accepted formal terminology for expressing his-
torical insights. Second, in the absence of a formal ter-
minology, the historian makes use of ordinary figurative 
language with all its inherent ambiguities. Third, since 
historical documents and artifacts are not given in some 
unambiguous order, the historian must antecedently organ-
ize them according to soI!le model. Now the process of in-
terrelating historical materials will be dependent on how 
one envisions the historical field and on what linguistic 
.form one thinks apt for expressing those interrelations. 
To envision the historical .field is termed a "poetic in-
sight," and the .formalization of that insight will corre-
spond to the adoption of one of the tropes of poetic lan-
guage. 9 As opposed to formal terminologies in the 
9What Hayden White means by "poetic insight" and by 
its formalization can be elucidated by way of contrast. 
Scientific systems employ formal terminologies in order to 
denote their data. The adopted terminology is intended to 
replace the figurative and ambiguous terms of ordinary lan-
guage. For example, calculus is employed in discussing 
physical reality. Its adoption as a formal mode of dis-
course limits the ways in which physical reality can be 
designated. But while his scientific conclusions will be 
expressed within the limits of formal discourse, the phy-
sicist's initial insights into the physical world will 
often be figuratively expressed. His task then will be 
to cast these insights in the mode of discourse adopted 
by other physicists committed to a common formal termin-
ology. 
Now, for the historian, there is no common formal 
terminology agreed upon within the profession. Thus his 
insights into historical events are not limited to a sin-
gle legitimate form of expression. Tnstead, his thoughts 
will be cast in one of the modes of figurative-poetic dis-
course. Hayden White notes at least four possible modes 
of .figurative discourse--the four tropes o.f poetic language: 
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sciences, history utilizes the figurative speech of every-
day living.IO White finds that histories of the nineteenth 
Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, Irony. Which one, or which 
set, of the modes the historian adopts as dominant in his 
work w5.ll be a formalization of his poetic insight which 
itself is antecedently determined by moral or aesthetic 
convictions. Thus, Hegel's convictions about the ration-
ality and moral significance of historical events required, 
first, that historical descriptions be cast in the mode of 
~' and second, that historical explanations be cast in 
~ode of synecdoche. The ironic mode retained the fac-
tualness of historical disasters and sufferi.ngs. On the 
level of individualizing description, human greed and vio-
lence paint an absurdist picture devoid of both reason and 
virtue. However, the synecdochic mode integrates the part 
into the whole, the individual into the larger historical 
process. 1dhat is described as a tragic condition for the 
individual becomes part of an explanatory scheme in which 
tragedies serve to promote--at great human cost--the grad-
ual elevation of humanity. 
Prior to any analysis of the content of the historical 
field, the historian will have "prefigured" the field by a 
poetic act which seeks expression in one of the modes of 
poetic discourse. Other historians will give predominance 
to other tropes more in keeping with their moral and aes-
thetic aspirations. As a result, a diversity of historical 
paradigms will characterize the work of historians. Con-
ceptual anarchy within the historical profession will be 
part of the price paid for the richness and diversity of 
its artistic expression. For Hayden White's comments on 
the above, see ibid., pp. 31-33, fn. 13. Examples of the 
prefiguration o'ftne historical field by poetic-artistic 
means are found in F. H. Cornford's Thucydides Mythistori-
~ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 
pp. viii and 132. 
10Hayden White conments that sixteenth-century natural 
scientists were in the same situation as historians today; 
they lacked a formal terminological system. At that ti_me 
different conceptions of science reflected different con-
ceptions of "reality" and different epistemologies based on 
the latter. A linguistic uncertainty lay at the root of 
that diversity. But the conceptual anarchy among sixteenth-
century natural scientists was largely resolved in the 
seventeenth century through the adoption of a specific mode 
of discourse--the technical language of mathematics. White 
notes that paradigms in the physical sciences periodically 
win wide acceptance. This indicates a general consensus 
l 
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century made use of ordinary forms of discourse which can 
be grouped under the four tropes of poetic language. 
This general linguistic classification constitutes the 
unity of the historical imagi.nation in that period. For 
all their evident diversity, nineteenth-century historians 
can be classified on a deep structural level according to 
the linguistic modes in which they expressed their views 
on history. 
The preceding remarks were intended to summarize the 
underlying positions of White's response to our earlier 
question--"Are there grounds for mediating the historical 
disputes which originate in moral and aesthetic preferen-
ces?" Those underlying positions consist of the following 
points. First, prior to the interpretation of the content 
of the historical field, the field itself must be prefig-
ured as a definite realm with discernible content. 11 Sec-
ond, the metahistorical element of every historical work 
will be (1) the £Oetic act which constitutes the field and 
selects the mode of expression suitable for analyzing the 
content of the field, (2) the moral or aesthetic determin-
~ which are manifested in the choice of linguistic 
forms, and (3) the subsequent strategies of explanation and 
on what will count as a scientific problem, what form scien-
tific explanations will take, and what types of evidence 
will be scientifically acceptable. For historians, how-
ever, such consensus does not exist and never has. See 
Metahistory, pp. 12-13. 
11Ibid.' p. 30. 
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types of articulation consistent with one's ·vision of the 
historical field. 
Further, White's structuralist analysis distinguishes 
this metahistorical element (or deep structure) from the 
surface structure of the historical work. On the surface, 
or explicit, level of the text one finds data for analysis, 
theoretical concepts for explaining the data, and a narra-
tive style for presenting the data as an intelligible ser-
ies of events.12 White locates the epistemological posi-
tion of the author on this surface level. Likewise, the 
theoretical operations by which one verifies interpretations 
of historical data belong to the surface structure. The 
implication is that such operations and the epistemological 
position receive an implicit, precritical sanction on the 
deep leve1. 13 The metahistorical underpinnjngs of the sur-
face dimensions (1) "analytically" precede the narrative 
form incorporating the :interpreted data, and (2) sanction 
the particular theories used to explain the data. 14 Given 
the above positions, White's response to our inttial ques-
tion is strongly supported. The disputes among historians 
derive from the adoption of fundamentally different his-
torical perspectives. In each instance the adoption of a 
perspective derives from precritical, extra-epistenological 
12Ibid., P• ix. 
l3Ibid., P• x. 
14Ibid., p. xii. 
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sources. 1 5 Consequently, there are no apodictic epistemo-
logical grounds for claiming that one historical perspec-
tive is more realistic than another.16 
The Unresolved Crisis: White's Proposed Solution to tg~ 
Sceptical outcome 
The problem of mediating conflicts among different 
paradigms has been discussed by proponents of a paradigm 
theory of science. As opposed to an earlier scienti.fic 
ideal of cumulative and progressive efforts toward a sin-
gle definitive account of nature, they operate with an 
ideal of science which is composed of multiple systems 
individually coherent but discontinuous from each other. 17 
l5Since epistemological considerations belong to the 
surface structure of.the text, the choice among possible 
historical perspectives will be made antecedently on non-
epistemologic'11 grounds. ">·/hi te suggests the likely grounds 
for such a ch5lce will be moral or aesthetic in nature, 
definitely not epistemological. Ibid., pp. xii and 433. 
16To exemplify this position, White recounts the 
struggle during the nineteenth century for dominance among 
secondary paradigms of historical explanation. Two para-
digms, the Fornist and Contextualist, gained dominance as 
models of explanation for historians. The Organicist and 
Mechanistic paradigms were eventually treated as isolated 
instances of an aberrant philosophy of history. The ex-
clusion of them reflects, according to White, a decision 
by historians not to allow integrations of data (e.g. those 
integrations effected by Hegel and Marx) modelled on the 
Organicist and Mechanistic paradigms. This decision res-
ted on precritical opinions concerning the form which a 
science of man and of society should assume. White points 
out the ethical aspects of these precritical opinions in 
ibid., pp. 20-21. (For the different meanings of Formist, 
~o:r;textualist, Organicist, and Mechanistic paradigms, see 
~.,pp. 14-18.J . 
17Patrick A. Heelan contrasts these two scientific 
ideals in his "The Logic of Framework Transpositions," 
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For the historical methodologist, this interdisciplinary 
problem can be phrased i.n distinctively historical terms: 
Is it possible to have complementary histories instead of 
mutually exclusive ones? Historians are generally agreed 
that no single individual can master all the details in-
volved in complex historical topics. Instead, muitiple 
projects are undertaken, each one of which illuminates 
specific features of the topic and hopefully contributes a 
partial but complementary study to other projects con-
cerned with the same complex whole. Under the paradigm 
theory of history, as envisioned by Hayden White, the com-
plementarity of partial studies is limited. That is, 
complementary results are possible if the historians pro-
ducing them share the same paradigm. But, if there is no 
co:rru::ion paradigm, differing historical interpretations are 
likely to be contradictory. And the possibility of reduc-
ing these contradictions to different but compatible posi-
tions will be slight. The basic presuppositions of several 
historians may be radically at odds and, so, antecedently 
may rule out the possibility of mediating subsequent 
Language, Truth and I'!eanin~, ed. by Philip Mcshane (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), pp. 93-94. 
Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hanson, Sellars are mentioned as repre-
sentative figures in the ongoing discussion of the differ-
ent scientific ideals. Thomas s. Kuhn's The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, Second edition (Chicago: Univer-
sity of C'hicago Press, 1970), offers a stronD defense of 
the paradigm theory of science. Israel Scheffler's work, 
Science and Subjectivity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), 
provides a defense of the older standard ideal of science. 
In Chapter Five, we will refer to both authors in discuss-
ing the problems of historical realism and of paradigm-
changes. l"'4'> 
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conflicts. 
Even if a mediation of "surface" conflicts appears 
unlikely for works operating under different paradigms, 
might·it yet be possible to settle them indirectly by a 
critique of the paradigms themselves? Such a critique--
if possible--would surely not be part of the surface 
structure of any text. White's thesis is that basic con-
flicts of interpretation among historical works have ori-
gins which analytically precede the assessment of histori-
cal data. And, if at the level of origins there are dif-
ferent paradigms, one must ultimately seek to mediate the 
conflicts there and not on a surface level, i.e. on the 
level of organizing and explaining one's data. But a cri-
tique of different paradigms requires a privileged stand-
point, a truly scientific paradigm. The problem White 
sees in this requirement is that there is an irreducible 
ethical componen~grounding one's choice of a paradigm and 
\) 
one's conception of historical knowledge, i.e. one's epis-
temology. To attempt to supply epistemological grounds on 
which to judge the cognitive adequacy of the different 
paradigms will itself, according to White, represent only 
another ethical choice. 18 
In effect, White is arguing that no one conception 
of history is more scientific than another because what 
constitutes scientific history, or historical "realism," 
18Metahistory, p. 26. 
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is determined by the paradigm one employs on the basis of 
ethical or aesthetic considerations. Given these precri-
tical grounds, one's claim of scientific realism for a 
particular paradigm will seem gratuitous to those holding 
other conceptions of historical processe.s and of historical 
knowledge. One will have merely stated a preference for 
what a historical science "ought to be. 1119 Consequently, 
an epistemological critique of historical paradigms is re-
quired to escape its own relat5_ vi ty to personal preferen-
20 ces, but such an escape is unlikely given the poetic 
and precritical origins of every historical viewpoint. As 
a result, White concludes that each paradigm will continue 
to present a seemingly exclusive conception of the histori-
cal field. 
There is a second argument against the possibility 
of arbitrating the disputes aoong historical paradigms. 
The first argument summarized above pointed out the 
l9Ibid. 
20rn this dissertation we will frequently use the 
terms "preconception," "preference," and "bias." By "pre-
conception" we mean some vaguely held opinion, usually 
unthematized, which belongs to the deep level of histori-
cal inquiry. In most cases, preconceptions are "taken for 
granted," they are.neither clarified nor defended. By 
"preference" we mean an individual's choice of a definite 
opinion or practice from among a number of opinions or 
practices. His choice need not be biased, but in most 
cases it is based on precritical grounds, i.e. the question 
of whether or not the choice is biased has not been asked 
or answered. By "bias" we mean a preconception or prefer-
ence which--on critical grounds--is found to block the 
spontaneous development of understanding. There are mul-
tiple types of bias. We will consider some of them in 
Chapter Four. 
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exclusivity of individual paradigms: their presuppositions 
are basically precritical, extra-epistemological opinions. 
Yet there are changes in paradigms; radical alterations in 
the way historical events have been interpreted can and do 
occur. A history of the fluctuating interpretations of 
the French Revolution or a history of works on the Puri-
tan contribution to American thought would provide examples 
of such paradigm-changes. Is it possible that such vari-
ance in viewpoints is prompted by the discovery of new 
data? If so, may not historical data themselves be the 
measure of the adequacy of paradigms and the:ir accompany-
ing theories? 
Hayden White takes up this particular possibility of 
mediation. He notes that theories of history have not won 
wide acceptance solely on the basis of how adequately they 
explained the data contatned in their narratives. 21 Aes-
thetic appeal and a coincidence between the theory and a 
given public's view of its own history are elements to be 
taken into account. Furthermore, there must be some con-
sensus on what constitute the signif:i.cant data in need of 
recounting. White argues that historical data are not 
brute givens. There seems to be no way of pre-establish-
ing what will be acceptable, irrespective of a particular 
audience, as a historical datum and as an adequate theory 
to explain the datum. A partial of 
----:::. 
21Metahisto~, p. 429. 
I I,.:_ 
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lies in the frequent disagreement a~ong historians over 
what should count as a specifically historical datum. 22 
Such disagreement reflects a prior disagreement over one 
or several of the metahistorical elements previously dis-
cussed. Agreement on what should count as a historical 
datum and as a theory for explaining it, thus, requires 
a prior consensus on a metatheory which distinguishes on 
metahistorical grounds between natural phenomena and spe-
cifically historical phenomena. 23 In short, historical 
22understanding this disagreement requires a distinc-
tion between the content of the historical field and the 
level of analysis most appropriate for explaining that con-
tent. A general consensus is likely on the historical data 
assignable to the historical field. All the artifacts, 
monuments, documents, art works created by men are candi-
dates for inclusion. But the difficulties begin when one 
seeks to account for the origins of these phenomena. The 
problem of motivation is particularly troublesome. How far 
should one push one's inquiry1 Psychological, biological, 
physico-chemical processes all might be considered sources 
of historical data. Which level of analysis is most legi-
timate? Does a psychological study have a greater claim 
to historical relevance than, for example, a materialistic 
analysis which reduces conscious intentions to biological 
impulses? The issues raised in these questions indicate 
that historical data are not easily distinguished from 
natural phenomena. The French structural anthropologist, 
Claude Levi-Strauss, notes this difficulty. "Ea.ch episode 
in a revolution or a war resolves itself into a multitude 
of individual psychic movements. Each of these movements 
is the translation of unconscious development, and these 
resolve themselves into cerebral, hormonal or nervous phe-
nomena, which themselves have reference to the physical or 
chemical order. Consequently, historical facts are no more 
~iven than any other. It is the historian, or the agent of 
istory, who constitutes them by abstraction and as though 
under the threat of an infinite regress." The Savage Mind 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 257. 
23Metahistory, p. 429. In Chapter Five of this dis-
sertation, we will propose metahistorical grounds for such 
a distinction. Although consensus on the metatheory 
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data are not the measure of the adequacy of paradigms. Ra-
ther, they are subordinate to the metahistorical positions 
which guide historical inquiry. 
The above conclusion leaves us without an explanation 
of the suggested paradigm-changes. The discovery of new 
data does not account for radical alterations in the way 
historical events have been interpreted. According to the 
paradigm theory of history, such alterations do not pro-
vide conclusive proof of "progress" in historical under-
standing. Each paradigm nay be manifested in works which 
present profound and consistent insights into history. 
These marks of consistency and profundity account for the 
"greatness" of the particular work. But they do not auto-
matically establish that work as a more scientific or 
realistic work than others which operate under different 
paradigms. Each work may be part of an "effectively closed 
system of thought, incommensurable with all the others ap-
pearing in contention with it. 1124 Ultimately its incom-
mensurability can be traced to moral or aesthetic varia-
bles. The result will be the introduction of discreteness 
into the historiographical field, a discreteness which elim-
inates the concept of development-by-accumulation. Multiple 
(transcendental method) which supplies these grounds can-
not be guaranteed, our basic argument is universal in 
scope: every development of meaning, every theory about 
"data," presupposes the occurrence of the component acts 
of transcendental method. 
24Ibid., p. 432. 
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histories with basic differences replace the ideal of a 
gradual approximation to a single definitive account of 
the past. 
Still there are paradigm-changes. How and why they 
occur is barely hinted at by White. 
Placed before the alternative visions that his-
tory's interpreters offer for our consideration, 
and without any apodictically provided theoretical 
grounds for preferring one over another, we are 
driven back to moral and aesthetic reasons for 
the choice of one vision over another as the more 
'realistic.' 25 
He goes on to paraphrase Kant: just as we are free to.make 
history, so we are free to conceive history as we please. 
Thus, one freely changes paradigms on the basis of changes 
in moral or aesthetic beliefs. A new personal discovery 
on the lat~er metahistorical level may be sufficiently 
radical to require a change in one's basic view of his-
torical processes and in one's position regarding histori-
cal knowledge. 
There is additional evidence that this account of 
paradigm-changes is White's own position. He suggests 
at the close of his work that one can overcome the pre-
vailing contemporary mode of historical consciousness (a 
mode resulting from the crisis of historicism) which is 
that of Irony. 26 His study of nineteenth-century historians 
25Ibid., p. 433· 
26Ibid. White offers the following descr:iption of 
the IronICiiiode of historical consciousness. "The trope 
of Irony, then, provides a linguistic paradigm of a mode 
of thought which is radically self-critical with respect 
p 
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and philosophers of history has established that the Ironic 
mode of conceiving history is but one of a number of pos-
sible modes. Realizing this as well as the possjble legi-
timacy of other perspectives based 9n alternate moral or 
aesthetic grounds,one is in a position to "relativize rela-
tivism." That is, one can recognize that the Ironic per-
spective is not a necessary view of historical processes. 
Instead, one is free to conceive history, determine its 
content, and construct its meaning in accordance with the 
paradigm most consistent with one's moral or aesthetic be-
liefs. In short, one can will "to view history from ano-
ther, anti-Tronic perspective. 1127 This will to choose an 
alternative to the sceptical stance of the ironic mind is 
the author's program for revitalizing historical conscious-
ness and for reestablishing its links with the golden age 
of history in the nineteenth century. 
The preceding pages have largely been an analysis of 
Hayden White's elaborated position in Metahistory: The His-
torical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. This 
not only to a given characterization of the world of exper-
ience but also to the very effort to capture adequately the 
truth of things in language. It is, in short, a model of 
the linguistic protocol in which skepticism in thought and 
relativism in ethics are conventionally expressed." Ibid., 
pp. 37-38. ~ 
27rbid., p. 434. This will to believe in a historical 
viewpoin'tCOnsistent with one's moral and aesthetic needs 
has been discussed by, among others, Kant and Nietzsche. 
'While White's position has had many contributors, Kant and 
Nietzsche have apparently been central to \~1ite's attempted 
solution to the crisis of historictsm. See ibid., p. 80 
(for Kant) and p. 332 (for Nietzsche). ~ 
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analysis offers a not too lengthy introduction to the body 
of the dissertation. Its purpose has been to sketch prob-
lems which contemporary historical methodoiogy confronts. 
More specifically, this introductory essay has narrowed the 
focus of the dissertation to a number of theses advanced 
by White. The clarity with which White expresses these 
positions is exceptional. Often similar theses are present 
but barely explicit in the works of historians and philos-
ophers of history. Therefore, White's arguments and con-
clusions are taken to be representative of a complex view-
point shared, at least in part, by other less philosophic-
ally articulate historians. 28 
28Numerous historians have remarked on the aesthetic 
presuppositions of their work. White cites Benedetto Croce 
as one instance, in Metahistor~, p. 380. Carl Becker has 
argued for both the aesthetic orm which sustains the his-
torian's arguments and a preceding "climate of opinion" 
which Becker describes in terms s~_milar to White's concept 
of paradigm. In The Heavenl~ City of the Eighteenth-Cen-
tury ?hilosophers (pp. 11-12 , Becker argues that climates 
of opinion are effectively closed systems of thought, i.e. 
no theoretical grounds are available for mediating con-
flicts between two opposed systems. In his Historical In-
evitability (reprinted in part in The Philosophy of History 
in our Time, pp. 249-271), Isaiah Berlin writes on the eth-
ical and aesthetic preconceptions to historical analysis. 
Morton ~hite points out the aesthetic and ~oral standards 
which guide the historian's selection of data. He notes, 
in Foundations of Historical Knowledge (pp. 252-254), that 
such evaluative grounds may not be shared by another his-
torian; thus, diversity in moral or aesthetic aspirations 
will give rise to different organizations of historical 
materials. 
Positions similar to Hayden White's paradigm theory 
of history are in evidence. G. G. Iggers, in The German 
Conception of History (pp. 247-248), cites Walter Hofer 
as a contemporary historian who argues for the priority of 
a formulated conception of history over a study of mater-
ials. Arthur Dante argues for the priority of organiza-
tional schemes over one's research into the historical 
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This complex viewpoint can be summarized in four 
theses. 
1. The disunity in the field of history which marked the 
"crisis of historicism" is traceable to the di versj_ty 
of paradigms employed by nineteenth-century historians 
and philosophers of history. The diversity of histor-
ical paradigms reflects a diversity in moral and aes-
thetic aspirations grounding the different paradigms. 
2. There are no adequate theoretical grounds for choosing 
among the different ways of conceiving history. 
3. The theoretical concepts employed by the historian and 
his epistemological position belong to the surface of 
the historical text. The historian's decision to adopt 
those concepts and that position rests on precritically 
held opinions belonging to a deep structure where 
theoretical procedures receive implicit, precritical 
sanction. 
4. Each historical paradigm is an eff'ecti vely closed sys-
tem of thought. Radical changes in paradigms reflect 
not the discovery of new evidence but a change in 
one's moral or aesthetic preconceptions about history. 
These four theses offer a clear focus for discussing 
and criticizing Lonergan's insights into the problems of 
historical methodology. Below we will offer four alterna-
tive theses to White's positions in order to express Lon-
ergan's claims for transcendental method and to focus the 
argument that Lonergan has shown a way beyond the basic 
problems of the crisis of historicism. In addition, this 
field. A thesis developed in his Analytical Philosophy of 
Historx (p. 111), is that such unifying schemes· are pre-
determined by specifically human interests. D. H. Fischer 
provides examples of explanatory historical paradigms, in 
his Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Lo ic of Historical 
Thoug , p. xv. In t e same wor p. , Fisc er no es 
that the theoretical doctrines which White takes to be for-
mulations of prior precritical determinants are metahis-
torical positions which are neither proved nor disproved 
by appeal to historical data. 
p 
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paralleling of different theses is a convenient methodical 
device for narrowing the number of issues to the basic 
disagreements about the possibility of resolving the cri-
sis. 
Preliminary Critique of White's Solution 
Later sections of this dissertation will treat in 
turn each of the four theses drawn from White's Metahistor;z. 
In this introductory chapter we want only to argue that 
his solution to the crisis is insufficient: first, in the 
light of historical practice, and second, for what it in-
plies about historical discourse. 29 
In the first place, the solution rests on the recog-
nition of free variables at the root of historical para-
dj_gms; moral or aesthetic aspirations are the basis for 
one 1 s choice among historical paradigms. That such as-
pirations are integral parts of the doin3 of history need 
not be denied. But White goes on to argue that critical 
or "scientific" history is but one of many types of his-
tory, all of which are rooted in variable preferences. 
The implication is that critical history is no more plau-
sible than other types.30 Each type reflects certain 
29The arguments for this insufficiency occur here for 
a purely strategic reason. Without them the impression 
that White's solution is satisfactory could be given. In 
that case, the extended treatment of Lonergan's thought 
would be anticipated as at best a supplement, at worst a 
mere postscript. 
30White argues that "the demand for the scientization 
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preferences, and none is epistemologically superior to the 
rest. But--one can object--a prevalent aspiration, or 
preference, among historians is to do critical history as 
opposed to mere propagandizing. A compelling epistemolog-
ical justification of critical history may be lacking, 
but the outlines of one may be known. How else can one 
detect abuses that are then labelled "propaganda"? In 
practice the normative guidelines for doing history al-
ready restrict the range of aspirations which one can ful-
fill and still be considered a historian. Thus, when Marx-
ist historians of the Thirties and Forties expunged all 
mention of Trotsky from accounts of the Bolshevist Revo-
lution, they were fulfilling the aspirations of the Stal-
inist regime but were no longer entitled to the name "his-
torians." 
There is a second objection to be made. White's 
"will to choose" among modes of historical consciousness 
would appear to require that historians modify the usual 
form of their knowledge claims. Their conclusions should 
be prefaced by remarks about the preferential grounds of 
historical assertions. "T believe ••• " or "It seems to 
me ••• 11 should be prefatory qualifications attending any 
conclusions in historical works. Again, the thesis is that 
of history represents only the statement of a preference 
.for a specific modality of historical conceptualization, 
the grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but 
the epistemological justification of which still remains 
to be established." Metahistor;z:, p. xii. 
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the moral or aesthetic preferences manifested through a 
particular paradigm qualify the subsequent selection of 
data and use of explanatory strategies. However, in most 
instances, historians do not mar their works with such en-
feebling qualfiers. Could it be that they are suffering 
from some form of Kant's transcendental illusion and feel 
no need for such remarks? In any case--one may still ob-
ject--White's thesis is not reconciliable wjth the usual 
way in which historical assertions are made. 
Furthermore, his solution to the crisis involves 
historians in "pragmatic make-believe." That is, they are 
to assume the truth of their historical perspectives on 
the basis of moral or aesthetic aspirations, what they 
"will to believe." But--one may object--this assu_rnption 
or belief is self-contradictory. '"A belief that believes 
only in itself is no longer a belief.,. ,.3l A historian 
would not escape scepticism by pretending that his per-
spective on the past was true simply because it was con-
sistent with his personal preferences. But such pretence 
may be unlikely; historical assertions are not usually 
prefaced by disclai.mers that one is advancing claims of 
only personal significance. 
3lThe self-contradiction of pragmatic make-believe 
is pointed out by .:2Jnil Fackenheim in his Metaphysi_cs and 
Historictt~ (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), 
pp. 4-?. he above quotation is taken from remarks of 
Erich Frank as found in ibid., p. 5, footnote 3. 
l 
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If the preceding objections are sound, then White's 
proposed solution is insufficient. It may be helpful to 
ask why White did not offer a more satisfactory solution. 
There are at least three reasons. ~irst, since White lo-
cates the historian's theoretical and epistemological exer-
cises on a surface level, he is left with only precritical 
grounds for adopting and evaluating a historical perspec-
tive. The precritical metahistorical elements of every 
historical work are prior to and determinant of issues of 
historical objectivity. Consequently a critical justifi-
cation of one's view and practice of history is effective-
ly subordinated to prior subjective variables. 
Second, t.he demand for critic al history is said to 
represent only the statement of a personal preference. 
This is one step in White's argument that an epistemologi-
cal mediation of the conflicts among paradigms is not 
available. His proposed solution to the crisis is not an 
attempt at mediating such disputes. Rather it is a sug-
gestion that they be tolerated as inevitable products of 
conflicting but equally plausible viewpoints. 
A third barrier to a more satisfactory solution is 
present. The historian's adopted paradigm determines 
what will be acceptable as historical data. Consequently, 
judgments based on accumulated evidence will never force a 
radical reappraisal of the adopted viewpoint. The valid-
ity of his paradigm is established not by the content of 
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the historical field but by precritical opinions and the 
strategies suitable to them for elaborating a consistent 
vision of the historical field. As a result, any radical 
paradigm-changes will occur because-of a basic shift in 
the historian's precritical opinions. Such changes are 
not the product of discoveries of new evidence and an in-
telligent desire to conform his conceptual apparatus to 
the new evidence. 
Sketch of Lonergan's Alternate Solution 
The test we envision for Lonergan's claims concern-
ing transcendental method includes weighing his alterna-
tive positions against the three preceding "barriers." 
The implication is that Lonergan's proposed solution to 
the crisis will only be more satisfactory than TJhite's if 
such obstacles are shown to be surmountable. First, against 
White's thesis that precritical elements of one's histori-
cal perspective are beyond the reach of any critical eval-
uation, there must be posed the thesis that critical 
grounds are available for scrutinizing preconceptions 
about history. Second, against the thesis that the demand 
for critical history is but the statement of a preference, 
we must demonstrate that the normative procedures of cri-
tical history express more than personal preferences. 
Third, against the thesis that no conclusive judgments are 
possible regarding conflicting views and practices in 
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history, there must be posed the thesis of a universal 
viewpoint from which one can mediate the conflicts among 
historical paradigms. 
The counterproposals which must be proved if these 
alternative positions are to be successfully held are the 
following.32 
1. The counterproposal to White's first thesis is not 
antithetical but supplementary. To the number of 
determinants of historical perspectives noted by 
White will be added elements uncovered by Lonergan's 
"horizon analysis." The most important addition 
will be the historian's awareness of his own intel-
lectual abilities. 
2. The subject's differentiated basic horizon provides 
adequate metahistorical grounds for criticizing the 
cognitional elements of one's historical perspec-
tive. 
3. Transcendental method formulates the spontaneities 
of human cognition. In so doing it is the a triori 
basis for the possibility of detachment from j_as 
and for critical sanctions of theoretical procedures 
on the surface of the text. · · 
4. Transcendental method makes possible an elaboration 
of a universal viewpoint from which to evaluate con-
flicting views and practices in history. 
White's four theses and the four preceding counter-
proposals provide the format for this dissertation. Again, 
the central issue is that the crisis of historicism con-
tinues so long as there is available no metahistorical 
basis for mediating the conflicts within the historical 
field. We have argued above that Hayden White fails to 
32rt should be noted that each of these counterpro-
posals corresponds in its respective order to the central 
issue of each of the following chapters. 
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supply the needed basis. It remains to determine whether 
or not Lonergan overcomes the barriers which hindered 
White's attempted solution, and thereby offers a more 
satisfactory methodological position. 
CHAPTER II 
HORIZONS AND THE THESIS OF PERSPECTIVISM 
INTRODUCTION 
This second chapter consists of four strategic steps. 
By first discovering points of compatibility between 
White's theory of paradigms and Lonergan's thesis of per-
spectivism, we will establish the possibility of supple-
menting White's position with insights drawn from Loner-
gan's work. Then, in keeping with the metaphor of sur-
face and deep levels in the historical text, we can search 
for Lonergan's view of how the two levels are connected. 
His notions of relative and basic horizons clarify the 
diverse connections between the historian's precritical 
opinions about history and the latter's surface proced-
ures. Out of Lonergan's horizon analysis comes the thesis 
of perspectivism--a thesis refuting attempts to promote a 
single privileged viewpoint on the past. Finally, in a 
fourth step, we argue that White's first thesis is in 
need of an important supplement. A study is made of how 
intellectual self-awareness conditions the historian's 
choice among possible modes of historical consciousness. 
While Chapter Three will further clarify the content 
of basic horizons, this chapter will sufficiently prove the 
47 
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presence of a cognitional element among the other compo-
nents of historical perspectives. This conclusion is 
important because it allows us to move beyond merely pref-
erential variables as the determinants of histortcal per-
specti ves--the first barrier to White's attempted solution 
to the crisis of historicism. If this new cognitional ele-
ment is later found to enter crucially into historical 
views and practices, then their critical justification 
may, after all, be more than a matter of prior subjective 
variables. 
Chapter Two takes as its starting point the first 
thesis drawn from Hayden White's Metahistory. Again, the 
thesis is that the disunity in the field of history which 
marked the crisis of historicism is traceable to the diver-
sity of paradigms employed by nineteenth-century historians 
and philosophers of history. This diversity of paradigms 
reflects a prior diversity in the moral or aesthetic as-
pirations which ground the different paradigms. 
To this relatively unobjectionable thesis is pro-
posed an alternate position which is supplementary rather 
than antithetical. There is evidence that more elements 
than White notes are at work in grounding the choice of a 
paradigm. To moral and aesthetic aspirations will be 
added: the works of other historians, the personal back-
ground of the individual historian, the assumptions of 
his era, what passes for common sense in his day, and, 
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most significantly, his estimation of his own intellectual 
abilities. 
It is apparent that Lonergan does not share the para-
digm theory of the natural sciences. 1 Yet one cannot sim-
ply say that he identifies with an earlier scientific ideal 
of cumulative and progressive efforts toward a definitive 
account of nature. He remarks that the scientist's goal 
is the complete explanation of natural phenomena. 2 But 
this goal functions as an ideal limit of the scientist's 
intending of natural phenomena rather than as some doc-
trine that the universe forms a single explanatory system.3 
The ideal limit has two bases: the first in the finite 
number of possible presentations of sensibility and the 
second in the basic structure of the human mind. The 
1At least two meanings were proposed in the preced-
ing chapter for the term "paradigm." In a general sense, 
a paradig~ is the linguistic form (i.e. one of the four 
poetic tropes) in which historical narratives are cast. 
In a more specific sense, a paradigm is the particular set 
of explanatory strategies with their modes of articulation 
which the historian adopts as effective means of expressicg 
his moral or aesthetic aspirations. In both senses a par-
adigm is a model of what historical inquiry and expression 
should be. In terms more appropriate for the natural sci-
ences, paradigms are thought-systems or theoretical frame-
works which are individually coherent but discontinuous 
from each other. In the sequence of their occurrence, 
there are incompatibilities which militate against the 
earlier ideal of cumulative efforts toward a single ac-
count of natural phenomena. 
211 rsomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," in 
Collection, pp. 149-150. Also see Lonergan's remarks in 
11 Dimensions of Meaning," in ibid·., pp. 259-260; in Method 
in Theology, p. 316; in Insign::r; p. 84. 
3For a denial of this latter position and support-
ing reasons, see Insight, p. 345. 
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latter basis will be considered in the remaining chapters. 
The former basis involves the empirical canon of selec~ion 
which dictates that empirical science limit itself to the-
ories involving sensible consequences. 4 If sensible pre-
sentations are finite, then theories which are applied to 
them will be finite. The sequence of more comprehensive 
and coherent theories may not be predictable, but there is 
no reason to think it endless. Hence, the ideal goal, no 
matter how renote and unattainable in fact, can be enter-
tained.5 
4For a discussion of this canon of empirical method, 
see ibid., pp. 71-72. 
5Lonergan argues that the advance of science has a 
lower limit in possible sensible presentations and an up-
per limit in cognitional structure. His arguments are 
part of a position which affirms that empirical science 
only approximates, though in an increasing way, to truth 
and which denies that one must hold scientific progress 
to be indefinite. Ibid., pp. 303-304. Patrick A. Heelan 
has studied this position and concludes two things. 
First, that Lonergan's position in Tnsight is consistent 
with the view of the history of science which envisions 
evolutionary sequences of complementary frameworks. Sec-
ond, that this position in Insight is compatible with 
views held by two representative figures of the paradigm 
school of science, Kuhn and l!,eyerabend. "The Logic of 
Framework Transpositions," in Lanro;uage, Truth and Vieaning, 
pp. 109-110. I seriously doubt thiB second conclusion 
since a controversial innovation of the paradigm school of 
science has been the incommensurability of different sci-
entific systems. There are not only different but comple-
mentary frameworks in the history of science, there are 
also djscontinuous and contradictory ones. But again, 
:for our purposes, this issue must be reformulated in dis-
tinctively historical terms. 
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Now our point is not to defend one sci.entif'ic ideal 
against another but to argue that there is a point of con-
tact between White's paradigm theory of history and Loner-
gan's thesis of perspectivism. Initially one might sus-
pect that, given this fundamental difference in regard to 
scientific ideals, Lonergan's position on historical per-
spectives will not even touch upon issues raised by a par-
adigm theory of science or of history. But, irrespective 
of differences in scientific ideals, we can argue for 
points of contact between the different positions in re-
spect to histo!:l• While Lonergan holds what may be termed 
the standard ideal of science (i.e. one seeking a complete 
explanation of nature), he distinguishes history from sci-
ence at a number of points, one of which is the inevitabil-
ity of historical perspectivism. More will be said of per-
spectivism in the third section of this chapter. For now 
a general description will suffice. 
The thesis of perspectivism draws support from a num-
ber of sources. First, the complexity of the past defies 
comprehensive interpretation. Second, the finitude of the 
historian requires that he be selective in his historical 
inquiries. Third, the involvement of the historian and of 
the significance of past events in ongoing history will 
obviate all claims to pronounce the final word on histori-
cal events. The label of perspectivism is thus attached 
to a theory of histor:i_cal knowledge which proposes that 
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only partial and approximate knowledge of the past is pos-
sible. Were the historian to ajm at a complete explanation 
of past events, he would need more in.formation than is 
available (those who left records were selecti_ ve in what 
they recorded). He would not be able to digest even the 
limited but massive amounts of material which have been 
preserved. He would not be able to foresee the future 
consequences of past events which might radically alter 
the significance of those events. 
For the above reasons, the study of history cannot 
be pursued realistically with the ideal that Lonergan ap-
plies to scientific inquiry. Lonergan substitutes a the-
ory of perspectivism which, it will be argued below, is 
compatible with and supplements the paradigm theory pre-
sented by Hayden White. 
There is an obvious point of agreement between the 
paradigm theory and the theory of perspectivism. Both 
share the position that the historian can only achieve an 
incomplete account of the past. Implied in this posit-Lon 
is the activjty termed "selectivity." Given the sheer 
magnitude of preserved materials and the finitude of the 
historian, some selectivity is a prerequisite when he be-
gins to explore the available materials. A second point 
of contact for the two theories is found among the pre-
requisites to the process of selectivity. The activity 
of selecting presupposes a process of evaluating. As 
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Croce argued, unless the historian evaluates, he cannot 
know what fragments of the immense wealth of historical 
materials are worth interpreting. 6 There are value 
judgments to be made before the process of selectivity can 
get underway. White emphasizes the moral and aesthetic 
nature of these preliminary decisions. As will be noted 
below, Lonergan expands the number of components operative 
in such decisions. ::!"n both cases, such moments of evalua-
tion are metahistorical, i.e. they are based on fundaDen-
tal positions which analyt:tcally precede specific histori-
cal tasks. 
Once we have initially considered the approximative 
character of the historian's work, we can pass to a few 
thoughts on the concept of horizon. It is argued that 
prior to research the historian must evaluate. And cri-
teria guiding his evaluation will belong to his horizon. 
Moral, aesthetic, cognitive positions provide some of the 
criteria contained within one's horizon. Lonergan offers 
a general description of the content of horizons: "Hori-
zons • • • are the sweep of our interests and of our know-
ledge; they are the fertile source of further knowledge 
and care; but they also are the boundaries that limit our 
capacities for assimilating more than we already have at-
tained. "7 A more laconic statement on horizons is 
6E. H. Carr paraphrases Croce's argument, in What 
Is History? p. 22. 
7nethod in Theology, p. 237. 
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available: "Literally, a horizon is a maximum field of 
vision from a determinate standpoint. 118 
The second section of this chapter will deal with 
the concept of horizon and its usefulness in illuminating 
the presuppositions with which the historian begins his 
work. There it will be argued that 'Jhite's parad:Lgm the-
ory and Lonergan's horizon analysis do not arrive at con-
flicting conclusions. However, horizons include more than 
the determinants of particular paradigms mentioned by 
White.9 The implication, at this point, is that the 
8Bernard Lonergan, "Metaphysics as Horizon," in 
Collection, p. 213. 
9For the sake of clarity, we can bring together and 
compare in one place the different concepts of horizon, 
perspective, and paradigm. There is no explicit statement 
in Lonergan's work on the interrelations of these three 
terms. However, what follows is compatible with separate 
remarks which are found in various places in his works. 
Of the three terms, "horizon" is the one having the 
broadest meaning. It includes all that a subject knows or 
cares about. In terms of one's personal life history, 
several horizons may be developed. Lonergan labels such a 
process of horizon development "specialization." It is a 
process of broadening one's expertise to take in the spec-
ialized techniques and languages of dlstinct d i_sciplines. 
For example, the COffiDon-sense interests of the adult may 
be expanded to include the interests and pursuits of a 
theoretical discipline such as contemporary physics. By 
itself physics requires more than the expertise of ordfn-
ary living and ordinary language; it demands familiarity 
with the formal terminology and competence in the proced-
ures of an autonomous professional community. 
We relate "perspective" to "horizon" on the basis of 
selectivity. Within any specialized horizon there are 
likely to be further specializations, e.g. micro-biology 
will be a subdivision of general biology. To specialize 
is to narrow one's focus, to take a limited area as one's 
field of inquiry. This limiting of one's area of concern 
is the adoption of a specific perspective which antecedent-
ly determines the outlines of research. In a sense, a 
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insights of .horizon analysis will supplement the position 
worked out in Metahistory. 
An additional point of compatibility between the 
paradigm theory and Lonergan's position can be briefly 
noted. There is agreement that the crisis of historicism 
results proximately from the multiplying of conflicting 
interpretations of the past and more radically from con-
flicting positions on the issue of historical objectivity. 
This latter, epistemological issue is formulated in the 
specialized horizon expands or contracts with the process 
of selectivity. And the definite point to which it is ex-
panded or contracted will be one's perspective. !n this 
case, the components of one's horizons will be prior to 
and influential in the forming of one's perspective. They 
will remain implicit in one's perspective as resources for 
the work carried on from that particular perspective. 
We relate "paradigm" to "perspective 11 as synonymous 
terms. Enough has already been written in Chapter One on 
the meanj ng of paradigm in Hayden ·1./hi te' s work. The sig-
nificant similarities between the two terms are, first, 
that paradigms are formalizations of prefiguring insights. 
In other words, they determine the outlines of the histor-
ian's field of research. Second, within the general field 
of history, there will be subdi_visions such as military 
history, economic history, and so on. At the same time as 
the historian selects such a subdivision as a topic, he 
also settles on strategies of explanation deemed suitable 
for the selected area. The same strategies will not prove 
equally useful in every area, so he is required to make a 
selection among available strategies as part of his choice 
. of a particular paradigm. Third, those metahistorical, 
precri'tical elements which White terns predeterminates of 
the historian's choice of a paradtgm remain implicit in 
his paradie;:m. (or perspective) as resources for the work 
carried on under its guidance. 
A recent lecture given by Bernard Lonergan was the 
source of some of the above remarks on horizons and spec-
ializations. "Aquinas Today: Tradition and .,..nnovation" 
(lecture given at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill-
inois, November 6, 1974). 
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question, What constitutes historical realism?lO If a 
definite and compelling response to this question can be 
given, one of the central problems of the crisis will be 
resolved. This possibility is merely noted here, but the 
purpose of the dissertation will be to evaluate Lonergan's 
arguments and conclusions for just such a response. 
These ;ntroductory remarks to the second chapter 
established some points of conpatibility between two seem-
ingly opposed views of historical work. Though the two 
mentioned authors hold different scientific ideals, yet, 
when it comes to the study of history, they hold some po-
sitions in comnon. That only incomplete accounts of past 
events are possible, that the inescapable process of sel-
ectivity presupposes a wide range of subjective variables, 
that the crisis of historicisn can be treated as an epis-
temological issue--these are points where the two thinkers 
meet. Lonergan' s thesis of perspecti vism, thus, i611 not 
be extraneous to the paradigm theory of history. To under-
stand this thesis, we must now investigate Lonergan's hor-
izon analysis. 
lOHayden White's position has already been summarized. 
The crisis was brought on by the multiplying of successful 
but mutually exclusive historical works. The works them-
selves were produced under different models of historj_cal 
explanation and expression. One of the features of such 
models was a determination of what constituted historical 
realism. Lonergan attributes his understanding of the 
crisis in part to Karl Heussi's work, Die Krisis des His-
torismus (Tubingen: Mohr, 1932). For Lonergan 1s remarks 
on Heussi's work as well as his additions to the insights 
of Heussi's position, see Method in Theology, pp. 214-21?. 
,... 
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HORIZONS 
The concept of horizon appears in Lonergan's post-
1957 works. Its emergence as a central category for his 
thinking coincides with a shift in his thought, one which 
emphasizes historical consciousness to an extent not found 
in Insight or earlier works. 11 we will begin by offering 
a description of the knowing process in which horizons 
operate. We will follow up by cataloging the general con-
tent of horizons. 
Lonergan states that, even prior to the writing of 
Insight, he was convinced that the knowing process con-
sists in raising and answering questions •12 :~uestioning 
is an act of intending aimed at transforming something un-
known into what is known. The act of intending itself oc-
curs between ignorance and knowing. It is not identjfied 
with either, for we begin to question only when we recog-
nize that there is an 'x' of which we are ignorant. our 
recognition of ignorance about the 'x' implies that we are 
not totally in the dark, yet, at the same time, it implies 
11navid Tracy remarks on this shift, in The Achieve-
ment of Bernard Lonergan, p. 9. Bernard Tyrrell similarly 
takes note of this development, in "The New Context of the 
Philosophy of God in Lonergan and Rahner," in Language, 
Truth and Beaning, p. 285. 
12This biographical detail is found in Lonergan's 
"Insight Revisited, 11 (lecture given at and published by 
Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1972), pp. 
2-3. 
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we do not have knowledge of it, else we would not need to 
ask questions. 13 
A three-fold division is suggested by this analysis 
of questioning. First, there are all those questions which 
I can raise and answer--this totality is labelled the 
"known." Second, there are all those questions which I 
can raise and think meaningful but as yet cannot answer--
this totality is labelled the "known unknown." Third, 
there are those questionswhich I do not ask because they 
are not meaningful for me--this vague area is labelled the 
14 
"unknown unknown." In the knowing process, my horizon 
has its outer limit between the second and third divisions, 
between what I am interested in knowing but do not yet 
know and what :!" do not seek to know because the relevant 
questions do not appear meaningful to me. Thus, the child's· 
horizon falls short of the questions which belong to the 
horizon of the theoretical physicist. 
The literal definition of "horizon" was already pro-
vided in the introductory section of this chapter. A hor-
izon is a maximum field of vision from a determinate 
13 11 .:r..very inquiry aims at transforming some unknown 
into a known. Inquiry itself, then, is somethi.ng between 
ignorance and knowledge. It is less than knowledge, else 
there would be no need to inquire. It is more than sheer 
ignorance, for it makes ignorance manifest and strives to 
replace it with knowledge. This intermediary between ig-
norance and knowing is an intending, and what is intended 
is an unknown that is to be known." Method in 'fheology, 
p. 22. 
14navid Tracy presents a careful summary of these div-
isions, in his The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp. 9-10. 
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standpoint. The precedi_ng description of the process of 
inquiry adds clarity to this definition. For the maximum 
.field of vision falls short of the unknown unknown, those 
questions which lack significance for a particular subject. 
The determinate standpoint of the subject is fi.nite; his 
stage of development as a historical fact excludes a num-
ber of questions which could not presently be meaningful 
to him. He will most likely be unaware of the precise 
limits of his present horizon, but by hindsight he can 
mark boundaries passed in t;_me. For example, questions 
once alien to the child's world may through education be-
come meaningful to the adult. As part of one's personal 
lj_fe history, one can mark the points at which one's hori-
zon surpassed former limits. 
Besides the subjective finitude involved in any hor-
izon, there is also an objective finitude. That is, be-
sides the questioner there is also that which is questioned. 
In the first place, the questioner at a particular stage of 
development will have access to only some "worlds of :r:iean-
ing. 1115 Other problems and concerns had by others will at 
15navid Tracy defines a 11 world of meaning 11 as 11 that 
totality of objects with which the subject in his present 
intentjonal development can operate. 11 (Ibid., p. 14.) We 
think this defjnition can be improved upon so as to include 
some reference to the stage of development enjoyed by the 
distinct discipline in which the subject strives to become 
proficient. We can then speak of a world of meaning which 
is open both to a particular subject at his present level 
of development and to anyone at this particular time given 
the state of the disci.pl:i_ne. 11 0bjecti.ve finitu<l.e" in hor-
izons is, thus, distinguished from the "subjective finitude" 
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present be foreign to him. In the second place, when one 
is dealing with dj.stinct special ties such as physics or 
theology, the stage of development enjoyed by them will 
not be fixed but will be part of an ongoing process. His-
torically one can remark on the significant turning points 
in a particular field, i.e. moments when new discoveries 
expanded the concerns of a whole professional community. 
At such moments, the objective limits of a shared horizon 
are surpassed and, thus, an enlarged "world of meaning" is 
opened to the subject. In short, there are both subjec-
tive and objective limits to horizons. Again, these boun-
daries are historically unstable; they nay expand or con-
tract. But both will be interrelated. The growth of the 
subject opens up new worlds of meaning for him; the expan-
sion of the obj ec ti ve limits of a shared horj zon prorilpts 
the subject to contjnue growing in order to keep up with 
the questions which new discoveries raise. 
This description of horizons obv-iously presumes that 
horizon development does occur. The proof for such growth 
is easily available. Physicists are not born; they emerge 
from childhood horizons by valuing and pursuing questions 
of no immediate concern to a child. A child psychologist 
does not base his claim to professional competence on the 
fact that he was once a child. Rather, he points to his 
of one's horizon on the basis of the ~ersonal limits of 
the latter and the public limits of t e former. 
JP 
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success in handling the specialized procedures which are 
part of a theoretical horizon. So horizon development 
does occur. A special instance of such development is the 
radical transformation of one's cognitional horizon which 
Lonergan terms "intellectual conversion." This type of 
horizon development and the evidence for its possible oc-
currence will be taken up in Chapter Five. 
In his more recent works, Lonergan has distinguished 
between two types of horizons: relative and basic. 16 The 
former can be considered the interiorized-personalized ver-
sion of what has come to be called the "climate of opin-
ion.1117 It is one's determinate standpoint arrived at 
through personal, psychological, social and cultural de-
velopment. The objective aspect of such relative horizons 
will be the level of development presently attained by 
human sciences (e.g. psychology, sociology, cultural an-
thropology).18 These sciences make possj_ble a controlled 
16
navid Tracy attributes this distinction to Loner-
gan's increasing faniliarity with contemporary discussions 
in the human sciences and with the philosophical schools 
of phenomenology and existentialism. Ibid., p. 19. 
17This phrase has a long history. One author, who 
popularized its use in this country, points out that the 
phrase originally appeared in the seventeenth century and 
was reintroduced in this century by \./hi tehead. Carl L. 
Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Phil-
osonhers, p. 5. 
18
navid Tracy, The Achieve~ent of Bernard Lonergan, 
p. 19. The reciprocal relation between the subjective and 
objective poles of relative horizons is discussed at some 
length in Lonergan's paper "The New Context of Theology," 
n.p., 1967, pp. 1-5 (mimeographed). Later published in 
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articulation of the subject's own personal history to the 
degree that (1) the subject is familiar with them, and (2) 
the sciences themselves are sufficiently developed to ex-
press complex human experiences. 
But, besides relative horizons, there is what Loner-
gan terms "basic horizon." It is the standpoint of the 
subject in relation to the presence or absence of various 
types of conversion. 19 In Chapter Five we will take up the 
issues of intellectual and moral conversion. Suffice it 
for now to say that, while one's relative horizon antedates 
one's basic horizon, it may be possible to modify the con-
tents of the former on the basis of the self-transformation 
occurring in the latter. The implication for the doing of 
history is that it may be possible to eliminate or control 
any bias which has attended the development of one's rela-
tive horizon. For now this implication is merely noted. 
In this section, we will limit ourselves to relative hori-
zons, their content and role in the work of the historian. 
Theology of Renewal I, edited by L. K. Shook (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1968), pp. 34-46. 
l9we have already mentioned Bernard Tyrrell's work, 
Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God, in which the types of 
conversion aEe interr~latea. David Tracy provides a brief 
description of these conversions in his com..11entary, The 
Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp. 19-20. A generar-des-
cription of the role of conversion in the doing of theology 
is offered in the Lonergan article cited in the preceding 
footnote, "The New Context of Theology," pp. 5-7. 
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The Content of Relative Horizons 
A useful distinction can be made in cataloging the 
contents of a relative hori.zon. Part of the determinate 
standpoint of the historiari consist~ of his familiarity 
with the works of both previous and contemporary historians. 
This familiarity forms the objective aspect of the histor-
ian's relative horizon. !n producing his own historical 
works, he will not be able to acknowledge all that he owes 
to other historians, but nonetheless he will be indebted 
to others. 20 Besides this objective aspect, there is a 
subjective aspect to relative horizons. This is formed out 
of the personal background of the historian. For the pur-
poses of this chapter, we suggest a four-fold division in 
this subjective aspect: the education and personal inter-
ests of the historian, the linguistic categories he employs, 
the dominant concerns of his era, the public opinions ·which 
pass for common sense in his day. 21 
20Marcel Proust has expressed this point much better: 
"• •• a book is a huge cemetery in which on the majority 
of totibs the names are effaced and can no longer be read." 
The Past Reca7tured, trans. by Andreas Mayor (New York: Ran-
dom House, 19 1), p. 158. 
21Again, those purposes require an expansion of the 
number of elements involved in the predeterminat;on of 
one's historical perspective. The crucial element missing 
from Hayden 11'ihi te 's analysis will be basically a cogni-
tional position. It is part, not of one's relative hori-
zon, but of one's basic horizon. But that point will be 
argued later. For now we propose to give a fuller account 
of the subjective variables behind historical perspectives. 
Our list of these variables presupposes those moral 
and aesthetic (poetic-linguistic) variables studied by Hay-
den White. Moral variables would be exemplified in 
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The innumerable records of past events, the diver-
sity of values once affirmed, and the richness of experi-
ences now past but remembered require that the historian 
be competent to handle complex materials, be open to val-
ues other than his own, and be attentive to his own exper-
ience. The more intelligent and cultivated he is the 
greater will be his ability to understand past events. 22 
Put simply, the broader his relative horizon the more 
likely he is to write great history. Clearly the histor-
ian's education and the range of his personal interests 
will affect both the perspective he assumes on the past 
and the quality of his subsequent work. 
A second element of the historian's background is 
the language he uses. He inherits linguistic categories, 
both ordinary and technical, from the society and profes-
sional community around him. It is in terms of these cat-
egories that he conceives the field of his research, and 
eventually it is through them that he expresses his results. 
historical perspectives stressing alternately either a 
politically active role for history (e.g. Mommsen's ap-
proach to historical writing) or a culturally isolated 
role (e.g. Burckhardt's approach). Aesthetic variables 
are manifested in the anecdotes chosen by a historian to 
symbolize or to typify an entire period or intellectual 
movement. There is a poetic element in the representative 
scene which dramatizes, without fictionalizing, the com-
plex motivations and conflicts of historical figures. 
247. 
sight 
22 0 I I Henr1-Irenee Marrou, 
Lonergan indicates his 
in r1ethod in Theology, 
The Meaning of History, p. 
concurrence with this in-
p. 216. 
, 
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Since the language of most historians (the most ardent 
devotees of quantified history may be excepted) is the 
speech of everyday living, the historian will be employing 
a precritical tool. The positions to which ordinary lan-
guage commits him unawares are not easily uncovered. Per-
haps it is the philosopher of historical method and not the 
historian who is responsible for 'clarifying the problems 
of historical language. 23 In any case, the linguistic 
categories which the historian neither invents nor con-
sciously appropriates·in their entirety are part of his 
given horizon. In the first place, they are part of his 
ordinary living. In the second, they are part of the pro-
fessional equipment which, at least in history, is never 
f d f d . i · . 24 ar remove rom or inary 1v1ng. 
The dominant concerns of an era, as internalized-
personalized by the historian, belong to the predetermining 
elements of his work. No one would write Gibbon's history 
of Rome today with the same polemical interests; the 
23I'1orton White appears to suggest such a d;vis:ion of 
labor. "Like the philosopher of natural science, the cri-
tical philosopher of history is theoretically oriented, 
primarily interested in analyzing historical language and 
achieving insight into history as a form of knowledge." 
Foundations of Historical Knowledge, p. 2. 
24Hayden White argues, along with other historians, 
that the historian's use of ordinary language is evidence 
of the proto-scientific status of history. Metahistory, 
p. 429. Patrick Gardiner has studied the relation between 
the language in which history is· written and the common-
sense speech of ordinary living, in The Nature of Eistori-
cal Explanation, pp. 6-7 and 63. 
66 
secular-religious tension of today is no longer what.it was 
in the eighteenth century. Nor, to offer another exa11ple, 
is it reasonable to fault Thucydides for failing to study 
the economic causes of the ·Peloponnesian War. Such mat-
ters were not part of his climate of opinion though they do 
belong to ours. Thus, today the Megarian Decrees come 
center stage in any new accounts of the Greek conflict, 
while the mythical forms which '.IbuJydides borrowed from 
Greek tragedy are relegated to the periphery as items of 
historical curiosity. 25 Lonergan provides examples of fun-
damental changes in the dominant concerns of an age, chan-
ges which modified man's image of himself, his world, and 
his science. 26 · The upheavals and acts of resistance which 
mark such transitions are evidence of the close bonds 
forged between an :1.ndi vidual and the prevailing concerns 
of his era. The historian is no exception. He writes not 
for all times but for his time, and his license to do so 
is his rootedness in his own time. 
A fourth subdivision of the subjective side of rela-
tive horizons is labelled "common sense." Clearly a per-
son is a man of common sense long before becomin:; a 
25F. M. Cornford elaborates this point at some 
length in his brilliant study of the mind of Thucydides. 
Thucydides Hythistoricus, especially Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
26see Method in Theology, pp. 314-317. A study, to 
which Lonergan refers, of basic changes in man's self-
image and in his views of science is Floyd w. I1atson's 
The Broken Tmage (Garden City, Hew York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1966). 
, 
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professional historian. Vague collections of everyday 
wisdom are put to use far in advance of every specialized 
enterprise. It should be noted that histcry, as distinct 
from more abstruse disciplines, does not leave common-
sense generalizations behind in its specialized proced-
ures. Rather, the comrion opinions of daily lj_ving provide 
a valuable resource and starting point for the historian. 27 
Lonergan offers a detailed description of common-sense 
knowledge, its operations and limitations. 28 He compares 
it to an adjustable tool whose purposes are numerous and 
whose adjustment is relative to the specific task at hand. 29 
27 11 Properly speaking, the historian does not proceed 
by way of deduction or induction. The point of departure 
must instead be the ord:i nary or com.r.'.lon knowledge which we 
use in our daily life." (Henri-Iren~e Marrou, The .Me~ning 
of Histo_rl, p. 89.) Hayden White concurs in tne opinion 
that co~;:non-sense generalizations provide major premises 
for historians. (Metahistory, pp. 11-12.) W. H. Walsh 
cites as an example of such conm.on-sense starting points 
the historian's initial un.derstanding of human nnture. 
See his Philosophy of Hist9ry: An Introduct~on, p. 66. 
Obviously, while common-sense opinions do for.::n part of the 
beginning of historical inquiry, the responsibilities of 
critical history require that the level of ordinary opin-
ion not be the only level on which the historian operates. 
:Marc Bloch sounds this warning in his unfinished classic, 
The Historian's Craft, p. 80. 
28see Chapter Six of Insight, especially pp. 173-182. 
29Method in Theology, pp. 229-230. There are many 
similarities between Lonergan's account of common-sense 
knowledge and Claude Levi-Strauss' description of mythical 
thought as a "science of the concrete." Especially rele-
vant are the remarks made by the latter regarding the 
analogy between activities of the "bricoleur" and the 
functions of mythical thought. See The Savage Mind, pp. 
16-22. 
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For the historian, this multi-purposed tool lies ready-to-
hand as a familj_ar means to human ends. It is there as 
part of his horizon in advance of more critical intentions, 
and it is never far off once such specialized intentions 
begin to guide his efforts at understanding the past. A 
thesis, to which we will later return, is that historical 
explanation emerges as a sophisticated extension of this 
common-sense horizon. 
The objective side and four subdivisions of the sub-
jective side of relative horizons have now been accounted 
for jn the precedtng ::paragraphs. Taken as a whole, they 
constitute the "historicity" or existential history of the 
individual historian. This is not the place to digress on 
the scope of human histor:!.ci ty and the problems of freedom 
and permanence which it involves.30 What has been attemp-
ted is a summation of the elements belonging to the rela-
tive horizon which precedes the historian's theoretical 
work. The developed state of his profession, his own edu-
cation, the language he spontaneously employs, the con-
cerns he internalizes from his social milieu, the common-
sense opinions he shares with his contemporaries--these 
are preconreptions which the historian brings to his tasks. 
30in the writer's opinion, Emil Fackenheim has of-
fered a very lucid account of these issues in his concise 
essay cited in the preceding chapter, Metaphysics and His-
toricity. Lonergan summarizes the theoretical premisses 
of human historicity in Method in Theology, p. 325. 
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What does this list of general preconceptions add 
to Hayden White's account of metahistorical components of 
the historian's work? His analysis of the poetic act 
which prefigures the historical field is a further speci-
fication of what has been generally described as the lin-
guistic subdivision. The remaining three subdivisions and 
the objective side of relative horizons are significant 
additions to White's analysis.31 Specifically they "so-
cialize" a metatheory which, in concentrating on the lin-
guistic preference of an individual, tends to neglect oth-
er debts which the historian owes both to his professional 
predecessors and to his whole social group. The role of 
common-sense opinion in historical inquiry is a particu-
larly important topic barely noted by ~.Jhite. But, again, 
the purpose of this second chapter is not to reject White's 
first thesis but to supplement it. 
31Note should be made that 1.-Jhite's theory of the po-
etic-linguistic deep structure of historical narratives is 
not inconpatible with these additional preconceptions. 
But, insofar as he ignores them, for whatever reason, and 
insofar as they are in fact metahistorical components of 
the historian's work, these additions are corrective of a 
metatheory which overemphasizes the role of language to the 
detriment of other social aspects of historical inquiry. 
In White's defense one can suggest that his central purpose 
was not to account for all the classes of variables appar-
ent in the historical field. His aim was narrower, namely, 
to work out a typology for characterizing that field in 
which there is so much diversity. However, insofar as 
White fails to discover--in the deep structure--a basis for 
critical criteria of historical practice, we add to his an-
alysis Ehe cognitional discovery introduced in the fourth 
section of this chapter. Once elaborated in subsequent 
chapters, this addition will prove to be incompatible with 
some of White's positions. 
p 
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Horizons and Presuppositionless Inquiry 
The preceding remarks on horizons have prepared the 
ground for a thesis which negatively holds that there is 
no presuppositionless history and which affir~atively as-
serts that the preconceptions of the historian modify his 
work. This thesis has gained such wide currency today 
that it is in danger of becoming a cliche. With the dis-
appearance of the positivist school of historiography, 
the polemical debates which once surrounded the thesis 
have ceased. But what no longer is questioned may soon 
pass itself off as common sense, and in theorizing about 
history this easy acceptance is dangerous. So in the re-
maj_ning paragraphs of this section and in the follow5_ng 
section, this thes1.s will be studj_ed and its limits dis-
covered. 
Lonergan terms the position which advocates doing 
histor~r without presuppositions the "principle of the emp-
ty head. 11 32 The implication often left unstated is that 
the historian should proceed without all that he has 
learned, internalized from his society and accepted as 
ordinary good sense. Jn effect, the principle asks him to 
3211 To say that the historian should operate without 
presuppositions is to assert the principle of the empty 
head, to urge that the historian should be uneducated, 
to claim that he should be exempted from the process vari-
ously named socialization and acculturation, to strip him 
of historicity. For the historian's presuppositions are 
not just his but also the living on in him of develop-
ments that human society and culture have slowly accumu-
lated over the centuries.'' Method in Theology, p. 223. 
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shed his historicity. The improbable consequence of such 
a hopeless venture would be a second infancy.33 
There may be an alternative. Perhaps the historian 
does not arrive at presuppositionless history by discard-
ing his horizon but by acknowledging it and by making ex-
plicit all that it contains. If the preconceptions con-
tained in his complex background can be thematized, per-
haps they can be rationally defended. One can envision 
this possibility of justifying the historian's horizon by 
proofs. But, for a number of reasons, this alternative 
holds out only a false hope. Since the historian employs 
ordinary language, the proposed alternative't'Vould require 
that, as a first step, he formulate a technical language 
free of the ambiguities of ordinary speech. Such a formal 
apparatus is available in mathematics and in most forms of 
33Lonergan projects the earnings of this methodologi-
cal program, in his "Bernard Lonergan Responds," in J?oun-
da ti ons of Theolog;y:, edited by Philip McShane (Notre-Dame: 
University of notre Dame Press, 1972), p. 228. !n another 
place he cites the works of Carl Becker and R. G. Colling-
wood as offering arguments against the thesis of presuppo-
sitionless history. See Method in TheoloQ'.:_, pp. 203-205. 
A logician who has contributed a valuable and exception-
ally readable study of historical fictions and misdirected 
controversies has termed the thesis the "Baconian fallacy." 
He notes the thesis is deficient in two ways: "it comnits 
a historian to the pursuit of an impossible object by an 
impracticable method." The historian is expected to con-
duct an induction of historical parttculars without being 
selective and, as a reward, to attain the whole truth 
about something. (This recoIIll!lendation to wander blindly 
amid a chaos of particulars perhaps deserves Lonergan's 
more provocative label.) Cf. D.· H. Fischer, Historians' 
Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pp. 4-8. 
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logic. But it is lacking in history and unlikely to be pro-
duced given the human content of the historical field. 
Furthermore, the alternative fails because the con-
tent of the historian's relative horizon can never be com-
pletely explicated. The historian sets to work on the 
basis of all the common-sense opinions that he has learned 
and spontaneously assimilated. The wealth of experience at 
his disposal, particularly his common sense, is not formu-
lated as specific knowledge, nor is it ever available to 
him in more than an incomplete state. For example, faced 
with a specific problem, the ind;_v;dual may, on the basis 
of his common-sense resources, know how to act. But this 
11knowing-how-to-act" requires an insight into the specific 
problem and is not complete prior to that insight. Thus, 
on one occasion a counsel of caution may be appropriate, 
on another occasion a counsel of haste.34 Consequently, 
34A more extended discussion of the necessary incom-
pleteness of co.r:mon-sense knowledge is available in !n-
sight, pp. 175-176. ~ 
To admit that the historian cannot thematize all the 
content of his relative horizon is not necessarily to ad-
mit that bias is uncontrollable. First, preconceptions are 
not necessarily biased opinions. They oay in fact be bi-
ased, but what separates preconceptions from bias is the 
occurrence of critical reflection which questions the val-
idity of preconceptions in order to discover hidden bias. 
Second, as we will note in more detail in Chapter Four, 
there are public-professjonal checks on any aberrations in 
the individual's scholarship. That is, if the individual 
does not correct the effects of bias in his work, others 
may; and they are likely to trace the effects back to the 
causes--the individual's hidden biases. 
However, even critics cannot uncover all the con-
tent of an individual's relative horizon. This is true 
not only for histori.ans but i'or anyone engaged in scholarly 
, 
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some of the preconceptions of one's personal background 
are only thematized in relation to specific contexts and 
cannot be formulated in the absence of those variable si-
tuations. In short, the historian's horizon will always 
be more extensive than his explicit knowledge. Within 
that horizon there is a fund of implicit "know-how" upon 
which he can draw to meet particular crises. But, in 
crisis-free periods, that "know-how" remains implicit and 
incomplete. 
If the content of the historian's horizon cannot be 
fully explicated, does that force him to admit that bias 
may well be inescapable? "Bias" has many meanings and 
must be carefully analyzed if one is not to become con-
fused and, as some writers have done, conclude that the 
mere presence of bias is an insurmountable obstacle to 
historical objectivity. But the topic of bias and of de-
tachment from it belongs to the fourth chapter. For now 
we limit ourselves to two objections against unrealistic 
demands placed upon the historian. First, he cannot be 
required to pursue his inquirjes without the use of the 
content of his relative horizon. Otherwise what is deraan-
ded is that he become an ahistorical, unsocialized being; 
or scientific studies. For research in every field be-
gins with common sense and, no matter how far one moves 
away from everyday speech and understanding, common sense 
is repeatedly consulted in planning experiments and 
strategies for convincing one's audience. 
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and such a creature is not to be found. Second, he cannot 
be required to thematize all the preconceptions which he 
brings to his study of the past. In the first place, he 
lacks the linguistic tools for clarifying all the ambigui-
ties which attend his everyday reflections on his life. 
In the second place, part of the content of his horizon 
must remain incomplete. Still, the historian usually dis-
tinguishes between competent work and the arbitrary asser-
tions which proceed either from carelessness or from some 
form of bias. Just as he feels a responsibility to make 
competent use of his resources, so he usually recognizes 
an obligation to control his bias. But in both cases his 
efforts will be distinctively personal. Even in remedying 
the defects in his background, the historian will be draw-
ing upon resources within that background. 
The preceding comments were intended to articulate 
the meaning of the thesis that the historian's preconcep-
tions modify his work. Some further specifics can be added 
to this general thesis. First, the historian's horizon 
promotes neglect of what lies outside his previous inter-
ests and developed understanding. Second, his horizon in-
clines him to choose some interpretations of events and to 
discard others. 
If the historian is not deluded by the principle of 
the empty head, he will recognize in his actual perform-
ance the operation which we have termed "selectivity." 
I 
l 
I• 
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This operation will be based in part on the preconceptions 
which he brings to his research. The four subjective vari-
ables described above have generally characterized the 
preconceptions which may be involved. The point previous-
ly established is that his relative horizon is an irre-
placeable guide to his research. Now to discover and to 
investigate what is compatible with his horizon is not 
too difficult. But what lies outside his previous inter-
ests and his present understanding will only be seen with 
difficulty.35 His horizon :i.s limited, and what lies beyond 
it will not be investigated simply because it will not seem 
significant. This is to say, his horizon will exclude some 
matters. For example, Thucydides ignored evidence of the 
economic origins of the .?eloponnesian War. He did so, not 
because he thought such evidence inconclusive, but because 
it did not enter his mind that it was evidence. His hori-
zon specified the relevant areas of information, and the 
suggestion of relevancy never arose in regard to economic 
conditions. 
Given several different interpretations of the same 
event, a historian's horizon will direct his choice of the 
most plausible interpretation. Lonergan draws several 
examples from Carl Becker's work in support of this state-
ment. Lonergan notes that extremes in early Christian 
asceticism are anomalies to present-day adults. The 
35.Method in 'l'heology, pp. 246-2l.J-7. 
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motives prompting such practices no longer belong to our 
general experience. When presented with such oddities, we 
usually are quick to pronounce them pathological. As a 
further example, Lonergan cites Carl Becker's remarks on 
the a priori exclusion of the possibility of miracles. If 
a person's horizon contains the presupposition that mira-
cles are impossible, then no number of witnesses to the 
contrary will shake this position. Jnstead, it will be 
far easier to categorize their testimony as mass hysteria 
or willful dishonesty.36 
In summary, the preceding study of Lonergan's hori-
zon analysis has clarified some of the connections between 
the historian's precritical preconceptions about history 
and his surface procedures. The multiple points of con-
tact were classified as either subjective or objective com-
ponents of the historian's horizon. As predeterminants of 
the historian's surface procedures, these components offer 
ample evidence to refute the thesis of presuppositionless 
history. However, the denial of this thesis did not 
36Ibid., pp. 221-223. The examples are drawn from 
Carl BecFe'Frs Detachment and the Writing of ~Iistor;z, edi-
ted by Phil Snyder (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1958). It is the test of a good historian to over-
come initial antipathies to beliefs and values not his own. 
Whether he ends by sharing those beliefs and values is not 
the issue.. What is important is that he understand them 
and not reject them out of hand as repugnant abnormalities. 
In addition, the historian's own horizon can be illuminated 
and perhaps even corrected by encounterin~ the values and 
beliefs of other ttmes and other people. A concise state-
ment on this point is offered in Method in fheology, p. 
247. 
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guarantee a clear understanding of the antithesis, and so 
we transformed the latter from a simple clich~ to a formula 
with a specific meahing. The antithetical position does 
not automatically entail either scholarly research or arbi-
trary assertions. The historian's complex horizon can be 
the basis for competent research, but it can also promote 
oversights of important evidence as well as a heavy-handed 
rejection of plausible interpretations. Given this possi-
bility of B.I!lbiguous results, the antithesis to presupposi-
tionless history must be investigated in more detail.· We 
will do this in the following section. In turning to the 
topic of perspectivism, we will be further specifying how 
from different horjzons come different interpretations of 
the same events. 
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THESIS OB ?.:2HS?~CTIVISM 
Lonergan uses the term "perspectivism" in a limited 
sense. He intends that it apply to different but not in-
compatible histories.37 He details three characteristics 
of such hjstories: (1) They are not contradictory, (2) 
they do not provide complete information or explanation, 
(3) they are i_ncomplete and approxir.late accounts of very 
complex realities.38 With the exception of some disputed 
details, historical works shar.;_ng the same topic are usu-
ally compatible. But contradictory histories do occur. 
One need only explore the extensive bibliographjes on the 
French Revolution or the works on the New England Puritans 
to find examples.39 Differences in relative horizons 
surely lie at the root of such irreconcilable historical 
interpretations. But, beyond such differences, there are 
what Lonergan terms fundamental divergences, not in rela-
tive horizons, but in basic horizons. These fundamental 
conflicts in basic horizons will be treated in later 
37Ibid., Method in ~heolog;z, p. 224, footnote 91. 
For a broader use of the term, see W. H. Walsh, Philosoph;y: 
of History: An Introduction, pp. 106-107. 
38Ibid., Method in Theolog;y, pp. 218-219. 
39Jean Jaures took note of some of the divergent 
interpretations of the French Revolution, in his Intro-
duction to The Socialist Histor;r of the French Revolution, 
reprinted in part in The ~arieties of History, pp. 158-
164. Peter Gay summarizes tfie c.onflicting appraisals 
which American historians have offered of the Puritan con-
tribution to American intellectual life, in A Loss of Mas-
tery: Puritan Historians in Colonial America (Berkeley: 
Univers:tty of California Press, 1966). 
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chapters. For now we limit ourselves to a treatment of 
compatible and not contradictory, historical perspectives. 
In the introductory remarks to this chapter, the 
point was made that the standard progressive ideal of sci-
ence is not realistically applied to history. The thesis 
of perspectivism is a substitute for that ideal. By re-
placing the former ideal, the thesis of perspectivism 
makes sense of the ongoing revision of historical thought 
and eliminates the scandal of the incompleteness of every 
historical work. The latter incompleteness results from 
the fi_ni tude of the historian and from the consequent of 
that finitude, the historian's selectivity. 
The complexity of the past, the masses of records 
preserved, the diversity of possible areas of historical 
inquiry--these force the historian to recognize his own 
limits. He must proceed selectively and forego the hope 
of producing the definitive account of some issue. W. H. 
Walsh draws a distinction within the process of selectiv-
ity. First, the process is departmental, i.e. an area or 
set of related areas forms the limited field of investiga-
tion. Thus, a historian may select the economic aspects 
of a particular crisis as his area of concentration while 
leaving aside matters of religious or military import. 
Second, the process of selectivity operates within the 
departmental confines. Not all the economic aspects are 
deserving of equal emphasis; some of them may be ignored 
jilf 
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altogether. Both areas of selectivity will bear the im-
print of the historian's relative horizon. His education, 
developed interests, common-sense beliefs will be called 
upon in narrowing down the mountai_ns of potential evidence. 
But, as noted above, the horizon cannot be fully articulated. 
Consequently, the process of selectivity is at least par-
tially rooted in sources which escape the control of the 
critical historian. 41 There is no way of establishing 
which records are worthy of every historian's interest and 
close attention. There are no criteria available for argu-
ing that it is better to write biographies instead of mono-
graphs. 
The unavoidability of historical selection is a com-
monplace. One historian speaks of a "necessary ignorance" 
which the modern historian must nourish if he is to write 
40w. H. Walsh, ?hilosophy of History: An !ntroduction, 
pp. 97-98. The author goes on to point out that the his-
torian's choice among aspects to be included and to be em-
phasized is, in part, determined by the interests, beliefs 
and values which he brings to the work at hand. Tn terms 
of this dissertation: the historian's horizon directs the 
process of selectivity. Similar remarks are made by Mor-
ton White in his .B'oundations of ::1istorical l~nowledge, pp. 
252-253. 
4111 The process of selecting has its main element in 
a common-sense, spontaneous development of understanding 
that can be objectified in its results but not in its ac-
tual occurrence. In turn, this process is conditioned by 
the whole earlier process of the historian's development 
and attainments; and this development is not an object of 
complete information and complete explanation. In brief, 
the process of selection is not subject~ objectified con-
trols either in itself or in its initial conditions." 
Method of Theology, p. 218. 
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. 42 history and not to succumb to antiquarianism. But the 
ensuing problem is whether, in opting for a partial (i.e. 
an incomplete) narrative, the historian is condemned to 
presenting a partial (i.e. a biased)· interpretation. Ray-
mond Aron argues that incompleteness is a form of partial-
ity or bias. 43 But this position has an unacceptable pre-
supposition. It presupposes that completeness alone is the 
measure of unbiased historical narration. But then, it is 
requiring that the historian proceed as an unhistorical 
being, i.e. as one who has no particular temporal stand-
point and no personal life history. 
In contrast, we have argued that the determinate 
standpoint of the historian is the necessary condition for 
his understanding the past. He must be selective, and the 
results he produces will be incomplete. But the alternative 
is the mindless and aimless attempt to say everything, the 
result of which is to say nothing. So the historian seeks 
to understand somethin~ of the past and his efforts presup-
pose a finite starting point. But that presupposed starting 
42Edward Hallett Carr, What Ts History?, p. 14. Even 
outside the field of history, this opinion on historical 
selectivity is held. "In so far as history aspires to mean-
ing, it is doomed to select regions, periods, groups of men 
and individuals in these groups and to make them stand out, 
as discontinuous figures, against a continuity barely good 
enough to be used as a backdrop. A truly total history 
would cancel itself out--its product would be nought." 
Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mjnd, p. 257. 
4 3Raymond Aron, Tntroduc ti on to the Philos opli;y of His-
~' translated by George J. Irwin (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1961), p. 289. L~vi-Strauss argues the same point in The 
Sava5e Mind, pp. 257-258. 
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point cannot condemn him from the very beginning to bias 
or to a lack of understanding if it itself is a precondi-
tion to understanding anything about the past. Consequent-
ly, selectivity is not necessarily arbitrary, but it is 
necessarily a part of the doing of history. 44 That a his-
torian's choice of emphasis or that his decision on what to 
exclude can distort his results is obvious, but such a dis-
tortion is laid at the door, not of selectivity, but of 
one of the forms of bias. 4 5 
Variables behind Different iiistories 
The finitude of the historian and the resulting proc-
ess of selectivity are two elements accounting fo~ differ-
ent but compatible histories. A third element was briefly 
4411Any area of knowledge only becomes intelligible 
through some principle of selection; the standpoint of the 
investigator cannot be eliminated because it is the condi··· 
ti on of understanding. ·.rhat is not to say, however, that 
it must lead to subjective or arbitrary assessments. To 
find a meaning in a situation is not thereby to introduce 
it from outside but rather to give coherence to what men 
have found neaningful." Gordon Leff, History and Social 
Theorr (University, Alabama: University of .c'i..laoama Press, 
1969), p. 46. W. H. Walsh argues convincingly along the 
same lines. "It ought, however, to be obvious that the 
fact that history selects by no means implies that it is 
subjective in any bad sense. If a narrative is condensed, 
it is not necessarily biased: it may be liable to mislead 
because of what is left out, but omission is not vicious 
in itself so long as only the relatively trivial and unim-
portant are omitted." Philosophy of History: An Tntroduc-
tion, p. 178. 
4 5rn Chapter Four we will ~iscuss Lonergan's posi-
tion on the four forms of bias and on the possibility of 
achieving detachment from them. 
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noted, namely, the fact that the historian's horizon can-
not be fully explicated. This third element does not refer 
to a static set of beliefs or values. Its general reference 
is to the historicity of the historian for whom situations 
constantly change and from whom new responses are repeated-
ly required. As a result, this historicity is itself some-
thing incomplete, and the limited understanding and selec-
tivity which grow out of it will be undergoing change. In 
short, the elements which compose the thesis of perspecti-
vism are not fixed but are in flux. 46 These are gener.al 
variables at the origins of different historical perspec-
tives which, in turn, yield different histories. 
Additional variables are also found in the prelimin-
ary activity of historical questioning. Noted above was 
Lonergan's view that the knowing process is basically a 
matter of raising and answering questions. We can agree 
with this view because, while understanding is sometimes 
spontaneous, it usually requires effort, and the effort to 
understand takes explicit form in questioning. Since the 
historian does not benefit from immediate intuition into 
the past, he must raise his historical experience to his-
torical knowine; by asking questions. 47 Marc Bloch offers 
46Method in Theology, p. 218. 
47one implication--there are others--of this view is 
that history becomes not a story-tell:i.ng discipline but a 
problem-solvin~ one. D. H. Fischer argues this point in 
his Historians' Fallac~_es: Toward a Logic of Historical 
Thought, pp. xii, xv and 131, footnote 1. 
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an example of the indispensable role which questioning plays 
in gaining historical knowledge. 
Before Boucher de Perthes, as in our own day, 
there was plenty of flint artifacts in the al-
luvium of the Somme. However,· there was no one 
to ask questions, and there was therefore no 
prehistory. 48 
Questioning, then, is a prerequisite to historical research. 
If this is so, then the thesis of perspectivism implies 
that variables will also be found in histor:i.cal questioning. 
Such variables are evident in two areas: (1) in the 
decisions on what questions to ask and (2) in the linguistic 
categories used to formulate the questions. The first area 
belongs to the topic of selectivity which we treated above. 
The historian begins to inquire not out of a vacuum but 
on the basis of all that he has previously learned and val-
ued. !n other words, his horizon is the background for his 
questioning. On that basis he attempts to pass from the 
known unknown to the known. 49 And if selectivity is the 
48The Historian's Craft, p. 64. Bloch goes on to add 
these remarks: 11 ••• every historical research supposes 
that the inquiry has a direction at the very first step. 
In the beginning, there must be the guiding spirit. Mere 
:passiYe observation, even supposi_ng such a thing were pos-
sible, has never contributed anything producti.ve to any 
• II Tb"d 65 science. ~-, p. • 
49David Tracy phrases this point concisely: "For 
every authentic question involves a heuristic anticipation 
of an unknown (the questionable) that is in some way al-
ready known (as questioned)." The Achieveoent of Bernard 
Lonergan, p. 126. At a phenomenological level, one might 
=falk of such heuristic anticipations as part of the "fore-
structure" of all interpretation. See Martin Heidegger's 
Being and Ti.me, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 189-195. 
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result of the finitude of the questioner, specific ques-
tions will be the form which this selectivity takes. The 
historian will not be asking the question which intends 
sorn.e single meaning of history. But·he will be asking a 
series of questions aimed, not at knowing ever;y-thin5 about 
everything, nor at knowing everything about something, but 
at knowing something about something.50 His choice of that 
"something" to be questioned will be, at least in part, 
determined by the interests, opinions and values contained 
in his horizon. It is in this sense that we can say that 
historical questioning proceeds from variable sources in 
the different horizons of different histo~ians. 
Variables are also found in the linguistic categor-
ies which are used to formulate historical questions. 
Noted above was the historian's use of ordinary language. 
In order to ask questions, he must employ some terms, and 
those most frequently chosen are the ones which lie nearest 
at hand. But the ambiguities attached to everyday speech 
are the source of diverse meanings and the potential source 
of subsequent misunderstandings. The historian's critics 
50David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward 
a Logic of Historical Thought, p. 5. The author remarks 
that those who ignore these limitations to questioning are 
either guilty of the Baconian fallacy or have wandered in-
to speculative philosophy of history. Henri Harrou offers 
some pertinent comments on both the infinite number (prac-
tically speaking) of possible questions which could be 
asked of one portion of the past and the variability of 
concepts which could be used to formulate responses to the 
questions. The Meaning of :Iistor;z:, p. 235. 
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may mistake his basic intent and either disagree with a 
position he never assumed or agree with a position he nev-
er thought of holding. From such misunderstandings result 
conflicting interpretations not only in history but also 
in historiography. And the ambiguities of ordinary lan-
guage are much to blame. Hayden White emphasizes the role 
language plays in historical disputes. Poetic expressions 
as well as ordinary language account in part for differing 
interpretations of the same material. Both White's study 
and the preceding remarks on horizons indicate that one's 
choice of linguistic categories with which to ask histori-
cal questions is a variable.51 And if the grounds for 
choosing expressions can vary, then so can the expressions 
themselves. 
In summary, the variable base of the thesis of per-
spectivism was further specified by two insights. First, 
historians proceed by questioning, and the questions they 
choose to ask will vary according to the horizons of the 
different historians. Second, the expression which they 
give to their questions follows upon a choice of linguis-
tic categories deemed adequate for their purposes. But 
those categories often are spontaneously drawn from every-
day speech. Therefore, the formulated questions are open 
to all the ambiguities of ordinary language. There is no 
51For the sake of brevity, we omit examples and spe-
cific arguments for this conclusion. Hayden \~1ite has am-
ply supplied both examples and arguments for it in his 
Metahistory. 
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agreed-upon technical language for the historian, and, as 
a result, linguistic expressions of inquiry will vary from 
historian to historian. 
Finally, just as perspectivism was said to follow 
from the rootedness of human finitude and of the process 
of selectivity in history, so too the historian's questions 
are affected by his ovm historicity. The questions he 
asks and the expression he gives them are never final. To 
paraphrase Collingwood, historical questioning is a river 
into which none can step twice; upon returning to a previ-
" 52 ous questi_on, the historian may find that it has chan,:.ed. 
It may now seem inadequate or its once unnoticed profund-
ity may now surprise him. In either case, the thesis of 
perspectivism, which accounts for different histories from 
different historians, may also cover instances of different 
histories from the same historian. 
Historical Revisions 
All of the above elements of historical perspectivism 
contribute to what is for sane a scandal anong historians, 
namely, the rewriting of history by each new generation. 
But those who find ongoing revision scandalous are likely 
to have unrealistic views of what the historian does. 
They overlook the variables noted above; and so, in effect, 
expect the hjstorian to write from a position above his 
52R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Histori, p. 248. 
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own history.53 But the impossibility of attaining such a 
trans-historical standpoint is not fatal to communication 
among historians. Though rooted in his own place and time, 
the historian can still understand and appreciate the views 
and values of other people in other t:i_mes and places. If 
such understanding and appreciation were not attatnable, 
the historian would be in the paradoxical position of writ-
ing only of the present while in fact he intended to say 
something of the past. But the doing of history is proof 
of such horizon-transcendence.54 Furthermore, historians 
have been known to cooperate on projects. :n order to do 
so, they must be able to understand one a~other and to move 
from diverging to converging views on the past. But there 
is another irariable yet to be considered in explaining how 
interpretations agreed on by the vast majority of histori-
ans can still be subject to revision. 
This further variable is easily stated: the signifi-
cance of the past changes with the present. Again, the 
53The classic example of this expectation is the 
perhaps apochryphal story about Fustel de Coulanges. Upon 
being applauded by his students for a lecture he gave, the 
French historian is said to have remonstrated, "Do not ap-
plaud me. It is not I who speak to you, but history which 
speaks through my mouth." 
54What it means to do history will be a topic of 
Chapters Four and Five. Historical procedures will be 
treated at length in Chapter Four. 'What is asserted in 
historical judgments (i.e. what from a present standpoint 
is said of the past) will be considered under the heading 
of ''historical realism" in Chapter :B~i ve. 
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historian understands the past by questioning it, ·and the 
questions asked will reflect the ongoing development of 
the historian's horizon. Therefore, as his interests in 
the present change, so his questions chan,;e, and the answers 
he finds significant may well be new. In addition, rela-
tively recent events have yet to reveal their full import, 
for their consequences may still be only partially under-
stood. Thus, the history of the Paris Commune nay be re-
written yet another time if the students and workers take 
to the streets of Paris as they did in 1968. In effect, 
this is to say that our awareness of the significance of a 
past event is limited by our ignorance of the future.55 
Future events may and often do alter the meaning of the past 
for us. Consequently, revision is possible for even the 
most widely accepted interpretations. 
Of course, revision is not the result of an ever-
changing past but of variables in historians' horizons. 
The past itself is fixed, but it is also enormously complex. 
Because of the historian's finitude and all the variables 
described above, this fixed but complex past can only be 
known incompletely.56 And so we can expect future 
55Arthur Danto uses this insight to argue effectively 
against the possibility of a comprehensive history. Ana-
lytical Philosophy of History, pp. 14-16. 
56Lonergan phrases this point as follows: "The past 
is fixed and its intelligible structures are unequivocal; 
but the past that is so fixed and unequivocal is the enor-
mously complex past that historians know only incompletely 
and approximately. It is incomplete and approximate 
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incomplete accounts which will revise present historical 
works. At the center of such efforts at revision will be 
new projects, new interests, which reflect a different 
present.57 
This third section can be briefly summarized. 
Lonergan adopts the term 11perspectivism" to account for 
different but compatible histories which are incomplete 
accounts of complex events. The basis of their incomplete-
ness consists of various elements: the finitude of the his-
torian, the selectivity process entailed by this finitude, 
the j_nvol vement of both in the ongoing history of the indi-
vidual writer. Additional variables which account for dif-
ferent historical perspectives were studied. Questioning 
appeared as a prerequisite to historical knowledge. And 
knowledge of the past that gives rise to perspectivism." 
Method in 1I'heology, p. 220. 
57Both Nietzsche and Heidegger have written at length 
upon this topic, the forner speaking of a "monumental" sense 
of history and the latter of "authentic historicity." A 
person looks to the past, not primarily for an accurate 
understanding of what has been (~ie es eigentlich gewesen), 
but for insight into possibilities for contemporary living. 
What can the past tell me about what it means to be human? 
--this is the sort of question to be asked of history. 
Nietzsche's comments are found in his 1I'he Use and Abuse of 
Histoq, translated by Adrian Collins (New York: Bob'5s-Mer-
rill Company, 1957), especially pp. 14-17. Heidegger's re-
marks occur in Being and Time, especially pp. 435-449. Ob-
viously one can argue that critical history has grown out 
of this prior sense of history and has established its in-
dependence through controlled inquiry. But the fact re-
mains that new questions in the present can require a re-
appraisal of past interpretations. And there seens to be 
no reason for excluding questions of human authenticity 
from those questions which may legitimately require a new 
critical effort to interpret the past. 
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questioning involves at least three variables: the choice 
of what question to ask, the linguistic frar::i.ing of the in-
quiry, the mutability of the question itself relat·ive to 
the questioner's own historicity. Finally, a consequence 
of perspectivism was treated. Historical revisions are the 
result of the previous variables as well as of the changing 
significance of the past for those who study it in the 
present. Our clarification of the variables involved in 
the historian's work supplements the moral, aesthetic, and 
linguistic variables listed by Hayden 1.fili te. As elements 
determining the historian's adoption of a paradigm or of 
a perspective, these variables were :in need of clarifica-
tion if an adequate account of the crisis of historicism 
was to be given. In the final section of this chapter, one 
additional variable--a crucial one for the purpose of this 
dissertation--will be added to those already mentioned. 
, 
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BASIC HORIZON 
The main thesis of this fourth section is the follow-
ing: the historian's awareness of his own intellectual abil-
ities is fundamental to his historical perspective. By 
"historian" we do not mean the neophyte who ventures into 
the profession eager to learn the techniques of his more 
advanced colleagues. Rather, we have in mind the profes-
sional historian whose years of study and of writing have 
been occasionally marked by doubts regarding the results 
of his efforts.58 
The distinction made in section two between relative 
and basic horizons is of importance here. Section three 
was devoted to specifying the content of relative horizons. 
This content, when joined to the finitude of the historian, 
provided a list of variables at the root of historical per-
spectives. The "relativity" of relative horizons was ac-
counted for in terms of these variables. But besides the 
58Lonergan is sounding a comnon refrain when he notes 
that most historians have but a vague notion of what histor--
ical knowledt;e is. "The precise object of historical in-
quiry and the precise nature of historical investigati0n are 
matters of not a little obscurity. This is not because there 
are no good historians. It is not because good historians 
have not by and large learnt what to do. It is mainly be-
cause historical knowledge is an instance of knowledge, and 
few people are in possession of a satisfactory cognitional 
theory." Method in 'rheolog~, p. 175. The qualifications 
which Lonergan puts on hisirst statement are an indication 
that he is aware of the complaint that philosophers of his-
tory often seem to be telling the professional historian 
what he ought to do. The recurrent controversies over his-
torical knowledge offer sufficient evidence for Lonergan's 
qualified assertion about historians and the estimations 
which they form of their own intellectual abilities. John 
Higham sketches the rhythm of these controversies among Amer-
ican historians. History (New York: Harper and How, 1973), 
pp. 89-91. 
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historian's psychological, social and cultural develop-
ment, there is the estimate he makes regarding his own in-
tellectual abilities. Again, such an estimate may suffer 
from obscurity, but the professional historian will have 
some awareness of the different positions advanced in the 
debates over historical objectivity, and he may even take 
part in the ongoing controversy. The opinion which he has 
formulated, no matter hov1 inconclusively, will belong to 
his basic horizon.59 
Differences of opinion on the issues identified with 
basic horizons are easily discovered. Lonergan surveys 
three handbooks on historical method and finds conflicting 
opinions on the relationship between historical facts and 
th · · t 11" "b~ · t t· 60 Th h db k eir in e 1g1 ie in erconnec ions. ese an oo ·s 
were published in the nineteenth century, but the same dis-
putes are found in the twentieth. Carl Becker, R. G. Col-
I I lingwood, Henri-Irenee Marrou are studied as representative 
historians of the period which follows the so-called 
59No attempt is made in this chapter to evaluate dif-
ferent relative or basic horizons. Our main purpose is to 
account for the origins of the different historical perspec-
tives. In this section, we limit ourselves to establishing 
that what Lonergan terms "be.sic horizon" is a fundamental 
aspect of the historian's perspective on the past. As such, 
a variance in basic horizons may yield different histories 
of the same events. The dj agram on the followi~ng paGe sket-
ches the role of both relative and basic horizons in the 
choice of historical perspectives and in subsequent surface 
procedures. 
60Method in '..I:heologz, pp. 198-201. The handbooks are 
those by-Droysen, Bernneim, Langlois and Seignobos. 
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DIAGRAM: HORIZONS AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVISM 
The Unknown Unknown 
The Questioned (Unkn~ Known) 
t 
Use of Historical Procedures, Selection of 
Potential Evidence, Narration 
1' 
The Adoption of Historical Perspectives 
1' 
The Questioner (Known !._(nown) 
(existential history of the questioner) 
"' '\ Relative Horizon 
Subjective finitude 
moral and aesthetic 
aspirations 
use of ordinary 
language 
poetic insights 
education 
personal interests 
received concerns of 
the era 
interiorized common-
sense opinions 
Objective finitude 
works of other his-
torians 
developed state of 
the profession 
(partial use of 
technical terms 
of other pro-
fessions) 
The Unknown Unknown 
Basic Horizon 
Vie1·1 of his-
torical knowing 
historian's 
est:imation 
of his own 
intellectual 
abilities 
(alternativP 
estimates 
based on 
type of 
horizon: 
differentiated, 
troubled, 
undiff eren-
tia ted) 
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Copernican Revolution in historiography. 
historian expected to passively allow the facts to "speak 
.for themselves. 11 The critic al and construe ti ve activity 
of the historian is now recognized as essential to the 
writing of history. 61 But this revolution did not put an 
end to disputes over basic issues of objectivity and his-
tori.cal method. Though simplistic notions of objectivity 
belonging to the positivist school have been retired, there 
are new controversies over the extent to which bias, rela-
ti ve beliefs, and subjective imagination :Lnfluence the 
historical work. 62 
Typ~~ of Conflict among.Jiistorical Perspectives 
Again, a thesis of this section is that differences 
in basic horizons yield conflicts among historical perspec-
tives (or paradigms). First, it should be noted that there 
are several types of conflicts. Two historians may hold 
conflicting views simply because one of them does not have 
all the information had by the other. Such conflicts re-
quire further research in order to be settled, and they are 
61 Ibid., p. 205. Lonergan is here summarizing the 
view of ~Copernican Hevolution in historiography which 
R. G. Collingwood presents in The Jdea of Histor~, p. 236 
and p. 240. 
62A collection of conflicting opinions on these is-
sues has been assembled by Hans Meyerhoff in The Philosonhy 
of History in Our Time. See especially the reprinted ar-
ticles by Becker, Beard, Aron, Dewey, Walsh, and Morton 
White. 
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not actually conflicts either of perspectives or on basic 
issues of historical knowledge. But there are also the 
conflicts mentioned in the preceding section on perspec-
tivism. There conflicts of interpretation were traced 
back to variables in relative horizons. These variables 
likewise accounted for differences in historical perspec-
tives. Lonergan distinguishes two types of perspectival 
differences: complementary and genetic. 63 The former 
type is exemplified by the departmental approach to re-
search, i.e. the historian selectively studies economic, 
military, political or religious aspects of a set of 
events. The product of such selective inquiry may supple-
ment other studies based on different aspects of the same 
set of events. But no single work will be comprehensive. 
Given historical complexity, each study Will remain incom-
plete. Thus, complementary differences can be attributed 
to what was described above as the historian's finitude. 
Genetic differences are more appropriately traced to 
the historicity of the individual, i.e. to the ongoing 
development of worlds of meaning into which he is capable 
64 of entering. Genetic differences mark varying points 
63Method in Theolo5l, pp. 235-236. 
64see footnote 15, section two of this chapter. Ob-
viously the finitude and historicity of the individual are 
intertwined, and we do not mean to separate them. But 
they can be distinguished for our purposes. For example, 
Macaulay's history of England is a more advanced form of 
historical expression than Bede the Venerable's chronicle 
because the objective pole of the former's relative horizon 
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along a line of development in the objective and subjective 
aspects of relative horizons. For example, the history 
written by Bede the Venerable is anterior to the history 
of England produced by !'Iacaulay. "Anterior 11 not simply 
chronologically but also in the sense that the chronicle 
antedates and is a less developed historical form than the 
social narrative. 65 In short, genetic differences will be 
present whenever two historians operate at different stages 
of historical expression. A variance in the development 
of subjective aspects will be in evidence whenever a cri-
tical historian opposes the efforts of an author who seeks, 
for political reasons, to revive the folk legends of an 
earlier period. 66 
Besides differences in relative horizons, there are 
fundamental conflicts growing out of different basic hori-
zons. Such conflicts are neither complementary nor genetic, 
but dialectical. They are dialectical because they lead 
to mutual repudiation on the part of those involved. Lon-
ergan's description of the dialectical confrontation is 
was more sophisticated. Both writers were obviously finite, 
but their 11 worlds of meaning" were not the same. 
65Lonergan sketches the stages of development for the 
objective side of historiographical horizons, in Method in 
Theolog;y, pp. 182-189. 
66
.Ex:amples are presented by Peter Gay. He criticizes 
the regressive and uncritical positions of some German his-
torians who advanced mythical heroes as historical figures. 
Weimar Culture (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 49-51. 
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concise. "w'hat in one is found intelligible is in another 
unintelligible. \./hat for one is true, for another is 
false. What for one is good, for another is evil. 1167 He 
cites two examples: astrology as unintelligible to some 
people, genocide as evil to most. 68 These are positions 
which, when publicized, reveal horizons which are dialec-
tically opposed to those of at least part of the audience. 
That both astrology and genocide have their proponents is 
a fact. But most listeners will find statements in de-
fense of genocide morally repugnant. The most favorable 
remark they can make is that such statements reflect moral 
blindness and a naive acceptance of racial myths. And 
most listeners will ascribe the recurrent interest in as-
trology to ignorance and intellectual jmmaturity. Can 
rational arguments mediate these basic conflicts? Perhaps 
--but the usual response is either an outburst of moral 
indignation or the devastating ridicule of silence. That 
is to say, mutual repudiation is the usual outcome of the 
meeting of dialectically opposed horjzons. 69 
Less dramatic conflicts originating from opposed basic 
horizons occur in discussions of historical knowledge. 
What exactly can the historian claim to know? While it is 
unlikely that any historian would label his own assertions 
67:Method in :.Cheo~, p. 236. 
68Ibid., p. 237. 
69Ibid., p. 247. 
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about the past mere inventions of his creative imagina-
tion, 70 there are disagreements about historical knowledge 
which come close to implying just such a conclusion. The 
positivist school of historiography j_n the last century 
argued that historical facts were "givens. 11 In his study 
of them, the historian was to be free of preconceptions.71 
In a contrary position, historical facts were considered 
to be primarily instruments for solving social problems 
in the present. Subjective convictions about past events 
may lead to action in the present, and it was argued that 
this allowed for a pragmatic test of the validity of those 
convictions.72 Between these two positions lie numerous 
less controversial opinions which recognize the construe-
tive role of the historian without identifying that role 
with an apologetics for current social programs. 
If the persistence of such disputes is evident, does 
that prove more than that historians have theoretical 
70A possible exception may be the 
opher of history who argues in various 
skepticism. J. W. l'Ieiland, Ske12ticis.o 
ledge (New York: Random House, I965). 
work of a philos-
ways for historical 
and Historical Know-
71Fustel de Coulanges is often cited as the classic 
representative of this position. See his characteristic 
remark quoted in D. H. B'ischer, Historians' J.i,allacies: 
Toward a f..!_ogic of Historical Thought, p. 6. 
72Though he held a number of positions on historical 
knowledge during his professional career, Carl Becker is 
frequently mentioned as the leading proponent of this prag-
matic theory of historical truth. See the discussion by 
Robert Allen Skotheim, American Tntellectual Histories and 
Historians (Princeton: Prjnceton University Press, 1970), 
pp. 114-118. 
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problems which defy easy solution? Why should such prob-
lems be identjfied with a historian's basic horizon? What 
is so "basic" about them? Hayden White locates epistemo-
logical issues on the surface level of the historical text. 
More basic than epistemological issues is the deep struc-
ture in which opinions on objectivity and on facts receive 
precritical sanction.73 Translated into Lonergan's term-
inology, this is to say: the historian's epistemological 
opinions are first arrived at on the basis of his relative 
horizon. The varjability of relative horizons accounts in 
part for disagreements on matters of method and factualness. 
But this is not to say that theoretical advances cannot 
later modify initial preconceptions about historical facts. 
It really says no more than that relative horizons are 
chronologically prior to the clarification of issues be-
longing to basic horizons. Put more directly, the histor-
ian first amasses a wealth of common-sense positions before 
he engages in theoretical work.74 
Genetically Dist;_nct Levels of Meaning 
In what sense is the historian's basic horizon more 
fundamental than his relative horizon? An answer will re-
quire a digression on genetically distinct levels of mean-
ing. Already granted is the temporal priority of the 
73Metahistory, p. x. 
74Method in Theology, p. 85. 
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individual's relative horizon to his basic horizon. As 
noted in section two, common-sense opinions are one ele-
ment of this prior relative horizon. A person is first 
taken up with the practical concerns of living. and he 
employs ordinary language to express everyday probleos and 
their solutions. But historically, needs other than those 
met by common sense have arisen. Lonergan cites Socrates' 
search for definitions as an example of a need which com-
mon sense could not fulfill. The Socratic questions on 
virtue baffled the best common-sense opinions available. 
Other examples can be adduced to reflect a historical dif-
ferentiation of levels of meaning.75 The primary examples 
will be drawn from the history of science. \.Jhat they exem-
plify is the emergence of a realm of theoretical meanings 
from the prior realm of common-sense meanings. No longer 
is everyday language sufficient for meeting the needs of 
scientific thought. New technical languages are forthcom-
ing which express in a distinctive way the theoretical 
meanings of scientific disciplines. 
What Lonergan carefully outlines is both a historical 
process and a possible development for individual human 
consciousness. Historically the development of science by 
the Greeks marked the differentiation of two modes of con-
sciousness: common sense and theory.76 Individually it is 
75Ibid., pp. 82-84. 
76The historical transition made by the Greeks between 
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possible to become a scientist and thus to operate on both 
levels of meaning. But the distinction between these two 
modes is not immediately clear. Perhaps common sense is 
nothing but primitive ignorance which science gradually 
replaces. Or perhaps science is only an elaborate but ab-
stract extension of everyday know-how which allows control 
of the environment without providing knowledge of the world 
itself. \·/hat then is human knowing? These issues raise 
further questions, not about the world, but about the hu-
man subject who claims to understand something of the past. 
And to meet these questions on their own ground requires a 
consideration of the knowing pr~cess as it occurs in the 
performance of the subject. Inquiry into the knowing pro-
cess need not take the historian far fron his routine ac-
tivities. He does research, asks questions, makes discov-
eries, proposes conclusions. He can then reflect on what 
he himself has been doing. In Lonergan's terminology, the 
historian can carry on an inquiry into his own human inter-
iority~ And there is the likelihood that such an inquiry 
will lead to the discovery of his own intellectual activi-
ties, their potentialitjes and the structure of their oc-
currence. 77 
these two modes of consciousness is recounted in a work to 
which Lonergan frequently refers. Bruno Snell, The Discov-
ery of th~_,Ylind (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). Davicr-
Tracy provides a brief summary of the differences between 
common sense and theory, in The Achieveraent of Bernard 
Lonergan, pp. 114-115. 
77Method in Theolog;y, p. 83. These points will be 
developed in Cnapter Three. 
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We stop short of exploring Lonergan's central theme of 
self-appropriation and the heightening of consciousness. 
Other chapters will resume where tbis section leaves off. 
A limited goal has already been reached. Historically 
human consciousness has been differentiated into at least 
three modes: common sense, theory, human interiority. 
These distinctions are a matter of historical record from 
the emergence of science with the Greeks to the turn to 
human subjectivity which was initially made by Descartes 
and later elaborated by Kant.78 
The preceding digression on genetically distinct lev-
els of meaning was made in order to answer a question: In 
what sense is the historian's basic horizon more fundamen-
tal than his relative horizon? An answer is now possible. 
The question of historical objectivity (to take but one 
issue) cannot be answered adequately on the level of common 
sense.79 And the question is not the direct concern of 
theoretical consciousness which first attends to objects 
and not to the attending and thinking process itself. If 
there is an answer to be found, it will be discovered by 
78Lonergan briefly sketches these transitions, in 
ibid.' pp. 95-96. 
79The writer offers in support of this claim the ar-
guments put forward in Plato's dialogue Theaetetus. While 
not directly concerned with historical knowledge Cindeed 
Plato would say there is no such knowledge), the dialogue 
offers ample proof that epistemological problems are not 
settled within the realm of common sense. 
104 
the subject's reflectjon on his own acts of intending which 
are prerequisites to reaching any conclusions either on the 
common-sense or on the theoretical levels. 
As noted above, the historian may have only obscure 
opinions on what it means to know. His entrance into the 
world of interiority may be half-hearted. While aware of 
scientific views which baffle his common-sense views, he 
may locate such differences, not within the multiple modes 
of human consciousness, but in the failings of ordinary 
language. 80 Whatever his explanation of these differences, 
there remains evidence of widespread confusion anong his-
torians on the distinctions between common sense and the-
ory. 81 Our present position, which will be elaborated in 
Chapter Three, is that such confusion requires a study of 
human interiority. For now, the concern is for conflicts 
in basic horizons. Lonergan draws some d~stinctions to 
throw light on the origins of these conflicts. The ab-
sence of any awareness at all of differences amons common 
sense, theory, and hum.an interior-tty is said to mark an 
"undifferentiated" basic horizon. A partial but inadequate 
awareness of the three distinct levels of meaninc is said 
80Hayden W'hi te appears to take ,just such a position, 
in Hetahistor~, p. xi, p. 12, pp. 428-429. 
81A prime example of this confusion occurs in many of 
the contemporary discussions of "covering laws" and deduc-
tive models for historical explanation. Chapter Five will 
have more to say on this misguided debate. 
p 
to mark a "troubled" basic horizon. An explicit under-
standing and affirmation of the distinct levels both in 
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theDselves and in their interrelations is said to mark a 
"differentiated" basic horizon. 82 
These distinctions can be used to classi_fy the vary-
ing positions regarding historical objectivity. Our the-
sis is that tbe historian cannot get around holding some 
opinions on the issue of objectivity. The questions in-
volved may seem bothersome, even dangerous if he sees him-
self being drawn into a philosophical labyrinth. He Il!ay 
dismiss the questions by pleadjng ignorance of such phil-
osophical issues. He may try to get around the problems 
of historical knowledge by strictly limittng his work to 
the narrowest monographs. But try as he may, he wtll still 
be assuming a position on the issues, e.g. 11 An accurate 
understanding of any complex historical topic is quite 
rare." And such a position will be basic to his doing of 
history. It will either limit or encourage him in the 
projects which he is willing to undertake. rt will be the 
basis for his confidence in the conclusions which he makes 
public. It will be the standpoint from which he measures 
the 8.1'.lbitions and works of his professional colleagues. 
If his position is that of the relativist, then the claims 
of other historians to provide true accounts of the past 
will seem so much self-deception~ On the other hand, if 
82These distinctions are found in Method in 'rheology, 
p. 84. 
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he is aware of the difference between common sense and the-
ory, then some pragmati.c theories of historical knowledge 
will seem basically misleading. 83 Whatever his stance, 
the opinions which form his basic horizon will be crucial 
to his work as a hjstorian. 
In summary, this fourth section began with the state-
ment of a thesis: the historian's awareness of his own 
intellectual abilities is fundamental to his historical 
perspective. A corollary of this thesis is that differ-
ences in basic horizons yield conflicts in historical per-
spectives. Note was taken of the issues of historical ob-
jectivity and of value judgments in history. Though usu-
ally attended by obscurity, the opinions of a historian 
on these issues belong to his basic horizon. The fact 
that there are conflicts over these issues was brjefly 
exemplified. But such conflicts on the level of basic 
horizon had to be distinguished from other types of con-
flict. Borrowing Lonergan's terminology, we described 
three types: complementary, genetic, dialectical. The 
first two types derive from differences in relative hori-
zons; the third type from differences in basic horizons. 
Dialectical conflicts were characterized by the mutual 
8 3He will find some pragmatic theories misleading be-
cause they hold that historical conclusions are measured 
by their usefulness as instruments of soctal pla.nning and 
not by what they accurately relate regarding the past. 
But this is to hold that historical narratives are _onl;z 
extensions of common-sense intelligence. what is over-
looked is the part played by critical-theoretical con-
sciousness. 
pi 
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repudiation which follows upon disagreements over funda-
mental issu~s of knowing and valuing. 
Given two types of horizons belonging to the same 
subject, one can ask how they are related. While relative 
horizons are chronologically prior to the development of 
basic horizons, the latter are more fundamental in that 
they determine the scope of an author's historical work. 
This conclusion was arrived at by means of a digression. 
Three genetically distinct levels of meaning were studied: 
common sense, theory, human interiori ty. The j_ndi vi dual 
may or may not understand these levels of meaning in their 
distinctness and interrelations. The different possibili-
ties for understanding them are classified accord:ing to 
th:::-ee types of basic horizon: undifferentiated, troubled, 
differentiated. The level to which the historian's con-
sciousness of his own intellectual abilities has been de-
veloped can be characterized by one of these three types. 
Whatever level he is at, he will proceed to do history 
with at least vague opinions about what he can hope to 
know and about what value judgments, if any, he can legiti-
mately make. If he confuses common sense and theory, his 
work as a historian may suffer. If he tackles the problec 
of historical knowledge, he may find that the only ade-
quate approach lies in distinguishing a third level of 
meaning, human jnteriority. Thus we come around to our 
main thesis: the historian's awareness of his own 
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intellectual abilities is basic to his hist6rical perspec-
tive. 
SUMMARY OF CHA.PI'ER II 
This chapter opened with a proposal to supplement 
Hayden wnite's account of how diverse historical perspec-
tives originate. Specific variables filled out his account 
of what lies behind developments in historical perspec-
tives. In almost every case, these new variables were 
compatible with 1..!hite's position. However, a crucial addi-
tion was proposed: the historian's consciousness of his 
own intellectual abilities is a basic element of his his-
torical perspective. The type of basic horizon he has 
will be decisive in his choice of projects, in his expec-
tations of success, and in his appraisals of the works of 
other historians. In subsequent chapters we will further 
clarify the content of basic horizons. Later discoveries 
about this cognitional aspect of every historical perspec-
tive promise to resolve basic problems of the crisis of 
historicism. Our central and most important discovery--
cognitional structure--is the topic of the next chapter. 
CHAPI'ER III 
DIFFERENTIATED HORIZON AND TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD 
INTRODUCTION 
This third chapter takes two strategic steps toward 
reaching the goals of this dissertation. It further de-
velops the "cognitional element" introduced in the previ-
ous chapter, thereby clarifying the content of a differen-
tiated basic horizon. It also introduces the metahistor-
ical grounds (i.e. cognitional structure) on which subse-
quent chapters will base responses to the fundamental 
problems of the crisis of historicism. If these responses 
are to be convincing, they must have a non-preferential 
grounding. Such a grounding is not available within the 
historical field. But, in this chapter, our starting 
point lies elsewhere--in human interiority. The cogni-
tional theory which ~onergan develops and defends on the 
basis of human interiority will be supported by additional 
arguments. We will be particularly interested in discover-
ing how critical Lonergan's formal account of human know-
ing is. His formal account is built upon an invariant 
structure in human cognition. Tµe critical transcenden-
tal method formulating the components and dynamic unity 
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of this structure promises to effect a breakthrough in re-
gard to the theoretical impasse of the crisis of histori-
cism. Subsequent chapters will exploit what for this 
chapter is only initially advanced as promising such a 
breakthrough. Still, in a final section of Chapter Three, 
we will apply transcendental method as a critical tech-
nique to presuppositions of a specific historical perspec-
tive. Even in a preliminary way, this application of 
transcendental method will prove that the crisis is not 
entirely composed of insurmountable theoretical obstacles. 
Hayden White argues convincingly that the crisis of 
historicfsm resulted from the recognition that adequate 
theoretical grounds were lacking for choosing among dif-
ferent historical perspectives. 1 Choices which were made 
were based on personal preferences and had no compelling 
force for other historians. In short, historicism as a 
theory worked out its implications in the crisis period, 
and these were the basis for a radical subjectivism. 2 
1Metahistori, P~· 431-432. 
2G. G. Iggers notes the logj_cal outcome, i.e. sub-
jectivism, to which historicism led, in his The German 
Conception of Histor?, p. 243. Hayden White's proposal 
to overcome the Ironic attitude in history by a new 
choice based on anti-Ironic moral or aesthetic aspirations 
does not escape this conclusion. In his work, moral and 
aesthetic grounds for historical perspectives are treated 
solely as variables. Likewise, the historian's poetic in-
sight and subsequent prefigurati.on of the historical field 
are said to be variables. The poetic insight can be cast 
in any number of linguistic forms since no formal termin-
ology has been agreed upon by professional historians. 
Thus, the choice of a linguistic form of expression con-
tributes to the uniquely personal style of the individual 
historian. 
, 
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This conclusion is implicit in White's second thesis: There 
are no adequate theoretical grounds for choosing among the 
different ways of conceiving history. 
·rn Chapter Two, note was taken of the various ele-
ments in a historian's relative horizon. White's first 
thesis on the moral and aesthetic grounds of historical 
perspectives was accepted but with the qualification that 
this thesis offered only a partial account of differences 
in historical perspectives. Among other needed additions 
to his incomplete survey was the element termed "basio 
horizon." In this chapter, the counterproposal made to 
White's second thesis further develops the previous dis-
cussion of basic horizons. The counterproposal is the 
following: The subject's differentiated basic horizon pro-
vides adequate metahistorical grounds for criticizing the 
cognitional elements of the historian's perspective. 
The long-range strategy behind this counterproposal 
can be briefly indicated. Specifically, the process of 
differentiating a basic horizon is said to reveal the a 
priori form of all knowing. This claim implies that it is 
possible to uncover a cognitional performance which is 
operative prior to all explicit theorizing about it and 
which does not owe its validity to implicit or explicit 
ethical or aesthetic concerns.3 Translated into 
3The "priority" involved here is not temporal but 
analytic. That is, the basic form of the knowing process 
is a prerequisite to actual theorizing, yet the form is 
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distinctiveJ,.y historical terms--it is possible to· attain 
a metahistorical position from which to criticize and, if 
necessary, to correct any precritical opinions about his-
torical knowing which may belong to the historian's per-
spective. Of course, there are other components besides 
cognitional ones in the historian's perspective. In 
Chapter Four, the metahistorical position developed j_n 
this chapter will be related to some of these other com-
ponents. 
The counterproposal speaks of "adequate" metahistor-
ical grounds. What measure of "adequacy" is available? 
An answer to this question is part of the main task of 
this chapter. There are Kantian precedents to guide a 
search for this answer. What is sought are the a nriori 
grounds for historical knowledge. To anticipate our con-
clusions, the adequate metahistorical posi_tion envisioned 
only actual when human thinking takes place. A qualifica-
tion, which appeared in both of the preceding chapters, 
must be immediately added. This cognitional performance 
does not take place in the absence of ethical and aesthetic 
variables. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapters Four 
and Five, to recognize how cognitional performance does 
take place will spontaneously lead beyond knowing to de-
ciding, i.e. to the question of how one should proceed as 
an intelligent and responsible knower. But, as will be 
argued in a later section, a method which is based on this 
performance will not owe its critical function or the val-
idity of its formulation to a moral or aesthetic position. 
For a brief remark by Lonergan which affirms that 
his inquiry into human knowing proceeds from a moral deci-
sion, see his "Bernard Lonergan Responds," Language, Truth 
and Meanin9, p. 310. But this is not an affirmation that 
liis cognitional theory is determined by a moral expecta-
tion. The a priori basis of the theory in cognitional 
structure rUles out such an interpretation of this remark. 
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will be reached by elaborating the formal structure of 
. 4 historical knowing. Again, a qualification must be en-
tered. What is to be elaborated is not a single privi-
leged historical perspective or paradigm. Our interest 
lies in uncovering an a priori basis for all historical 
perspectives. This may prove to be the basis for modify-
ing some elements of different historical perspectives. 
But we do not foresee any total reversal of particular 
perspectives. The arguments given in Chapter Two in sup-
port of the thesis of perspectivism preclude any elim~na­
tion of the diversity of historical perspectives. 
4 . The word "structure" suffers from overuse in con-
temporary philosophical speech. The third section of this 
chapter will work out a precise meaning for the term. 
, 
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INTERIORITY AS THE STARTING POINT 
Before attempting to locate a starting point for a 
formal study of historical inquiry and theorizing, we need 
to retrace some of the steps taken in Chapters One and Two. 
Specifically one of White's arguments and our response to 
it need recounting. The argument was as follows: 
The historian's adoption of a particular paradigm 
is based ultimately on precritical, moral or aes-
thetic grounds. His epistemological/theoretical 
positions have their prior determination in these 
non-theoretical grounds. In effect, the former 
belong to the surface of the historical text while 
the latter are part of the deep structure of the 
text. Consequently, any attempt to provide an 
epistemological/theoretical justification of 
one.'s adopted paradigm represents simply another 
ethical choice. 5 
Our response to this argument granted that precriti-
cal elements of the historian's relative horizon precede 
the clarification of his basic horizon and direct his 
choice among possible historical perspectives. 6 Yet it 
is possible that the historian's developing awareness of 
his own intellectual abilities will be the occasion for 
modifying his previous perspective. Such a modification 
reflects a cognitional development and basic horizon 
5Metahistory, p. 26. 
6This admission derives in part from the recognition 
that the historian's starting point is generally not a set 
of postulates or a widely accepted theory but his own 
unique mixture of common-sense beliefs. Lonergan's remarks 
on this point are found in Method in TheolofiY, p. 216. 
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development (i.e~ at least a partial differentiation of 
levels of consciousness) and not simply another ethical 
choice.? But this is to say contra White that epistemolog-
ical/theoretical positions need not.· remain on the surface 
of the text. They may be expli.citly involved in the refor-
mulation of historical perspectives and, hence, may be 
operative at the level of predeterminations to historical 
narratives. 
Though in the last section of Chapter Two we gave 
examples of how expl:l.cit cognitional discoveries were ap-
plied to precritical elements of relative horizons, we did 
not argue, on the basis of a formal theory of historical 
knowing, that prior preconceptions about knowing could be 
critically measured by a criterion derived from that for-
mal cognitional theory. Such a criterion would allow us 
?This counter-argument is perhaps stating the obvi-
ous. Most historians quickly learn that common-sense pos~­
tions are not adequate for all the tasks they undertake. 
Certainly scientists discover this inadequacy even sooner. 
In any case, while common-sense opinions provide a major 
resource for directi_ng investigations, the complexity of 
the field of inquiry, whether historical or scient-i_fic, 
will soon require the use of more technical resources. A 
broadening of the adopted perspective is required by the 
needs of theoretical inquiry and not solely by specifically 
ethical aspirations. :Marc Bloch provides examples of the 
limits reached by common sense and of the subsequent need 
for rearranging some of the historian's preconceptions. 
(The Historian's Craft, pp. 80-81.) However, to recognize 
tlie need for changing earlier opinions does not guarantee 
that one will change them. What is required is that a new 
discovery about cognitional performance be implemented in 
subsequent performance. Thus, a decision must be made to 
conform one's doing to one's knowing. Such a decision is 
discussed under the headings of intellectual responsibil-
ity and moral conversion. These topics will be treated in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
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to note any differences between what a historian says about 
his professional procedures in reaching conclusions and 
what actually occurs when he attempts to reach those con-
clusions. In other words, it uncov_ers differences between 
the historian's cognitional opinions and his actual per-
formance.8 This issue of a critical cognitional position 
involves the foundational questions of a transcendental 
critique of historical knowledge.9 
Where does one begin such a critique? The starting 
point will not be found in some newly discovered historical 
data for two reasons. First, a transcendental critique is 
not concerned directly with what is known but with how one 
knows. 10 Thus, the data which are of interest to the 
8Lonergan offers examples of differences discovered 
between cognitional theories and actual performance, in 
Ins~ht, p. 389, and in 11ethod in Theologl, p. 21. Philip Mes ne further elaborates the significance of these exam-
ples, in his Randomness Statistics and Erner ence (Notre 
Dame: University of Ho re Dame Press, , p. 4. Mor-
ton White takes note of the differences between Charles 
Beard's theory of historical knowledge and his actual per-
formance as a historian. Morton White, "Can History Be Ob-jective?" The Philosophy of History in Our Time, pp. 200-202. 
9Wilhelm Dilthey attempted to provide such a critique 
but left his work unfinished. An excellent study of Dil-
they' s project as well as a brief exercise in comparing 
Lonergan and Dilthey is contajned in a lengthy article by 
Matthew Lamb, "Wilhelm Dilthey' s Critique of Histori_cal 
Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language, 
Truth and Meaning, pp. 115-166. 
lOAccordingly, the phrase "transcendental critique" 
is used in a Kantian sense. Note Kant's remark: "I en-
title transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not 
so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of 
objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possi-
ble a priori." Critique of Pure Reason, translated by 
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historian a~e not the immediate concern of the historical 
methodologist. Second, as will be argued in a later chap-
ter, historical data are not given prior to or independent 
of a particular historical perspective. The historian's 
perspective provides an antecedent framework which regu-
lates what is acceptable as potential evidence. 11 If the 
needed starting point were identified with certain histor-
ical data, we would be presupposing the privileged status 
of the historical perspective which included those data. 
But this would be unacceptable for two reasons: (1) the 
starting point would then be uncritically accepted; (2) 
our adoption of the antecedent perspective of the starting 
point would be uncritical. The consequence would be to 
eliminate any basis for mediating the disputes of the cri-
sis of historicism. Again, those disputes occur among his-
torical perspectives, and to attribute primacy to one per-
spective over the rest is not the way to settle the long-
standing disputes. 
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. .Mart;_n' s Press, 1965), 
p. 59. 
11Hayden White's position on antecedent paradigms 
and on their determination of what will count as historical 
- data is the source of these remarks. See Metahistory, p. 
430. Morton White argues to a similar conclusion, i.n his 
Foundations of Historical Knowledge, p. 254. Note must be 
made that our acceptance of Hayden White's conclusion does 
not extend to his theory of paradigms as effectively closed 
systems of thought. The problen of closed frameworks will 
be treated later. The suggestion will then be made that 
antecedent frameworks are heuristic structures which are 
open to criticism and, if necessary, to correction. 
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Although historical data cannot provide the needed 
starting point, that is not to.say that the starting point 
must be non-empirical. Besides the data of sense, there 
are the data of consciousness. It is the latter which Lon-
ergan proposes as his starting point. The beginning, then, 
lies not in the realm of common sense nor in the realm of 
theory but in that which Lonergan terms "human interior-
i ty." Though we must prove that such a starting point is 
critical, the suggestion is made that the data of conscious-
ness are not bound by the same restrictions which were men-
tioned above in relation to historical data and particular 
historical perspectives. They are not so bound because 
they do not belong to the surface of the text. At this 
point one can surmise that the data of consciousness may 
offer a way beyond the theoretical impasse which is called 
th . . f h. t . . 12 e crisis o is or1c1sm. 
Already in Chapter Two we made note of three geneti-
cally distinct levels of meaning: common sense, theory, hu-
man interiority. The third level can become explicit 
through the attempt to understand the problematic relation 
between the first two levels. 1 3 And the thesis advanced 
1211uch is being antic:tpated here, and it will only be 
in the next section that arguments are presented to back up 
these preliminary remarks. Matthew Lamb's article briefly 
hints at the possibility of advancing Dilthey's historical 
project through the adoption of just such a starting point 
in human interiority. "Wilhelm .Dilthey's Critique of His-
torical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," 
Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 145-146 and 158. 
l3The disputes in modern philosophy over primary and 
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at this point is.that in interiority we will find the 
starting point for a formal theory of historical knowledge. 
Moreover, the claim made by Lonergan is that this will be 
a "privileged" starting point in tha:t the data of conscious-
ness supply empirical grounds for judging all claj_ms to 
knowledge. 14 The arguments for these assertions will 
occupy the rest of this chapter. 
secondary qualities exemplify this problematic relation. 
See Insight, pp. 84-85, and 130-131. Additional examples 
are provided in Method in Theology, pp. 84 and 258. 
14Bernard Lonergan, "Response," The Nature of Phil-
osophical Inguir~. Proceedings of the ACPA, edited by 
George F. McLean, O.H.I. and Valerie Voorhies, vol. XLI 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1967), 
p. 256. An element of continuity in the history of modern 
philosophy has been precisely this search for a pr~vileged 
starting point. With Descartes there begins an ongoinc 
effort to establish the foundations of science, not in 
theory, but in human consciousness itself. Kant, Hegel, 
Husserl, among others, can be interpreted as further de-
veloping the insight that consciousness must supply the 
grounds for all forms of knowledge. 
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COGNITIONAL STRUCTURE 
The second chapter advanced the thesis that the his-
torian does not come empty-headed to his task. Much space 
was devoted to clarifying the general subdivisions of the 
historian's relative horizon. Only in the final section 
was any emphasis given to what the historian knows about 
himself. The topic of self-knowledge is re-in~roduced in 
this section. What does the historian know about himself? 
More specifically, what does he know of his own procedures 
as a curious, intelligent, and responsible interpreter of 
past events? FNery historian claims to know somethine; of 
the past, but what does he know of the process which leads 
to that knowledge? If Collingwood and others are correct 
in claiming that historical knowledge is only secured in 
its foundations by the self-scrutiny of the historian, 
then inquiry into cognitional operations has priority over 
the writing of history. 1 5 
l5"Self-knowledge is desirable and important to man, 
not only for its own sake, but as a condition without 
which no other knowledge can be critically justified and 
securely based." R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, 
p. 205. The inquiry into cognitional operations is not 
undertaken before the historian begins his work. But, 
for the experienced historian, the problems of his field 
will eventually require some reflection on matters of 
human knowing. The "priority" mentioned above is conse-
quently one of theoretical justification of what the his-
torian finds himself already doing. Lonergan recarks on 
the priority of this task, in his Introduction to Insieht, 
p. xxix. 
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The Problem of Introspection 
There is an ongoing debate over the possibility and 
mode of attaining self-knowledge. This is the problem of 
introspection. How does the human subject gain self-
knowledge? For our purposes--how does he come to know 
about his own acts of cognition? In the first place, 
the subject is already seeing, touching, understanding, 
and evaluating prior to any reflection upon these personal 
acts. The acts themselves are transitive in the psychol-
ogical sense that in them the subject is aware of objects, 
i.e. he intends objects. By the act of seeing he intends 
the seen, by evaluating he intends the valued , and so on. 
In the second place, there is the subject who acts con-
sciously, who in seeing is present to himself as seeing, 
and so on. Hence, besides making present intended objects, 
conscious acts of the subject make the acting subject 
present to himself •16 
The presence of intended objects to the conscious 
subject and the presence of the subject to himself are dis-
tingujshable. The spatial metaphor of external and inter-
nal experience is frequently used to distinguish these two 
16Method in Theolog~, pp. 7-8. 
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modes of in~entional presence. 17 Objects are present to 
the subject· as seen, as attended to, as reflected upon. A 
subject is present to himself in the seeing, in the attend-
ing, and in the reflecting. This second mode of presence 
is simply the subject experiencing himself in intentional 
acts. In being conscious he is present to himself, not as 
an object which vies for attention with intended objects, 
but as that which is intending objects. Thus, the subject 
can be conscious as seeing and yet give all his attention 
to the object seen. 18 
The problem of introspection arises when the subject 
attempts to discover his own subjectivity. The problem is 
twofold: (1) as regards what is intended, (2) as regards 
the mode of intending. To catch the subject in its "being 
the subject" is a hopeless quest. To turn back, as it 
were, on the subject discovers not the subject as subject 
but the subject as object. The elusive subject discovers 
but is not discovered as subject. 19 
l7Lonergan uses and defends the use of this spatial 
metaphor, in "Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 226. 
18Method in Theology, p. 8. In his description of 
the two modes of _presence to consciousness, Lonergan pre-
sents an interesting example to put across his point that 
objects are present to the subject because the subject is 
present to himself. "As the parade of objects marches by, 
spectators do not have to slip into the parade to become 
present to themselves; they have to be present to them-
selves for anything to be present to them; and they are 
present to themselves by the sam.e watching that, as it 
were, at its other pole makes the parade present to them." 
"Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 226. 
l9ill2:,., "Cognitional Structure," pp. 226-227. 
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As regards.the mode of intending, the term "intro-
spection" gives rise to certain problems. Often the term 
is used to denote a type of inward inspection, a "glance 
within." We can disregard ·the spatial metaphor and con-
centrate on the analogy to ocular vision. Lonergan argues 
that inward inspection is a myth. His point of attack is 
the implicit assumption that knowing is a matter of taking 
a look. 20 Later in this section of Chapter Three, we will 
give more consideration to this assumption. If the assump-
tion can be shown to be fallacious, then introspection can-
not be described as a type of inward looking. 
Thus, the twofold problem of introspection is not 
solved by attempting the impossible: to intend the subject 
as subject. Nor is it helpful to imagine that the subject 
is a thing which may be "seen" in some vague internal way. 
Lonergan suggests an alternate approach to the problem. 
The term "introspect:i,.on" may be used to refer not to the 
intending of the subject as subject but to the intending 
Sartre has argued this point at some length in his Bein~ 
and Nothingness, translated by Hazel B. Barnes (New Yor : 
Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 89-96. The elusive 
subject discovers objects but is not himself discovered as 
subject. For example, in trying to discover himself as 
subject within the act of seejng, or intending an object 
visually, the subject turns himself into an object. He 
does not discover himself as subject but as that which was 
seeing. 
20More will be said about this assumption in subse-
quent chapters. It was this sense of the term "introspec-
tion" to which Dilthey objected when he wrote, "'Man knows 
himself only through history, not through introspection.'" 
Quoted in Howard Nelson Tuttle, Wilhelm Dilthe;y's Philos-
ophy of Historical Understandi.ng (Leiden, Netherlands: E. 
J. Brill, 1969), p. 25. 
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of what the subject consciously does. Tn that case the 
subject intends the data of his own consciousness, e.g. 
his questioning, his searching for evidence, his recogni-
tion of a clue to a puzzle. Such acts can be reflectively 
apprehended. But this is not an "inward look;" rather, it 
requires purposeful attention to what the subject has been 
doing spontaneously. If he begins to understand what oc-
curs in questioning and how he searches for clues, then 
he may be able to make clear statements about his own cog-
nitional acts. 
To consider reflectively these acts and to formulate 
a tentative understanding of them is a step in the objecti-
fication of the contents of the subject's own conscious-
ness. That is, the subject raises to the level of self-
consciousness those acts which occur spontaneously as the 
subject's presence to himself. 21 What is heightened is 
the subject's level of activity, for he is now self-con-
sciously attending to his everyday acts of sensing, imagin-
ing, understanding, and so on. The curious thing about 
this is that, in attend;ng to his acts, the subject is 
duplicating them, e.g. he is then attempting to understand 
2111 Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 227. It 
should be noted that we are limiting our discussion of 
self-knowledge to cognitional self-awareness. Obviously 
there is much more to know about ourselves than this. 
Lonergan remarks on this point, -"In the main it is not by 
introspection but by reflecting on our living in common 
with others that we come to know ourselves." Ibid., p. 
238. -
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his acts of .understanding. 22 This duplicating maneuver is 
introspective in that it seeks self-knowledge through an 
intending of the objectifiable acts of the subject. 
Cognitional Acts 
Self-knowledge can then be sought through purposeful 
reflection on the data of consciousness. Again, these 
data are the acts of the subject, e.g. his hearjng, ques-
tioning, understanding, judging, valuing, deciding. Each 
of these acts occurs as part of our experience. Adver-
tence to one or several of them is motivated in both the 
scholar and layman by the injunction "Know Thyself." As 
noted above, the injunction may take the form of a problem: 
how are common sense and theory related? But in this case 
the subject's advertence is not random but is specifically 
guided by the traditional issues of the problem of know-
ledge. what does it mean to know? Which of the data of 
consciousness, which activity or activities, is to be iden-
tified with human k~owing? 
The history of philosophy presents numerous conflict-
ing responses to these questions. To those who suggest 
that perceiving, hearing or tasting can be considered acts 
of knowing, others point out that perceiving without under-
standing can only be an indeterminate gaping, a type of 
22 
' ~·' p. 224. 
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blindness. 23 Of. those who hold an identity between under-
standing and knowing, others quickly ask, What is it that 
is understood? Without content supplied by the senses, 
the latter charge, understanding wo~ld have nothing to 
understand, and so the act of understanding would not oc-
24 
cur. But if sensing and understanding cannot be indi-
vidually identified with knowing, perhaps when taken to-
gether they can be. Lonergan argues persuasively that acts 
of judging cannot be ignored. It is precisely those acts 
which distinguish fact from fantasy, history from legend, 
astronomy from astrology. 25 But then judging cannot stand 
alone as accounting for human knowing. "To pass judgment 
on what one doe.s not understand is, not human knowing, but 
human arrogance. To pass judgment independently of all ex-
perience- is to set fact aside. 1126 
Lonergan's conclusion is that none of these acts 
apart from others is sufficient for human knowing. He 
23This objection has been made in varying ways from 
the time of Plato (see his Theaetetus) to the present day 
(see Heidegger's Being and Time, pp. 190-192). 
24 . 
"Cognitional Structure," Collection, pp. 222-223. 
To both of the preceding controversies Kant's famous obser-
vation is apropos: "ThoughiB without content are empty, in-
tuitions without concepts are blind." Critique of Pure Rea-
~' p. 93. 
25Ibid., ''Cognitional Structure," p. 223. Colling-
wood use"Stlie same form of argumentation to dispel the myth 
of an intuition of the real' "for j_ntui ti on' just because 
it is intuition and not thought, knows nothing of any dis-
tinction between the real and the imaginary~" The Idea of 
History, p. 193. 
26
rbid., "Cognitional Structure." 
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distinguishes between elementary and compound kno~j_ng. The 
former is knowing in a loose or generic sense; the latter 
is knowing in a strict or specific sense. 27 Elementary 
acts o:f knowing are the di:fferent cognitional activities 
as distinct from one another. Compound acts of knowing 
are the conjunction of several elementary acts of knowing 
into a single knowing. 28 Elementary cognitional acts, 
when taken separately, are not identi:fied with human know-
ing. But surely knowing is not something other than these 
acts. We make assertions about what we experience, and our 
assertions formulate our understanding of that experience. 
If pressed for proof, we back up our assertions by making 
explicit the evidence which tacitly ratified our assertion 
to our own satisfaction. Our claims to knowledge appear 
to unite seyeral distinct components into some kind of 
whole. In Lonergan's terns, acts of knowing are not sin-
gle operations, but wholes whose parts are operations. 29 
Put another way, human knowing is a compound act which is 
reached by a series of elementary acts. To say more of 
this, we must discuss the structure of human cognition. 
27Ibid., p. 224. 
28nethod in Theolo¥e, p. 12. In other places Loner-
gan emphasizes that singEi cognitional acts are not proper-
ly termed human knowing. See Insight, p. 432; "Cognitional 
Structure," Collection, pp. 222-223. His position is that 
elementary acts of knowing are components which prior to 
an act o:f judgment are not complete as human knowing. In-
sight, p. 489. 
29 11 Cognitional Structure," Collect:lon, p. 223. 
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By "s-,:;ructure" Lonergan means a whole the parts of 
which are functionally interdependent. In its internal 
relations the whole is complete and in no need of addition. 
Should one part be removed, the whole would be destroyed.30 
But there are different types of structures. Inanimate 
and animate, natural and artistic, macrocosmic and micro-
cosmic are terns which describe distinct types. Lonergan 
concentrates on dynamic structures, i.e. wholes the parts 
of which are activities. He distinguishes materially dynam-
ic and formally dynamic structures. A dance as a pattern 
of bodily movements and a melody as a pattern of sounds 
exemplify the former. Here the emphasis is on the content 
of the structure, on the parts which are patterned activ-
ities. Formally dynamic structures are exemplified by the 
growing organism which produces its own organs and lives 
through them.31 Here the emphasis is on, not the parts, 
but the whole which is self-assembling and self-constitut-
ing. Formally dynamic structures assemble themselves, they 
summon the appropriate activities in their proper order 
until the whole process is complete.32 
30"Each part is what it is in virtue of its function-
al relations to other parts; there is no part that is not 
determined by the exigencies of other parts; and the whole 
possesses a certain inevitability in its unity, so that the 
removal of any part would destroy the whole, and the addi-
tion of any further part would be ludicrous. Such a whole 
is a structure." ~·, p. 222 •. 
31Method in Theology, p. 13. 
32Ibid. See also "Cognitional Structure," Collectjon, 
p. 222. -
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Lonergan applies the preceding distinction ~o human 
knowing. It is materially dynamic because activities are 
its components. It is formally dynamic because the know-
ing process is self-constituting. To prove his point, 
Lonergan asks his reader to reflect upon his own experi-
ence. Arguments, some of which occur above, are available 
for proving that knowi.ng is not a single cognitional act 
but a series of them. However, the strongest and most 
direct proof lies in the introspective operation of objec-
tifying the data of the reader's own consciousness.33_ Are 
there or are there not activities of seeing, hearing, con-
ceiving, evaluating with which I am familiar? Have J not 
referred to.them as means of gaining knowledge? As a tea-
cher, have T not structured lectures and explanations a-
round these different activities in the hope that students 
would pass from inattention to careful listening and even-
tually to a clear understanding of my point? If so, then 
the knowing process is at least materially dynamic. 
Arguments are also available to establish that this 
materially dynamic process is also self-constituting, i.e. 
is a formally dynamic structure. But, again, the path of 
self-reflection offers the strongest proof. Have I puz-
zled over something I observed? Did the puzzlement leave 
me inert or did T begin to make guesses? On some 
33we have already discussed this process of objecti-
fication. The subject can "heighten" his presence-to-self 
by intending those cognitional acts which are themselves 
conscious acts of intentionality. 
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occasions have I not made "lucky guesses" and felt satis-
fied at solving the puzzle? If pressed to translate my 
lucky· guess into action or to publicize it as a correct 
way of solving a problem, have I not gone back to check it 
out? Has this rechecking gone on indefinitely or have I 
finally concluded something about the validity of my for-
mer guesswork? Specific details could fill out these rhe-
torical questions, but the important point is to grasp the 
sequence of operations which these questions describe. In 
functionally interrelated steps T have moved toward know-
ledge of what was first observed with puzzlement, then in-
telligently grasped, and finally judged to be the case. 
Intermediate steps may have occurred, e.g. choosing a meth-
od of investigation, inventing imaginative hypotheses, 
discarding first one guess and then another. But, for now, 
the important feature of this process is its spontaneity • 
.Experience spontaneously provides unforeseen diffi-
culties. Not everyone stays out of harm's way, and so some 
thought must be given to overcomin<; diffi.cul ties. Scien-
tific intelligence seeks an eventual control over the dif-
ficulties which endanger human welfare. Methodical in-
quiry into diseases which threaten men yields insights 
which can be formulated as preventive measures. But these 
measures are not adopted without further testing lest the 
cure be worse than the disease. Only after much care has 
been expended will the nod of assent be given to tte 
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application of laboratory results on human subjects. And 
that nod presupposes a reflective appraisal of the safety 
and of the probable benefits of the well-tested measures. 
Our point in the above example is that the knowing 
process begins spontaneously and only comes to term in the 
reflective moment of assent. But that moment has come at 
some time for everyone, and so it is likely that the ser-
ies of operations which led up to that moment can be re-
trieved. In this possibility of retrieval lies the possi-
bility of recognizing the formally dynamic structure of 
human cognition. What is retrievable are the first moments 
of puzzlement ~nd the hints of a possible solution, then 
the sudden awareness of the dimensions of the actual solu-
tion, and finally the affirmation of the way out of the 
puzzle. Analysis of what is retrieved yields a growing 
awareness of how spontaneous acts on the part of the sub-
ject intelligently moved toward the point where he could 
assert, "I have the answer." Through such spontaneous acts 
human cognition constitutes itself, i.e. brings itself to 
completion through a series of elementary acts which occur 
in an orderly sequence. 
In sUI!lIIlary, arguments were advanced that knowing can-
not be identified with any single act of human intention-
ality. To singleness was counterposed the unity of a ser-
ies of cognitional acts. This formally dynamic unity is 
retrievable through an intending of the subject's own 
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conscious acts. Therein lies the possibility of recogniz-
ing the functionally interrelated steps which he has spon-
taneously followed in coming to know. To understand these 
steps in their distinctness· and in their interconnections 
is an exercise in objectifying the subject's intentional 
acts and formulating a clear understanding of them. Even-
tually the question will arise, Is that understanding cor-
rect? What is called for is the reflective nod of assent 
or a return to renewed inquiry. 
But, if assent is given, what is it that is affirmed? 
Lonergan schematizes the elements of the affirmation under 
three headings. In the first place, the subject affirms 
his own sensitivity on the basis (1) of experiencing the 
intended acts .of seeing, heartng, and so on, and (2) of 
understanding them as distinct intentional acts on his part. 
The subject goes on to affirm his own intelligence on the 
basis of his experiencing and understanding of his own ef-
forts at asking questions of, conceiving possible solutions 
to problem9, and so on. A similar process takes place re-
garding the subject's rationality. Has the subject had 
experiences of reflecting on the soundness of his work, of 
testing his hypotheses, of affirming the strength of some 
conclusions and the weakness of others? Then those exper-
iences along with an understanding of them are the basis 
for affirming the subject's own rationality.34 
3411 co~nitional Structure," Collection, pp. 225-226. 
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The preceding schematization requires that the sub-
ject recognize qualitative differences in his experience 
of coming to know. That is, when the subject asks ques-
tions, he recognizes that more than·perceiving is involved, 
and at the same time he recognizes that the first plausi-
ble answers may not be the ones he fi.nally accepts. The 
above schematization is of different levels of intentional 
operation. There is the sensitive (or empirical) level of 
sensing, imagining, feeling. There is the intellectual 
level of questioning, forming hypotheses, coming to under-
stand,1 expressing new insights. There is the rati.onal 
level of reflecting, weighing evidence, judging the truth 
or falsity of conclusions.35 For the sake of brevity, Lon-
ergan denotes the multiple operations of the three levels 
by the principal occurrence on each level. Thus, the 
35l"lethod in Theolo~y, p. 9. To these three distinct 
levels of operations weave yet to add the level of re-
sponsibility on which what we understand and affirm be-
comes the basis for decisions and actions. While some men-
tion of this fourth level will be made later, our concen-
tration on epistemological issues will preclude an elab-
orate treatment of this fourth level. What we will devel-
op is how the subject's spontaneous curiosity does not usu-
ally halt once it has reached answers to its intellectual 
questions; it often goes on to ask what changes should be 
made in past works and what new steps should be taken to 
avoid repeated mistakes. Our later thesis will be that 
intellectual responsibility is found among the spontanei-
ties of human consciousness. Thus, the fourth level of 
intentional operat~ons is a concomitant aspect of the spon-
taneous performance studied in this chapter. A detailed 
schema of the basic levels of human interiority is presen-
ted at the end of Matthew Lamb's article, "Wilhelm Dil-
they's Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Loner-
gan's Meta-methodology," in Language, Truth and Meaning, 
p. 164. 
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operations ~re termed in general: experiencing, understand-
ing, judging.36 Again, these distinct acts are conscious 
operations and therefore can be intended. But if they are 
distinct acts, then the subject's intending of them will 
turn up qualitative differences among them. Consequently, 
the subject will not assert that knowing is an undifferen-
tiated intuitive process. 
This section of the third chapter began with the the-
sis that self-knowledge is a precondition to securing the 
foundations of historical knowledge. The work of the· sec-
ond chapter provided the broad outlines of the preconcep-
tions with which the historian operates. However, to out-
line the general features of relative horizons is not a 
substitute for the efforts to thematize the specific con-
tent of my own relative horizon. These efforts are osten-
sibly aimed at increasing self-knowledge. But given the 
preceding descriptions of the knowing process, J can expect 
these efforts to occur in a certain sequence. From an 
initial interest in my preconceptions, T move to an inves-
tigation of them.37 Gradually T may move to an understand-
ing of them. Perhaps I will be recognizing and formulating 
36Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 14 and Tnsi5ht, pp. 
272-275.~ 
37This investigation usually moves forward by means 
of contrast. For example, ! read someone else's view on 
what I take to be an important issue of the day. If I find 
we disagree, r may seek out the origins of our disagree-
ment. On occasion this will lead me to reflect on what I 
must be tacitly assuming in order to hold my position. 
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some preconceptions for the first time. As argued in Chap-
ter Two, J cannot expect to explicate all of them, but 
there will be some preconceptions which J can elaborate. 
I can check their implications and then either accept or 
reject them. But this is to say that my efforts toward 
self-knowledge will be carried out on those baste levels 
of intentionality which were outlined above. Consequently, 
in order to know about my preconceptions, I must engage 
in the intentional operations of cognitional structure. 
The formal pattern of cognitional acts will be the precon-
dition to knowing any of my preconceptions. The import of 
all this is that the demands for self-knowledge can be re-
directed away from the specifics of my relative horizon to 
the antecedent form of my basic horizon. 
Mention has already been made of three points which 
are relevant to grasping the form of basic horizons. 
First, acts of human intentionality are conscious. Second, 
wha~ is conscious can be intended. Th:ird, to know what 
knowi_ng is requires a duplication of the structure of human 
knowing. Put another way, the subject objectifies his con-
scious cognitional acts by attending to his intending, by 
understanding the diverse acts which it involves, and by 
judging his understanding of the acts to be correct. 
These three points are pr~paratory to a distinction 
between consciousness and self-knowledge. We have already 
made use of the distinction in saying that intentional acts 
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are conscious and can be intended. Yet usually the subject 
pays attention to the objects he intends in those acts, 
and only a special act of retrieval turns his attention 
back on what he himself has been doing. Consciousness, 
then, is a component of self-knowledge, but by itself it 
lacks the completeness which is reached by the subject's 
compound process of knowing that he is knowing. The proof 
of this lies in asking someone what seeing is or what un-
derstanding is. Both types of intending lie within a per-
son's experience; they are part of his consciousness._ Yet 
even if he gives a satisfactory account of seeing, he is 
unlikely to articulate an equally coherent account of un-
derstanding. The reason for this is that he has not given 
much prior thought to the matter. But in that case, there 
will be conscious acts which are not reflectively known.38 
The main purpose of this section has been to uncover 
the structure of human cognition and, by doing so, to move 
3811 cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 225. It 
should be pointed out that language plays a key role in the 
concretization of the subject's knowledge of his intellec-
tual abilities. Self-knowledge requires more than atten-
tiveness to the data of consciousness, more than a correct 
and affirmed understanding of them. It requires that the 
subject carefully express the intentional content of his 
consciousness and thereby stabilize his basic horizon. 
This function of language is noted by two theorists in the 
sociology of knowledge. "This capacity of language to 
crystallize and stabilize for me my own subjectivity is 
retained (albeit with modifications) as language is de-
tached from the face-to-face situation. This very impor-
tant characteristic of language ·is well caught in the say-
ing that men must talk about themselves until they know 
themselves." Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The 
Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 196?), p. 38. 
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through the.first stage of a formal and critical account 
of human knowing. OUr starting point was no historical 
datum but, rather, the data of consciousness. Two ques-
tions which have been implicit in preceding paragraphs 
can now be explicitly asked and answered. Are there in 
fact data of consciousness? Ts there in fact a basic pat-
tern to their occurrence? 
Arguments a~e not difficult to find for the actual 
occurrence of cognitional acts, i.e. for the reality of 
the data of consciousness. What subject would deny that 
he has ever experienced sensations or ever had feelings? 
Has he ever conversed with others while at the sane time 
maintaining that understanding what another person says is 
an impossibility? Has he ever addressed an audience only 
to remark that he has not pre-considered whether what he 
is to say is true or false? Curiosities, indeed, would be 
those subjects who denied that they had ever felt, under-
stood or defended a position.39 
Is there a pattern to the occurrence of these acts? 
The distinction made above between consciousness and self-
knowledge comes into play. Prior to intending our intend-
ing, we are caught up in everyday tasks which demand our 
full attention, our practical know-how and quick reactions. 
In these hurried moments we do not recognize the acts of 
cognition as distinct from one another. The relations 
39Method in fheology, p. 17. 
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among them go unnoticed. What we experience is tne undiffer-
entiated unity of consciousness. But this is to affirm 
again an earlier thesis: relative horizons precede the 
clarification of a basic horizon. 
The world of interiority opens up to us only when we 
respond to certain problems. Then it is possible to set 
to work analyzing the functioning unity of cognitional 
process. The acts themselves may be distinguished from 
one another and the:tr interconnections may be worked out. 
We will then be in a position to recognize that both the 
acts themselves and the pattern of their occurrence have 
been implicit in our conscious living.40 The spontaneous 
efforts to move from puzzlement to understanding and to 
test the proposed solution are recognized as movements 
which have occurred prior to any attempts on our part to 
formulate the stages in which they occur. But, after mak-
ing explicit these stages of cognitional process, we w111 
discover ourselves to be multi-levelled subjects. The 
acts we now reflect on are recognized as what constitutes 
our sensitivity, intelligence, and rationality. The 
proof of this lies in occasional lapses from intelligence 
4o"But the point to the statement that the pattern 
itself is conscious is that, once the relations are for-
mulated, they are not found to express surprising novel-
ties but simpiy prove to be objectifications of the rou-
tines of our conscious living and doing. Before inquiry 
brings the pattern to light, before the methodologist 
issues his precepts, the pattern is already conscious and 
operative." ~·, p. 18. 
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and rationality. For in not bothering to understand, we 
must plead ignorance and remairi puzzled; in not bothering 
to weigh evidence, we leave ourselves open to the charge 
of intellectual irresponsibility. On occasion we may even 
feel uncomfortable with the awareness that we have not 
taken the trouble to separate rumor or fantasy from fact. 
Such a feeling can be considered evidence both of the for-
mally dynamic unity of the knowing process (which does not 
of its own accord remain incomplete) and of the usually 
irresistible development from curiosity to plausible an-
swers ground;ng future inquiries and decisions. On the 
other hand, to terrainate the cognitional process short of 
fact and to substitute rumor is a common failing. But ru-
mors can be tracked down and either conf;rraed or discon-
firmed. To do just that or to ignore theLl entirely will 
characterize the actions of an intellectually responsible 
person. 
The preceding arguments establish (1) that there are 
data of consciousness, and (2) that such data occur as com-
ponents of a formally dynamic structure. These two conclu-
sions mark the attainment of the first goal of this chapter, 
namely, to provid'e a formal theory of human knowing. It 
remains to establish that this is a critical theory. This 
we will do in the next section by reviewing Lonergan's 
transcendental method. 
In summary, this third section has been an exercise 
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in self-knowledge--that self-knowledge which is a pr~condi­
tion to critical history. The problem of introspection 
rises up to confront anyone who attempts to explain how he 
knows about himself. The p·roblem is compounded if one con-
ceives introspection to be some type of inward look. How-
ever, in contrast to the myth of inward self-inspection, 
there is the subject's intending of his own conscious acts. 
And, studied closely, this intending reveals a series of 
distinct acts compounding themselves -tnto single acts of 
knowing. The notion of a formally dynamic structure ex-
presses how this series of cogn:ttional acts develops toward 
its term in the complete act of knowing. 
Now an important discovery lies in the recognition 
of the data of consciousness and of the pattern of their 
occurrence. Those data, or cognitional acts, were present 
prior to our recognition of them. They were spontaneously 
assembling themselves prior to our exercise in self-know-
ledge. So, what we were preyiously conscious of but did 
not reflect upon or know was a cognitional structure oper-
ating independently of any methodological interest in it. 
But, then, this is to say that we have uncovered the a 
Eriori form which specific acts of knowing take. The im-
plications of this discovery for critical history will be-
gin to manifest themselves in the next section when this 
discovery is conceived as transcendental method. 
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TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD 
The task of this fourth section is twofold: (1) to 
establish the critical function of the a priori form, or 
structure, of human knowing·; (2) to.argue that a r.ietahis-
torical method based on this structure can criticize and, 
if necessary, correct cognitional elements in one's histor-
ical perspective. Both of these goals require a study of 
transcendental method. The initial claim is that transcen-
dental method allows the methodologist to discover any 
conflicts between a mistaken cognitional theory and the 
prior performance of the mistaken theorist. 41 The impli-
cation is that a metahistorical standpoint is possible 
from which to modify preconceptions about historical pro-
cedures and historical knowing. 
Lonergan introduces his transcendental method in a 
series of steps. We have taken one of those steps already 
in the preceding work on cognitional structure. Another 
step is to indicate what method is and why it is needed. 
A method is a normative pattern of recurrent 
and related operations yielding cumulative and pro-
gressive results. There is a method, then, where 
there are disttnct operations, where each operation 
is related to the others, where the set of rela-
tions forms a pattern, where the pattern is des-
cribed as the right way of doing the job, where 
operations tn accord with the pattern may be re-
peated indefinitely, and where the fruits of such 
repet1tion are, not repetitious, but cumulative 
and progressive. 42 
41Ibid., p. 21. 
42~.' p. 4. 
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Lonergan bases this description on method in the 
natural sciences. He points out the recurrent operations 
in the natural sciences: inquiries, observations, descrip-
tions, discoveries, hypotheses, deductions, experimenta-
tion. Next he notes how these operations are interrelated. 
Everyday experj_encing can become scientific observation 
through specialized inquiry; description can stabilize 
what is observed; what is stabilized for one scientist may 
be problematic for another, and the problem will be set-
tled only by new discoveries; hypotheses are tentative 
formulations of such discoveries; the implications deduced 
from the hypotheses are subject to experimentation. These 
distinct activities are related; their occurrence is not 
haphazard but forms a pattern which is the accepted mode 
of conducting scientjfic projects. 4 3 
43rbid., pp. 4-5. The preceding description of meth-
od also mentioned cumulative and progressive results. The 
scientist finds that his experiments turn up new data, ob-
servations, descriptions which may or may not support his 
guiding hypothesis. He then must either gather further 
evidence in support of his hypothesis or he must modify it 
on the basis of disconfirming evidence. With a modified 
hypothesis, he will again construct experiments which may 
yield a new round of discoveries. Lonergan concludes that 
method gains its cumulative character from this broadening 
of the field of observed data, from the addition of new 
discoveries to previous ones, from the facility with which 
new hypotheses and theories express new insights as well as 
incorporate those valid insights contained in what the new 
positions replace. From these accumulations springs the 
conviction that progress is being made toward the scienti-
fic goal of a complete explanation of all natural phenomena. 
(Ibid., p. 5.) 
~We took note in Chapters One and Two of Lonergan's 
acceptance of the standard-progressive ideal of science, 
i.e. the comprehensive and definitive account of nature. 
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Two observations of some importance to the historian 
are made regarding the above description of method. First, 
the mentioned operations are not exclusively logical ones 
in which the investigator aims at coherence among basic 
terms and consistency in developed propositions. Logical 
operations are not lacking (e.g. formulating hypotheses and 
deducing implications), but there are also operations of a 
non-logical type (e.g. observing, inquiring, choosing exper-
iments). The recurrent and related operations of method 
are nether exclusively logical nor exclusively non-logic-
cal. The second observation is that the conjunction of 
these two types of operations allows an open process of 
inquiry, discovery, hypothesizing, experimenting, verify-
ing.44 In other words, the investigator is not wholly 
bound by a set of prior rules which direct his work and 
Also noted were the works of some contemporary philoso-
phers of science who challenge this ideal and substitute 
for it a paradigm theory of science. It was ar5ued in the 
opening pages of Chapter Two that Lonergan's view and the 
paradigm theory are not incompatible when they are applied 
to history. The thesis of perspectivism is held in common 
by both sides in the disputes over historical models. How-
ever, this compatibility does not appear in their different 
ideals for the natural sciences. Still, we can suggest 
that, when taken in a limited sense, Lonergan's description 
of scientific method with its cumulative and progressive 
aspects is compatible with the parad1gm theory of science, 
that is, when the description of method is limited to pro-
cedures of scientists who share the same paradigm. In this 
case, their efforts may yield an increasingly coherent and 
comprehensive account. 
44Ibid., p. 6. Lonergan contrasts this view of meth-
od wtth ~"static fixity" which characterized Aristotle's 
search for necessary and imnutable laws. He also contrasts 
it to the closed system w4thin which the Hegelian dialec-
tic operates. (~.) 
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limit the scope of his insights. 
These observations on scientific method are pertinent 
to the historian's work, (1) because his own procedures 
are not formalized in any c·omplete iogical manner, (2) be-
cause the fact of historical revision and the fact of di-
verse perspectives on the past imply that history is an 
ongoing occupation which defies completion. Thus, scien-
tific method, despite all its differences, is not something 
totally foreign to historical method. Their differences 
will be studied in Chapter Five. For now, it suffices to 
note that a complete separation of the two methods would 
overlook not only the presence of non-logical operations 
in both but also their resulting openness to future devel-
opments. 
In what sense can both history and the natural sci-
ences be termed methodical? First, they are not methods 
for collecting random pieces of information. Rather, they 
both involve formal principles and non-logical operati_ons 
which are aimed at systematically exploiting a selected 
field. 4 5 The label of "antiquarianism" is attached to the 
contrary aim of assembling bits· of data on all the events 
.of a given era. But the historian does not realistically 
entertain this ambition. Jn the first place, such a total 
collection is impossible; in the second, the lack of any 
45 W. H. Walsh discusses this point of commonality, in 
his Philosophy of History: An Introduction, pp. 35-38. 
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principle of relevancy results in a flat landscape of 
equally undistinguished events~ A diplomat's sneeze would 
appear as important as his signature on a treaty. 
But there are other reasons, beyond the avo~dance of 
antiquarianism, for the historian's methodical approach. 
With the proliferation of historical studies in the nine-
teenth century, problems of cultural, historical, and reli-
gious relativity appeared. While men had always been mak-
ing history, it was only the rapid development of histor-
ical consciousness which brought to the foreground the prob-
lems associated with human historicity.46 But such prob-
lems are not adequately handled by the spontaneous and some-
times unmethodical measures of common sense. The histor-
ian, instead, needs to explore and to criticize methodic-
ally the sources and products of human historicity. Prob-
lems posed by bias, ideology, and cultural pluralism will 
be met by a historical profession which ideally has set-
tled on common norms for investigating disputed issues. 
Examples of such norms will occur in the next chapter. 
Although the need for a comnon method and norms was 
quickly recognized, their attainment did not follow with 
equal rapidity. The reasons for the delay are worth in-
vestigating. Lonergan describes two stages in the develop-
ment of most methods. The first stage is imitative. 
46Matthew Lamb, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of His-
torical Reason and Bernard Lonergan' s i1eta-methodology," 
Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 148-149. 
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Method is learned by following the example of a master. 
So, in the historical seminar, the student learns both 
from the achievements of his teacher and from the latter's 
criticism of the student's performance. But the insights 
and procedures gained in this way are usually limited to a 
single school of thought. Conflicts among different schools 
over basic mathodoloBical issues remain. The second stage 
is hierarchical. An estimate of particular norms and pro-
cedures is made in relation to the dominant science of the 
age. If the investigator's discipline is not this particu-
lar science, then he proposes an analogy of science in 
which he attempts to conform his procedures to the success-
ful approach employed in that science. 47 Descartes' use 
of a geometrical model for his metaphysical system and 
Hume's adherence to Newtonian precedents in his moral phil- · 
osophy are examples of such attempts at conformity. Today 
we find the natural sciences, physics in particular, rest-
ing at the top of the heap. History, when not dosnatically 
excluded £rom the hierarchy of scientific disciplines, lies 
some distance from the top. 
Lonergan points out flaws in both approaches to meth-
od. In the first case, a discipline which is struggling 
for recognition from the scientific community will, be-
cause of its youth, lack masters to imltate. Tn the sec-
ond case, an analogy of science leaves the less successful 
47Method in Theology, p. 3. 
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discipline at a low spot in the hierarchical order.48 It 
struggles along with borrowed preconceptions and proced-
ures; it lives an ersatz existence which may be not at all 
suited to its particular subject-matter. Dilthey fought 
against the tyranny which a positivistic model forced on 
the historical thought of his day. His efforts to provide 
a distinct method for history followed upon a basic dis-
tinction which he made between the natural and the human 
sciences. T.f his Verstehen method did not win over the 
historical profession, still his distinction freed histor-
ians to develop their own method. 49 
If today the imitative stage has been outgrown and 
the hierarchical stage has been challenged, it does not 
follow that historians are at peace among themselves on 
methodological issues.50 Contemporary disputes over the 
role of bias and its possible elimination, over the role 
of value judgments and their li_abili ty to ethnocentrici ty, 
and over the form of historical expression and explanation 
are evidence that the problems which first indicated a 
48 Ibid., p. 4. 
49For Lonergan's estimation of Dilthey's work, its 
strengths and weaknesses, see ibid., pp. 210-212. 
50one writer observes that many historians treat such 
issues with suspicion and even with hostility. Perhaps 
they foresee themselves being trapped in a philosophical 
labyrinth by the attempt to wor~ out a basic justification 
of their procedures. David Hackett Fischer, Historians' 
Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. ix. 
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need for historical methods have yet to be answered. 
Lonergan attempts a third approach which is more 
sophisticated than imitative ones. It is an approach more 
cognizant of the differences between history and natural 
sciences than were those approaches of historians who held 
that history was a science--nothing more and not~ing less.51 
This third approach is based on the operations of the human 
mind. We have prepared for its introduction (1) by detail-
ing the data of consciousness and the basic pattern of 
their occurrence, and (2) by presenting a general descrip-
tion of method which Lonergan derives from procedures in 
the natural sciences. A method based on the operations of 
human intentionality is both more general and more funda-
mental than methods employed in the natural sciences.52 
Such a method is concerned with the basic pattern of oper-
ations employed in every field of inquiry, sc:i enti_fic or 
otherwise. It thereby takes up issues which regi_onal or 
particular disciplines must presuppose, namely, the activ-
ities of human consciousness. Because it lacks the partic-
ularity of regional disciplines, it is a more general 
method. Because it investigates what they all presuppose, 
it is a more fundanental method. ·rhis th:i_rd, more general 
51J. B. Bury is usually cited as representative of 
this group of historians. See his :inaugural lecture, "The 
Science of History," reprinted in The Varieties of Histor;y, 
p. 210. 
52Lonergan makes this claim in Method in Theology, 
p. 4. 
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and more basic approach is transcendental method. 
What precisely does Lonergan mean by transcendental 
method? He identifies it with the basic pattern of oper-
ations which occurs in every cogni t_ional task. 53 It is 
termed "transcendental" because those operations are the 
intending, not solely of determinate objects, but of all 
that can be understood, known, and valued.54 These two 
53Ibid. There is a need to distinguish transcenden-
tal methO'd'?rom the cognitional theory elaborated in the 
preceding section. The center-piece of the cognitional 
theory is the invariant structure of human knowi_ng. Trans-
cendental method is the methodical exploitation of the con-
tent of human i.nteri_ority, i.e. it is the transcendental 
procedure which works out the implications of the basic 
pattern formulated in the former theory. Tn a sense, this 
distinction between the structure of knowing and knowledge 
of the structure of knowing is no distinction at all. For 
transcendental method is the reflective appropriation of 
what has belon~ed to cognitional performance all along. 
However, the inquiry into human interi orj_ ty can be distin-
guished from the result of the inquiry (i.e. the appropria-
tion of critical consciousness) because the latter brings 
out into the open that which previously was only implicit. 
And what is brought into the open now requires a continued 
critical reflection on one's actual performance. Thus, 
transcendental method becomes an explicit technique for 
present and future inquiries. At the same time, it was the 
implicit guide to previous intelligent inquiry and reason-
able affirmation. 11ore important, it was implicitly used 
to discover and to prove the former cognitional theory 
stnce that discovery and proof were marked by intelligent 
questions and reasonable arguments. 
54"It is a transcendental· method, for the results 
envisaced are not confined categorically to some particu-
lar field or subject, but regard any result that could be 
intended by the completely open transcendental notions." 
Ibid. , p. 14. The distinction between categorical and 
transcendental in-..;end;_ng is discussed by Lonergan in 
ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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statements can be joined to yield a definition. Transcen-
dental method is the dynamic structure of human intending 
which has as its field of inquiry all that man can ask 
about.55 
Before working out the implications of this defini-
tion, let us relate it to some positions which have already 
been established. First, it was argued that the basic 
operations of cognition develop spontaneously in conscious-
ness. The subject spontaneously desires to know, asks 
questions, learns, and attempts to verify some of his opin-
ions. Second, the pattern of these acts is present in 
consciousness prior to any explicit understanding or formu-
lation of it. Third, by following through these activities, 
the subject establishes his own intelligence and rat~onal-
j ty. By short-circuiting them, he es ta bl ishes hi.mself as 
stupid and intellectually irresponsible. 
Given the preced:tng positions, if transcendental 
method is the bas;c pattern of cognitional acts, then it 
develops spontaneously in human consctousness. Prior to 
the subject's explicit formulation of it, i.e. prior to 
55"Finally, while it is, of course, true that human 
knowing is limited, still the transcendental notions are 
not a matter of knowing but of intending; they ;ntended 
all that each of us has managed to learn, and they now 
intend all that as yet remains unknown. In other words, 
the transcendental field is defined not by what man knows, 
not by what he can know, but by what he can ask about; 
and it is only because we can ask more questions than we 
can answer that we know about the limitations of our know-
ledge." !bid., pp. 23-24. 
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bis objecti~ication of the content of bis own consciousness, 
transcendental method is active as a routine of daily liv-
ing. Tnsofar as the subject is attentive, intelligent, and 
reasonable, he is following transcendental method. Insofar 
as he is inattentive, close-minded, and stubbornly resis-
tant to arguments, he is rejecting his own development as 
a sensitive, intelligent, and reasonable person. 
We can now return to the definition offered above: 
transcendental method is the dynamic structure of human 
intending which has as its field of inquiry all that man 
can ask about. This is the structure which develops spon-
taneously in consciousness, which is operative prjor to 
any explicit formulation of it, which differentiates atten-
tiveness from inattentiveness, intelligence from stupidity, 
reasonableness from unreasonableness. 
Now, if the alternative to being attentive, intelli-
gent, and reasonable is a state of unintelligent gaping and 
. 
uncritical acceptance of the latest curiosity, then trans-
cendental· method has a normative function. That is, the 
subject either develops as a sensitive, intelligent, and 
rational subject or he stifles this spontaneous develop-
ment for the sake of something else. But, in the latter 
case, he cannot avoid the need to ignore inopportune data, 
to suppress unpleasant inquiries, and to descend to sophis-
try in order to buttress a weak position. Continued long 
enough, these exercises in obscurantism will corrode his 
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sense of what intellectual curiosity and evaluation are.56 
An ideology may be developed in order to justify his sup-
pression of evidence and his intolerance of the free ex-
change of ideas.57 But bef.ore an ideology is worked out, 
there are those conscious acts which implicitly assert that 
the subject should be attentjve, intelligent, and reason-
able. He first learns by living spontaneously according 
to these acts. To discard this way of living later re-
quires a special effort to block their continuing occurrence. 
But the fact that a special effort is required wi_ tnesses 
to the normative function of transcendental method. 
Lonergan formulates what he calls transcendental pre-
cepts to explicate this normat5.ve function: Be attentive, 
56The result of such flights from transcendental 
method is termed "scotosis" by Lonergan. He analyzes the 
origins, defenses, and psychic distu~bances of such flights 
from human intelligence, in :rnsight, pp. 191-203 • 
. 57rn Insight, Lonergan discusses ideology in terns 
of the forms of human bias; see pp. 191-206 and 218-232. 
In Method of Theology, he explicitly refers to ideology 
as the self-justification of the subject who refuses self-
transcendence; see pp. 357-359. This refusal is the mark 
of the alienated man, for his spontaneous development 
toward intellectual, moral, or religious conversion is 
blocked and, hence, he settles for something less than 
openness to future personal growth. 'l'he negative nuance 
usually attached to the term "ideology" is justified by 
an ethical judgment: the intellectual self-transcendence 
of the subject must be matched by a desire to make his 
doing consistent with his knowing. Tn Chapter Five, we 
will offer arguments in support of this ethical judgnent. 
For now, we are interested in showing that what comes 
first is the spontaneous movement from curiosity and under-
standi_ng to renewed inquiry in keeping with what has been 
learned. Obstacles to this movement may occur secondarily, 
and then they put the intellectually responsible subject 
to the test. 
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Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be respon~ible.58 But the 
thesis is that, even prior to the formulation of these 
general norms, they are tacitly presumed by the subject 
who spontaneously wonders, ·j_ntelligently seeks answers, 
and rationally ponders alternative solutions. The proof 
of their tacit presence lies in those occasions when a 
person lapses into an indifference which asks no questions, 
values all opinions equally (that is to say, values none), 
and asks only not to be disturbed. If prolonged, this in-
tellectual lethargy becomes self-destructive. The indj_f-
ferent person must still cope with everyday problems. He 
must be shrewd· in protectj_ng his isolation. Therefore, 
his indifference is not complete; when his personal inter-
ests are at stake, he will be most attentive and careful 
to choose the course of action best suited to his ends. 
Consequently, despite his flight from the turmoil of pub-
lie liv~ng, he still will not cease to follow transcenden-
tal method even if it is only allowed to operate within a 
narrow area of his life. 
58Method in Theology, p. 20. There is a need to re-
late these precepts ~o transcendental method. As noted a-
bove, the formulated precepts express the normative func-
tion of transcendental method. Now, just as this method 
is implicit in all critical thinking, so too the norms, or 
precepts, are implicitly at work guiding inquiry and affir-
mation. However, transcendental method, once made explicit, 
introduces a difference into cognitional performance: one 
is now concerned with continually reflectint; on this per-
formance in order to avoid bias and failures to understand 
correctly. Likewise, once the transcendental precepts are 
formulated, one is more aware of and more responsible for 
how one carries out inquiries. In other words, the norca-
tive function of transcendental method becomes a recog-
nized standard of both critical thinking and critical prac-
tice. 
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The Problem of Formalism 
But a serious objection arises both to these precepts 
and to transcendental method. Are they anything more than 
formalistic imperatives? Do these precepts not suffer from 
that generality which Hegel charged to Kant's categorical 
imperative?59 That is, are the precepts--Be attentive, Be 
intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible--empty of content 
and capable of receiving any content? A response to this 
objection can be made in two parts. First, the precepts 
and transcendental method presuppose that there is a dif-
ference between attention and inattention, intelligence and 
stupidity, reasonableness and unreasonableness. 60 In any 
person who has been inquisitive, proud of hj_s d:i scovery yet 
careful not to publ; sh it without further checki_nc;, there 
has been at least a vague awareness of the difference. Con..: 
sequently, he will consciously undertake some activities 
and reject others because they either advance his work or 
59Hegel' s charge is succinctly put: ''[Kant's] duty as 
such is form void of all content and capable of any." The 
Phenomenology of .Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie (New--
York: Barper and Row, 1967), p. 672. The complaint has 
been voiced frequently. The categorical imperative deter-
mines only the form one's maxims ought to take; it does 
not prescribe specific actions. Consequently, some crit-
ics have concluded that Kant's categorical imperative is 
completely devoid of specificity and indifferent to all 
particular actions, wlaether moral or immoral. Space does 
not permit a counter-argument to this conclus;on. But 
the grounds for a counter-argument lie in the fact that 
Kant offered several formulations of the categorical im-
peratj_ve and, by doing so, placed limits on which actions 
could conform indirectly through maxims to the categor5-cal 
imperative. 
6011ethod in 'fheology, p. 20. 
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guarantee his failure. But this is to say that the trans-
cendental precepts, even prior to their formulation, are 
the basis for rejecting some acts, i.e. "content." There-
fore, the second part of the charge.·of formalism, nru.ctely, 
the indifference of the precepts to content, falls. 
The first part of the objection states that the trans-
cendental precepts are so general as to be empty of speci-
fic content. Two responses are made to this part of the 
charge. First, it is through acts of observation, discov-
ery, and verification that a subject constitutes himself 
in fact as a sensitive, intelligent, and rational person. 
The defective indi vi.dual who suffers nearly total sensory 
deprivation will not become such a person because the con-
stitutive acts are beyond his very limited abtlities. But 
it is f~om a study of the constitutive acts that Lonergan 
derives the transcendental precepts. In effect, he is ar-
guing that their content will be all that a subject has 
previously learned through being attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable, and responsible. 
An im.oediate objection will be that this concluston 
relativizes the precepts themselves. If their content be-
longs to the personal history of the indi vi.dual, then what 
they prescribe will vary from individual to individual. 
But this is the point in formulating them as formal trans-
cendental precepts. What an individual learns through 
being attentive and intelligent and reasonable is not 
156 
limited to what he has intended in those acts. He also 
learns through repetition how to be more attentive, how to 
control his inquiry, how to structure his experiments. In 
other words, he builds up a competence that improves upon 
what was initially spontaneous. What originally was only 
a vague awareness of the difference between being atten-
tive and inattentive, intelligent and stupid, reasonable 
and unreasonable can in time become a developed facility 
in careful observation, rapid grasp of solutions, and dili-
gent pursuit of oversights. In short, the precepts will 
be a working part of the specialized know-how of the sub-
ject. And t'.-,_is specialized know-how does not remain pri-
vate, but becomes social in the recommended procedures and 
canons of a professional community. The differences be-
tween intelligence and stupidity, between intellectual 
responsibility and reprehensible dishonesty, are not left 
entirely to the individual to discover. Rather, they are 
concretized in the advice given in graduate courses and 
in methodological publications. 
The second response to the charge of formalism ar-
gues that the generality of the precepts is not in fact 
separable from all specificity. The individual consti-
tutes himself as an intelligent subject by specific acts 
of intelligent inquiry. For example, the child develops 
routines of behavior which allow him to master his narrow 
world. But there are larger environments in which these 
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routines will prove inadequate. If challenged by_ problems 
which require theoretical solutions, the adult puts aside 
his daily routines and takes up the technical tools of his 
profession. Among such tools will be the method appropri-
ate to his theoretical task. His method guides the activi-
ties which solve problems. But his success in the present 
is not guaranteed by simply following a prescribed series 
of operations. He must also ask the right questions, hit 
upon the suitable experiment, and be wary of accepting his 
first results as conclusive. These operations belong-to 
the non-logical elements of method which were mentioned 
above. They require an attentiveness, an intelligence, 
and a critical sense which, in a much less sophisticated 
way, were first used in solving the proble~s of the child. 
Therefore, whatever the specific problem to be solved may 
be, the required operations will be specifications of the 
transcendental precepts. 61 The normative generality of 
the latter is found to be presupposed by the operations of 
specific methods. For the above reasons the charge of pure 
formalism does not warrant acceptance. 
61
"All special methods consist in making specific the 
transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be 
reasonable, Be responsible. But before they are ever for-
mulated in concepts and expressed in words, those precepts 
have a prior existence and reality in the spontaneous, 
structural dynamism of human consciousness. Moreover, just as the transcendental precepts rest simply on a study 
of the operations themselves, so specific categorial pre-
cepts rest on a study of the mind operating in a given 
field." Ibid. 
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The Critical Function of Transcendental Method 
In the final section of Chapter Two, we argued for 
the possibility of applying explicit cognitional positions 
to the precritical content of relative horizons and, there-
by, of modifying those horizons for theoretical and not 
ethical reasons. However, we did not argue that this appli-
cation was critical. Our argument had to await the intro-
duction of transcendental method. rt is the latter which 
has a critical function to perform. That is, it provides 
a basis for discovering whatever contradictions there.may 
be between what a person asserts about his acts of knowing 
and what actually occurs when he knows. 62 We have argued 
that, prior to any formulation of the basic structure of 
human knowing, prior to any preconceptions about acts of 
knowing, there is a dynamic self-constituting process al-
ready at work in the intentional acts of the subject. Now, 
if through his study of human interiority Lonergan has the-
matized the normative a priori pattern of that process, is 
he not in possession of a critical basis for evaluattng 
assertions about human knowing? For our own purposes, do 
we not have a viewpoint now which allows us to neasure 
against knowing as it actually occurs every explicit C06-
nitional theory and every preconception about human knowing? 
The groundwork has already been laid for answering 
these questions. First, epistemological positions need 
62!!?.!£., pp. 20-21. 
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not be limited to the surface of the historian's text, i.e. 
they need not owe their validity to prior moral and/or aes-
thetic preferences. The process of differentiating the 
subject's basic horizon can lead to·a modification of pre-
conceptions for distinctively theoretical reasons. 63 Sec-
ond, through a study of human interiority and a differen-
tiation of basic horj_zons, there is uncovered the a priori 
structure of human knowing. This a priori. pattern is oper-
ative in intentional acts prior to all theorizing about it. 
Third, this formal schema of cognitional process is a nor-
mative precondition to intelligent preconceptions about 
history. Poetic insights into the field of hi.story or 
moral expectations about the meaningfulness of past events 
belong, not to the somnambulist, but to the inquisitive 
and intelligent histor:i.an. 
From the three components of the groundwork, we con-
clude the following. The basic structure of cogni t:i.onal 
63rt should be pointed out that the discovery and 
proof of cognitionah structure is a task that properly is 
located within the world of interiority and not the world 
of theory. Recall that the issue which prompted the con-
sideration of human interior:tty was the conflict between 
common sense and theory over disputed claims to furnish 
knowledge. A theoretical solution would only settle the 
conflict to the satisfaction of those who were on the side 
of theory from the beg]nning. Consequently, an acceptable 
solution must be distinguishable from both parties in the 
original conflict. However, if the solution is found in 
interiority, still the arguments derived from that solu-
tion can be properly labelled "theoretical reasons." Cog-
nitional theory rests on the structure of human 5.nterior-
i ty, but the theory itself contains positions which elab-
orate the implications of that structure. 
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operations, having a validity independent of all ~thical 
or theoretical preconceptions, can provide the critical 
metahistorical basis for judging all accounts of human 
knowing. The claim to provide a basis for judging all 
accounts of human knowing is an aspect of thi.s conclusion 
which deserves a more explicit treatment. Specifically 
the aspect of universality will be open to a number of 
objections. 
A relativist would quickly challenge this claim to 
universality. !n effect, is not this cognitional pattern 
merely a set of theoretical propositions which express an 
incomplete and, therefore, conditional understanding of 
human knowing? 64 May not others in coming to self-knowledge 
find a different pattern in their cognitional acts? If so, 
then there is nothing univeral about Lonergan's formula-
tion of the pattern. What he has discovered is not some-
thing unconditional in the human subject but a series of 
activities which may well vary from individual to individ-
ual and almost certainly will vary from one culture to the 
next. 65 
64Note that this question has been constructed in or-
der to bring out a frequently overlooked presupposition: 
for sometbing to be known unconditionally it must be known 
completely. A partial understanding is relative to the 
knower and may in fact be mistaken. Chapter ~°'i ve will con-
sider this presuppositiot! in more detail. 
65This charge is consistent wi_th Dilthey's conclu-
sion that nothing unconditional is discovered in the human 
subject. Hay this not be one reason for the ~nconpleteness 
of his lifelong project? "The question whether the subor-
dination to somet "dng uncondi.tional, which, after all, is 
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The response to this challenge both grants a portion 
of it and denies a portion. It grants that human self-
knowledge is in process and so is incomplete. What we 
have said about cognitional structure, which is only a 
part of that self-knowledge, can surely be revised and im-
proved. But this is not to grant the possibility of find-
ing a different pattern in cognitional acts. A distinction 
must be made between the pattern im.:nanent in these acts 
and the expression which formulates our understanding of 
it. The latter, as a matter of linguistic expression, is 
obviously open to revision. 66 Has not the basic pattern 
already been described j_n several different ways in this 
chapter? 
But is the pattern itself open to drastic revi-
sion? Could someone else discover a radically different 
a historical fact, can be traced back with logical conclu-
siveness to a universal, not temporally limited, condition 
in I:lan, or must be viewed as a product of history, leads 
ultimately to the profundities of transcendental philosophy 
which lie beyond the empirical sphere of history and from 
which even the philosopher cannot extract a certain answer." 
Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and .Meanin in History, edited by 
H. P. Rickman (New or : I arper an .Low, l. _, , p. 165. 
66
"A distinction must be drawn between the normative 
pattern i.m.nanent in our conscious and intentional opera-
tions and, on the other hand, objectifications of that pat-
tern in concepts, propositions, words. Obviously, revision 
can affect nothing but objectifications. It cannot change 
the dynamic structure of human consciousness. All it can 
do is bring about a more adequate account of that struc-
ture." .Method in Theolo~;r, pp. 18-19. For Lonergan's 
views on the instrumenta1ty of ljnguistic expressions 
which in themselves are neither true nor false, but merely 
adequate or inadequate, see Insight, p. 556. 
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pattern in cognitional activities? To discover s~ch a dif-
ference, he would have to come across data of conscjous-
ness which previously were ignored or misapprehended. Then 
he would have to offer a more adequate explanation of both 
the new and the old data. Finally, to prove his point, he 
would have to offer evidence and argue the greater probabil-
ity of his account. But, in that case, the reviser will 
have followed that very pattern of activities which he is 
attempting to alter. 67 Thus, a revision of the basic struc-
ture of cognition is limited to the expression which is used 
to formulate it. And even in such attempts at revision, 
67This is a brief summary of Lonergan's argument as 
found i.n Method in ;l'heolo~, p. 19. A lengthier treatment 
of the same position is available in Insi~ht, pp. 335-336. 
Dilthey may have been aware of the streng h of a similar 
position which places limits on revision. Matthew Lamb 
points out that Dilthey was aware that, even if all theor-
ies are relative and hypothetical, still the recurrent 
activities which form, correct, and expand those theories 
are not open to radical revision. See Lamb's article, 
11 Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and Ber-
nard Lonergan Is Meta-methodology' II Language' rl'ruth and 
Meaning, p. 323, footnote 36. Lonergan makes much tEe same 
point in Insight, pp. 276-277. 
It seems ~hat Lonergan's argument on the limits of 
revision has an acceptable presupposition, namely, the 
intellectual responsibilj ty of the person atter.1pting to 
alter radically the basic pattern of cognitional acts. 
The argument does not apply to any attempt to assert arbi-
trarilt a counter-argument as part of some polemic. ~ 
then w at is gratuitously asserted can be gratuitously 
denied. And it is likely that what is so denied will be 
lo.belled "intellectually irresponsible." Such censure is 
earned because we automatically suppose that what one knows 
should guide how one speaks and acts. This assumption will 
turn up in Chapter Five as part of our analysis of the 
moral conversion which is neede~ to effect the changes 
required by intellectual conversion. 
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care must be taken to distinguish and to interrelate the 
empirical, intellectu~l, and rational levels of operation. 
To do otherwise would be to overlook the very steps 
through which the process of revi.sion itself goes forward. 
The counter-argument of the relativist is correct to 
the extent that it argues that cognitional theories can 
always be clar-5.fied. But, given our preceding remarks, if 
such efforts to clarjfy are to succeed, they must follow 
the pattern of spontaneous cognitional acts. Otherwise, 
in failing to be attentive, or to ask intelligent que~tions, 
or to entertain critjcal doubts, the proponent of a new 
cognitional theory will be left with a deficient and not 
an i.mproved theory of human knowing. But this is to say 
that the pattern, once explicated, is the universal measure 
of accounts of human cognition. This is its critical func-
tion--that every exact theory of cognition will be con-
firmed and every inaccurate theory of cogniti.on will be 
refuted. 68 The first part of our twofold task is thus com-
pleted: The a priori structure of human cogni t~_on is a 
cri t:i.cal basis for judg:ing all accounts of human knowing. 
The Metahistori.cal Grounds Provided by Transcendental Method 
The second half of the task remains: to establish 
that a metahistorical method based upon this norm~tive 
structure can criticize and, if riecessary, correct 
68Ibid., Method in 'l'heology, p. 20. 
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cognitional .elements in a historical perspective •. Already 
we have argued that the differentiation of the subject's 
basic horizon reveals genetically distinct levels of mean-
ing. Among them is human interiority. An investigation 
of it reveals the a priori pattern of human cognition. 
Transcendental method formulates the distinct but inter-
related components of this pattern. Thus, transcendental 
method is a metahistorical method provided by a dif feren-
tiation of the subject's basic horizon. The issue is 
whether this method contains adequate metahistorical grounds 
for criticizing the cognitional elements of the historian's 
perspective. 
Lonergan suggests that the needed measure of "ade-
quacy" is not necessity but matter-of-fact. The spontanei-
ties of human knowing supply the factual basis for evaluat-
ing the cognitional elements of historical perspectives. 
When an individual begins a study of hunan interiori t;y, 
he already has a personal history of asking questions, 
grasping possible answers, and working toward the correct 
ones. This is the human subject in his unobjectified atten-
tiveness, intelligence, and reasonableness. 69 This is the 
ultimate basis of human knowing. In any attempt to find 
an even deeper foundation, the subject must make use of 
that same cognitional process which he already spontaneously 
employs. Consequently, any "deeper" foundation would 
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presuppose and not justify that cognitional process. Now 
this foundation provided by the unobjectified activities 
of the subject is established by his spontaneous living 
and intending. Both are a matter-of-fact, not a necessity. 
The fact is undeniable as soon as one inquires, begins to 
understand , and struggles to get things right. 70 
This argument indicates that Lonergan is not unmind-
ful of charges made against Kant's transcendental approach, 
namely, that Kant attempted to justify critically the re-
sults of human cognitional process all the while using 
that process to perform his critique. For Lonergan the 
issue to be met directly is one of objectifying the fac-
tual routines of that process. The result, as was argued 
above, is a basic pattern of operations with a normative 
function. Transcendental method themat:i.zes in formal 
70"Self-aff:i.rmation has been considered as a con-
crete judgment of fact. The contradiction of self-negation 
has been indicated. Behind that contradiction there have 
been discerned natural inevitabilities and spontaneities 
that constitute the possibility of knowin(;, not by der:10n-
strating that one can know, but pragmatically by engae;ing 
one in the process. Nor in the last resort c~n one reach 
a deeper foundation than that pragmatic engagement. Even 
to s~ek it involves a vicious circle; for if one seeks such 
a foundation, one employs one's cognitional process; and 
the foundation to be reached w:i.11 be no more secure or sol-
id than the inquiry utilized to reach it. As I might not 
be, as I might be other than ! am, so my knowing mit;ht not 
be and it might be other than it is. The ultimate basis of 
our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact, and the 
fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, 
but simultaneously with it. The sceptic, then, is not in-
volved in a conflict with.absolute necessity. He might not 
be; he might not be a knower. Contradiction arises when he 
utilj_zes cognitional process to deny it." Insight, p. 332. 
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precepts the general operations which yield human knowled~e. 
Negatively, it implies that neglect of those operations 
condemns the subject to ignorance and sophistry. 
Now, if the historian- is concerned with securing the 
foundations of his historical perspective, he will know in 
advance that clarity in his assumptions and strength in 
his arguments are assets. His inquiry will extend beyond 
cognitional theory. He must bring to light much of the 
content of his relative horizon. He must clarify the moral 
and aesthetic expectations which he brings to his research. 
The linguistic-poetic framework for his historical narrat-
ing may be investigated. But throughout his inquiry into 
this implicit content, the historian will either be follow-
ing transcendental method or he will be thwart:i.ng his am.-
bi ti on to explicate his presuppositions and to establish 
their worth. Again, he most likely will not have formu-
lated transcendental method. But, inasmuch as he is fe.mil-
iar with the differences between attention and inattention, 
intelligence and stupidity, reasonableness and arbitrary 
conclusions, professional responsibility and intellectual 
dishonesty, he will be following the transcendental pre-
cepts. Consequently, the attempt to secure the perspective 
which he finds himself already possessing presupposes that 
the historian will make use of transcendental method. Con-
comitantly, if he discovers an error or an unacceptable 
implication in his prior perspective, the removal of it and 
, 
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replacement by some other position will be a matter of 
improving his understanding of the issue involved, of argu-
ing the superiority of the new position over the old, and 
of responsibly implenenting.changes-in earlier works. 
In short, our argument is that inquiry into a par-
ticular historical perspective, while infrequent, is not 
impossible. But the success of such an inquiry depends 
upon the historian's at least implicit adherence to trans-
cendental method in clarifying, checking, and perhaps even 
revising elements of his historical perspective. The bas~s 
for this conclusion is proximately Lonergan's cognitional 
theory which formulates the invariant structure of human 
knowing. Ultimately the basis for this conclusion lies in 
the factual spontaneities of human consciousness which are 
not complete until what is discovered and verified becones 
the guide for intelligent decisions (e.g. decisions to re-
vise earlier works). The cognitional theory which expl'es-
ses the universal form of these intentional routines sup-
plies a metahistorical position for evaluating attempts to 
clarify historical perspectives.71 The cognitional theory 
?lThat is, it suppiies a roetahj_storical position 
which has a normative function to perform in regard tc how 
the historian should proceed in intelligently exploring the 
content of historical perspectives. How he proceeds will, 
on the surface, be a matter of implementing rules for evi-
dence and of doinG competent exegesis. But, on a deeper 
level, he will be followine; the transcendental precepts 
which implicitly guide the actual use of such rules and 
the labor of exegesis. 
As perspectives are clarified and their implicit 
assumptions are detected and criticized, the historian's 
self-understanding develops. But, reciprocalJy, his 
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which expresses the invariant pattern of intent5.onal acts 
supplies a critical basis for clarifying and, if necessary, 
for correcting cognitional elements j_n historical perspec-
tives~ 
This conclusion completes the two-fold task assigned 
at the beginning of this section. The arguments leading 
to the preceding conclusion cari be faulted for lacking 
specific examples. The fifth section of this cha]!ter will 
offer examples of presuppositions in a historical perspec-
tive. On the basis of Lonergan's cognitional theory,.recom-
mended changes in the cited presuppositions will be defended. 
Before we SU1lli11arize the ground covered in this fourth 
section, a few remarks will be entered about what h:..;.s not 
been accomplished. First, we have described the l)rocess of 
differentiating the subject's basic hor5zon. But ~rimarily 
this description has been of an anonymous mind. This wr:L ter 
has had to work through much of this process for hi:nself. 
But the presentation has rarely been in the first person, 
so the anonymous subject remains. It remains as an invita-
tion and as a warning. There is the invitation to continue 
increased self-understanding requires that his preconcep-
tions be fu~ther clarified, their implications worked out, 
and the whole matter subjected anew to critical reflection. 
What remains fixed in this reciprocal process are the re-
current operations which establish, test, and advance the 
historian's understandtng of history and of himself. Lon-
ergan :phrases tiis ::nore generally: '"l'horoughly understand 
what it is to understand, and not only will you understand 
the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also 
you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, open-
ing upon all further developments of understand i.ng." Ibid. , 
p. 748. 
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reflecting on cognitional acts. There is the warning: no 
one can carry out this exercise in self-knmvledge for 
another person. Lortergan's writings enttce one to the 
effort but are no substitute for it. So the work of this 
fourth section is not to be identified with the actual 
event of self-appropriation, but it has been preparatory 
to and descriptive of the content of that event. 
Second, this fourth section has not provided a trans-
finite perspective on history. No single perspective on 
the past has been singled out for exclusive adoption.72 
Nor has an a uriori historical method been detailed. Trans-
cendental reethod offers a formal account of how the histor-
ian operates as an intelligent, rational, and responsible 
subject. But the specific rules he follows and the ques-
tions he asks as a historian will vary with the task at 
hand. The hypotheses which he employs, the evaluation of 
72I1atthew Lamb sounds a strong warning aga:tnst any 
attempt to argue that transcendental method is the hs.s:is 
for discovering the I!leaning of hi story. "The i nvi ta ti on 
to a self~appropriation of this baste horizon :is not to 
reach above or behind history nor autocratically to inpose 
some pattern on it, but to discover in one's self the open 
and dynanic structures of one's own constituting of history 
and, through collaboration with others, gradually to artic-
ulate the complicattons, concretisations, amplifications 
and differentiations of this baste horizon in the histori-
cal process itself. To appropriate the enpirical, intelli-
gent, critical and existential structures of conscious in-
tentionality is the exact opposite of boasting an Archimed-
ean lever that would permit one iIDIJediately to pry into all 
problems. For such an attitude would be an inattentive, 
unintelligent, uncritical and irresponsible forgetfulness 
or one's radical historical finitude and so evince the ab-
sence of self-a.ppropriation." "Wilhelm Dilthey' s Critique 
of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Heta-methodol-
ogy." Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 125. 
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sources which he makes derive from personal decisions which 
cannot be made a priori.73 Both the finitude of the his-
torian and the non-logical character of his questioning 
are left intact by the conclusions of this section. As a 
result, the diversity of historical perspectives and the 
thesis of perspectivism which accounts for this diversity 
are also left intact.74 
In summary, the task of this fourth section was two-
fold: (1) to establish the critical function of the a nri-
ori structure of human knowing; (2) to argue that a meta-
historical method based on this structure can criticize 
and, if necessary, correct cognitional elements in his-
torical perspectives. 
The first part of this twofold task required the in-
troduction of Lonergan's transcendental method. ·i'his in-
troduction was carried out in a number of steps. ThoPe 
worth recalling here were (1) the discovery of both logj_cal 
73Henri Marrou discusses the dependency of method on 
the questions asked by the historian, in The Meaning of 
History, pp. 65-66. 
74The invariant form of cognitional process is a dyn-
amic pattern, o+ structure, which allows for diversity in 
the content of specific acts o.f historical knowing. Arthur 
Danto uses an interesting example to show how what is in-
variant is compatible with what is variable." "One does 
not find sonnets less interesting or beautiful upon being 
told that all sonnets hn.ve an invariant form. If anything 
our admiration for poetic creativity increases upon learn-
ing that so many distinctly individual and dissimilar works 
should all have been produced in conformity \·1ith the most 
rigid and invariant set of rules!" Analytical .?hilosophy 
of History, p. 256. 
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and non-logical operations in methodical inquiry, _and (2) 
the importance of method for historical inquiry and for 
the handling of certain theoretical problems which first 
presented themselves with the development of historical 
consciousness in the nineteenth century. But, because 
method can develop in a number of ways, a commonly accep-
ted set of norms for handling these problems has not been 
available. Lonergan proposes that transcendental method 
supplies both a more general and a more fundamental approach 
than any of the previous attempts. As such, it offers the 
possibility of resolving some of the historical problems 
and of being the basis for a consensus on historical norms. 
Consensus is possible because transcendental method 
formulates spontaneities of living, i.e. it fornalizes the 
routines of human intentionality with which every historian 
operates in wri ti.ng history. Since these routines occur 
in an invariant pattern and since the patterned perform-
ance of the subject can be formulated in transcendental 
method, there is available a fixed base from which to 
judge cognitional theories. Errors and omissions contained 
in the latter will turn up when the latter are measured 
against the actual pattern of the subject's co[;nitional 
performance. Transcendental method, therefore, has a cri-
tical function to perform in relation to all accounts of 
human knowing. 
The second half of the twofold task translated the 
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arguments a~d positions of the first part into distinctive-
ly historical terms. Cognitional structure is a precondi-
tion to (1) the subject's adoption of intelligent opinions 
about his own work as a historian, and (2) his study, eval-
uation, and possible revision of historical perspectives. 
The method which formulates that structure will be pre-
supposed by the historian in his efforts to clarify, check, 
and even replace elements in his own historical perspective. 
He may not recognize this implicit method. But, if he 
does, his explicit understanding of transcendental method 
will provide him with a metahistorical basis for criticiz-
ing the cognitional elements of other historical perspec-
tives. In the final section of this chapter, we will 
offer an example of just such an application of transcen-
dental method. 
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TR.ANSCZNDENTAL METHOD APPLIED 
A promise was made toward the end of the preceding 
section to supply examples of presuppositions in histori-
cal perspectives. The purpose of these examples is to in-
dicate how the critical application of transcendental meth-
od can bring about needed changes in historical perspec-
tives. 
A problem irn.oediately arises. ·ro criticize presuppo-
sitions, one usually must first thematize them; but not 
all presuppositio~s can be explicated. This is particular-
ly true for the historian. His starting point is not a set 
of axioms or even a set of insights which could be explicit-
ly formulated in an unambiguous way.75 In Chapter Two, the 
analysis of relative horizons listed some of the components 
of the historian's starting point. His personal life 
history and received common-sense opinions were but two of 
the components listed. And these components defy a com-
plete elucidation. However, even though all of his presup-
positions and preconceptions cannot be thematized, still 
some of them can be. Only a person who insisted that, un-
til one knows all there is to be known, one knows nothing 
at all--a presupposition in itself--only such a person 
would deny that he can know some presuppositions. But the 
75Lonergan remarks on these points and on the impos-
sibility of systematically objectifying the historian's 
development in understand i ne; the past, in Viethod in T'heol-
ogy, p. 216. 
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goal of comprehensive knowledge has already been shown to 
be foreign to the historian's work. 
Some presuppositions and preconceptions renain in-
plicit; self-consciousness does not pervade all of the his-
torian's past. But this is not to deny the possibility of 
knowing some presupposi ti.ons. However, a second -oroblem 
confronts even this limited possibility. Granted one can 
bring to light and formulate some preconceptions, still the 
statements expressing them fall within the boundaries of a 
particular perspective. In other words, the meaning of 
the statements belongs to the perspective within which the 
subject works. The statements do not prove the validity of 
his perspective, they presuppose it.76 Consequently, if 
they are to be criticized, thematic presuppositions require 
a new franework which is r;iore fundamental than tte frane-
work which first justified them. Otherwise a critique of 
these positions will be based on grounds which ori~~nally 
validated the positions. 
The-solution to this problem has already been found. 
Transcendental method is not based upon part~cular opinions 
or upon the variables of a personal life history; it is not 
the priv~leged possession of a certatn theoretical or his-
torical perspective. Rather, it is the formulation of the 
pre-systematic and dynamic operations which give rise both 
76Lonergan makes a particular application of this 
point, in "betaphysics as Horizon, 11 Collect.ion, p. 214. 
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to intellige.nt preconceptions about history and to devel-
oped historical theories. It has already been argued that 
transcendental method does not owe its validity to any 
ethical variable. Its precepts are a priori in respect to 
every historical theory and are the measure of all accounts 
of historical knowing. Thus, transcendental method commits 
the historian to no single historical perspective; instead, 
it makes possible both his knowledge of and his critique 
of preconceptions about history. Again, it is the critical 
base upon which to build an account of historical knowing 
whose only debt is to the factual spontaneities of human 
consciousness.77 
Havin6 cleared away the two preceding problem9, we 
can begin to discuss specific examples of presuppositi_ons 
and needed chan~~es in historical perspectives. In his fa.m-
ous study of the French Enlightenment, Carl Becker argues 
that the preconceptions of one's age, or the preva~.11-ng 
"cl:iJTI.ate of opinion," close one off from other ages and 
prevent one from passing judgment on the argur:ients and ccn-
clusions of thinkers of an earlier time. Those argUI.:J.ents 
and conclusions are sustained by a climate of opinion in 
which we no longer share. Consequently, for us they are 
neither true nor false, but only irrelevant.78 
77The brevity of this argument will be compensated 
for in the following study of Carl Becker's work. 
78Becker cites two instances of "climates o~ opinion" 
which are effectively closed to contemporary critical 
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Becker's position is not an isolated one. Hayden 
White's theory of paradjgms as effectively closed systems 
of thought is comparable. The bugbear of ethnocentricity 
among many anthropologists arises from a similar notion of 
the exclusivity of cultures and values.79 What these po-
sitions have in common is the assertion that the critic 
is not competent to judge the beliefs, values, and 
reflection: the theological works of the thirteenth cen-
tury and tee political thought of the eighteenth century. 
"The one thing we cannot do with the Sunna of St. Thomas 
is to meet its arguments on their own ground. We can.nei-
ther assent to them nor refute them. It does not even oc-
cur to us to make the effort, since we instinctively feel 
that in the climate of opinion which sustains such arguments 
we could only gasp for breath. Its conclusions seea to us 
neither true nor false, but only irrelevant; and they seem 
irrelevant because the world pattern into which the;y are so 
dexterously woven is no longer capable of eliciting from us 
either an emotional or an aesthet:tc response." (A provoca-
tive thesis, indeed, for the author of the Verbu.~ articles.) 
Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Ei.gnt;eenth-Centur;y 
Ph.ilosonhers, pp. 11-12. 
Becker continues in his second example: "I have chos-
en to say something about the political and social tr.ought 
of the eighteenth century, somethine; about the ?hjlosonh.es. 
If I could stand on high and pronounc·e judgment on -i:;nem, 
estimate authoritatively the value of their philoso_phy, 
tell wherein it is true, wherein false--if I could only do 
all this it would be grand. But this, unfortunately, is 
not possible. Living in the twentieth. century, ! a~ limi-
ted by the preconceptions of my age." ill_£., p. 28. 
79Garrett Barden has some critical reraarks to make on 
the ambiguity of many critiques of ethnocentricity. He 
faults anthropologists for accepti_ng a too easy relativism 
in place of working out the details of critical conscious-
ness. In effect, they dodge two difficult tasks: (1) dis-
coverin~ the source of any errors in what they are study-
ing; (2) becoming critical subjects themselves by analyzing 
their oun viewpoints. See his arti.cle, "'Ehe Intention of 
Truth in Mythic Consciousness," Language, Truth and Mean-
ing, pp. 18-21. 
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explanatory theories of a culture or school of thought or· 
which he is not a member. He can describe those beliefs 
and values and understand those theories, but any attempt 
to evaluate them will be unavoidably tainted by cultural 
prejudice. Therefore, di verse his tori.cal paradigms, or 
perspectives, are presented in a formal study by Hayden 
White, but he intends to avoid any judgment of their val-
idity. BO In effect, he consciously adopts an ironic per-
spective which conceals an inherent scepticism behind a 
purely formalistic and purportedly value-neutral study.Bl 
BOMetahistory, pp. 3-4. In this writer's opinion, 
al though Hayden ·-.Jhi te intends to avoid any critic ism of 
historical paradigms and of their philosophical implica-
tions, he does leave behind his value-neutral analysis in 
the sections on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. See ibid., 
pp. 237-243 (for Schopenhauer) , and pp. 371-374 (for Nietz-
sche). 
In Chapt~r Four we will discuss this question of value-
neutral inquiry. For now, we merely note an interesting 
(ironic?) paradox in White's purportedly value-neutral stu-
dy. He begins with a claim to value-neutrality, but in the 
end he reco:tm:lends that h:i.storians adopt whatever value sys-
tems fit their various moral and aesthetic aspira ti.ens. 
In other words, value-neutrality gives way to a free choice 
of partisan positions. !s there an arbitrary ele~ent here? 
In a purely preliminary way, we can suggest that the ..t'ourth 
transcendental precept expresses an iramanent restraint on 
arbitrariness. The subject chooses positions in t!1e light 
of what he knows and believes. More detail will be given 
to this i:mnanent restraint in Chapter Five. 
Blibid., p. 434. As noted before, White's thesis is 
that this ironic attitude can be laid aside at the con-
clusion of his study. By then the ironic perspective ap-
pears as only one of many possj_ ble perspectives on the 
past. The historian is free to adopt from amonG them a 
perspective consistent with his moral and/or aesthetic 
aspirations. The weaknesses of this "soluti_on" to the 
crisis of historicism have already been pointed out in 
Chapter One. 
' ! 
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What presuppositions lie at the base of this cultur-
al relativism? A lengthy study cannot be undertaken here, 
but some presuppositions, their implications, and possible 
modification can be supplied. First, the differences among 
climates of opinion are presumed to be fundamental. One 
cannot investigate the sources of these differences; they--
the differences--are simply given. Second, what is not 
given is a standpoint from which to grasp the origins of 
the differences. Rather, every standpoint is intrinsically 
related to a particular climate of opinion and, hence, is 
bound by the prevailing beliefs, values, and theories. 
What these two positions imply is that the subject is im-
prisoned in a closed world of meaning-- the climate of op in-
ion into wh~ch he happened to be born. 82 Furthermore, the 
positions imply that efforts to understand oneself, to 
attai_n self-knowledge, fall exclusively within the boundar-
ies of the inherited worldview. There is no question of 
finding in the subject a trans-cultural and invariant base 
upon which to develop critical consciousness. 
Perhaps a critique of different perspectives is pos-
sible if the historian attempts to do presuppositionless 
history. If he can cancel the subtle influences of his 
82carl Becker allows mailing privileges to those in 
confinement: We may not be able to evaluate the arguments 
of the Summa, but--"'1./e can. • • understand what is therein 
recorded well enough to translate it clumsily into modern 
terms."' The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Phil-
osophers, p. 11. 
I 
I 
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own personal background, then his critical remarks_ on other 
viewpoints may be considered objective. This, at least, 
seens to be the ideal of objectivity which is inplicit in 
Becker's position. But, of course, he recognizes that the 
ideal is unattainable. 'Whether we must conclude that his-
torical objectivity is therefore impossible is a topic re-
served to Chapter Five. For now, the possibility of criti-
cizing the previously mentioned presuppositions and their 
:i_mplications will not depend on the possibility of doing 
presuppositionless history. That would be to invoke the 
principle of the empty head which was challenged in Chapter 
Two. Becker and others are correct in arguing that state-
ments made within one "climate of opinion" owe their Eean-
ing to that prior perspective. 
But it does 'not follow that differences in clinates 
of opinion are absolutely fundamen-tal, i.e. th8..t the sources 
of such differences cannot be located and criticized. It 
does not follow if the starting point of the investigator 
is, not a set of statements intrins~cally related to a par-
ticular perspective, but the performance of the in~elligent 
subject. An inquiry can be made into the incentional acts 
which elaborate historical perspectjves and which nanifest 
the historian's assumptions. The latter perspectives and 
assumptions presuppose these acts. ~·lhether or not a parti c-
ular perspective and its subordinate theories give a mis-
taken account of this prior performance does not chance the 
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fact that intentional acts occur and can be objectified.83 
It is the human subject who constitutes diverse meanings, 
develops theories which exploit and defend them, and takes 
a stand on certain values t6 the exclusion of others. His 
performance is logically prior to the finished product 
whether it be a series of statements, a partially thema-
tized perspective, or a vague set of assumptions. 
We have already argued that this performance c~n be 
object5_fied, that objectification reveals an invariant 
pattern which is present prior to all cognitional theoriz-
ing, and that, hence, a position which formulates this a 
priori pattern is not dependent on the subjective variables 
of a particular perspective. \le have also argued ti-iat the 
normative function of transcendental method can be expressed 
in transcendental precepts, of which specialized modes of 
argumentation are particular applications. !n addition, 
we warned that transcendental met~od is not a privileged 
historical perspective. Rather, it is an affirm8d posi-
tion on human knowing which opens out onto all developments 
of understanding. 
Now our argument, whicl} concludes to a r:iodifica ti on 
of the preceding positions held by Becker and others, can 
be simply put. If the critic begins with the actual perfor-
mance of the subject, then he can "get behind" the diverse 
meanings of varyint; climates of opinion to the sub,jects 
8 3 11 Metaphysics as Horizon," Collection, pp. 214-215. 
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who constitute those meanings. In this case, the .differ-
ences among perspectives are not absolutely fundamental. 
(Thus, the first presupposition is denied.) Hext, if the 
objectification of the subject's performance yields an in-
variant pattern of intentional acts, then the critic can 
formulate a position which cuts across the diverse beliefs, 
values, and theories of different cultures. If this formu-
lated position is normative and regulative of all specific 
modes of inquiry and argumentation, then the critic can 
identify sources of dialectical differences anong histori-
cal perspectives. (Thus, the second presupposition is de-
nied.) Finally, if transcendental nethod opens out onto 
all developments of understanding, then the critic who ap-
propriates his own cognitional structure is not con.fined to 
a single perspective. He not only can understand the be-
liefs of 'other cultural groups, he can also learn from them 
and take note of their mistakes. (Thus, the two implica-
tions are rejected.) The thesis of closed worlds of mean-
ing, or climates of opinion, is replaced by discovering in 
the subject an invariant pattern of acts of meaning. Cog-
nitional structure supplies the universal standpoint which 
embraces all intelligible theories, beliefs, assertions, 
84 
and their supportive frameworks. 
84chapter Five will unpack· this final statement to 
get at the hermeneutical tasks which can be carried out 
from this standpoint. 
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The preceding arguments apply to more than ~ust the 
cognitional aspects of Becker's position. There is also a 
moral and aesthetic content in his thesis of divergent 
climates of opinion. He states that the conclusions of 
an alien climate of opinion are neither true nor false, 
but only irrelevant. And the reason they are irrelevant 
is that the perspective to which they belong is no longer 
capable of eliciting an emotional or aesthetic response 
from contemporary men. 85 No response is forthcoming be-
cause the dominant concerns and problems addressed by. 
those conclusions no longer hold our attention. The moral 
aspect of this viewpoint is derived from Becker's opinion 
on the functional purpose of historical inquiry. "'His-
torical thinking is • • • a social instrument, helpful in 
getting the world's work more effectively done. 11186 
Now, just as we argued that the differences among 
85carl-Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-
Century Philosophers, p. 12. 
86carl Becker quoted in Robert Allen Skotheim, Amer-
ican Intellectual Histories and Historians, p. 112. ~er 
was one of the leading members of the Progressive Tradi-
tion in American historiography. That school envisioned 
history, not as a refuge from the troubles of the day, but 
as a discipline capable of contributing to social progress. 
Far from being the neutral ground inhabited by antiquar-
ians, history was rather a storehouse of ideas, projects, 
values which could be of use to the present. Unfortunate-
ly an overemphasis on the pragmatic value of history devel-
oped in this school of thought. However, after the Second 
World War, Becker modified the theoretical relativism 
which had been part of his pragmatic view of history. 
Both Skotheim (in ibid., pp. 121-122) and Lonergan comment 
on this change. See-i:iethod in Theology, p. 232. 
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perspectives are not fundamental, so we can add tbat diver-
sity in problems and in their solutions is not fundamental. 
Admittedly, some of the problems which confronted thir-
teenth-century theologians and eighteenth-century philos-
ophers are no longer of central importance today. Still, 
the critical subject can learn from the intellectual per-
formance of those historical figures. He can admire the 
intellectual passi.on which prompted the:i.r jnquiries, and 
he can imitate the standards for honesty which they imposed 
on their own thinking. He can take note of where individu-
als fell short of these standards and of the resulting er-
rors in judgment. The moral and aesthetic ideals of his 
predecessors may be formulated in antiquated terms, but 
the critical subject does not begin his research with only 
a set of propositions. His ability to understand and to 
estimate the moral decisions and aesthetic ideals of other 
ages is based on more than the prevailing opinions of his 
day. The distance between two ages can be crossed because 
the same invariant structure which governed the performance 
of his predecessors has been appropriated by the critical 
subject. 87 Consequently, the irrelevancy of past conclusions 
87This invariant structure is not the basis for elim-
inating the relativity of specific cultural values. Again, 
transcendental method does not raise the critical subject 
above his own historicity. However, transcendental method 
does allow the subject to form a judgment about how well 
earlier subjects expressed what was known about the recip-
rocal responsibility between the individual and the group. 
Presupposed here is a transcultural moral imperative: One's 
doing should be consistent with one's knowing. Since 
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to contempo~ary problems is no absolute barrier to under-
standing and to reflective criticism of those conclusions 
as products of human intelligence and rationality. 
In summary, this final section was to apply trans-
cendental method to the presuppositions of a historical 
perspective. Two obstacles to this application were con-
sidered: not all presuppositions can be thematized, and a 
critique of presuppositions which itself remains within the 
supporting perspective of those presuppositions presumes 
their validity from the start. After clearing away these 
obstacles, we drew examples of presuppositions and of their 
implications from the work of Carl Becker. First, different 
climates of opinion were said to be mutually exclusive. 
Second, there is no standpoint from which to locate and to 
criticize the sources of differences among climates of opin-
ion. The implications were, first, that the subject is 
bound to his own climate of opinion, and, second, that his 
development of self-knowledge will not turn up any trans-
cultural base for critical consciousness. In contrast, we 
argued that transcendental method provides the needed 
knowledge both advances and declines, an element of rela-
tivity characterizes specific value statements and the 
acts which they describe. Still, the precept, Be respon-
sible, expresses a transcultural aspect of value judgments, 
namely, the subject's responsibility to value what he 
knows to be good. To offer more than these preliminary 
remarks would take us too far afield. !n Chapter Five, 
we will return to defend the transcultural element in-
volved in the fourth level of intentional operations. 
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standpoint for a critical evaluation of the sources of 
differences among climates of opinion. Finally, the thesis 
of closed worlds of meaning was undercut by finding in the 
subject's cognitional performance an invariant pattern 
which has a normative function in respect to every elabor-
ation of an intelligible perspective. 
Summary of Chapter !II 
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the 
validity of our second counterproposal: The subject's dif-
ferentiated basic horizon provides adequate metahistorical 
grounds fo~ criticizing the cognitional elements of the 
historian's perspective. 
Section two outlined the primary requisite to reach-
ing this goal, namely, a formal theory of the precondi-
tions of historical knowing. Chapter Two had already sup-
plied some of these preconditions, but a transcendental 
starting point was still missing. Section three discovered 
the needed starting point in the data of consciousness. Ar-
guments followed to the effect that intentional acts occur 
in an a priori pattern which is the basic structure of all 
knowing. 
The fourth section accomplished a twofold task. It 
established the critical function of the a priori structure 
of human knowing. Next, it indicated that, through the 
objectification of his intentional horizon, the subject 
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can attain an adequate metahistorical position for evaluat-
ing the cognitional elements of historical perspectives. 
Finally, section five applied transcendental method as a 
critical tool to certain presuppositions in a selected 
historical perspective. However, throughout these sections, 
we have stopped short of raising the issue of bias. In 
any of its many forms, bias may be at work both on the 
level of historical preconceptions and on the level of his-
torical procedures. The obstacles it raises to the appli-
cation of transcendental method will be the topic of the 
following chapter. 
CHAP.rER IV 
DETACHMENT AND THE 'WRITING OF HISTORY 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Four takes up Hayden White's third thesis 
and the counterproposal to it. In this introductory sec-
tion, both positions are outlined, their respective prob-
lems noted, and the proposed solutions sketched. The ·sec-
ond section of this chapter offers a summary of historical 
procedures--those procedures occurring on a surface level 
which, White argues, are determined by precritical opinions 
belonging to a deep level of the historical text. Finally, 
the third section presents arguments for the possibility of 
detachment (or freedom from bias) in the writing of history. 
These arguments will be derived from an analysis of how 
transcendental method sanctions the specialized procedures 
which were previously summarized in the second section. 
White's third thesis is the following: the histor-
ian's theoretical concepts and his epistemological position 
belong to the surface of the historical text. The histor-
ian's decision to adopt this set of concepts and this par-
ticular epistemological position rests on precritically 
held opinions. These opinions belong to a deep structure 
18? 
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where theoretical procedures receive an implicit, precri-
tical sanctfon.1 
To this thesis the following counterproposal is made: 
Transcendental method is the basis for a detached attitude 
and can provide a critical, non-biased sanction of theoret-
ical procedures. 2 
Before expanding on the preceding counterproposal, 
we will review the background to 'White's third thesis. He 
sets himself the task of analyzing the deep structure of 
the historical imagination. The classics of nineteenth-
century European history provide a focus for his analysis. 
1Metahistory, p. x. 
2To anticipate remarks which are to follow later in 
this chapter--we grant that precritical opinions are part 
of the relative horizon of every historian. It is likely 
that some form of bias will also be present. However, an 
inquiry into human interiority may lead to the development 
of critical consciousness. The latter, coming to expression 
in transcendental method, has normative and critical func-
tions which are able to modify and, if necessary, to cor-
rect precritical opinions contained in relative horizons. 
Bias may, therefore, not be an irreducible aspect of every 
historical work. 
For the sake of clarity, we should repeat the dis-
tinctions made earlier among preconceptions, bias, and 
preferences. We understand preconceptions to be precriti-
cal opinions which may or may not be biased. What distin-
guishes them from bias is the absence of critical reflec-
tion which seeks to discover any hidden bias in them. Bias 
we take to be a distortion of the subject's spontaneous 
intellectual uevelopment. It sets up barriers which pre-
maturely halt the process of understanding. Preferences 
are expressed choices among varying and sometimes conflict-
ing opinions. They are basically a matter of individual 
partiality even though a large group may favor the same 
opinions. In any case, ?Either the individual nor the group 
justifies its preferences on compelling theoretical grounds. 
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What emerges as the content of the deep structure is a set 
of precritically accepted paradigms which dictate the plau-
sible forms for historical explanations. These paradigms 
are the metahistorical element of the historian's work. A 
spatial metaphor expresses the distinction between this 
element and other dimensions of his work. Surface proced-
ures are preceded by operations on a deep level which are 
basically preconceptual and poetic. On the surface, or 
manifest, level there are obvious differences in how his-
tory is conceived. One author stresses the diachronic ele-
ments of the past while another emphasizes the synchronic. 
One historian reconstructs in impress~onistic fashion the 
"spirit of the age 11 while another penetrates to the "laws" 
which guided the course of events. One author argues the 
relevancy of history for solVing contemporary problems 
while another underlines the basic differences between past 
and present and, thus, d:i.scourages the presentist concerns 
of his counterpart.3 
These manifest differences are said to reflect more 
fundamental disagreements over the form which historical 
explanations ought to take. Hayden White cites the case 
3Metahistory, p. 4. White cites Michelet and Ranke 
as historians who produced diachronic narratives; Tocque-
ville and Burckhardt as historians who produced synchronic 
narratives (ibid., p. 10). Ye have already noted the pre-
sentism of Carl Becker. His counterpart might well be 
Hegel. See the latter's remarks in the Introduction to 
The Philoso of Histor , translated by J. Sibree (New 
ork: Dover .Pu ica ions, 1956), p. 6. 
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history of Organicist and Mechanistic modes of explanation 
to exemplify how surface differences originate in deep 
structural conflicts. These two paradigms of historical 
explanation have been excluded from contemporary profes-
sional circles in favor of the more "empirical" paradigms 
of Formism and Contextualism. The professional historical 
community is fairly unanimous in its avoidance of the phil-
osophies of history practiced by Hegel (Organicist type) 
and Marx (Mechanistic type). But (1) inasmuch as the ex-
cluded paradigms provide insights into the past which·are 
unachievable through other paradigms, and (2) inasmuch as 
history is not a rigorous science committed to a single 
terminological system, the decision to exclude some para-
digms in favor of others must rest on precritical opinions 
about the way past events should be recounted. These opin-
ions, according to White, manifest a preference for one or 
more sets of explanation over others. Insofar as the pref-
erence is precritical, it is likely to be no more than the 
bias of those who express a choice among paradigms. At 
least it may appear so to anyone making an alternate choice 
among historical paradigms.4 
White's preceding conclusions are part of his more 
general thesis: when the historian chooses among alternate 
perspectives on history, the likely grounds for his choice 
4 See ibid., Metahistory, pp. 20-21, for an expanded 
discussion Ofthe points made in thts paragraph. 
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will be mora.l or aesthetic preferences. 5 Nineteenth-cen-
tury historians attempted to justify their choices on epis-
temological grounds, arguing that their modes of explanation 
were more scientific or "realistic" than others. However, 
all these theoretical arguments belong to the surface of 
the historical texts. They reflect ethical or aesthetic 
commitments which lie on a deeper level. It is these com-
mitments which sanction theories used both to explain his-
torical data and to justify the selection of narrative forms. 
There are numerous problems entailed by Hayden \.lhite's 
third thesis. We have already taken note of some of them 
in Chapter One. In the first place, if both the histor-
ian's choice of a paradigm and his subsequent attempts to 
justify that choice are based on precritical grounds, then, 
to those not sharing this paradigm, his choice and defense 
will seem gratuitous. His arguments Will seem so many ex-
pressions of personal temperament. 
We apprehend the past and the whole spectacle of 
history-in-general in terms of felt needs and as-
pirations that are ultimately personal, having 
to do with the ways we view our own positions in 
the ongoing social establishment, our hopes and 
fears for the future, and the image of the kind 
of humanity we would like to believe we represent. 6 
5 Ibid., p. 433. 
6 Ibid., p. 283. White's remarks emphasize personal 
needs or-a5'pirations. But one can ask, Are there not general 
human needs which cut across individual differences as part 
of communally adopted aspirations? Such needs might assure 
the historian of a certain type of public objectivity if 
his work were based on a widely accepted set of values. 
White does not speak of this possibility. He does mention 
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One implication of this position is that the writing of 
history is not so much an account of past events as it is 
a self-revelation on the part of the writer.? 
Other implications can be drawn from White's thesis. 
First, if each historian works under the guidance of a pre-
critically accepted paradigm and if that antecedent frame-
work predetermines his use of evidence and modes of argu-
mentation, then his work is above criticism from those who 
adopt other historical perspectives. Their precritical 
choices will not contain grounds for criticizing the work 
of others who make different choices. In effect, we are 
back to the previous position studied in Chapter Three. 
That is, differences among systems of thought are final; 
there is no access to the source of these different sys-
tems, the intelligent human subject. Second, if historical 
procedures are justified only on the basis of individual 
preferences, then conflicting historical interpretations 
cannot be mediated. What strikes one historian as a biased 
that conflicting paradigms win supportive audiences, but 
he locates the link between historian and audience on a 
pretheoretical, and specifically linguistic, level of con-
sciousness. (Metahistor~, p. 429.) In view of how he at-
tempts to resolve the crisis of historicism, the possibil-
ity of universal needs or values would seem to be out of 
the question. Such needs or values, if they were discov-
ered, would themselves present a challenge to the ironic 
mode of consciousness implicit in White's formalistic study. 
?w. H. Walsh discusses this type of paradoxical im-
plication, in his Philosophy of History: An rntroduction, 
p. 109. 
193 
use of evidence may seem quite appropriate to another. What 
is condemned as bias by one school of thought may be praised 
as moral conviction by another. The implication is that 
any bias in a historical work is irreducible; there are 
no grounds for critically establishing that it is in fact 
bias. 8 
What these implications reflect is a series of ob-
stacles preventing any resolution of the crisis of histor-
icism. 9 Since the main purpose of this dissertation is to 
estimate the strength of Lonergan's claims for transcenden-
tal method, these obstacles must be related to that method. 
8Room is left by this conclusion for understanding 
what other historians talk about. But what is lacking is 
a set of criteria for evaluating what one has understood. 
This situation sums up the extreme individuality of nine-
teenth-century histor:tcism. Friedr:i.ch I1einecke aptly des-
cribed its outcome: "'It understood everything and forgave 
everything, and so (to quote Dilthey's words) ended up in 
"an anarchy of convictions."'" Friedrich Meinecke quoted 
in the Tntroduction by Carl Hinrichs to Meinecke's Histor-
ism, translated by J. E. Anderson (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1972), p. xlviii. 
9Hayden White's limited solution (outlined in Chapter 
One) fails to overcome these obstacles. He is correct in 
locating theoretical procedures on the surface of the text. 
However, when he limits the deep-structural content to 
precritical opinions and poetic insights, he is effectively 
excluding critical grounds for judgments which mediate the 
disputes of the crisis. The grounds he does offer are mor-
al convictions and aesthetic preferences. But, for him, 
these are variables which leave intact the incompatible 
differences of historical paradigms. 
The variables (e.g. moral convictions about what so-
cial relationships should be) might be shared by a wide 
audience. Then it is possible for a limited number of par-
adigms to dominate the historical field. However, White 
takes for granted that such convictions and their dependent 
paradigms have not been justified on any compelling theoret-
ical grounds. No matter how large a plurality is won by 
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This fourth chapter argues that theoretical operations on 
the surface of the historical text can be critically sanc-
tioned. The basis for this critical sanction cannot be 
merely another set of ethical or aesthetic preferences. 
Nor can the basis be part of the surface structure. That 
transcendental method is correctly termed part of the deep 
structure of historical works can be argued in the follow-
ing way. It is not based on an appeal to historical data, 
nor on a theory of history, nor on a preferred mode of 
historical narration. The latter are surface elements. 
But transcendental method is the a priori condition to 
meaningful arrangements of historical data, to convincing 
theories, and to intelligible narratives.10 It, therefore, 
precedes and conditions all subsequent operations on the 
manifest level of historical works. 
Finally, the critical sanction envisioned by this 
one party, there are always other parties with alternate 
convictions and their dependent perspectives. And what 
the crisis of historicism means is that subsequent disputes 
over convictions and perspectives lead to no satisfactory 
conclusion. That is, the perspectives are fundamentally 
different, their grounds are variable, and it is up to the 
indiVidual to choose sides. 
10ve distinguish here between a priori and a poster-
iori conditions of historical knowledge. To the former be-
longs the inquisitive and rational subject through whose 
efforts critical history is produced. To the latter belong 
the materials which may become evidence to support an inter-
pretation of past events. Transcendental method which for-
mulates the intelligent and rational operations of the his-
torian interrelates these conditions. Human intelligence 
is an a priori condition to historical works, but that in-
telligence is constituted through acts of inquiry which 
take up the materials of research as empirical evidence. 
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chapter implies the possibility of detachment from bias. 
It must be possible, first, to discover bias ~ bias, and 
second, to offer an alternative to it. A detachment which 
has an a priori foundation in critical consciousness sup-
plies an alternative to the "anarchy of convictions" which 
prevails in the crisis period. 
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· HISTORICAL PROCEDURES 
The counterproposal of this chapter can be divided 
(1) into the issue of a critical sanction of theoretical 
operations, and (2) into the issue of detachment from bias. 
The first issue will be our initial concern. Put negative-
ly, this part of the counterproposal denies that in every 
instance theoretical operations must be based on subjec-
tive preferences. A review of the conclusions reached in 
Chapter Three will indicate how far we have come in proving 
this part of the counterproposal. 
Ye argued that the subject can enter the realm of 
interiority and, through the occurrence of particular ques-
tions, can begin to differentiate the multiple levels of 
his own consciousness. This differentiation of a basic 
horizon reveals the a priori form of all knowing. The dis-
covery of the basic structure of human knowing gives us 
access to a performance that is prior to any theorizing 
about it. Once this performance is formulated in a cogni-
tional theory, we have available a metahistorical position 
upon which to base a critique of precritical elements in 
historical perspectives. !n add.ition, we argued that trans-
cendental method which is part of this formulated perform-
ance has a normative function in relation to all special 
methods and theoretical procedures. 
Two of the conclusions can be rephrased in terms of 
the problems taken up in this chapter. First, the 
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metahistorical cognitional position provides the basis for 
criticizing.the precritical opinions which sanction, at 
least initially, the theoretical operations proper to the 
adopted paradigm. Second, transcendental method allows 
access to the subject's performance "under" the manifest 
level of the historical text. This method formulates a 
cognitional pattern which is presumed by every theoretical 
operation. Now if this method has a normative relation to 
every surface procedure, and if prior opinions affecting 
historical procedures can be measured against a critically 
based cognitional theory, then precritical differences 
among historical paradigms are not "too deep" for criti-
cism. That is, both they and their consequent differences 
on the manifest level are not absolutely fundamental. In 
the first place, different paradigms have a common deeper 
origin in the performance of the subject--and that perform-
ance can be formulated. In the second place, conflicting 
historical interpretatjons which ultimately derive from 
different presuppositions can be checked by procedures 
which conform to the deeper transcendental method. 
Of these last two s·tatements, we take the first to 
be already proved. This section of Chapter Four takes 
some initial steps toward a proof of the second statement 
by outlining the intelligent and rational procedures of the 
historian. rn other words, it summarizes specific opera-
tions which form the surface level of the historical text. 
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The third section of the chapter will show the po~sible 
conformity of these operations to transcendental method 
and, thereby, will reveal an unbiased basis for a media-
tion of historical conflicts. 
Formation of Contexts 
We begin our survey of historical procedures by pre-
suming two things: (1) that our hypothetical historian knows 
how to do research, and (2) that, aware of the pitfalls of 
exegesis, he therefore proceeds with caution. OUr survey 
presumes rather than investigates these two points because 
of the numerous variables which are involved. For example, 
medieval charters are not subject to the same tests as con-
temporary dispatches between embassies. In this country, 
the student of history is initiated into these variables 
largely through the professional exempla offered in the 
graduate seminar. Likewise, we presume that arguments in 
Chapter Three established that knowing is a compound act. 
Thus, historical procedures leading to historical knowledge 
can be generally subdivided among historical experience, 
historical understanding, historical judging. 
There are two inseparable dimensions to historical 
experience: ind1vidual becoming and social becoming. The 
individual experiences his own growing out of a past and 
into a future. This experience is not of a succession of 
instants but of a flow of intertwined intentions and 
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activities. At this level of individual experience, the 
subject lives the temporal unity of past and future. This 
unity of intention and act is a distinctively historical 
process. :rt accounts for our histor-ical being, for we are 
what we are becoming and have become. Human being is ac-
cordingly translated into action-terms; it is self-making 
process.11 However, what has been constituted by the sub-
ject as his own historical be;ng is not isolated from the 
historical experi.ence of the group. What the individual 
remembers of the past is usually conveyed to him by the 
anecdotes and narratives, the rules and institutions of 
his community. This community owes its identity to the com-
mon traditions it preserves and to the institutions which 
predecessors saw fit to establish and maintain. A sudden 
collapse of social traditions will produce a loss of iden-
tity in the group. Then the individual reverts to an ear-
lier stage of development and, along with others, must 
again build up the traditions and institutions which weld 
a group together as a historical community. 
Both the individual's personal experience and the 
shared maintenance of customs and institutions are mater-
ials for a rudimentary history. Written histories may 
11For Lonergan's remarks on this point, see both 
Method in Theology, (p. 181), and his essay, The Sub~ect, (MilwaUkee: Marquette University Press, 1968), pp. I -29. 
An expanded discussion of human historicity is found in 
Emil Fackenheim's careful study, Metaphysics and Histori-
city, pp. 27-48. 
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incorporate them. Mythical exploits and legends of heroes 
are mixed 1n to inspire the community and to educate it by 
examples from the past. 12 But, in fact, historians have 
made the transitions from rudimentary history to ever more 
complex forms of history. Lonergan sketches the develop-
ing sophistication of history from early rudimentary forms 
to the distinct specialty of history which is the concern 
of a separate professional community. Autobiography and 
biography are intermediate forms which concentrate on in-
dividual lives. Accordi.ng to Lonergan, the specialty .of 
history concentrates on the "times" and, thereby, includes 
the content of biographies within an expanded treatment of 
social development or decline. 13 
Throughout the more developed forms of historical 
writing, a common set of procedures occurs. The historian 
investigates materials assembled by prior research. From 
among them he selects the apparently significant details 
of the life and/or times which he chooses to study. He 
abbreviates the routine and omits the commonplace. This 
12~., Method in Theology, p. 182. 
l3For a more extensive treatment of autobiography, 
biography, and history proper, see ibid., pp. 182-184. 
Lonergan•s claim that history proper is more than a series 
of biographies is argued on the basjs of the inco.mmensura-
bility between individual deeds and social processes. In-
stitutions and communal values are more than the sum of 
individual lives; they provide part of the context in which 
such lives are first lived and later recounted. This claim 
and its arguments are similar to the position taken by 
Maurice Mandelbaum in his article, "Societal Facts," re-
printed in Theories of History, pp. 476-488. 
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~· process of ~electivity has already been discussed ·in Chap-
ter Two. Next, by inquiry and gradual discovery, the his-
torian pulls together the details into an imaginative se-
quence of events. He surmises how events might have oc-
curred and then proceeds to search for confirming or dis-
confirming evidence of his imaginative scene. Some occur-
rences may be readily verified, others may not. With what 
is verified the historian will proceed to organize a ser-
ies of limited contexts in which issues are ranked accord-
ing to importance.14 
Lonergan's notion of context is worth some special 
attention. He notes a heuristic meaning in which "context" 
refers to the framework in which an issue is raised. For 
example, a study of Boswell's Life of Johnson has as its 
context the author's other works, his own life and times 
which he shared with Dr. Johnson, and the values and aims 
of the author. The literary commentator places his selec-
ted issue in this broad context and relates it to other 
issues falling within the same boundaries. The result is 
a skeletal framework, or heuristic structure, for a subse-
quent literary study. 
14The importance of historjcal issues is Janus-faced. 
The historian is concerned with th~ir importance to those 
who lived the events and the significance of their outcome 
for those who came later. It is in the latter case that 
one can say that the significance of the events of 1789 is 
still an open question. Gordon Leff points out that the 
central dialectic of historical knowledge is to reconcile 
events as they happened with their outcome. See his His-
tory and Social Theory, p. 24. 
l 
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But there is another meaning of "context." In this 
second sense, "context" is the interconnection of questions 
and answers in limited groups.15 The historian begins his 
inquiry by isolating the significant issues for his chosen 
topic. By asking and answering questions, he builds up a 
series of positions which complement or challenge one ano-
ther on the significant issues. Through repeated efforts 
to understand, his grasp of a complex topic may improve, 
mistaken surmises may be eliminated, and what remains may 
be organized into a coherent whole. Now this interweaving 
of limited positions into a coherent whole is the raising 
of particular contexts to a higher unity in which parts are 
interrelated and the overall view assigns each part its 
place in the general scheme.16 
To illustrate how limited contexts develop to an 
overview of a complex topic, let us set up a hypothetical 
instance of historical inquiry. Suppose a historian decides 
to study the economic conditions of the American cotton 
trade between 1840 and 1860. The limits of his topic are 
initially chronological. Shipping manifests, bills of 
trade, market quotations supply data for his study. Out 
of this jumble of dates and numbers, the historian selects 
materials which represent a cross-section of the trans-
actions carried out within the specified period. Then he 
15tiethod in Theolosz, p. 163. 
16 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
-
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searches for patterns in these representative materials. 
A.re there trends to be noted, recurrent fluctuations in 
cotton pr:S.ces, noticeable differences between prices at 
one port and those at another? Such questions may uncover 
significant patterns in tradtng over a number of years. 
But answering these questions will give rise to £urther 
ones. Why this sudden drop in prices in 1850? Did foreign 
competition depress the market or was the overproduction 
of cotton in new areas west of the Mississippi to blame? 
Such questions will recur, but, given a limited topic,- they 
will not be endless. Gradually the historian will build 
up an understanding of two and three-year periods of cotton 
trading. Exceptional market conditions will be disting-
uished from the normal flow of business. The good years 
as well as the bad will be arranged in an overview of twen-
ty years. Then the historian may be in a position to grasp 
the long-range prospects of the cotton trade during those 
two decades. Were there signs of decline or of prosper-
ity? To answer this question, he must pay attention to 
more than the limited context of a two or three-year per-
iod. He must interconnect all the contexts set up by the 
preceding inquiry and so round out his view of the full 
twenty years. Trends may be established which suggest that, 
with some exceptions in particular locales and in years of 
drought or heavy rainfall, the cotton market was extremely 
healthy during this age and gave many indications of 
204 
continued expansion. 
Now the purpose of this b.Ypothetical example was to 
illustrate what Lonergan means by limited contexts which 
can be organized to form an overview of a complex topic. 
The historian begins with a general issue: The economic 
condition of the cotton trade between 1840 and 1860. Mul-
tiple questions turn up related but less general problems. 
Solution of the lesser problems is a step toward discovery 
of the components of the more general topic. An arrange-
ment of these component answers into a larger pattern ·re-
quires that the historian recheck his solutions, eliminate 
any errors, and strive to move from the economic trends of 
a few years to the broader perspective of twenty-year 
trends. When the component trends have been arranged in a 
general scheme, when problems have been settled to the his-
torian's satisfaction or the remaining ones are of doubt-
ful relevancy, then he can say what was going forward dur-
ing the twenty years. And his assertion can be backed up 
with the converging evidence supplied in limited contexts 
of two or three-year periods.1? 
l?Ibid., p. 164. Lonergan distinguishes the task 
of the historian from 1that of the exegete. The latter 
aims at understanding what his subject meant, but the for-
mer goes beyond this accomplishment. "He wants to grasp 
what was going forward in particular groups at particular 
places and times. By 'going forward' I mean to exclude the 
mere repetition of a routine. I.mean the change that orig-
inated the routine and its dissemination. I mean process 
and development but, no less, decline and collapse." Ibid., 
PP• 178-1?9. ~ 
This description of the historian's task obviously 
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An additional purpose is served by the preceding 
example. The historian• s proce.dure aims at winning an un-
derstanding of a complex topic. He solves problems, an-
swers specific questions, and tries to interrelate his 
answers. Now this procedure comes to a provisional end 
when the relevant questions have been answered and the 
intelligible connections drawn. Then a historical judg-
ment is possible on the topic previously investigated and 
illuminated .from many sides. Recall that historical know-
ing has been accepted as a compound act. The study of 
materials, the understanding of limited contexts in their 
particularity and interrelatedness and the reasonings link-
ing them come to term in a judgment on the overall inter-
pretation built up out of these many components. Does the 
historian think his task complete? The answer depends on 
whether other significant problems remain, whether .further 
relevant questions occur to him. Without the impetus sup-
plied by .further problems and questions, the historian will 
does not iimit him to· a study o.f the intentions of his sub-jects. "What was going .forward" at some time was largely 
unknown to those who participated in the process. For the 
details of Lonergan's argument on this point, see ibid., p. 
179• We can take this argument as a challenge to UOI'Iing-
wood' s thesis o.f historical intentions which are to be re-
enacted by the historian. The challenge is specifically 
to the exclusive ~laim to identify such re-enactment with 
the task o.f the historian. See The Idea of Histori, pp. 
176-177. Gordon Leff states the challenge to Collingwood's 
thesis in a paraphrase o.f .Marx: '.'The historian owes his 
role to the fact that though men make their history they 
do so without knowing how they do so." History and Social 
Theory, p. 48. 
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seek no further insights into his topic. And without ad-
ditional insights, there will be no new discoveries ~his 
part which will complement, revise, or correct the inter-
pretation he has made. 18 In effect, he will be satisfied 
with his interpretation and feel assured of its high degree 
of probability. 
There is an obvious ambigUity in the statement, 
"Judgment rests on the absence of further relevant ques-
tion. 1119 Does the statement mean that there are in fact 
no additional relevant questions, or does it mean that the 
questioner is unaware of any more? Questtons occur to 
individuals who are seeking to understand some point or 
other. If an individual considers his present understand-
ing of some issue sufficient and believes that any remain-
ing obscure points are only minor matters which cannot re-
vise his understanding of the issue, then he will judge 
his understanding to be correct. Yet, needless to say, 
the remaining points of obscurity may involve major prob-
lems. Were they to be investigated, the individual might 
have to alter radically his understanding of the issue. 
The actual absence of further relevant questions implies 
an end to the search for insights into a particular issue. 
In turn, this precludes the possibility of new discoveries, 
and so the achieved understanding of the issue will in fact 
18Ibid., Method in Theology, pp. 163-164. 
l9Ibid., p. 166. 
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be correct •. But, if only to the best or his knowledge 
there are no further relevant questions, then the individ-
ual may say that his understanding is probably correct. 20 
We began this subsection by discusstng how the his-
torian isolates and develops limited contexts. Our purpose 
was to offer insights into the gradual process of organiz-
ing the elements o:f a complex historical topic. By inter-
connecting questions and answers, the historian builds up 
a series of complementarr but partial viewpoints. As con-
cretized in our example of the pre-Civil War cotton trade, 
an overview of the partial viewpoints may eventually be 
reached. Then a judgment on the complex topic becomes pos-
sible because the parts of the complex whole have been un-
derstood in themselves and in their interrelationships. 
Complexity is thus mastered in historical inquiry. In what 
:follows, we will be detailing how such mastery is won in a 
methodical way. 
Five Aspects o:f Historical Procedures 
A :fuller treatment of historical judgments will occur 
20Ibid., p. 191. The thesis of perspectivism accep-
ted by Lonergan implies that the "relevancy" of further 
questions is, at least in part, dependent on the horizon-
content of the individual historian. Hence, the historian 
can aim at a high degree of probability for his interpreta-
tions of complex topics, but certainty will elude him. 
Still, in regard to fairly simple issues and in regard to 
negative conclusions (i.e. how something could not have 
happened), certitude in historical judgments is likely. 
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in Chapter Five when we take up the issue of historical 
objectivity. At this point our interest is in clarifying 
the procedures which lead the historian to make claims of 
objective knowledge. These procedures are not the same for 
every type of history. In fact, objectivity is not sought 
in every historical inquiry. Consider the exception pre-
sented by rudimentary histories of folk heroes. Clear in-
sights and correct judgments give way to other purposes in 
such accounts. Since, in this chapter we are concerned 
with the relation between historical procedures and trans-
cendental method, we must distinguish between precritical 
forms of history and the methodical operations of a pro-
fessional historical community. 
Among several features differentiating precritical 
from critical history, Lonergan emphasizes the practical 
function of the precritical. The latter seeks to streng-
then the identity of the group and to foster devotion to 
its institutions. This practical aim translates into an 
educational task: to communicate a strong appreciation of 
the group's heritage and a concern for its advancement. 
On the other hand, critical history replaces this practi-
cal aim with a concern for settling matters-of-fact. Lon-
ergan reiterates Ranke's famous maxim to characterize this 
interest in what actually happened. An argument is offered 
in support of this distinction. If the work of critical 
history is not pursued apart from political or apologetic 
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aims, the historian is likely to find himself serving two 
masters. Records will be twisted to read as he wants them 
to be read for the sake of some ulterior goal. 21 The argu-
ment can be expanded. If there is a difference between 
propaganda and history, then, no matter how many failures 
occur, the historian will still strive to detach himself 
from the apologetic concerns of precritical history. The 
alternative is an unscholarly submission to the vagaries 
of popular causes and a willingness to hold in check his 
critical abilities. Tn such a situation, attentive selec-
tivity would be foresworn. In addition, any attempt to 
justify such submission would stumble over an obvious ques-
tion: How would a historian know that he is able to produce 
only propaganda if he djd not first know of an alternate 
way of doing history? 
Further, if critical history is primarily concerned 
with judging matters-of-fact and if history proper involves 
an inquiry into what was "going forward" in the group at a 
particular time, then critical history is more than a com-
pilation of chronicles. It is not only attentive, it is 
also intelligently selective of events. On the other hand, 
chronicles work within the limits of historical experience; 
events are arranged in temporal sequence as their contem-
poraries experienced them. But a serial listing of exper-
iences does not suffice to make sense out of historical 
21 Ibid., p. 185. 
210 
processes. It is simply not intelligently selective or 
discriminating in regard to significant events. Again, 
contemporaries of the events often did not foresee the 
outcome of their actions; thus, they were unaware of the 
full significance of the events. It is up to the historian 
to work his way from isolated events to an understanding 
of the larger context. The road to understand:i.ng both the 
events and their consequences will be marked by a series of 
discoveries. As previously noted, the process of histori-
cal discovery begins with the selective question which is 
directed toward a specific issue. For Lonergan, the begin-
ning of a critical study lies with a question for histori-
cal intelligence: What was going forward in this situation 
at this time?22 
This questioning is not without its presuppositions. 
The question for historical intelligence is framed accord-
ing to the inquirer's previous historical knowledge. With-
out some prior acquaintance with the selected topic, he 
would not know what was problematic and needed further in-
quiry. So questioning begins with an incomplete under-
standing of some issue ("incomplete" because otherwise 
there would be no reason to seek to know more about the 
22Ibid., p. 187. D. H. Fischer concurs that the his-
torian moves from curiosity to controlled inquiry by means 
of questioning. See Historians' Fallacies: Toward 
of Historical Thought, p. • • G. Co ingwood m es he 
same point regarding the historian's collection of evidence. 
See The Idea of History, p. 281. 
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issue). The more familiar the historian is with the issue, 
then the more materials he will be able to use and the more 
questions he will be able to ask and the greater his appre-
ciation will be of the complexities.~! the issue. 23 In a 
word--the more intelligently selective he will be. To 
return briefly to Chapter Two, the historian's questioning 
occurs between an unknown known and a known known. The 
former is what he intends, the latter is what he brings 
to his intending. The wider his background, the better his 
chance of selecting the right questions and of intelligent-
ly directing his inquiry toward satisfactory results. 
In searching for a more complete understanding of the 
selected issue, the 'historian engages in what was previ-
ously termed an imaginative and tentative reconstruction 
of events as they have happened. There is a second aspect 
to this procedure: the heuristic. Henri Marrou has ana-
lyzed it. 24 Upon asking a question, the historian may 
23Ibid., Method in Theolo~y, p. 18? and p. 216. See 
also Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 247. Our discus-
sion in Chapter Five of the hermeneutical circle will elab-
orate this idea of historical fore-knowledge. 
24Henri-Iren~e Marrou, The Meanin~ of History, pp. 
65-66. D. H. Fischer also argues !or t e heuristic func-
tion of what he terms "operational questions." (Histor-
ians' Fallacies: Toward a Lo ic of Historical Thou ht, pp. 
• or onergan s remar s on e use of euris ic 
devices in methodical inquiry, see Method in Theolo~, p. 
22. An extended discussion of ideal types and of teories 
of history as heuristic devices is found in ibid., pp. 227-
229. Patrick Gardiner similarly locates the-va:Iue of the-
ories of history in their suggestive powers, their ability 
to illuminate histor;_cal fields. See his The Nature of 
Historical Explanati.on, p. 112. 
J 
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immediately .formulate one or more possible answers. The 
question takes the form of a hypothesis which is yet to be 
verified: "Could it be the case that •• ?ti . . With this 
type of question, the historian will be specifying the 
possibilities to be investigated; he will be giving direc-
tion to his historical inquiry. The heuristic function 
of hypothetical questions aims at a precision which is 
far from the random collection of data and the "pure see-
ing" of past events. Eventually such hypothetical probes 
require verification. But the whole purpose in making 
them specific is to anticipate the gathering of relevant 
eVidence. 
This may be the best place to enter an aside on the 
term "evidence" as it affects the select:i.ve, heuristic 
questioning of the historian. Collingwood makes the point 
that nothing is evidence except in relation to a definite 
question. 25 The historian does not attempt to embrace at 
once all the materials relevant to his topic. Tnstead, 
he proceeds by isolating key issues, figures, events; then, 
by gradually interconnecting them, he builds up an over-
view of the myriad details. The questions-hypotheses which 
give direction to his work require verification. Thus, 
just as knowing is a compound act and just as the process 
of interconnecting limited contexts is a gradual achieve-
ment, so too the determination of evidence is a step-by-
25The Idea of History, p. 281. 
step process. 
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First, the historian determines potential 
evidence, i.e. materials which are available to him and 
which may or may not be relevant to his inquiry. Second, 
he determines f'ormal evidence, i.e. ·materials which he 
actually uses to ask and to answer his questions. These 
are the materials, or data, which he determines to be rel-
evant to his initial hypotheses. Third, he determines 
actual evidence, i.e. materials which are not only rele-
vant to his topic but are used to support a judgment ei-
ther f'or or against a historical conclusion. 26 
These distinctions in the determination of' evidence 
are parallel to the pattern of' cognitional activities. Po-
tential evidence is data as available here and now f'or the 
historian's use. Formal evidence is data as available and 
understood in relation to some broader context. Actual 
eVidence is data as both available and understood and, then, 
as ref'lectively adopted f'or warranting some historical 
judgment. Arguments can reinf'orce not only these distinc-
tions but also this paralleling of' evidence and cognitional 
acts. First, research turns up more materials than will 
be relevant to a specif'ic inquiry. Selectivity intervenes 
to save the historian from entanglement in countless de-
tails of' only potential worth. Second, there are false 
starts in every type of inquiry. A heuristic insight may 
26z.rethod in Theology, p. 186. On the basis of our 
epistemological arguments in the next chapter, we will 
place restrictions on the notion of potential historical 
evidence. 
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initially seem pertinent to the matter at hand only later 
to be discarded as misleading. The investigator may have 
understood correctly; it is just that the understood evi-
dence is better used elsewhere. Third, just as inquiry 
grows more specific as a study advances, so too the evi-
dence is narrowed down. Some of the original materials 
have been discarded, some of the insights into the remain-
ing materials have been limited to remarks in footnotes; 
but other materials have been used to bolster arguments in 
the text. The historian has a reasoned interpretation to 
propose, and it will rest on the intelligently assembled 
eVidence which he thinks appropriate and convincing. 
The precedtng remarks were a digression from the heur-
istic aspect of historical inquiry even though evidence is 
anticipated by selective questions-hypotheses which probe 
for solutions to historical problems. But, just as evi-
dence is no simple historical "given," so too particular 
formulations of questions are not inviolable. They may be 
so altered during the process of investigation tha~ they 
scarcely resemble the original questions with which the 
historian began. Such changes occur when the original 
questions do not lead to satisfactory results. If in-
sights are slow in coming, then new questions will be 
formed. Gradually the historian may clarify his selected 
issues. At some point he will attempt a surmise or provi-
sional descr1ption of what he is studying. This requires 
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that he pull together the fragmentary insights into some 
kind of unity. What is involved is an interrelation of 
tentative insights. This process is the constructive as-
pect of the historian's procedures. · 
PreViously we spoke of the imaginative reconstruc-
tion of events by the historian. A creative effort on his 
part is called for if coherence is to be made of multiple 
insights. Complex issues do not unravel themselves, data 
do not simply fall into historical forms ready for publica-
tion. What is required is the use of hypotheses (the heur-
istic aspect) and the interconnection of several of them to 
form a tentative account of the chosen topic (the construc-
tive aspect). 
Tm.mediately the problem of idealism arises. Does the 
historian create or reconstruct something other than what 
actually happened? This question cannot be settled in 
advance of the historian's presentation of evidence. The 
use of constructed hypotheses and organizational schemes 
does not preclude the possibtlity of a verifiable interpre-
tation. 2? By themselves hypotheses are neither valid nor 
27Arthur Danto cites Charles Beard as one historian 
who mistakenly distinguished history and natural science 
on the basis of the historian's use of constructed hypothe-
ses. Beard thought the procedures of natural science did 
not include the use of hypotheses. The historian made use 
of them but to the detriment of his discipline. Beard was 
mistaken on two counts: (1) that scientists do not use hy-
potheses; (2) that hypotheses somehow hinder the discovery 
of verifiable interpretations. See Danto's Analytical 
Philosophy of History, pp. 99-102. 
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invalid, they are heuristic means :for reaching de.finite 
results which can then be tested. Only if there is con-
firming evidence will the historian argue that his creative 
e:ffort is headed in the right direction. But there is an 
intermediate stage where tentative descriptions persist 
or fail. I:f they lead to further related insights and i:f 
the :formed opinions coincide with the evidence as more and 
more of it is assembled, then the tentative descriptions 
will persist and develop. But i:f :further questions and in-
sights are not :forthcoming, then the historian must drop 
the proposed descriptions and try another approach. Fur-
thermore, even if more questions and insights occur on the 
basis of the original hypothesis, still he must be attain-
ing more than new sets of hypotheses. If only a series 
of surmises is being gained, the historian may be on the 
wrong track and so be in need o:f a new starting point. 28 
In short, the constructive aspect offers no guarantee that 
hypotheses and tentative.descriptions will prove accurate, 
but neither does it necessitate that the historian fiction-
alize the past. 
A :fourth aspect o:f the historian's procedure rein:for-
ces the statecent that historical :fictions can be avoided. 
"Ecstatic" is the somewhat unusual name which Lonergan 
gives to this aspect. The label refers to the outcome of 
the historical inquiry which we have already outlined. 
28Method in Theolo&, p. 187. 
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From prior historical knowledge and researched materials 
·to selective questions, to the formation of hypotheses, to 
further understanding, to converging evidence--this is a 
cumulative process. Lonergan notes ·that, as the histor-
ian's insights increase and he recognizes that his initial 
guesses were not wide of the mark, a shift occurs in the 
way the historian asks questions. Originally his hypothe-
ses were largely a matter of guesswork though prior his-
torical knowledge did lend them some focus. But the grad-
ual accumulation of insights and ·the isolation of specific 
problems yet to be solved are the basis for additional 
questions which are less dependent on guesswork and more 
directly connected with the materials under study. There 
may be a movement away from the assumptions and viewpoint 
with which the historian began. Increasingly he will be 
aware of what positions and viewpoints are pertinent to 
the issues themselves. He will leave behind previous opin-
ions regarding issues which his cumulative inquiry has now 
cast in a clearer light. To the extent that new discov-
eries are corrective of former opinions, the historian is, 
figuratively speaking, taken out of himselr. 29 Hence, 
the term "ecstatic" conveys an idea of both developing 
understanding and, if required, self-correction. 
Up to this po:tnt four aspects of the historian's pro-
cedures have been described: selectivity in materials; 
29Tbid., pp. 18?-188. 
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heuristic devices which promote possible answers to ques-
· tions; constructive schemes which elaborate initial dis-
coveries; the ecstatic discovery of the questions and 
viewpoints best suited to the issues under study. A fifth 
aspect is termed the "critical" or discriminating aspect.30 
In any lengthy inquiry the historian will recognize 
that some of his insights are superfluous. To return to a 
previous example, a study of the cotton trade between 1840 
and 1860 will involve materials from many sources. Under 
the rubric of selectivity, not all the materials will ·be 
given equal weight. But what happens in the case of potential 
30we have already used the term "critical" in refer-
ence to the relation between transcendental method, which 
formulates the performance of the subject, and cognitional 
theories about that performance. The term also occurred 
in the distinction between precritical and critical history. 
Much as in the case of "structure" and "ideology," the word 
"critical" suffers from overuse and a consequent vagueness. 
It has a general meaning in philosophical thought: critical 
thinking is doubting, questioning. The "critical spirit" 
is philosophical intelligence committed to question every-
thing. Ideally the philosopher hopes to take nothing for 
granted. 
Lonergan's use of transcendental method is critical 
in this latter sense. He begtns his project, not with a 
statement, but with a performance, namely, the act of ques-
tioning. To attempt to doubt questioning requires a ques-
tion: Do questions occur? There.fore, his starting point 
is a commonly experienced, indubitable act. (See rnsight, 
p. 330.) Lonergan shares this "critical" starting point 
.with Emerich Coreth and other members of the rather loose-
ly allied school of Transcendental Thomism. While their 
positions develop along different lines, they are in agree-
ment that human performance, and not some theory about 
that performance, should be the .foundation. Lonergan ana-
lyzes Coreth's starting point, in "I1etaphysics as Horizon," 
in Collection, pp. 214-215. 
Since some confusion could result from these multi-
ple meanings of the term "critical," we will use the term 
"discriminating" to characterize the fifth aspect of his-
torical procedures. 
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evidence will recur in regard to formal evidence. - !nsights 
based on certain materials may at first seem relevant, but 
continued study may show them to be otherwise. For exam-
ple, the historian may at first suspect that a depressed 
cotton market in 1850 resulted from overproduction in the 
newly planted areas west of the Mississippi. Further in-
vestigation, however, may determine that levels of produc-
tion were steady in these areas a number of years prior to 
1850, and no increase in production was recorded in that 
year. The assembled materials and accumulated insights on 
these areas and their productivity may be of use in ano-
ther study, but they contri_bute nothing posit;_ ve to an 
understanding of the depressed market. In short, the his-
torian will discriminate between insights suitable to his 
topic and those which are not. Here one notices the self-
correcting process of historical-learning. 
Lonergan is more specific in regard to this discrimi-
nating function. He distinguishes between direct and in-
verse instghts.31 The former involve an understanding of 
how multiple details fit together; the latter occur when 
the inquirer recognizes that the details being worked with 
do not fit the matter under study. That is, they throw no 
light on the problem to be solved.32 In our previous 
31For an extended discussion of inverse insights as 
well as examples of them, see Tnsight, pp. 19-25. 
32Method in Theolog~, p. 188. Inverse insights do 
occur. Anyone who has, a ter much labor, discovered that 
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example, th~ discoveries about cotton production in newly 
cultivated areas did not account for the depressed state 
of the market in 1850. Those discoveries may be of some 
use in other studies, but it will take a direct insight 
into their applicability before they will be put to use. 
In other words, inverse insights can be followed by direct 
insights which grasp the suitability for a new context of 
what did not fit into an earlier context. 
In summary, five aspects of the historian's process 
of developing understanding have been noted. The process 
is selective, for not all the available materials can be 
used and not all are of equal importance. It is heuristic 
because the historian anticipates the unknown by precise 
questions. It is constructive in that he synthesizes 
fragmentary insights in a tentative description which focus-
ses future inquiry. It is ecstatic because the historian 
he has been on the wrong track will recognize what is meant 
by the above description. But there is a problem which 
should not be overlooked. How is the historian to deter-
mine "what fits" or "what does not fit" in regard to an ex-
planation? He may in fact conscript some materials as evi-
dence which do not prove the specific argument he is mak-
ing. D. H. ~'ischer labels such a mistake the "fallacy of 
the irrelevant proof'." (Historians' Fallacies: Toward a 
Logic of Historical Thought, pp. 45-47.) Similarly the 
historian may omit as irrelevant those details which, if 
entertained, would seriously challenge his present inter-
pretation. Decisions on the relevancy of materials may be 
influenced by bias--witnessed either in an overeagerness 
to shore up one's shaky po§ition with irrelevant proofs or 
in the bli~ders which conveniently excl~de damaging evi-
dence. The critical, or "discriminating,'~- aspect of the 
historian's procedure is in need of another critical func-
tion, namely, the one formalized in the transcendental pre-
cepts. Section Three will elaborate this second form of 
critique. 
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gradually c~mes to depend less on initial hunches -and more 
on the viewpoints suggested by the materials which he is 
beginning to understand. Finally, the process is discrim-
inating, for he distinguishes between insights which are 
appropriate to his task and those which have nothing to 
contribute through a self-correcting process.33 
33Ibid., Method in Theology, pp. 188-189. Lonergan 
remarks t1iat a aistinctive characteristic of critical his-
tory is the double occurrence of these five aspects. First, 
the historian must understand his sources, their authors, 
social contexts, purposes. Second, he must employ his un-
derstanding of the sources in order to learn about his 
selected topic. !n the former instance, he concentrates 
on understanding the intentions of authors, their projects, 
and how they carr~ed them out. !n the latter instance, he 
uses what he has learned from the sources to understand the 
events which are referred to in them. There is a recipro-
cal aspect to this duplication of the process of historical 
understanding. Insight into original sources casts light 
on the events under study. A developing understanding of 
the events may lead to new insights into and uses for the 
original source materials. In both instances the histori-
ian will be selective in his use of materials, creative in 
putting questions to them, discriminating in respect to an 
author's strengths and weaknesses, and concerned with ap-
plying a proper grasp of someone else's perspective to the 
events under investigation. See i~id., p. 189. 
On these issues Lonergan is speaking from his own 
experience. His works on Aquinas' various notions of grace 
and of the act of judgment provided him with a practical 
understanding of historical method. Cf. Verbu.m: word and 
Idea in Aquinas, edited by David B. Burrell (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1970); and Grace and Free-
dom (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). The different 
schools of thought surrounding Aquinas' various theories 
had to be related to what Aquinas himself wrote. This 
work with both primary and secondary sources required a 
discriminating use of secondary sources as well as a con-
structive approach to the different positions as Aquinas 
developed them over a period of years. 
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A Sixth Aspect: The Reflective-Judicial 
Our discussion of five aspects of historical proced-
ures pointed out the primacy of the question for historical 
intelligence: "What was the long-term economic condi-
tion ••• ?" After much labor the historian may in fact suc-
ceed in isolating the relevant materials, in forming them 
into a provisional web of interconnected insights, in grasp-
ing solutions to multiple secondary problems, in attaining 
and overview of the whole topic. If that is the case, then 
a new question arises: "Is my grasp of the materials, ·of 
their interconnections, and of the selected topic accur-
ate?" This is a question for reflection.34 It is answered 
in the affirmative or the negative, or the historian begs 
off for a time with an "I do not know." But, whatever his 
answer, he makes a judgment about his understanding of the 
topic: That it is accurate, erroneous, or insufficient at 
the present tj_me. This aspect of the historian's procedure 
is named the reflective or judicial aspect. 
Given a limited topic and the competence to handle 
complex issues, the historian is likely to bring his in-
quiry to a close. To reach that end, he must answer ques-
tions, interrelate answers to form a coherent whole, and 
support his interpretations with evidence. This process 
may not proceed smoothly. He may have to retrace his steps 
34The distinction between questions for intelligence 
and questions for reflection is treated in Insight, pp. 
271-274. 
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because new .discoveries require a correction of previous 
positions. Points previously thought crucial may be de-
moted to footnotes; obscure materials may eventually be 
the central pillars of his historical thesis.35 But the 
process is unlikely to go on indefinitely. Eventually the 
historian covers what are to him all the relevant issues; 
he asks the seemingly important questions and makes dis-
coveries which clarify the complex issues. How does he 
recognize his proximity to the end of an investigation? 
Lonergan suggests that the cessation of further relevant 
questions is a sign of such proximity. His argument is 
convincing. As noted in an earlier part of this section, 
an understanding of some issue can be corrected, comple-
mented, or revised only if further discoveries pertaining 
to the issue are po~sible. The condition for this possi-
bility is the occurrence of further relevant questions. 
If, in fact, all the relevant questions have been asked 
and answered, then an understanding cannot be significantly 
altered. Hence, the historian can affirm the validity of 
his interpretation.36 
A qualifying statement must be entered immediately. 
The judicial aspect is part of the intelligent and rational 
work of fallible individuals. The absence of further rele-
vant questions may be a sign that an individual's under-
35Method in Theology, pp. 190-191. 
3Gibid., p. 191. 
r 
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standing is sufficient. If in ~ there are no more ques-
tions, then his understanding is correct. But in history 
it is more likely that complex issues are never closed is-
sues. The historian's knowledge is admittedly limited; 
so, when he experiences the cessation of his own questions, 
he simultaneously should note the possibility of new ques-
tions from his professional colleagues. For him there may 
be no problems left unresolved, but the limits of his 
knowledge require a caveat about claims to offer the defin-
itive account. As far as he knows, the issues have been 
thoroughly explored, but another historian may uncover evi-
dence which demands startling revisions. And besides the 
discovery of new evidence, there is the previously men-
tioned dialectic of historical knowledge. To reconcile the 
historical event with its outcome is in many cases an un-
finished task. Recent events or events of long-range sig-
nificance (e.g. the colonization of Africa by European na-
tions) continue to have consequences for groups which were 
not contemporaries of the original events. The signifi-
cance of such past events may be tied to events in the 
future. Consequently, no final word is possible on their 
role in hjstorical developments.37 
37rbid., pp. 191-192. At this same place, Lonergan 
points o~hat both the discovery of new sources of in-
formation and the as-yet-indeterminate meaning of recent 
events do not invalidate the results of competent histori-
cal work. The massive evidence and the arguments which 
support previous interpretations must be taken into account 
by later historians. Some interpretations may be refuted, 
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In short, given the fallibility of the historian and 
the two sources of possible revisions, historical judg-
ments are usually only probaole.38 We say "usually" be-
cause negative judgments are often likely to warrant claims 
of certitude. The historian can be certain that a charter 
attributed to Charlemagne is a forgery if it mentions indi-
viduals or events of a later period. But to discover whose 
work the charter actually was is a more difficult task. 
The inferential work of the historical detective may es-
tablish with certainty who was not at the scene of the 
cr:i.me: but to find the guilty party may depend on purely 
circumstantial evidence. 
The reflective or judicial aspect of historical pro-
cedure occurs a second time in the commentary and criticism 
of the professional historical community. Evaluations pub-
lished in journals and delivered in papers at conventions 
provide an institutional check on the research and conclu-
sions of the individual historian. !n order to understand 
the work of a fellow-historian, others will follow the 
procedure previously outlined. The discriminating aspect 
others de-emphasized, and still others filled out. But 
well-argued historical positions rarely cease to be of 
further use to later scholars. 
3811But as in natural science, so too in critical 
history the positive content of judgment aspires to be no 
more than the best available opinion." Ibid., p. 191. 
For a brief statement of the change in scientific ideals 
from certitude to probability, see Lonergan's "Dimensions 
of Meaning," in Collection, p. 259. 
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will be part of their evaluations. Just as the individual 
historian discriminated between insights which were rele-
vant to his topic and those which were not, so his suc-
cessors, who perhaps have a-broader understanding of his 
topic, will discriminate between his valuable insights 
and conclusions and those which in time prove faulty.39 
Lonergan remarks that this discriminating function 
of the professional historical community provides histor-
ical knowledge which historians presuppose when they begin 
their inquiries.40 The cumulative work of past historians 
is a reservoir upon which a historian may draw in framing 
hypotheses, locating evidence, and avoiding faulty argu-
ments. By discriminating between the strengths and weak-
nesses of past works, other historians will avoid uncriti-
cal homage to their predecessors and may learn how those 
earlier scholars made breakthroughs in the development of 
critical history. Procedures followed in the present are 
owed to the efforts of those predecessors--both efforts 
which succeeded and those which failed. 
In summary, this second section of Chapter Four has 
outlined the intelligent and rational procedures which, 
in the absence of bias or intellectual deficiency, lead to 
39Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 193. 
4~ention was made of this point in Chapter Two 
when we discussed the objective (i.e. public) aspects of 
the historian's relative horizon. 
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historical knowledge.41 These procedures (e.g. the use of 
hypotheses, the interconnection of limited contexts, the 
tentative formulation of an overview) belong to the surface 
operations which, Hayden White argues, are ultimately de-
termined by subjective preferences. Now the purpose of 
this chapter is to establish critical grounds for sanction-
ing theoretical operations on the surface of the historical 
text. Consequently, the third section of the chapter will 
argue that the previously outlined procedures can conform 
to transcendental method and, hence, be free of subjective 
bias. 
41A possible objection to this remark is made by 
those who claim that bias is precisely what is never absent 
from historical procedures. But all that we have asserted 
is that these procedures are means to historical knowledge. 
(Chapter Eight of Method in Theology is written within the 
same limits; see pp. 195 and 196.) Something may interfere 
with attempts to do critical history. One of the forms of 
bias may misdirect or limit these procedures. But that 
possibility does not negate the worth of the procedures; 
it only establishes the need to thematize the basic cogni-
tional acts which support the procedures and to apply re-
flectively one's newly acquired self-knowing to any obsta-
cles presented by bias. 
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THE POSSTBILITY OF DETACHMENT 
This third section forwards the project of Chapter 
Four by linking the procedures outlined in the preceding 
section to transcendental method. It will be argued that 
the conformity of these procedures to transcendental meth-
od is the criterion of detachment from subjective bias. 
In Chapter Three we argued that cognitional structure pro-
vides a critical basis for a subsequent evaluation of pre-
critical elements in a historian's perspective. Among 
such precritical elements are subjective variables whi~h 
antecedently sanction surface procedures. Hayden White 
has brilliantly explicated and categorized some of these 
variables. But we have supplemented his list with the 
content of the historian's basic horizon. This addition 
gives us some access to the sources of h1.storical conflicts.· 
By formulating the cognitional structure which is implicit 
in every basic horizon, we can criticize diverse preconcep-
tions which both produce historical conflicts and condi-
tion the historian's surface procedures. 
Furthermore, we have argued that, insofar as trans-
cendental method formulates the a priori structure of human 
knowing, it can be considered part of the "deep structure" 
of historical works. Consequently, the manifest procedures 
will presuppose the pattern of conscious acts formulated 
in transcendental method. Now some preconceptions and 
forms of bias may block the spontaneous sequence of 
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cognitional ~cts, and they may misdirect historical proced-
ures. But if transcendental method permits a critique of 
historical preconceptions, and if it has a normative func-
tion in regard to historical procedures, then these obsta-
cles to understanding can be located and alternate ways 
of proceeding can be suggested. 
A major implication of the preceding argument is 
that bias is not an irreducible component of every histor-
ical work. On the one hand, there is an invariant basis 
for a critique of bias which is already established in a 
historical perspective. On the other hand, the normative 
function of transcendental method is a counterweight to 
new forms of bias. Both the argument and its implications 
must be further analyzed. The analysis will be carried out 
in two parts. First, the relation between transcendental 
method and specific canons governing theoretical procedures 
will be sketched. Our purpose is to exemplify the norma-
tive function of transcendental method in regard to special 
methods. ·Second, the issue of detachment must be closely 
studied. Types of bias which hinder the development of 
understanding and which interfere with the mentioned pro-
cedures will be contrastea to a limited detachment. 
The second section of this chapter outlined proced-
ures which, in the absence of any interfering bias, lead 
to historical knowledge. In general terms, "bias" is a 
distortion of spontaneous intellectual development. It 
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sets up obs~acles which bring the process of understanding 
to a premature conclusion. The multiple ways in which 
understanding may be blocked will be treated below. 
The Six Aspects in Relation to Transcendental Method 
At this point our task is to relate historical pro-
cedures to transcendental method. The process of attain-
ing historical knowledge was analyzed under six distinct 
aspects. The first aspect--that of selectivity--presumes 
that historical materials, or data, are not brute givens 
which the historian passively receives. Rather, they are 
materials for his project, i.e. pieces of evidence in 
which he is interested on the basis of their possible 
relevance to his chosen task. Historical materials thus 
belong to a context defined by the interests and competence 
of the historian. On the one hand, not all materials are 
pertinent to a limited topic; on the other, the finite 
historian usually cannot handle all the materials which 
his predecessors have accumulated. And of what is avail-
able and within his reach he will want to make a discrim-
inating use. But this need to select and to exclude gives 
an opening to bias. The historian's decisions may be based 
on factional or party interests. Then his attentiveness 
will be divided between the materials and the predetermined 
position which they are to support. His partisan attitude 
will narrow his attentive selectivity so as to exclude those 
materials which appear to threaten the party line. They 
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must be ignored or else molded to fit the desired ·conclu-
sion. 
In contrast, it is possible that a detached histor-
ian will not allow his attention to be narrowed in such a 
way. He can do this by subordinating the practical aims 
of precritical history to the more developed techniques 
and aims of critical history. !n other words, the his-
torian's social and cultural values are not eliminated, 
but they can take second place to the spontaneous desire 
to understand the materials and, through the latter, to 
settle matters-of-fact. He is not substituting passive 
indifference for an active interest in getting the record 
straight. Repeated efforts to subord.;_nate all other con-
cerns to the desire to understand require a personal dedi-
cation that is alien to the passive spectator.42 His 
efforts are directed toward a change in priority from the 
interests of the propagandizer to the interests of the 
ideally impartial historian. 
This ideal is not easily attained, but the effort 
42Friedrich Meinecke comments on the personal dedica-
tion evidenced by Ranke. He held an exaggerated view of the 
historian's detachment which was in contrast to the mark of 
personal genius stamped on what he himself produced. "Ranke 
was always anxious to show 'what things had really been 
like'. Jn order to let the centuries come through with all 
their mighty power, he would have liked as it were to ef-
face his own personality. This, as has often been rightly 
pointed out, was a wish that could not be fulfilled. And 
yet, however paradoxical this may sound, he needed this de-
sire to inspire him to produce the highest of which he was 
capable." Friedrich Meinecke, "Leopold von Ranke," (Memor-
ial Address to the .Prussian Academy of Sciences, January 
23, 1936), reprinted in Historism, p. 498. 
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need not be wholly individual. The historian has been 
trained in his discipline; a professional community watches 
over his work, and his failures to make an honest use of 
historical materials will not go forever unnoticed. But 
both the stewardship of that community and the individual's 
effort to subordinate other interests to his desire to make 
competent use of available materials will be incarnations 
of the transcendental precept, Be attentive. How else 
could that stewardship be exercised and those efforts be 
made if this preliminary norm of the knowing process did 
not implicitly guide attempts to know through attentive 
selectivity? 
A second aspect of the historian's procedure, the 
heuristic, was located between historical curiosity and 
professional research. Curiosity becomes controlled in-
quiry by taking the form of a precise question. A ques-
tion is an act of intending which occurs between the as-
yet-unknown and the known. As such it anticipates what is 
to be known, and that anticipation is guided by prior know-
' 
ledge. rn controlled inquiry the anticipations which take 
the form of questions or hypotheses are usually guided by 
rules or canons.43 In historical studies such canons are 
often adopted from other disciplines though they may be re-
stated in ordinary language terms. D. H. ~1ischer recommends 
43Lonergan gives a detailed description of canons of 
empirical method in Chapter Three of Tnsight, pp. 70-102. 
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seven canons or, as he calls them, "seven rules of thumb," 
which in controlling historical inquiry may guide the his-
torian past some of ·the pitfalls in historical research. 44 
As guides to historical practice, these rules work against 
indeliberate factual errors in research. Since historical 
ignorance is dispelled by answering questions, it is impor-
tant to avoid answers which only appear to satisfy the ori-
ginal inquiry. And if that avoidance is not guaranteed 
in advance, some guides to controlled inquiry are warranted. 
Now questions which originate in spontaneous curios-
ity require a good deal of intelligence if they are to be 
part of a professional investigation. Direction must be 
given to them; they must be formulated so as to serve the 
needs of a $elected topic. But these requirements are ano-
ther way of saying that the historian must be intelligent. 
Again, this is no surprising discovery but merely the expli-
cation of an implicit routine. Similarly the canons which 
guide historical inquiry are developed in response to an 
44Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Histori-
cal Thought, pp. 62-63. Two of these "seven rules of thumb" 
can be briefly summarized. Historians recognize that not 
all the evidence pertinent to a problem is of equal worth. 
A canon of immediacy requ:i.res that the best relevant evi-
dence be selected. Usually this canon dictates that pri-
ority be given to evidence most immediate to the events 
under study. A second canon--a canon of affirmation--re-
quires that evidence always be affirmative. A lack of 
evidence for the occurrence of an event does not prove 
that the event did not take place. Rather, affirmative 
evidence alone can prove that an event never took place. 
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inner imperative. The immanent requirement is that the 
spontaneous desire to know be allowed to develop, and the 
canons of a particular method are developed to forward 
that process. Tn fact, the road from a sometimes whimsical 
curios:tty to a methodical investigation is long. Fields of 
inquiry must be d:tfferentiated, their limits set, and prop-
er tools assembled. Once in hand these tools or methods 
are themselves heuristic devices which guide intelligent 
inquiry and discourage unintelligent conclusions. They 
mark the difference between controlled inquiry and the 
random question of the child because they restrict the 
excusable errors of competent sc:holars and show the proper 
way of amending faulty positions. 
The third aspect of the historian's procedure was 
derived from his use of constructed sets of hypotheses, 
e.g. the division of history in to peri_ ods and in to geo-
graphical areas.45 Both divisions and constructed sets of 
hypotheses are employed to focus the inquiry. What they 
proVide is an antecedent framework which ideally situates 
45"The division of history into perjods is not a 
fact, but a necessary hypothesis or tool of thought, valid 
in so far as it is illuminating, and dependent for its val-
idity on interpretation. Historians who differ on the 
question of when the ~iddle Ages ended differ in their in-
terpretation of certain events. The questton is not a 
question of fact; but it is also not meaningless. The div-
ision of history into geographical sectors is equally not 
a fact, but a hypothesis: to speak of European history may 
be a valid and fruitful hypothesis in some contexts, mis-
lead~ng and mischievous in others." Edward Hallett Carr, 
What Is History?, pp. ?6-??. 
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the details of a selected topic. One historian has collec-
ted common hypotheses about the preconditions to civil 
wars.46 Some twenty-one hypotheses gathered under five 
different headings exemplify both the narrowing function 
of the hypothesis and its usefulness as an antecedent frame-
work. For example, under the heading of social precondi-
tions to civil wars, there is the hypothesis that a lack 
of social mobility breeds frustration which in turn may 
foster revolutionary actions. This constructive sugges-
tion adds an intelligent direction to the desire to under-
stand how civil wars originate. In order to test this hypo-
thesis, the historian must apply it to the records of revo-
lutionary movements. Such a process of verification is 
described by the remaining three aspects of historical 
procedures. 
The critical or discriminating aspect consists of 
decisions which separate useful insights from those which 
distract the historian from his chosen topic. The process 
of understanding a complex issue will frequently turn up 
inverse insights, those "dead ends" which make no positive 
contribution to a specified issue. Tn putting these in-
sights aside, the historian makes use of a canon of rele-
vance. In history more than accuracy in one's facts is 
required. The historian must also get the "right facts 
46Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," 
Studies in. the Philosophy of History, pp. 127-128. 
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right. n4? I.t does no ·good to prove that a man was a sun-
shine patriot if the issue at stake is his possible col-
laboration with an enemy occupying his country. 
The discriminating aspect also applies to the use of 
constructed hypotheses. Just as hunches may lead the his-
torian astray, so formulated guesses in the form of pre-
cise hypotheses may carry him down a blind alley. Even-
tually he may recognize that he is headed away from his 
selected topic. Then a new beginning must be made. And 
the basis for th~s turn in his thinking will be the inverse 
insight that a prev:tous strategy was wayward. 48 The pur-
suit of understanding thus may be on the wrong track for a 
time, but human intelligence can be self-correcting. The 
primary need tb be intelligent can require a change in 
' 4?,.A historian must not merely get the facts right. 
He must get the right facts right. From this a simple 
rule of relevance may be deduced: historical evidence must 
be a direct answer to the question asked and not to some 
other question." D. H. Fischer, Htstorians' Fallacies: 
Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. 62. For a liumor-
ous incident in which this rule was violated, see ibid., 
pp. 46-47. Lonergan describes a canon of relevance-wliich 
is part of empirical method in Insight, pp. 76-78. 
48To recognize that inverse insights occur is to rec-
ognize the fallibility of applied tnsights. That is, when 
applied to a concrete situation, insights may be irrele-
vant--a supposed solution may be no more than wishi"ul think-
ing. But insights do not mark the end of the knowing pro-
cess; they must be verified and critically appraised. The 
obviousness of this plus the frequency with which Lonergan 
points it out make it hard to understand how one commenta-
tor could charge that Lonergan overlooked the possibility 
of self-deception in applying insights to concrete problems. 
See J\,ndrew J. Reck, "Bernard Lonergan's Theory of Tnquiry 
vis-a-vis American Thought," in The Nature of Philosophical 
Inquiry, p. 24~. For Lonergan's reply to this commentator, 
see "Response, in~., p. 256. 
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basic strategies. How else can one account for the occur-
rence of inverse insights and the changes in strategy 
which follow? This self-correct;_ng procedure is an intel-
ligent alternative to any stubborn maintenance of positions 
which, after the battle has been lost, survive only through 
rear-guard actions. The desire to understand can, through 
trai.ning, become wary of such total investments in attrac-
tive hypotheses. After all, the constructs of the histor-
ian are intended to illuminate the past and not to dictate 
automatically what must have been. 
The self-correcting function of human intelligence 
has been located under the critical or discriminating as-
pect of historical understanding, but its results are best 
placed under the ecstatic aspect. For if a historian's 
initial guesswork proves misleading and if he corrects 
those early missteps, he will be exper~enc:tng the detach-
ment of human intelligence. Not to cling to his first sur-
mises but to outdistance them as his understanding broadens 
and demands revisions will be the occasion both for an ex-
perience and an understanding of his own intelligent unbi-
ased transcendence of developed systems and symbolic con-
structs. 
The historian may not advert to his own critical 
consciousness, but the experience of learning through the 
sometimes slow, sometimes fast, accumulation of insights 
will provide some sign of his self-correcti.ng transcendence 
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of particular theories and perspectives. He may succeed 
in subordinating his ambition (e.g. his ambition to preserve 
a position won at hard labor) to his desire for further 
understanding. In this case, he will probably recognize 
the meaning of the word "ecstatic" when it is applied to 
the process of historical understanding. On the other 
hand, he is also acqua1nted with the feeling of reluctance 
which often opposes new discoveries when they are in con-
flict with personally accepted interpretations. But he 
may also recall his experience of and response to a desire 
for more adequate interpretations. Not an external stimu-
lus but an immanent desire to know will push him beyond 
old stances to the renewed efforts of inquiry. 
As noted previously under the heuristic aspect, hypo-
theses require verification. The historian may have omit-
ted irrelevant 1 insights and materials and he may have as-
sumed a perspective proper to his topic, but the activity 
of weighing evidence and of rechecking the interconnected 
pieces of the historical puzzle remains. Here one encoun-
ters the validating reflective aspect of historical pro-
cedures, the sixth aspect. 
There is a long-standing controversy over the role 
of judgment in history because various types and levels 
of judgment have been confused. Usually the issue centers 
on moral verdicts passed on those no longer able to def end 
themselves and on actions which cannot be altered no matter 
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what the verdict.49 This part of the controversy cannot 
-
be treated here, for it would require a lengthy digression 
into moral philosophY and it is not to our purpose. But 
there is another part of the controversy which must be dis-
cussed. That is the question of value-free judgmental 
studies in history. 
In the first place, critical history is distinguished 
from its less developed predecessors by the primacy accor-
ded to judgments of fact. But the controversial issue of 
value-free analysis is not limited to the obvious duty.of 
the historian to separate fact and legend. Rather, the 
issue is one of value judgments which assert, not neces-
sarily what was good or bad (in a moral sense), but what 
counted as significant events for groups both in the past 
and in the .present.50 !n precritical history the signifi-
. 
cant events o~ legends are those which stir an audience to 
patriotic fervor. To the extent that critical history ab-
stains from this criterion of historical significance, it 
may be free of the more unsophisticated value judgments 
49Hans Meyerhoff presents a respectable selection of 
some of the major articles written on this issue. See his 
The Philosophy of History in Our Time, for articles by 
Geoffrey Barraclough, Herbert Butterfield, Sir Isaiah Ber-
lin, Jacob Burckhardt, Reinhold Niebuhr. 
50The selection of "significant" events is a value-
charged operation, and its inevitability for the historian 
has been the basis for multiple denials of the possibility 
of historical objectivity. For a survey of the controver-
sial issues involved, see William H. Dray, Philosothy of 
History (.Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ha 1, 
1964), pp. 21-39. 
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which are manifestly a part of propaganda. Also, .in empha-
sizing the need to settle matters-of-fact, critical history 
is free of a wide range of pragmatic values. Facts require 
a prior interconnection of evidentiary materials. But 
pragmatic value judgments in history have often settled 
for much less; namely, that what is asserted be capable 
of educating an audience in the "wisdom" of the past.51 
Their appeal to evidence will forego an empirical base for 
one which conforms to the ideological needs of the writer. 
However, there is a sense in which history is always 
judgmentally value-laden. The process of selectivity re-
quires that the historian determine what is worth recount-
ing. If he does 'not evaluate, he will be left with an in-
discriminate heap of materials. A straight chronology of 
events might a~oid value judgments, but then the chronicle 
is not critical history. So the historian must evaluate 
in order to form interpretations of the past. Again, if 
his primary aim is to settle matters-of-fact, then value 
judgments; particularly those which advance any ethical 
position of the author, will play subordinate roles. But 
it is perhaps only in the monograph or the archival report 
that this subordination can be safely assumed.52 Even in 
51Method in Theolog;r, p. 232. 
52Hayden White allows these two exceptions to his 
formal theory of historical works. See his Preface to 
Metahistory, p. ix. For more comprehensive studies, W'hite 
insists that value judgments are unavoidable and that they 
manifest prior subjective opinions. Now unless one is 
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these works of very limited scope, a historian will be sel-
ective, and so evaluation will not be entirely absent. 
The preceding remarks have not been a digression 
from our attempts to relate the judicial aspect to trans-
cendental method. Historical procedures which gain direc-
tion through selective value judgments gradually yield 
partial accounts which isolate and clarify subordinate is-
sues in a more general topic. Then partial contexts have 
to be brought together to form a coherent account of the 
whole. If, after constructing this larger context, the 
historian has answered what to him were the sj_gnificant 
questions, he is ready to make another type of judgment. 
This time the judgment refers not to the parts but to the 
whole work. He does not require additional evidence if 
his questions for :intelligence have all been answered. 
There will only remain the question for reflection, "Is 
it the case that ••• ?" And this question requires a 
review question, "Does the evidence prove that • • • ?" 
The reflective judgment of the whole then follows upon this 
review of the total deposit of evidence. In asking the 
question for reflection and in reviewing the evidence, the 
judger experiences the transcendental precept: Be reasonable. 
willing to hold that all value judgments are biased, the 
discovery of personal evaluation in historical works is 
not automatically grounds for historical skepticism. 
There is at least the possibility of objective valuing. 
Chapter Five will give a limited consideration to this 
possibility. 
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Previously we noted how the absence of further rele-
vant questions for intelligence had to be qualified. We 
also remarked on two· sources of possible revision. New 
information may require a change in prior historical in-
terpretations; new consequences of a past event may modify 
the meaning originally ascribed to it. But then there 
will be other historians and new projects to handle the 
new information. What these later inquiries will say of 
an outdated work will vary. But if an earlier author 
was intellectually competent and made use of the evidence 
available to him, his successors will not charge that he 
was unreasonable or dishonest. His conclusions may have 
been the best available opinion of his day. However, new 
insights are possible today which go beyond the scope of 
his work. Consequently, his labors will be judged inade-
quate, but they will not be dismissed simply as a collec-
tion of errors. Tn short, the inadequacies of his work 
will be challenged, but any strong points will be built 
upon by succeeding generations. 
A precondition to this cumulative historical effort 
is a recognition of previous authors as intelligent in 
their procedures and as honest in their judgments of fact. 
-And if later historians are to recognize these strong 
points, they in turn must be familiar with the judicial 
aspect of their own procedures. This familiarity is evi-
denced in statements to the effect that one can understand 
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how another historian could base a reasonable judgment on 
evidence which to present writers is no longer sui'ficient. 
A common imperative; most probably unexpressed, is the bas-
is for such a sympathetic understanding. Those later his-
torians will understand the immanent imperative to be rea-
sonable, and they will have noted the efforts of a predeces-
sor to conform to that common imperative. 
The theme throughout the precedi_ng paragraphs has 
been that historical procedures and canons are developments 
of critical consciousness. An individual is born to whim-
sical curiosity, and eventually he may enter the world of 
scholarship and science in which that curiosity becomes 
methodical. Through the example of other historians and 
through training in several fields, the individual histor-
ian becomes a master of his profession. In addition, he 
may become an expert in numismatics so as to relate more 
thoroughly the economic decline of the Roman Empire. He 
may study contemporary physics so as to relate the history 
of science in the twentieth century. In most instances, 
he will find himself drawing upon discoveries and methods 
which have a wider application outside the historical 
field.53 Our theme has been that these procedures have a 
common origin in the spontaneous desire to know which 
53Historical adaptations o~ psychoanalytic concepts, 
of statistical patterns. of carbon-datjng techniques come 
to mind as examples of borrowed tools which historians 
turn to their own purposes. 
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first expresses itself in the child's curiosity. But this 
desire is only an anticipation of knowledge and not know-
ledge itself. A process of intellectual development must 
supervene, so that differentiated techniques can be formu-
lated. In turn, these techniques will be the distinguish-
ing marks of competent inquiries in science, mathematics, 
history, philosophy.54 The techniques themselves are an-
ticipations of knowledge, but now curiosity is controlled 
inquiry. And, more significantly, what is controlled are 
also those interests, feelings, and spontaneous opinions 
which belong to daily living. 
Our conclusion is that the procedures of historical 
( 
understanding originate in the spontaneities of human in-
telligence and rationality. Since the procedures are prod-
ucts of a spontaneous desire to know, a critical method 
which formulates the patterned development of that desire 
will have a normative function in regard to its products. 
Transcendental method is such a formulation. Since it is 
based on the universal and invariant structure of human 
knowing, it will be a general controlling method (or cri-
terion) of all those derivative procedures and specialized 
54"Finally intellectual development has its roots 
in the detached and disinterested desire to know; but the 
mere desire is not knowledge of anything; it will lead to 
highly differentiated structures that are masteries of 
logic, mathematics, natural science, common sense, philos-
ophy, and human science; but these intelligible differen-
tiations are yet to come, and they come only in and through 
the process of development." Insight, p. 453. 
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methods. And since it is based on a performance which is 
prior to all theorizing, it supplies a priori grounds for 
criticizing all theoretical procedures irrespective of an.y 
subjective preferences. The intelligibility and reason-
ableness of such procedures is not left to individual var-
iables. In short, transcendental method independently of 
subjective preferences can sanction the procedures which 
occur on the surface of the historical text. 
Yet it is a fact that one and the same subject can 
be dedicated to scholarly work and still experience the 
pull of ambition which counsels haste over careful research. 
Periodically a scandal will occur in some scientific group 
because experimental results were falsified for the sake of 
public acclaim. Such falsification is condemned unequivo-
cally. More than the reputation of the profession is at 
stake; there is a prior commitment to intellectual honesty. 
!n terms that we have been using--there is a prior commit-
ment to intelligence and reasonableness, a prior trust is 
placed in-the spontaneous development of the desire to know. 
We have argued that certain procedures forward this 
spontaneous development, and that, in the absence of bias, 
they do lead to historical knowledge. We have also argued 
that transcendental method can sanction these procedures 
irrespective of subjective preferences. But our arguments 
are incomplete. A direct response must be made to the 
relativist who claims that bias is what can never be absent 
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from the finished historical product. Even though we will 
postpone a discussion of moral conversion until the next 
chapter, we will be able to give a direct response to the 
relativist in this chapter. So far we have established a 
criterion for that detachment which, when accompanied by 
the controlling techniques of a discipline, promises re-
sults untainted by bias. That criterion is the repeated 
advertence to the immanent imperative of one's own critical 
consciousness, it is the continual advertence to the spon-
taneous desire to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, 
and responsible. It remains to show that such detachment 
is in fact possible. 
TyJ>es of Bias 
First, we must consider the obstacles to that possi-
bility. There are multiple barriers to detachment; there 
are multiple forms of bias. Bias can be generally described 
as a distortion of the subject's spontaneous intellectual 
development. In Insight, Lonergan analyzes four forms of 
bias which distort and interfere with the process of com-
ing to know.55 They are dramatic bias, individual bias, 
group bias, and general bias. 
Dramatic bias is located in the subject's precon-
scious refusal to admit certain ideas about hjmself and 
55The major sections given over to an analysis of the 
forms of bias are, in Insight, pp. 191-206 and 218-238. 
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his behavio~. If his rejection of self-understanding is 
carried on for very long, the intersubjective checks on 
individual behavioral aberrations will be excluded. Then 
the subject withdraws into a closed world of fantasy which 
yields little understanding of other people's actions and 
which aggravates the subject's own isolated condition by 
condoning behavior which will be misunderstood both by the 
subject himself and by others. 
Usually one can expect that, if dramatic bias goes 
unchecked, it will gradually infect the healthy parts ·or 
the subject's life. If the subject is a scholar, his work 
will eventually suffer. Isolated failures to understand 
himself and to act reasonably may affect how well he inter-
prets the lives of other people. For the historian writ-
ing a biography, those discoveries which he rejects in re-
gard to his own life, he may also avoid in regard to the 
life he is studying. In Chapter Two, we proposed a thesis 
about relative horizons: the richer the historian's own ex-
perience and the more comprehensive his self-understanding, 
the more likely he is to write competently about complex 
matters. But dramatic bias may lessen his attentiveness 
to certain subtleties in the historical career he is in-
vestigating. JPcplanations of the historical figure's 
behavior may not occur to the historian simply because 
they too closely resemble explanations which he has been 
avoiding about his own behavior. So, in the absence of 
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certain self-discoveries, his relative horizon remains con-
tracted, and that contraction may weaken his scholarly 
thoroughness. 
The cure for this bias consists in the occurrence 
of acts of understanding which previously were blocked. 
But rarely can the individual effect a cure for himself. 
Armed with the techniques and common-sense strategies of 
psychoanalysis, the analyst may be able to reach the trou-
bled subject. He may be able to shed light on the origins 
and self-destructive nature of those barriers with which 
the subject cannot cope in a detached way. Together ana-
lyst and analysand may break through those habitual ways 
of acting which had only increased the analysand's confu-
sion and insecurity. But initially the analyst bears the 
responsibility for proceeding in his therapy with the tech-
niques provid·ed by his formal training and by his common 
sense know-how. His own intelligent use of these resources 
may overcome the resistance of the analysand and thereby 
prepare both of them for the discovery of the guarded 
source of the subject's troubles. !n successfully conclud-
ing the therapeutic procedure, the analyst may also estab-
lish himself as a counter-example to the analysand's prior 
condition of isolation and avoidance of self-understanding. 
The second type of bias is termed individual bias. 
It is not simply identified with egoism and contrasted with 
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al truism. 56 But it is identified with an egoism t_hat is 
incomplete in its development. ·The subject is concerned 
in an intelligent way with solving his own problems. With 
a great deal of care and intelligent planning, he labors 
"to get ahead." He is even capable of a certain degree of 
detachment; for, desires and fears of a lesser sort are 
subordinated to his desire for workable solutions to prob-
lems which hinder his advance. But this form of egoism is 
labelled faulty or biased because the subject refuses to 
entertain questions about how his actions affect the social 
group so long as their effects have no bear4ng on his own 
aspirations. Time is spent studying the social group so 
as to learn how he can earn the group's rewards without 
sacrificing anything personal of great worth. !n short, 
the subject uses his intelligence where his own interests 
are at stake, but he rejects the use of that intelligence 
in measuring how compatible his aims and actions are with 
the existing social order. Thus, his spontaneous desire 
to know is encouraged where his own interests are concerned, 
but it is stifled when the interests of the group seem to 
restrain his self-advancement. 
Just as dramatic bias contracts the subject's rela-
tive horizon, so too individual bias narrows the subject's 
self-awareness. Particularly absent will be reflection 
56Lonergan makes use of Aristotle's position in the 
Ethics on self-love to argue that egoism has a legitimate 
role in social living. See Tnsight, pp. 219-220. 
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on human relationships and the reciprocal responsibilities 
entailed by living in society. For the historian suffer-
ing from individual bias, there may be a subtle undermining 
of professional standards. Those norms and organs of 
criticism common to the professional co:nll!lunity may be seen, 
not as aids to competent scholarship, but as regrettable 
hindrances to quick self-advancement. Instead of being 
responsible to his colleagues, he may view them as rivals 
whose favor is to be sought and whose criticism must be 
turned aside at all costs. Alternately obsequious and 
obstreperous, the biased historian will be ill-suited to 
the cooperative tasks of a professional community. 
Group bias is the third type to be studied. Quite 
simply this is the bias evident in any social group which 
places its own political/economic interests above the wel-
fare of society as a whole. The group will weigh prospec-
tive social changes according to the single criterion of 
its own preservation and advancement. Now what is specific-
ally biased about this narrow opportunism is the arbitrary 
way in which new social plans are rejected. Groups not in 
power will propose programs and responses to crises, but, 
if these new insi.ghts do not serve the interests of the em-
powered group, they will be rejected. Just as in dramatic 
bias and individual bias there i~ resistance to an under-
standing of existing problems, so too in group bias there 
is a guarded blind spot regarding needed changes which 
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might lessen the group's power.5? If social problems are 
serious enough and if they are neglected long enough because 
the needed solutions are too costly to the empowered, then 
there will be the makings of a revolutionary party. What 
the dominant group rejected, oppressed groups will cham-
pion. Eventually the latter may seize control and imple-
ment the envisioned changes. But then they too will be 
liable to group bias, for their tenuous hold on power may 
breed a reactionary stance which takes its turn in suppres-
sing the voice of intelligent criticism. 
Group bias has been evidenced by historians. Differ-
ent schools have favored historical interpretations which 
justified, even glorified, the gradual accumulation of 
wealth and power by certa-ln groups in society. .Alternately 
some historians have identified with those outsiders whose 
history had not been written by professionals occupying 
endowed seats in major universities. Historians of the 
"New Left" present radical criticism of laws and institu-
tions--criticism which is usually labelled "iconoclastic" 
by the pooh bahs of the professional community. 
Each party may be guilty of factionalism or group 
bias. Each may argue that history is on the side or one 
segment of society. But then there will be inattentiveness 
to how soci.eities advance or decline depending on the 
presence or absence of social cooperation. The contributions 
5? ~., Insight, p. 223. 
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of minority groups may be misunderstood, perhaps entirely 
overlooked. As a result, the historian knows less about 
the past which he investigates. He feels no responsibility 
to account for contributions made by those outside his 
narrowed focus. His inattentiveness may lead him to over-
look crucial pieces of evidence; his lessened sense of 
responsibility may make him unsympathetic to the viewpoints 
expressed by historical figures who were in their own day 
"outsiders." Consequently, his thoroughness in inquiry 
and in explanation will be lessened. The limited contexts 
which he builds into overviews of complex issues will be 
marked by partisanship. And if his judgments on the parts 
are tainted with bias, his conclusion about the whole may 
also be biased. 
General bias, the fourth type of bias, is not li.mi-
ted to the i..ndividual or to specific groups. All men are 
liable to it. To varying degrees all men recognize the 
competence of common sense to satisfy their curiosity about 
concrete daily matters. In contrast, the world of theory 
is entered with difficulty; the world of interiority is 
even more re~ote. Few in number are those who are willing 
to inquire into all the levels of consciousness. What is 
near at hand are the routines of thought and action which 
are usually labelled "common sense." And these routines 
repeatedly prove their worth by producing immediate con-
crete results. Tn contrast, the interests of the 
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theoretical mind appear abstract and remote. The.training 
required seems wasteful in terms of time and less than 
expeditious in terms of concrete results. On the other 
hand, common-sense routines yield immediate results and, 
for the most part, are indifferent to the long-term con-
siderations which consume the time and energy of theorists. 
Now if the subject's concern for issues that have an illltled-
iate bearing on his life is allowed to domj_nate other is-
sues of a theoretical nature, then he has succumbed to 
general bias. 
Lonergan works out the implications of this type of 
bias for the group which values expediency over careful 
planning and long-range reflection.58 In general terms, 
the community suffers from a lack of understanding. In 
the name of a no-nonsense practicality, barriers are set 
up against theoretical inquiry into the long-range effects 
of present policies. Individual members of the group 
rationalize their avoidance of intellectual development 
by means of the same slogan. But eventually stop-gap mea-
sures and hasty responses to unforeseen crises cannot pre-
vent deterioration of the community. Just as the person 
who suffers from dramatic bias sinks deeper into his fan-
tasy world, so a community afflicted with general bias 
loses control of its own life. Political debates become 
more strident and erupt into street brawls. More and more 
~ Ibid., pp. 228-232. 
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of the population grows receptive to myth-makers and poli-
tical charlatans. Eventually the only intelligibility 
expected of political affairs is found in the latest news-
clippings on attempts to balance national powers and to 
equalize economic pressures.59 
Moreover, efforts to criticize the current turmoil 
and to offer remedies to the spreading confusion are 
viewed as soft-headed idealism. Long before 'the si tua-
tion has deteriorated this far, human intelligence and 
critical thought have been assigned academic posts far 
from the political arena in which they are thought to be 
of no use. In short, the belief spreads that human intel-
ligence and reason are unable to control historical events. 
The detached critic has nothing to offer a society which 
must hasten to respond to one crisis after another. 
The historian may be one of those exiled to an aca-
demic island in the midst of turbulent social crises. 
But he also may be caught up in the slogans and catch-
phrases of the day. Then he will be less able to inves-
tigate and to criticize the preconceptions of his own rela-
tive horizon. He may extend his facile :indifference to 
the basic assumptions guiding public policy. He may view 
historical events as uncontrollable, or at best, as some-
thing alien to his own critical abilities and responsible 
decisions. What happens in the community at large is no 
59 !bid., p. 229. 
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concern of the academic world. 
General bias can also infect his continuing education 
as a scholar. New techniques which require time and care-
ful study to master may be ignored. Questions which seem 
pertinent to a problem in hand may never be followed up 
because they would cause delays in immediate results. 
New sources of evidence may be left unexploited for the 
same reason. As a result, the historian's hypotheses and 
imaginative reconstructions may be short-sighted. His 
eventual conclusions will then have a less adequate base 
in both supporting evidence and comprehensive understanding. 
Is there an alternative to this dismal scene? To find one, 
we will have to turn to the question of detachment, i.e. 
to the question of whether these premature closures of 
historical inquiry are inevitable. 
A Limited Detachment 
We began the preced~ng paragraphs on bias with a 
general description: bias is a distortion of spontaneous 
intellectual development. The implication is that detach-
ment involves a challenge to such distortions. The de-
tached attitude is identified with a willingness to allow 
criticism of every issue. But the central question re-
mains--Is detachment in fact possible? We approached 
this question by way of contrast, i.e. by sketching obsta-
cles which in fact suppress critical thinking. Therefore, 
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our question becomes more specific: Are these obstacles in 
fact surmountable? We must also approach this question by 
way of contrast; for detachment has been conceived in dif-
ferent ways, and not all of these ways are acceptable. 
How an individual conceives the struggle for detach-
ment depends on his theory of knowledge and of morals. 60 
Lonergan's own ethical theory has not been discussed be-
cause of its complexity and because at this point the cog-
nitional theory already outlined is adequate for our pur-
pose, namely, to establish the conditions for the possi-
bility of a limited detacbment. 61 
In the first place, we cannot conceive detachment as 
a process of excluding from one's inquiry everything that 
is subjective. Any ideal of detachment as pure passivity 
is likely to rest on a cognitional theory which understands 
human knowing to be a matter solely of receptivity to em-
pirical facts. 62 But we have already argued that knowing 
60Method in Theology, p. 231. 
61rn the following chapter our neglect of Lonergan's 
ethical theory will be partially remedied by a considera-
tion of moral conversion. His theory of cognition has, of 
course, been introduced in Chapter Three. Chapter Five 
will contain an extensive treatment of the epistemology 
which is based on that cognitional theory. 
For the basic distinctions which Lonergan makes among 
cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, see 
ibid., pp. 25 and 316. 
62That is, if one is to knpw, then one must be atten-
tive to the given facts and careful not to add anything 
which was not found in the initial observations. Criticism 
of this view of knowing takes many forms. Lonergan•s re-
marks usually contain some mention of the "principle of 
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is a compoW?-d act which is irreducible to any single com-
ponent. Furthermore, the impulse to inquire arises spontan-
eously in the subject. It is the intelligently controlled 
curiosity of the historian which promotes the use of heur-
istic devices and of critical techniques for handling 
available materials. Finally, it is up to him to evaluate 
carefully the strength of his interpretation. Far from 
being a side-line spectator, the historian only under-
stands and solves problems by much labor and personal dedi-
cation to his profession. If he retains some variant.on 
the passive ideal of knowing, then some of his procedures 
will be either overlooked or considered detrimental to the 
objectivity of his work. In the latter case, his expecta-
tions both about detachment and about objectivity cannot be 
fulfilled, and so he argues that history involves an irre-
ducible measure of subjective bias. But if the historian 
began his work without the expectation of passive recep-
tivity, then the occurrence of value-laden selectivity and 
of the reconstruction of the past by imaginative schemes 
would not be a personal scandal. On the contrary, he might 
the empty head" which was treated in Chapter Two. Even 
though this understanding of human cognition is attacked 
from many sides, some writers continue to expect that ob-jective knowledge should be this product of pure receptiv-
ity. They may recognize that this expectation cannot be 
fulfilled, but then they turn this discovery into an argu-
ment for relativism rather than returning with renewed 
interest to a study of the cognitional performance which 
precedes theoretical expectations about human knowing. 
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even find it scandalous that any historian ever conceived 
detachment as the passive receptivity of the automaton. 63 
What we have in mind is a limited detachment which 
is an ongoing effort rather than a fixed achievement. The 
historian may be devoted to social and cultural goals which 
he intends his scholarship to forward. He obviously does 
not dispense with the content of his relative horizon in 
writing history. But there is such a thing as "intellec-
tual passion" of which Michael Polanyi has written at 
length. 64 Then, for the sake of correctly understanding 
a chosen topic, the scholar may subordinate social and 
cultural goals to his desire to solve historical problems 
and to answer accurately historical questi.ons. He will 
draw on past experiences and education to pose direct 
questions, but he w111 be willing to admit that past events 
were different from present events and must be accorded 
some measure of uniqueness. And the historian will not 
be alone in this effort to remove any interfering opinions 
63Hannah Arendt, in a paraphrase of Noam Chomsky, has 
expressed such a reaction. "Absence of emotions neither 
causes nor promotes rationality. 'Detachment and equanim-
ity' in view of 'unbearable tragedy' can indeed be 'terri-
fying,' namely, when they are not the result of control 
but an evident manifestation of incomprehension. In order 
to respond reasonably one must first of all be 'moved,' and 
the opposite of emotional is not 'rational,' whatever that 
may mean, but either the inability to be moved, usually a 
pathological phenomenon, or sentimentality, which is a per-
version of feeling." On Violence (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1970), p. 64. 
64Personal Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962), see especially Chapter Six. 
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from his st~dy of the past. While not so fully objecti-
fied as in the natural sciences, historical techniques 
and canons are available to guide his inquiry. In addi-
tion, there are other historians capable of examining the 
same evidence and of using it to check the individual's 
arguments. Moreover, the historian will be communicating 
his results to an educated public which eventually be-
comes wary of mere assertions and demands proof. In 
short, there are public arenas in which subjective bias 
becomes glaringly obvious and in which failures to trans-
cend parochialism are regretted. 
From the preceding remarks we conclude (1) there are 
techniques and canons developed to help the historian 
avoid bias in his work; (2) there is a bar of professj_onal 
peers and public scrutiny which exposes bias and passes 
judgment on the work of the individual historian; (3) the 
historical profession explicitly recognizes that the pre-
occupations of the present must be transcended if the his-
torian is to understand the problems which confronted his 
predecessors. 65 But will the h:istor:ian make use of those 
techniques? Will he submit his work to the judgment of 
his peers? Will he recognize that past groups had ends of 
their own distinct from his? Answers to these questions 
65Arthur O. Lovejoy states.this common theme: self-
transcendence is a requisite to a successful study of the 
past. "Present Standpoints and Past History," The Philos-
ophy of History in ~ Time, p. 180. 
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can only be given by the individual historian. A.willing-
ness to allow his intelligent and rational activities to 
develop unimpeded by personal bias cannot be imposed. 
Otherwise one could not speak o:f the historian's intellec-
tual responsibility. But the alternatives are (l) a will-
ingness to pe~sist in ignorance and to invest more heavily 
in a personal obscurantism, and (2) a willingness to bat-
tle with critics despite all costs to professional stan-
dards and intellectual honesty. 
The test, then, of detachment from bias and willful 
obscurantism is the subject's willingness to allow spon-
taneous inquiry and reflection to carr:y him beyond the 
limits of his relative horizon and beyond any impeding bias 
contained therein. Just as childhood cur:iosity originated 
with a spontaneous desire to know and just as theoretical 
inquiry is a controlled formulation of that same desire, 
so the fu~ther questions which disturb his familiar ways 
and firm convictions will stem from that same source. 
Now such troubling questions may be suppressed by the 
subject's fears for his own security which he identifies 
with certain limited positions. Self-protecting screens 
may be thrown up to exclude difficulties and doubts over 
long-standing positions. But the problem is that these 
questions have not an entirely external origin. Of course, 
spectfic questions may be suggested by what someone else 
said or did, but the fa1nt hint that perhaps the other 
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person's words or deeds pose a valid challenge to.the sub-
ject's position is the product of the subject's own intel-
ligence. The desire to know may take on the form of a nag-
ging doubt about his previous self-assurance. This is to 
say that difficulties or doubts suggested by something ex-
ternal are interiorized. In effect, the desire to know 
becomes an immanent source of further questions which may 
require a change in familiar opinions or ways of acting. 
What we have sketched in the preceding paragraph is 
a psychological function of transcendental method. 66 .That 
method formulates the spontaneous exigencies of critical 
consciousness. rn a subject committed to scholarly pur-
suits, there will likely be conflicts between these exigen-
cies and lesser ones which demand the avoidance of deeply 
troubling questions. Tension results; for, on the one hand, 
a radical openness to new ideas and reasonable proposals is 
required, and, on the other, retention of the established, 
security-giving positions is desired. Whether this ten-
sion is successfully resolved (we do not say "eliminated") 
is a matter of intellectual conversion. More will be said 
66navid Tracy offers some brief comments on this func-
tion, in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, p. 144. We 
might add that this function is specialized in psychoanaly-
tic techniques. Barriers to self-understand5ng and resis-
tance to needed changes in behavior are sometimes so deeply 
rooted that the subject's own conscious efforts to overcome 
them will not be adequate. The therapeutic counsel of the 
analyst may strengthen these conscious efforts, but in the 
end there is no substitute for the subject's willingness 
to accept help and to be open to troubling new thoughts. 
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of intellectual conversion in the next chapter. ~or our 
present purposes, a brief comment will suffice. 
Intellectual conversion is one of the three types of 
conversion analyzed in Method in Theology. The basic con-
ditions for its occurrence are treated in Tnsight. 6? Re-
peatedly the point is made that the act of self-appropria-
tion which carries out this conversion is an act of per-
sonal discovery. But though the act of discovery is an 
achievement of the individual, still the content of the 
act, what is discovered, is another matter. What is dis-
covered and made explicit is the threefold process of human 
knowing. And the universal and invariant structure of 
this process has implications beyond the personal discov-
ery that one is in fact a knower. The major implication 
is that the desire to know cannot be restricted in advance 
by bias. We first are curious, and the only barriers to 
that curiosity which can be said to exist in advance are 
the limits to our questioning. That is, the only prior re-
strictions are not what we do not want to know but what we 
do not ask about because the relevant questions do not 
strike us as meaningful. Bias comes later when the sweep 
of our questions has touched on areas that begin to trou-
ble us, and so we restrict our inquiries. In effect, we 
decide not to know. But such a decision cannot be made in 
advance of the spontaneous desire to know, and it must be 
6?see Chapter Eleven, pp. 319-347. 
repeatedly made if that prior desire is to be kept in 
check. 68 
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Again, the issue of this chapter is the possibility 
of a limited detachment. "Limited" in the sense that eval-
uation and subjective construction are unavoidable, indeed 
necessary, conditions for historical knowledge. This issue 
of detachment has been tied to the possibility of intellec-
tual conversion. Since the latter possibility will not be 
treated at length until the next chapter, it would seem 
that the goal of this chapter could not be reached. How-
ever, enough steps have been taken to present an argument 
for the possibility of detachment. Chapter Five will add 
to those steps without requiring any major shift in our 
argument. 
We began this chapter with the thesis that bias is 
an irreducible component of every historical work. In the 
first part of this third section, we argued that transcen-
dental method offers a sanction of historical procedures 
irrespective of subjective bias. However, in the second 
part, we recognized that the possibility of actually em-
ploying these critical grounds was yet to be established. 
Specifically, the relativist may accede to the presence 
68A possible topic for another paper would be the 
long-term effects of this suppression of the desire to 
lmow. Is intellectual "death" possible? Is there some 
point beyond which the spontaneities of human conscious-
ness could not recover from the repeated efforts to stifle 
them? 
r 
' 
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of the desire to know in the human subject. But he will 
quite legitimately also point to those other desires and 
interests which conflict with this basic intellectual pas-
sion. He will argue at length that these other interests 
cannot be successfully subord-tnated to the desire to know, 
and hence, bias will be an irreducible element in every 
historical work. 
Preparation for a response to this thesis was made 
in three steps. First, how we conceive the possibtlity of 
overcoming bias (i.e. the possibility of detachment) will 
depend on our cognitional theory. Against the ideal of 
passivity before historical facts, we posed the construc-
tive activity of the intelligent and rational subject. 
Consequently, only a limited or quali.fied detachment was 
envisioned. 
Second, the desire to know which is the basis for 
both the child's questions and the scientist's sophisti-
cated hypotheses is also the origin of further questions 
which carry the subject beyond his accepted positions. 69 
Conflicts may occur between this desire and lesser inter-
ests, but the resulting tension is a product, in part, of 
the immanent desire to know. Hence it cannot be avoided; 
a willtngness to persist in ignorance and to engage in 
sophistry will, at least initially, increase the tension 
69see the previous co:rranents in section two and in 
this third section on the ecstatic aspect of the histori-
an's procedures. 
265 
.. 
rather than eliminate it. The issue of detachment is thus 
located within the subject's own consciousness and is not 
primarily a matter of external pressures.?O The secondary 
external pressures will be public controls on the perpetua-
tion of biased historical accounts. Accepted canons of 
research and common modes of argumentation, the critical 
review of the historical profession, and the opinion of 
an educated public are public checks on historical bias. 
Third, whether the historian respects these external 
controls and, more important, whether he subord~nates·les-
ser interests to his desire-to-know cannot be determined 
in advance. Nor, for that matter, can a choice of obscur-
antism be necessitated in advance. There is only a ques-
tion mark placed over his willingness to make an immanent 
desire-to-know the primary motive of his historical inquir-
ies. 
On the basis cf the preceding points, the following 
reply can be made to the thesis that subjective bias is 
unavoidable and intellectual detachment is factually im-
possible. First, the possibility of detachment lies not 
in the affirmation of some theory but in the appropriation 
by the subject of his own intelligent and rational perform-
ance. And this act of appropriation yields knowledge of 
an invariant structure in that performance. As formulated 
in transcendental method, this metahistorical position 
?0rnsight, pp. 473-475· 
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excludes no .interpretations a priori and accepts none a pos-
teriori until reasonably convincing evidence is forthcom-
ing. 
Second, both prior to and after the act of appropri-
ation, the subject finds himself already holding opinions 
' which are mixtures of good sense, bias, and the cliches of 
the day. Such opinions will be influencing his historical 
procedures. !n previous chapters we argued that transcen-
dental method (1) is the basis for a critical evaluation 
of preconceptions about history, and (2) has a normative 
function in respect to all specialized methods and proced-
ures. Consequently, the subject's prior opinions of mixed 
origin can be investigated and an estimate formed of their 
influence on historical procedures. 
Third, the actual use of transcendental method to 
criticize preconceptions and procedures depends on the 
Willingness o.f the individual historian to bring his prior 
opinions and procedures into conformity with what he now 
knows about human knowing.?l This willingness cannot be 
imposed. But just as the desire to know led him to develop 
a cognitional position consistent with his spontaneous per-
formance, so it can lead him to a willingness to check 
?lour line of argumentation presupposes that what 
the subject knows about human cognition (the result of 
intellectual conversion) demands. of him a corresponding 
willingness to make his doing consistent with his knowing 
(the result of moral conversion). Chapter ffive will have 
more to say on this point. 
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repeatedly his historical procedures against that new 
awareness.72 This desire prompts further questions which 
may turn up lapses in critical thinking. If these lapses 
are rooted in long-standing· bias, much effort will be re-
quired to remedy them. There may well be a struggle be-
tween what the subject knows his historical performance 
should be and those alien interests which make that per-
formance something less. But if he has appropriated his 
own critical consciousness, then he can recognize the dis-
torting effects of bias on his procedures and conclusions. 
And to recognize bias for what it is (a distortion of in-
tellectual development), while not guaranteeing that the 
subject will try to eliminate it, is at least to recognize 
an alternative to bias. Hence, because there is a recog-
nized alternative, bias is not unavoidable. Moreover, bias 
that is already present is not irreducible because a way 
is seen beyond the distortive screens, i.e. the subject 
knows what his performance should be. It remains for him 
to modify any faulty preconceptions or practices and to be 
72 "The immanent source of transcendence in man is 
his detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. 
As it is the origin of all his questions, it is the origin 
of the radical, further questions which take him beyond 
the defined limits of particular issues. Nor is it solely 
the operator of his cognitional development. For its de-
tachment and dis~nterestedness set it in opposit5on to his 
attached and interested sensitivity and intersubjectivity; 
and the knowledge it yields demands of his will the endea-
vour to develop in willingness and so make his doing con-
sistent with his knowing." Tnsight, p. 636. 
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on guard against equally biased replacements·. 
This lengthy argument concludes the second part of 
this third section. In summary, the section undertook to 
argue two positions. First, transcendental method has a 
normative function in regard to the historical procedures 
outlined in section two. Second, conformity to transcen-
dental method in one's theoretical procedures is a criter-
ion of detachment from subjective bias. The major impli-
cation of these two conclusions is that bias is not an 
unavoidable or irreducible component of every historical 
work. 
Summary of Chapter IV 
Both the thesis and the counterproposal of this chap-
ter were concerned with a single major problem: If subjec-
tive bias is an irreducible component of every historical 
work, then the crisis of historicism cannot be resolved. 
Wb.ite's fourth thesis implies that this will be the case 
since historical procedures which might eliminate bias 
are themselves grounded in variable preferences. But our 
counterproposal argued that transcendental method can be 
reflectively applied to these procedures so as to reveal 
distortions arising from antecedent preferences. 
The second section of the chapter argued that trans-
cendental method could reach beyond the manifest level of 
the text in order to carry out a critique of precritical 
opinions belonging to the implicit level. 
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Tn keeping with 
our application of transcendental method to both levels 
of historical works, we then turned to the study of sur-
face procedures. These procedures were first classified 
in relation to historical experiencing, Un.derstandtng, and 
judging. They were then analyzed under six distinct head-
ings, thereby clarifying stages in the methodical process 
of attaining historical knowledge. 
But this process may be disrupted by the distorting 
influence of bias. As a counterwieght to such interfer-
ence, we proposed the reflective application of transcen-
dental method to the previously outlined stages of histor-
ical method. Methodical procedures and historical canons 
were said to be part of a controlled inquiry which special-
izes the spontaneities of critical consciousness. Since 
transcendental method formulates the basic structure of 
these spontaneities, it will have a normative function in 
regard to the developed procedures and canons. But then, 
as opposed to White's thesis, there is a metahistorical 
basis for a critical sanctton of surface procedures. 
Will this critical sanction be applied or will pre-
critical opinions be left to determine how the historian 
conducts his inquiry? This question cannot be answered 
in advance of a decision which the historian himself must 
make. At stake will be his own detachment from bias. But 
if he has formulated the basic exigencies of his own 
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critical thinking, he will know what his historic~l per-
formance should be. Moreover, ·he will recognize failures 
to allow that performance to develop unhindered by one of 
the forms of bias. 
Our concluding argument was that to recognize these 
failures as lapses in critical thinking is already to 
recognize an alternate way of proceeding. This recogni-
tion by itself does not guarantee the elimination of bias 
and the ongoing maintenance of critical detachment. But 
it does indicate that there is an alternative to bias. 
Hence, bias is not of necessity the lot of every historical 
inquiry. We thus have removed the barrier implied in 
\.lhite's thesis to any resolution of the crisis of histor-
icism and have established the possibility of resolving 
the crisis. Jn the following chapter, arguments will be 
advanced in support of a recommended strategy for moving 
from this possibility to an actual resolution of the 
crisis. 
C~ER V 
. . 
HISTORICAL OBJECTIVITY 
INTRODUCTION 
A central issue has been repeatedly formulated in the 
preceding chapters. Jn the absence of a critical metahis-
torical basis for mediating conflicts within the histori-
cal field, the crisis of historicism remains unresolved. 
Ve have already argued in a number of places that Hayden 
White fails to supply the needed basis. His structural 
analysis of historical works achieves significant results 
in classifying the types of historical conflicts and in 
locating variables at the root of the historical conflicts. 
But obstacles remain to prevent a transition from his 
descriptive study to an explanatory position which both 
accounts for historical differences and contains the 
grounds for a critical evaluation of the basic differences. 
The preceding chapters have been building up to a deter-
mination of whether or not Lonergan's methodological pro-
posals can surmount these obstacles and thereby succeed 
in advancing beyond the limits of \.lhite's work. 
By raising the question of historical objectivity, 
this fifth chapter becomes an explicit study in epistemol-
ogy. Our previous analysis of Lonergan's cognitional 
2?1 
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theory will be the basis for this study~ What is .at stake 
is the issue of historical "realism." This is the issue 
on which there was no consensus among nineteenth-century 
historians. Their disagreements took the form of diverse 
and often conflicting modes of historical consciousness. 
The implications of these disagreements are formulated by 
Hayden White in a series of theses. This chapter takes 
up his fourth thesis: Ea.ch historical paradigm is an ef-
fectively closed system of thought; radical changes in par-
adigms reflect not the discovery of new evidence but a 
basic change in one's ethical Viewpoint. Consequently, 
any attempt to offer an epistemological justification of 
one's paradigm represents only a prior ethical choice.1 
The counterproposal to this thesis agrees with it in 
part. Lonergan's horizon-analysis turns up results which 
are compatible with the thesis that paradigms are prior to 
eVidence, i.e. that they are frameworks which predetermine 
1
"In my view, there are no extra-ideological grounds 
on which to arbitrate among the conflicting conceptions of 
the historical process and of historical knowledge appealed 
to by the different ideologies. For, since these concep-
tions have their origins in ethical considerations, the 
assumption of a given epistemological position by which to judge their cognitive adequacy would itself represent only 
another ethical choice. I cannot claim that one of the 
conceptions of historical knowledge favored by a given 
ideology is more 'realistic' than the others, for it is 
precisely over the matter of what constitutes an adequate 
criterion of 'realism' that they disagree. Nor can I claim 
that one conception of historical knowledge is more 'sci-
entific' than another without prejudging the problem of 
what a specifically historical or social science ought to 
be." Metahistory, p. 26. 
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what will be acceptable as historical data. With a ~ari­
ance in prior frameworks, there will be a consequent var-
iance in what counts as historical evidence. So, by it-
self, evidence cannot require the radical modification of 
its prior framework. But part of White's fourth thesis 
can be challenged. The assertion that paradigms are closed 
systems of thought raises problems which the contemporary 
discussions of the hermeneutical circle have addressed. 
Lonergan's analysis of the self-correcting process of learn-
ing is a valuable addition to these contemporary debates. 
In conjunction with this analysis, there are complex notions 
of evidence and of objectivity which can be opposed to some 
of the conceptions of historical knowledge held by histor-
ians. If the epistemology which supports these complex 
notions can be proved to have a privileged claim to "real-
ism," then paradigms which support alternate notions may be 
open to modifications for other than ethical reasons. 
In order to elaborate and to defend the counterpro-
posal, two goals must be reached. First, arguments must 
establish that crttical consciousness which develops sys-
tems of meaning can also transcend the inherent limits of 
its thought-products. Second, in contrast to White's posi-
tion on the preferential basis for every historical theory, 
it must be possible to offer an epistemological justifica-
tion of some historical theories over others. Both of 
these aims are steps in the elaboration of a universal 
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viewpoint from which to criticize different historical 
perspectives. It was the previous absence of just such a 
metahistorical viewpoint which hindered any solution to 
. . 
the historical conflicts of the crisis period. 
The preceding chapters have prepared for the intro-
duction of this universal viewpoint. In Chapter Two, the 
predeterminants of historical perspectives were expanded to 
include the historian's basic horizon. Thus, a cognitional 
element was identified as part of the deep structure of 
the historical text. In Chapter Three, this cognitional 
element was further analyzed; its structure and formulation 
in transcendental method were outlined. Taking an example 
from Carl Becker's work, we applied the developed cogni-
tional position to certain viewpoints in that author's basic 
horizon. This application specified the previous conclu-
sion that a differentiated basic horizon provides metahis-
torical grounds for criticizing precritical elements of 
historical perspectives. Finally, in Chapter Four, we took 
up the question of whether a critical, non-biased evalua-
tion of historical perspectives and practices was in fact 
possible. On the basis of previous arguments, transcenden-
tal method was shown to be in the unique position of medi-
ating differences on both the deep and surface levels of 
historical works. It can be both the basis for detachment 
from precritical, biased opinions about history and also 
the norm for procedures guided by those prior opinions. 
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Consequently, bias which may be part of historical para-
digms is not necessarily a permanent aspect of historical 
work done under the guidance of those paradigms. 
The fifth chapter will build on earlier chapters in 
an attempt to supply an epistemological criterion of his-
torical realism. If this criterion does not represent sim-
ply another set of preferences, then the differences among 
historical paradigms may be criticized on grounds other 
than the subjective variables allowed by White. 
The work of this chapter will be carried out in four 
sections. This introductory section has already stated 
the thesis and counterproposal. Before concluding this 
section, we will review aspects of Hayden White's thesis 
as well as problems entailed by it. In the second part of 
Chapter Five, the topics of historical models and of the 
hermeneutical circle will introduce specific problems which 
confront all claims to historical objectiVity. fhe third 
section advances beyond the second by proposing and defend-
ing a complex notion of objectiVity. This proposal is part 
of an analysis of Lonergan's epistemology, and we will bor-
row from his theory key insights into historical realism. 
Finally, the fourth section pulls together the preceding 
conclusions on paradigms, objectivity, and historical real-
ism in order to answer the difficult question: Can conflicts 
over historical realism be mediated? 
The obstacles to be surmounted in this chapter are 
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apparent in .White's arguments as they terminate in his 
fourth thesis. Again, his thesis is that any attempt to 
offer an epistemological justification of certain para-
digms will represent only a prior ethical preference. 
This thesis is first defended against an alternate sug-
gestion that paradigms be measured against historical evi-
dence, i.e. a convincing historical position will be one 
which adequately comprehends the available data. To this 
suggestion White replies that what has not been settled 
is precisely what counts as a historical datum and as ·a 
theory for explaining what the data mean. 2 
In the absence of a metahistorical solution to this 
problem, the historical theorist can only point to the 
diverse viewpoints which conceive historical data differ-
ently. 3 He has no grounds outside of personal preferences 
for adopting one viewpoint rather than another. Further-
more, as "surface" elements of the text, historical data 
fall within the predetermining boundaries of the chosen 
model. Therefore, the prior model cannot be disproven by 
the discovery of new data, for data will only be admitted 
2 Ibid., p. 429. 
3In his structuralist approach, White traces these 
different conceptions of historical data to prior poetic 
insights and variable preferences. His classification of 
the latter tacit elements in historical works does not an-
swer the question of which conceptions of historical data 
are to be preferred. The diversity of different and even 
incompatible paradigms remains irreducible. 
2?? 
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as evidence i£ they conform to antecedent expectations. 
The major implication 0£ this conclusion is that 
historiography will continue to witness mutually exclusive 
interpretations 0£ the same events, each 0£ which may, with 
equal legitimacy, claim to be "realistic. 11 5 While the au-
thors of these interpretations may argue from their accumu-
lated evidence, White's analysis indicates that the valid-
ity 0£ the interpretations is ultimately rooted elsewhere. 
The consistency, coherence, and illuminative power of the 
overarching vision 0£ historical processes are the measure 
0£ validity.6 The injunction appears to be: Maintain con-
sistency within your basic historical perspective. An at-
tempted justification of your perspective will merely re-
flect prior ethical decisions; it will not be compelling 
for anyone not sharing your initial assumptions. 
From the preceding conclusions there emerge problems 
which this chapter must treat in some detail. First, there 
is the problem of discrete incommensurable systems of 
thought. The thesis of perspectivism takes account of an 
irreducible diversity in the historical field, but here 
we are talking about incompatible differences which suppos-
edly cannot be mediated. Only a formalistic comparison is 
4Metahistory, pp. 4 and 430. White applies this con-
clusion to the conflicts over Marxist interpretations of 
historical processes, in ibid., p. 284. 
5Ibid., p. 428. 
6 Ibid., p. 4. 
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allowed, e.g. a linguistic theory of tropes applied to nar-
rative forms. The problem to be faced is whether some 
standpoint can be taken "beyond" these differences which 
will allow for a critical mediation·of them.? 
A second problem involves the depreciation of an 
. . 
epistemological concern for evidence. If historical evi-
dence is subordinated to the adopted paradigms, and if the 
paradigms are subordinated to precritical preferences, is 
it possible to retain any notion of objectivity? It would 
seem that White answers in the negative. Among the differ-
ent conceptions of historical knowledge proposed by nine-
teenth-century historians, no one of them proved to be 
more "scienttfic" than the others.8 The meaning of "ob-
jectivity" stands in need of clarification as does the re-
lationship between science and history. This clarification 
will be part of the following sections. To anticipate how 
those sections will handle the two preceding problems: first, 
our notion of objectivity will not be based on theoretical 
?In a work prior to his Metahistory, White noted that 
a failure to find such a standpoint was one of the reasons 
for the crisis of historicism. In his words, the problem 
is one of fjnding grounds within history for distinguishing 
between realism and a purely imaginative vision of history. 
See his translator's introduction, "On History and Histori-
cisms," in From History to Sociology, p. xv. 
8Metahistory, p. 26. The question of whether history 
is or can be or even ought to be a science has been treated 
by numerous commentators. The fourth section of this chap-
ter will clarify the similarities as well as the differences 
between history and science. Then our question will be, not 
which of the many paradigms is more "scientific" than the 
others, but which of them can be considered appropriate de-
vices for anticipating historical knowledge. 
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norms but will be derived from the structured activities 
which constitute the world of human interiority. Thus, 
the measure of objectivity is neither wholly logical nor 
wholly scientific.9 Second~ the problem of incommensur-
able systems of thought will be contrasted (1) with the 
heuristic and ecstatic aspects of human intelligence, and 
(2) with an epistemological position derived from the prior 
analysis of cognitional structure. On the one hand, changes 
in paradigms may reflect a development in understanding as 
well as basic changes in ethical values. On the other, con-
flicts over what constitutes historical realism may be set-
tled in a preliminary way by first settling what historical 
"objects" are and what objective knowledge of them might be. 
The following section will undertake the first of 
these two contrasts, namely, the contrast between closed 
systems of thought and the heuristic and ecstatic aspects 
of human intelligence. These introductory remarks have in-
dicated that the contrast is qualified by some areas of 
agreement between White's position and the work of previous 
chapters. In the first place, historical evidence is not 
some "pure given" but is dependent upon the questions, 
9rt is not wholly logical because the methodical pro-
cedures of critical consciousness involve non-logical oper-
ations. It is not wholly scientific because the standard 
is primarily identified with a personal appropriation of 
one's own structured interiority. This act will allow a 
return to the world of theory/science in a methodical man-
ner. See Matthew Lamb's article, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Crit-
ique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-meth-
odology," in Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 158. 
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interests, ~nd variables which the historian brings to 
his task. Second, evidence is understood in terms of the 
models, hypotheses, ·constructs which guide historical in-
quiry. These heuristic frameworks predetermine what will 
be acceptable as evidence; and, so, evidence by itself will 
not require any radical changes in the prior frameworks. 
But a contrast is still possible because there are areas 
of disagreement. To closed systems of historical thought 
will be opposed the self-correcting process of learning. 
To the thesis that paradigm changes reflect only shifts in 
basic ethical beliefs, there will be contrasted changes 
which are required by an epistemological argument. 
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PROBLE1S OF OBJECTIVITY 
In Die Krisis des Historismus, Karl Heussi argues 
that a simplistic notion of objectivity entertained by 
historians was the occasion for the crisis of historicism. 10 
Expectations about the fixity of the past and about the 
ability of historians to give definitive accounts of it 
were brought low in the crisis period. In this section 
we will take up aspects of the problem of historical objec-
tivity which receive the attention of contemporary writers. 
While the relevant issues will be treated as specifically 
historical problems, in section three the developed no-
tion of objectivity will have a wider application. Again, 
one of our aims is to supply an epistemological basis for 
countering the inherent relativism of the crisis period. 
But that basis will have a more general application to 
the problem of relativism wherever it occurs. 
Historical Data 
Perhaps the most frequently mentioned difficulty en-
countered by claims to historical objectivity is the deter-
mination of historical data. Some consensus is evident in-
sofar as documents, art works, and tools are concerned. 
These are products of distinctly human origin. But how is 
lODie Krisis des Historism~s, pp. 37 and 103. Loner-
gan takes note of Heussi 1s position, in Method in Theology, 
p. 214. 
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one to disco.ver the motives and intentions behind-these 
human creations? Human consciousness has multiple threads 
woven through it which form a fabric of psychological, 
biological, physico-chemical patterns. Should the histor-
ian limit his inquiries to the conscious intentions of his-
torical figures? Or should he view the latter as surface 
manifestations of more basic neurological impulses? He 
may even treat individual creations as the products of 
more general social forces such as class consciousness or 
the "spirit of the age. 1111 
These difficulties provide two arguments for assert-
ing that historical data are not simply "given." !n the 
first place, there are ongoing debates over just where his-
torical data are to be found. If one accepts an art work 
by Leonardo da Vinci as an expression of historical signif-
icance, can one study it solely as an art historian would, 
or must one proceed in the manner of Freud to probe that 
creative expression for signs of the artist's own psyche? 
Second, as we have argued before, historical data only 
1111Much depends on how far one wants to pursue the in-
quiry into motive and intention. One can try to penetrate 
to the interior of consciousness, where motives and inten-
tions merge first with psychological, then with biological, 
and ultimately with physico-chemical processes in the 
depths of human being. But this would expose thought to 
the threat of an infinite regress. The decision of a con-
ventional historian to take the statements of conscious 
intention of historical agents at face value is neither 
more nor less legitimate than the decision of the Material-
istic Determinist to reduce conscious intention to the 
status of an effect of a more basic, psycho-physical cause, 
or that of the Idealist to interpret it as a function of a 
more general 'spirit of the age.'" Metahistory, p. 430. 
283 
" become spec~fied as "historical in relation to some task 
which anticipates their potential worth to an understand-
ing of the past. Ari.d the prior evaluation of their poten-
tial worth has its own preconditions. The data will be 
noticed only if the historian's previous understanding is 
sufficiently developed to be able to include them. That 
is, his scholarly competence must be a match for the in-
tricacies of research, otherwise potential materials will 
be overlooked. 12 
Both these preconditions and the uncertainty of ·where 
specifically historical data leave off and the data of other 
disciplines take over are the basis for a denial of ready-
made historical data. 13 The meaning of a historical 
12An additional precondition involves the linguistic 
sophistication of the researcher. He must have an under-
standing of categories and distinctions commonly used in 
his profession. Otherwise he will lump together complex 
realities which an advanced discipline already has analyzed 
into significant parts. For example, a study of class 
structure in France circa 1850 will be aided by Marx's con-
cept of the lumpenproletariat. But if a researcher were 
to be ignorant of that special classification, he might 
misconstrue the support of the Parisian mobs for Louis 
Bonaparte as an initial revolt of the working classes. All 
of which is a way of saying that, if the words are absent, 
the data cannot be referred to directly and are likely to 
be left unanalyzed. Method in Theology, pp. 347-348. 
l3In other words, historical materials do not enjoy 
a fixed meaning which exists in advance of the historia:o.'s 
questions. Otherwise those variable questions would even-
tually converge on a single interpretation of the same e-
vents. But, as argued in the thesis of perspectivi.sm, an 
irreducible diversity in historical interpretations is to 
be expected. This diversity need not include incompatible 
differences, but diversity itself will be unavoidable if 
historical materials can have multiple meanings depending 
on what questions are asked of them. This potential for 
multiple meanings is, I think, the basis for Collingwood's 
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document doe.a not leap out at the reader but must .be dis-
covered by competent research. All that appears to be 
given are the ink marks on pieces of paper. But these 
marks are not by themselves historical data. In order to 
become historical materials, the critical techniques of 
the exegete, the questions of the historian, and the inter-
est of a professional community must be turned in their 
direction. Then these ink marks begin to convey a message 
but only because an intelligent subject who perceives them 
is both interested in and able to understand them histori-
cally .14 
Let us grant that historical data are such because 
of a relationship they have to the historical interests of 
inquiring subjects. Those interests may vary; for example, 
the critical interests of the professional historian can 
be distinguished from the interest which produced the min-
strel's song of chivalrous knights. And if the interests 
vary, then the relationship of historical data to the in-
quiring subjects will vary.15 But the point which we want 
provocative thesis that in history there are properly speak-
ing no data. See The Idea of History, p. 243. 
14An example of this last statement would be the var-
ious rock strata which Indian tribes often perceived in can-
yon walls. For these to become measures of geological/ 
historical time, perception was not enough; a link had to 
be made between these remains and processes of stratifica-
tion and erosion. And such a link was only made when his-
torical interests prompted the relevant investigations. 
l50ur previous remarks in Chapter Two on pragmatic 
views of history exemplify this conclusion. Historical 
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to make her~ is that historical data are relative-to the 
intentions and goals of those who take an interest in them. 
This is a simple enough proposition, but the implications 
for certain controversies in the philosophy of history are 
significant. 
There is the controversy over what types of entities 
can be classified as historical materials. From what his-
torians usually write about, one can conclude that human 
intentions and motives are readily accepted as historical 
entities. No difficulty is encountered in expanding this 
ciass to include the human creations which externalize 
these intentions, e.g. laws, monuments, documents. But 
doubts arise when unconscious drives and psycho-physical 
impulses are said to be matters for historical inquiry. 
An infinite regress threatens historical work from two 
directions. The external record of human achievement has 
innumerable components, so much so that it is a record 
which could never be compiled. The internal landscape is 
like a Chinese box w:i.th conscious intentions giving way to 
unconscious instincts which in turn have biological recesses 
behind them. The catch-phrase nihil humanum alienum does 
not dispel the threat. The thesis of perspectivism only 
data may also be the means for an approximate account of 
what took place and why. On the one hand, they are tools 
for constructing social bonds. On the other, they are 
means for answering questions and advancing historical 
understanding. 
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points out t~at multiple interests or equal legiti-macy 
will continue to prompt historical inquiries which borrow 
from anthropology, psychology, biology. It appears that 
there is no standard way or thinking about the subject 
matter or history, i.e. no consensus on what limited range 
of objects should stand in a particularly historical rela-
tion to inquiring subjects.16 
Does the work of previous chapters offer any help in 
these difficulties? In a tentative way we can argue that 
primacy can be accorded to a certain region of historical 
entities. Chapter Three presented arguments for the for-
mally dynamic structure of conscious acts. The unity of 
conscious intentions which is self-constituting allows us 
to distinguish the patterned development of conscious 
acts from the physical, chemical, and neural activities 
which are not conscious activities. 1? When the historian 
considers actions in relation to the intentions of 
16The absence of such a standard is noted by W. H. 
Walsh in Philosophy of History: An Tntroduction, p. 116. 
The problem is not without ramifications. If the field 
of historical objects is not clearly delineated, the can-
ons of interpretation for investigating that field will 
also not be a matter of general consensus. The obvious 
outcome will be a repetition of the slogan of some nine-
teenth-century historians: hverything can be treated in 
terms of its historical development. But the optimism 
which once accompanied that slogan may now be absent. 
Anything can be treated historically, which is another way 
of saying, history is not precisely focused on something. 
l?Matthew Lamb, "Wilhelm Dflthey's Critique of His-
torical Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," 
Language, Truth and Meaning, p. 150. 
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historical figures, he can attempt to recapitulate the ex-
perience which was a background for those actions, the in-
telligibility which the actors thought they were express-
ing, and the probable defense they would have or perhaps 
even did give for their decisions. 
Except when he suspects that a historical figure was 
suffering from a neurosis or psychosis, the historian pre-
sumes that the conscious side of human thinking, deciding, 
and acting was in control. And in the actor's conscious 
flow of intentions and decisions, there is a pattern or 
sequence of distinct acts which the historian can provision-
ally reconstruct. The clues which guide this reconstruc-
tion are the actor's preserved words, the recollections 
of contemporaries, and the shrewd estimate of human behav-
ior upon which a competent historian relies. The latter 
is familiar with human ambition; he knows how skilled some 
men are in directing others toward certain goals. He has 
experienced the ease with which rationalization covers over 
both tainted success and disappointing failure. So his 
inquiries need not be naive; statements of conscious motives 
are initial clues and not immediately decisive in questions 
of motivation. But more than individual motives and ac-
tions are his concern. What he seeks in the assembled 
clues is more than the historical agent's purpose and mean-
ing. He seeks to unravel the puzzle of how individual 
thoughts guiding decisions lead to actions altering for 
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better or worse the condition of a particular group.18 In 
other words, he seeks to learn how and why human subjects 
made history in a particular way. 
Now we began this discussion of the subject matter 
of history with the suggestion that some limited range of 
historical entities could be given primacy over others. 
Comments in the preceding paragraphs mention intentional 
acts which can be distinguished from biological and chemi-
cal functions. They also mention the actions which follow 
upon conscious intentions. However, the statement is added 
that the historian is concerned with more than the :individ-
ual's intentions and actions. This "something more" is 
the mutually constitutive relations which obtain, first, 
between a conscious subject and his actions, and second, 
between a historical agent and his community. The deeds 
objectify the man to himself and to others.19 The commun-
ity is constituted by the deeds of the many and reciprocal-
ly constitutes individuals by what it accepts from and 
18The implicit reference here is to the task of crit-
ical history, namely, to discover what was "going forward" 
in the group at a particular time and place. Thus, the 
reconstruction of motives is only part of the more complex 
issues of societal development or decline. Historical bi-
ographies, of course, may occasionally avoid this broader 
issue, but usually their subjects were public figures who 
influenced the institutions of their day. Consequently, 
some reference of the individual to the group will be ne-
cessary simply to write an adequate biography. 
l9we include under the heading of "deeds" the spoken 
word. The word externalizes and stabilizes the subjectiv-
ity of the individual just as the words of others mediate 
their complex beings to him~ 
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gives to the.m in return. 
Our tentative thesis, then, is that the primary ob-
. jects of history are constitutive relationships.. Motives 
and actions stand in such a relationship to each other. 
Actions of individuals which (1) are more than routine and 
(2) influence the course of social growth or decltne, stand 
in such a relationship to the community. Examples of these 
relationships are not difficult to find. Tn Chapter Three 
we pointed out that the subject constitutes himself as an 
intelligent and rational being by acts of inquiry and-of 
reflection. Tnstitutions are only founded and maintained 
by acts of loyal citizens who f:lnd them preferable to the 
vacuum of anarchy. In turn, institutions have a constitu-
tive relatton to the subject, e.g. the law prescribes what 
the subject is to become. 20 The human family is more than 
a product of nature; it is an organization of relationships, 
or meanings, which determine basic obligations as well as 
the initial opportunities for human growth. If the 
20L~nergan analyzes the constitutive function of mean-
ing, in Method in '£heolo~y, pp. 178-1?9. He makes special 
note of the institutiona carriers of meaning which have 
meanings as intrinsic components. (Ibid., p. 78~ In rela-
tion to the above thesis on the primary objects of history, 
Lonergan remarks that the constitutive role of meaning in 
the controlling side of human conscious action grounds the 
"peculiarity" of the historical field. (Ibid., p. 178.) 
That is, historical events are distinguis~from natural 
events on the basis of acts of meaning which not only mold 
the natural to human ends (the efficient function of meaning), 
but also change man himself. (Ibid., pp. 77-78.) For exam-
ple, the road building of the Romans altered the natural 
landscape and also made a centralized government a feature 
of human living. 
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constitutive relations change, then the institution chan-
ges as witnessed in the weakening of the extended family 
in industrialized, mobile societies. 21 
Now human intentions and decisions, human actions 
and social constructs are distinguishable from both the 
chemical/neural events which occur outside consciousness 
and. the events in nature which have no direct human cause. 
The distinguishing mark will be the constitutive relation-
ships which exist among the former historical entities. 22 
Such entities are constituted by acts of meaning and of 
valuing, and so they bear a human stamp. It is human self-
making which ultimately grounds the distinction between 
historical and natural events. And the products of this 
self-making are to be accorded primacy as historical ob-
jects. 23 
We began the preceding discussion of historical ob-
jects because one of the problems of historical objectivity 
is the uncertainty over just what can be counted as a 
21Bernard Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento," 
Collection, p. 244. 
22A more extensive discussion of the difference be-
tween natural objects and historical objects will occupy 
our attention in the fourth section of this chapter. 
23we have only argued that constitutive relations 
are the primary components of the historical field. We do 
not mean to exclude totally those other entities and events 
which by themselves are of a nat'1I'al origin. For example, 
Napoleon's stomach cancer is not a historical entity, but 
it will be mentioned by biographers because they think it 
affected his historical decisions and actions. 
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historical datum. Already we have argued that, w~atever 
data or materials are accepted,· they will not be simply 
given. Rather, they are relative to the intentions and 
goals ·of those who take an interest in them. In making 
the point that constitutive relationships are the prjmary 
objects of the historical field, we have been clarifying 
this relativity. For the historian constitutes himself 
as a competent scholar by closely attending to his selec-
ted materials and by subordinating all lesser interests 
to the desire to understand a certain sequence of events. 
Moreover, as a member of a community, he helps to consti-
tute that community's intellectual life by his own scholar-
ly works. Thus, the thesis of the relatiVity of data to 
inquiring subjects is not an admission of arbitrariness 
in historical research. Instead, it is the recognition 
. 
that historical data are bound to historical processes and, 
more specifically, to the beings which make history. Con-
sequently, there can be a history of history (or histori-
ography) because what the historian does stands in a con-
stitutive relation both to himself and to his community. 
However, there are other aspects to this relation 
which have not yet been clarified. In the absence of a 
convincing argument for solipsism, we must admit that his-
torical data initially have a potential relation to his-
torical consciousness. The medieval manuscript which is 
discovered buried in some ruins has a potential for 
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enlightening the historian who stumbles across it~ More 
to the point, the researcher may have overlooked a key 
passage in some text and may only by chance come across it 
in a later reading of the text. According to our earlier 
remarks on selectivity, historians have to cultivate a 
selective inattention if they are not to be buried by 
countless details. What they exclude from their initial 
investigations may be later attended to; and, once atten-
ded to, these formerly potential data will prompt further 
inquiry. 24 
Historical data cannot be said to be simply given if 
their constitution as historical data depends at least in 
part on the interests and competence of the historian. 
For example, the markings on a Babylonian tablet become 
24The issue of selectiVity, of what materials will 
be attended to, was treated in Chapters Two and Four. His-
tory, as distinct from the natural sciences, usually in-
volves a prior evaluation of what is worth recounting. 
And the basis for this prior estimation will be the his-
torian's relative horizon as well as any opinions he has 
formed about human knowing, e.g. opinions on the limits 
of his ability to reconstruct past events. The crucial 
issue here is whether his selectivity will be entirely a 
matter of preference. We accept Collingwood's position 
that historical evidence only becomes such in relation to 
some historical question. (See The Tdea of History, p. 
281.) And historical questions belong to the non-logical 
operations of historical method. Consequently, there is 
no way to dictate in advance either what questions should 
be asked or what data should be considered. But the poten-
tial relativity of data to as-yet-undetermined questions 
belongs to uninitiated projects for settling historical 
problems. If the problems are not arbitrary, then the 
questions may not be, and the resulting selection of data 
may also not be arbitrary or solely a matter of personal 
preference. 
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items for h~storical curiosity because there are scholars 
who are interested in and can decipher them. By them-
selves the markings communicate nothing. 25 They can be 
said to be meaningful only because scholars recognize the 
human imprint of marks on stone and can understand the re-
lationships between marks and human intentions. That is, 
they can understand the meaning which these signs were 
intended to convey. So, historical data stand in relation 
to two human contexts: that of the past and that of some 
historian's present. In critical history this is espe-
cially true; for the statements and traces from the past 
are not simply accepted in the present without question. 26 
They must be investigated and checked. And ultimately the 
critical criterion for this process is the historian himself. 
250ne might argue that this example contains grounds 
for arguing that there are "raw" historical data. If a 
scholar finds a tablet on which there are marks from a lan-
guage he does not know, is he not confronting some simple 
givens of a historical nature? But how does he know that 
these marks are signs of human meaning and not the haphazard 
scratches of weather and natural decay? And if they are 
signs, then they are more than the marks, for signs refer 
to something other than themselves--in this case, they re-
fer to a past which is not "given" but must be discovered 
on the basis of the traces which the historian cannot im-
mediately decipher. 
26Lonergan refers to the position which holds histor-
ical materials to be verified simply in their irmnediate 
givenness as the fallacious "ideal of the cinema and sound-
track." (Insight, pp • .582-583.) We have gone beyond his 
stated position in arguing that historical data are con-
stituted by their relation to an.inquiring subject. He 
limits himself to the constitution of histortcal facts by 
such a relation. The distinction between data and facts 
is discussed in subsequent paragraphs. The differences 
in our positions will show up there. 
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The responsibility is his for being more than a "mirror" 
of the traces; he must analyze and pass judgment both on 
the authenticity of received materials and on the accuracy 
of past reports. But even prior to· ·this process of veri-
fication, our argument is that historical data, precisely 
as historical, have undergone an interpretative process. 
The implications of this argument will become clear when 
we take up the issue of the hermeneutical circle. 
From Data to Facts 
In keeping with the conclusions of Chapter Four, we 
can assert that the historian can be attentive to histori-
cal data while under the freely chosen control of a de-
tached attitude. Again, that attitude is not to be iden-
tified with a pure seeing of some uninterpreted given. 
Rather, it is a repeatedly affirmed decision to concen-
trate his efforts on understanding what actually happened. 
The interference of bias is always possible; but, on the 
strength of the arguments of the preceding chapter, it can 
be held that this interference is not inescapable. If the 
historian substitutes ideological and polemical interests 
for critical detachment, he may not argue that the substi-
tution was necessary and unavoidable. Prior to any attemp-
ted rationalization of scholarly failings, he has a desire 
to know. And what that desire spontaneously aims for is 
a translation of historical data into historical facts. 
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The distinction between historical data and histori-
cal facts can be maintained if human knowing is a compound 
activity. A conclusion of the third chapter was that hu-
man knowing is such a compound activity. Our study of 
historical procedures in Chapter Four further strengthened 
this conclusiop. by specifying the formal components of 
historical knowing. Thus, historical data must be selec-
ted, arranged in tentative orders, and used in a discrim-
inating fashion. But even these first steps of a histori-
cal investigation involve more than the attentiveness -of 
the investigator. His acts of understanding lay out the 
initial arrangements of historical materials; they separ-
ate promising arrangements from those which appear less 
than advantageous. So historical data belong to a process 
which begins with curiosity and heads for a goal that is 
satisfying to that curiosity. The goal is historical know-
ledge. And facts are distinguished from data in being the 
content of this goal. 
Between data and facts intervene the cr5tical and 
interpretative procedures of historical method. 27 These 
27 11 rt is enough to accept as a prerequisite of all 
historical study that the letters on a stone or a piece of 
parchment or the remains of a medieval village or a trea-
tise by a schoolman, do not of themselves provide more than 
the data on which the historian sets to work; and in order 
to make them into historical facts--i.e. what he assumes 
to have been the case--he has to employ a full critical and 
interpretative apparatus of selection, evaluation, inter-
polation and rejection •••• " Gordon Leff, History and So-
cial Theory, pp. 22-23. 
Recognizin5 the multiple steps from data to facts, 
.. · 
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procedures ~nd the intellectual effort they requi~e pre-
cede the emergence of historical facts. In critical his-
tory the procedures and the transition from data to facts 
are employed twice. Those preserved materials in which the 
historian initially takes an interest are not immediately 
accepted as reliable and useful reports on past events. 
They must first be sifted and tested both for their accur-
acy and their place on a scale of primary and secondary 
sources. Once this work with the sources is underway, in-
formation of varying degrees of reliability begins to· 
emerge. For the exegete or the editor of manuscripts, 
reliable information will be labelled historical facts. 
But since the historian's task is not just to criticize 
sources but to interpret the events to which they refer, 
this reliable information is not the goal of historical 
facts or historical knowledge. The historian's goal is 
an overview of the limited contexts which exegesis may es~ 
tablish. Consequently, the exegete supplies data for the 
discovery of historical facts. Between the data and the 
facts intervenes the interpretative reconstruction which 
in fact is shown to be supported by the assembled evidence. 28 
we can understand Raymond Aron's denial of the existence of 
any elementary or atomistic historical facts. "Historical 
facts are historical to the extent to which they are con-
nected with collective things." Raymond Aron, Introduction 
to the Philosophy of History, p •. 143. 
2811rt follows that the facts ascertained in the cri-
tical process are, not historical facts, but just data for 
the discovery of historical facts. The critical process 
has to be followed by an interpretative process, in which 
29? 
The different points of the preceding paragraph im-
ply a distinction between establishing the meaning of his-
torical materials and determining what was going forward 
in a particular group at some time. 29 If the meaning of 
some Babylonian inscription can be discovered, then, by 
relating it to other available records, the historian may 
be able to reconstruct the historical process to which the 
inscription bears witness. In keeping with our previous 
discussion of constitutive relationships as the primary ob-
jects in the historical field, historical facts, properly 
speaking, must be more than knowledge of past events, i.e. 
knowledge of what happened.30 So the meaning of the 
the historian pieces together the fragments of information 
that he has gathered and critically evaluated. Only when 
this interpretative process of reconstruction is terminated 
do there emerge what may properly be called the historical 
facts." Method in Theolog~, p. 203. Lonergan applies this 
distinction between exegesis and history to both the work 
of the historian and the work of the scientist. See ibid., 
pp. 348-349. ~ 
29In Chapter Four we argued that this latter task 
was specifically a part of critical history. The main ar-
gument is that what a group records for posterity is limi-
ted to what the group knows about its own history. But, 
in many cases, the group misjudges or is unconcerned with 
the long-range consequences of its actions. Only a later 
historian can fit their partial self-estimate into a lar-
ger context. 
30we are disagree5_ng with Lonergan when he simply 
states that historical facts are known events. (See Meth-
od in Theology, p. 202.) This disagreement is not crucial 
to the purposes of this dissertation. It may in fact not 
be a serious disagreement at all since, in various places, 
Lonergan argues that (1) historical procedures come to 
term in historical knowledge, i.e. historical facts; and 
(2) for critical history, these facts pertain to the ques-
tion of what was "going forward" in the past, i.e. what 
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~·· Babylonian inscription and the events to whiqh it refers 
become historical facts through the historian's success-
fUl efforts to interrelate the known details. He synthe-
sizes them in an overview which reconstructs the intelli-
gible sequence of actions and consequences.31 Quite sim-
ply, historical facts emerge when known events are related 
among themselves so as to disclose the mutual constitution 
of act-consequence-historical advance or decline. The act 
effects a change in the group; the change in the group de-
termines the historical meaning of the act. 
Heuristic Frameworks 
What we have been doing in the preceding paragraphs 
course the known events were taking. Consequently, his 
position appears to be that historical facts, properly 
speaking, are more than the known events. 
3l0ur thesis that historical facts are more than 
known events draws support from two commentators on his-
tory--Henri Marrou and Gordon Leff. Marrou writes: "His-
tory attains intelligibility only to the extent that it 
shows itself able to establish and to disclose the rela-
tions that join each new stage of human progress to the 
past and to its consequences." (The Meaning of Hjstory, 
p. 186.) Of course, we should add that stages of human 
decline cannot be overlooked. Marrou does not overlook 
the hiatuses which limit the thoroughness of historical 
reconstructions. That is, not all events are linked, and 
so some intelligible relations may be unavailable to the 
historian. 
Gordon Leff remarks in a similar vein: "The study of 
history--of whatever branch--is to discover how what hap-
pened did happen; knowledge of an event alone is not his-
tory but merely its raw material: in the degree to which 
it can be related to other events it becomes an intelligi-
ble reconstruction of the past which is the object of his-
tory." History and Social Theory, p. 53. 
r t: . 
• 
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is to clari~y the relations between historical data and 
facts, between historical materials and the inquiring his-
torian. A further clarification can now be made. There 
is the relation of historical materials to the heuristic 
frameworks which anticipate a historical intelligibility 
in the materials. The use of heuristic frameworks was 
discussed in Chapters Two and Four. There we argued that 
such anticipatory constructs are not necessarily detrimen-
tal to critical history. Usually the contrary view con-
tains the implicit assumption that critical history should 
begin without presuppositions. Historical knowing is a 
matter of "observing" the given facts, and so any prior 
hypotheses will only interfere with this direct grasp of 
historical facts.32 
The myth of the observational historical given is 
seriously challenged by Hayden White's theory of poetic 
prefiguration. The objects of the historical field are 
not invariant throughout changes in basic paradigms. Ra-
ther, with a change in paradigms, the data for historical 
analysis will change. Now we take White's theor-J to be an 
elaboration of that "Copernican Revolution" in history 
which Collingwood identifies with the critical and 
32Previously we noted Arthur Danto•s critique of 
Charles Beard's position on the use of historical hypothe-
ses. The critique is also aimed.at Beard's misleading 
metaphor that the historian can "see" the past through the 
medium of documents. Hypotheses should be unnecessary if 
this were the case. See Danto's Analytical Philosophy of 
History, pp. 95-99. 
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constructive aspects of historical method.33 The belief in 
invariant historical givens is the basis for what Colling-
wood labels "scissors-and-paste" history.34 This type of 
. . 
historical narration was in practice surpassed by nine-
teenth-century historians, but many of the expectations 
about historical method lagged behind this change. The re-
sult was a simplistic notion of historical procedures which 
was out of touch with what historians actually were doing. 
Our own analysis of relative and basic horizons further 
spe~ifies how historical materials are not simply observa-
tional givens, but are related to the selective, construc-
tive, and critical operations of the intelligent historian. 
His use of precise questions presupposes historical know-
ledge and is an anticipation of what answers are likely. 
The latter anticipation is reflected in the precise ques-
tion which takes the form of a hypothesis. 
Now the reaction of those who hold to some invariant 
historical givens is predictable. Are the preceding remarks 
not an admission that the historian's use of materials is 
arbitrary? Those remarks indicate that some type of des-
criptive framework is antecedent to the gathertng of his-
torical materials. Whatever is "given" in historical ex-
perience is given in terms of the antecedent framework 
33R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 240. 
34Ibid., pp. 257-263. 
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which formulates the expectations of the historian. Conse-
quently, there is no immediate grasp of historical facts. 
And, if there is no·such grasp, then there are no priVi-
leged historical facts which every historian must recog-
nize. 35 
We accept the conclusion that there are no privileged 
historical facts which are given independently of a partic-
ular perspective. Arguments in Chapter Two for the thesis 
of perspectiVism require this conclusion. It is apparent 
that we do not share the expectation that historical facts 
are immediately intuited. But it does not follow that, in 
the absence of a body of unassailable historical facts, the 
historian's use of materials must be arbitrary. The com-
plaint actually is twofold. Since there is no single pri-
Vileged historical perspective, the perspective which is 
35This conclusion is not too different from Colling-
wood' s following remark. "All that the historian means, 
when he describes certain historical facts as data, is 
that for the purpose of a particular piece of work there 
are certain historical problems relevant to that work which 
for the present he proposes to treat as settled; though, 
if they are settled, it is only because historical think-
ing has settled them in the past, and they remain settled 
only until he or some one else decides to reopen them." 
Ibid., p. 244. 
---- W. H. Walsh comments on the absence of unassailable 
historical facts. The conflicts among historical perspec-
tives are sometimes thought to be resolvable by an appeal 
to independent historical facts. But this expectation has 
not been fulfilled because no consensus has been reached 
on either a fixed body of evidence which all historians 
recognize or on a standard mode of historical conscious-
ness. See walsh's Philosophy of History: An Introduction, 
pp. 114-115. 
£ 
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adopted will be marred by personal preferences. And since 
the adopted perspective determines what counts as histor-
ical data, the handling of materials will be influenced by 
the variable preferences which ground the antecedent per-
spective. 
Admittedly there are preferential variables involved 
in the choice of a historical perspective. But much of 
the work of the preceding chapters has been concerned with 
finding some limit to these variables. Thus, we have ar-
gued that there are theoretical grounds for criticizing 
elements in one's historical perspective. We have argued 
that these grounds are decidedly non-arbitrary, but are 
invariant across changes in moral and aesthetic viewpoints. 
r1oreover, in regard to the second part of the complaint, 
the previous chapter argued for a critical sanction of his-
torical procedures. The histor1an's use of materials is 
conditioned by his preferences, his prior expectations 
about historical processes, his specific hypotheses. But 
his use o~ materials can also be subord}.na ted to a reflec-
tive analysis which checks his procedures against an appro-
priated cognitional performance. 
These previous arguments have recognized the con-
structive aspect of the historian's work as well as the 
possibility of an interfering bias. But what they, and 
particularly the final section of Chapter Four, have gone 
on to show is that the historian's constructs can be 
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products of .a detached intelligence which recognizes the 
difference between bias and critical thinking. \./hen these 
constructs are the hypotheses which focus inquiry without 
concluding what the answers must be, then the historian's 
experience is likely to be a self-correcting process.36 
He sets up plausible constructs, modifies them as his work 
progresses, and perhaps even abandons constructs which his 
discriminating intelligence finds to be misdirected. There 
are at least three effective limits to any arbitrary con-
structs: the historian's own intelligence, the public con-
trols of a critical professional community and an educated 
audience, and the accumulating evidence which either rein-
forces or undermines a tentative thesis. In advance of 
these controls, there are no privileged historical facts 
and no single privileged perspective on the past. 
We are agreeing with Hayden White that historical 
models are needed for organizing a field of research. He 
36The proof of this statement lies in the recogni-
tion that hypothetical constructs are not ends in them-
selves but means to historical knowledge. They launch a 
process of verification which may or may not confirm the 
initial guesswork of the historian. Thus, the unavoidable 
use of historical constructs is not a basis for historical 
idealism. What is advanced hypothetically is a product of 
both the historian's intelligence and his prior knowledge 
of some topic. Furthermore, that hypothesis and its pre-
supposed knowledge may be altered by a new encounter with 
evidence which is acceptable to the historian's perspec-
tive without being totally coherent with prior opinions 
belonging to that perspective. On the problem of con-
structs and idealism in history, see Henri-Trenee Marrou, 
The Meaning of History, pp. 65-66. 
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notes that documentary records do not immediately present 
an ordered and unambiguous image of past events.37 A 
heuristic framework which provides a plausible order for 
events is a requisite for a· methodical study of the records. 
Examples of such frameworks abound. The most obvious is 
simple chronology which differentiates history into periods 
thereby offering a point of reference for individual 
events.38 More complex examples occur when the historian 
seeks a model for explaining the relations among events. 
Occasionally a scientific model is adapted to historical 
purposes, e.g. Darwinian biology and scientific mechanisms 
have been prevailing models for some historians.39 These 
models may be elaborated into speculative philosophies or 
theories of history. There appears to be some consensus 
on the heuristic worth of such grand schemes for ordering 
events.40 While, as Hayden White proves, there is no 
3?Metahistory, p. 30. 
38we have already remarked on E. H. Carr's observa-
tion that the periodization of history is a necessary tool 
for historians. (See What Ts History?, p. ?6.) Claude L4vi-
Strauss provides insights into the functions of historical 
dating, in The Savage I1ind, pp. 258-261. 
39such models may be employed without much awareness 
on the part of those employing them. Cultural differences 
offer some help in explicating one's own preconceptions 
about historical processes. Our contemporary preconcep-
tions differ greatly from the Greek view of hlstory, and a 
study of the latter may help us to recognize what we have 
taken for granted and left unstudied. Cornford's Thucydi-
des :Mythistoricus provides just such an opportunity. 
4
°For examples, see Bruce Mazlish, The Riddle of His-
~' pp. 428 and 447; also Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of 
H!St"orical :Explanation, p. 112; similarly, Henri-Ir~nee 
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consensus on which theory or set of theories is actually 
proper to history, there is agreement that illuminating 
models can forward historical understanding. 
A problem which must be considered is the "givenness" 
of historical models. PreViously we have qualified the 
statement that historical data are "given." As historical 
data they have already been classified. That is, they be-
long to a class of materials having some relation to his-
torical interests. Both these interests and the intended 
materials are the components of variable historical con-
sciousness. The variability of this consciousness shows 
up in the antecedent frameworks which both guide the his-
torian's questions and set the boundaries within which 
data can be found. Now these frameworks or models may be 
so much a part of the historian's cultural heritage that 
he does not recognize them as models. Instead, he takes 
for granted that they are the actual image of historical 
processes. 41 Let us use the familiar phrase "climate of 
Marrou, The Meaning of History, pp. 167-169, and pp. 196-
197; also David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: 
Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, p. xv. Lonergan's 
discussion of theories of history as ideal types and as 
heuristic devices occurs in Method in Theology, pp. 227-
229. 
41we have in mind Corn.ford's remark: "It is impossi-
ble for us to tell how pervasively our own view of the 
world is coloured by Darwinian biology and by the categor-
ies of mechanical and physical science." In the Preface 
to Thucydides 1'1ythistoricus, p. Viii. 
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opinion" to refer to such a set of accepted but unstudied 
historical models. Our problem, then, is no longer the 
givenness of data but the givenness of understanding. 
These climates of opinion are the antecedent ways in 
which observations are made. They supply the classifica-
tions which allow an observation of data to be specific-
ally historical. As such, they raise anew the problem of 
closed systems of thought. 42 
The latter problem was formulated at the close of 
Chapter Three. We specified the dimensions of the problem 
. . 
by working out the presuppositions and implications of 
Carl Becker's position on climates of opinion. Again, 
that position was that the preconceptions of one's own age 
close one off from the thought of other ages. No valid 
judgments of truth or falsity pass between different cli-
mates of opinion. Two presuppositions of this position 
were (1) differences among climates of opinion are funda-
mental givens, and (2) what is not given is a basis on 
which to build a critique of both the differences and their 
sources. Two implications of the position were (1) the 
historian's search for self-knowledge occurs within the 
42Recall that one purpose of this chapter is to de-
termine how human intelligence is related to these ante-
cedent models or thought-systems. Is the relation one of 
subordination such that the "given" climate of opinion in-
corporates all our possible questions? Or is it possible 
to develop increasingly complex thought-models as our ex-
perience and understanding outstrip original ways of think-
ing? 
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boundaries of his antecedent thought-system, and (2) he 
will not discover within these boundaries an:y basis for 
judging works operating under a different set of precon-
ceptions. 
Becker's thesis of the ultimacy of cultural differ-
ences stands if one begins with statements about cultural 
values or historical knowledge. 43 But we have argued the 
possibility of beginning with the prior performance of the 
subject, i.e. starting with those cognitional acts which 
give rise to both statements and their formulated cultural 
contexts. This performance can be objectified, and its 
inherent structure is the a priori condition for all de-
velopments of meaning. Consequently, a discovery is made 
of something which is not owed to the particular framework 
.· 44 
or climate of opinion of the discoverer. Given this 
discovery, it is possible to reach "behind" both the given 
climates of opinion and their differences to the subjects 
43To repeat the argument for this conclusion--the 
climate of opinion is prior to the meaning of statements. 
The latter do not validate their climate of opinion; ra-
ther, it is to their prior context that they owe their 
meaningfulness. 
44This statement must be qualified. Cognitional 
structure is a priori both in the sense that it is a pre-
condition to developments of meaning and in the sense that 
it precludes none of them in advance. However, the struc-
ture is discovered only by investigating the subject's acts 
of intentionality. These acts will be carried on within a 
context of prior knowledge, preconceptions, values, and so 
on. Consequently, there is an a posteriori aspect to the 
structure of knowing, i.e. the discovery of cognitional 
structure takes place within the particular climate of 
opinion of the discoverer. 
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who constituted them. This is to say that the two presup-
positions associated with Becker's work must be corrected. 
First, any "given" differences among perspectives or frame-
. . 
works or theories presuppose the prior performance of their 
originators. The understanding of historical processes 
which they express is not simply a factual given, the ori-
gins of which must be left in obscurity. Second, transcen-
dental method which formulates the operations of critical 
consciousness is a basis for criticizing the differences 
among perspectives because it can note omissions or con-
fusions which occurred at the source of those differences. 45 
The implication of our response to Becker's position 
is that any "given" historical model or climate of opinion 
can be measured against the spontaneous performance of the 
critical subject. Are there questions, problems which the 
model overlooks or dismisses out of hand? How well does 
it account for the available materials which a profession-
al historical community accepts as in need of explanation? 
45we need to distinguish here between differences 
which, accordi.ng to Becker and others, cannot be made to re-
veal their sources and differences which the thesis of per-
specti vism declares to be irreducible. The latter differ-
ences are not matters of truth or falsity in jistorical 
works, but are products of varying interests and relative 
horizons. Such differences can be investigated but not e-
liminated. Indeed, no purpose is served in trying to level 
them. But incompatible differences among historical per-
spectives usually can be traced to omissions or confusions 
in their underlying cognitional theories. Thes~ are the 
differences which cari be criticized once transcendental 
method is applied to them. 
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In the use of evidence which the model itself allows, are 
there arbitrary assessments, convenient omissions, or lap-
ses in consistency? In the arguments of historians who 
employ the given model, are there fallacies which can be 
traced to basic assumptions in the model itself? 
The preceding questions are both too general and too 
specific. They are too general in that actual cases of 
historical criticism would involve more concrete examples. 
They are too specific in that our purpose is to show how 
.. 
questions about the intelligibility and reasonableness of 
historical models can be connected to critical conscious-
ness. The formal precepts of critical consciousness (i.e. 
the transcendental precepts) are not openly manifest in 
the preceding questions. But they are at least implicit 
as the guiding assumption that one can tell the difference 
between an intelligent use of materials and a prejudiced 
use, between a reasonable transition from evidence to 
1 . d •t 46 cone us1on an a non segu1 ur. 
Our.first question--Are there questions, problems, 
which the given model overlooks or dismisses out of hand?--
is of special importance when considering the relation of 
transcendental method to historical models. It is the type 
of question which reveals the possibility of a cross 
46This implicit presence we take to be established 
on the basis of arguoents in Chapter Four. There our con-
clusion was that transcendental method and, hence, its for-
mal precepts have a normative function in regard to his-
torical procedures. 
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comparison between different historical framework$. 4? More 
is at stake than the historian's accuracy in his work; 
there is also the question of his ability and willingness 
to consider new ideas and the probable opinions of those 
who do not share his framework. 48 The precepts of atten-
tiveness and intelligence require that the historian broad-
en his vision to include the work of other schools of his-
torical thought. What can he learn from them? Do their 
divergent views challenge his own position? Do historical 
models other than his own provide insights which he sus-
pects can be verified? If his suspicions turn out to be 
correct, is he willing to make the needed changes in his 
perspective? 
4?This cross comparison is called for by Haskell Fain 
in his Between Philoso)hy and History (Pr:inceton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970 , p. 244. He inquires after criter-
ia for such a comparison but settles on nothing definitive. 
Our position is that the formulated performance of the sub-ject, without be5ng identified with strictly logical cri-
teria, provides the needed basis for a critical comparison. 
48E. H. Carr notes the limits which a concern for the 
historian's accuracy involves. "To praise a historian for 
his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-
seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. 
It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essen-
tial function." \./hat Is History?, p. 8. There is also the 
narrative style which the historian will want to make attrac-
tive to a potential audience. Similarly he may be concerned 
with coordinattng his research with the work of his col-
leagues, so as to advance the exploration of a topic impor-
tant for his era. Even more important, he may be concerned 
with giving his work the broadest possible research basis, 
and this requires that he listen. to and evaluate the opin-
ions of historians from different schools of thought. 
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Now our argument is that, if such questions.are in 
fact possible, then the historian can understand other sys-
tems of thought; he can learn from them both what his er-
rors may be and what theirs may be. But this is to say 
that human intelligence can transcend climates of opinion 
or systems of thought or historical frameworks which are 
initially guiding its acts of inquiry and discovery. It 
is never without such frameworks, but our point is that 
critical consciousness which develops contexts of meaning 
can also move beyond the inherent limits of its own prod-
ucts.49 The key to such a possibility is the occurrence 
of questions which presuppose a given standpoint but which 
intend the content of other standpoints. That is, ques-
tioning which is not prejudiced in advance can carry the 
questioner beyond his initial preconceptions to an under-
standing which modifies and improves upon his starting 
point.5° 
The Hermeneutical Circle 
In a preliminary way we have reached the first goal 
49This conclusion was listed in the introductory sec-
tion of this chapter as the first of two goals which had to 
be reached if the fourth counterproposal was to be success-
fully defended. The problem of the hermeneutical circle--
considered in subsequent paragraphs--must be treated before 
this conclusion is definitely accepted. 
50see the remarks in Chapter Four, section three, on 
the ecstatic aspect of historical procedures. we noted 
there the self-correcting process which gradually replaces 
initial guesswork with questions suggested by the topic 
under study. 
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of this cha~ter: to establish that human intelli;ence can 
transcend the antecendent frameworks it employs. There 
remain the various counter-arguments to this conclusion. 
They come under the general heading of the problem of the 
hermeneutical circle.51 In the first place, the historian 
seeks to understand something about past human events. 
But since his efforts to understand are not a matter of 
"pure seeing," he brings to that task a prior understanding 
of how human beings act, the motives which prompt decisions, 
and other general information about human living. This pre-
supposed understanding in some way already understands 
those past human events. Consequently, what is to be 
learned about those events is not independent of the stand-
point of the historian. If he is trying to prove something 
about1hose events, he will already be presupposing much of 
what he aims to prove. If he uses documents to interpret 
some events, he must first know that they are appl1cable; 
but the condition for knowing that they are appl:i.cable is 
to already know how those documents forward the interpreta-
tion of the events themselves.52 
The circularity here is apparent. The problem is 
5lThe problem of the hermeneutical circle is concise-
ly stated by Richard E. Palmer: "How can a text be under-
stood, when the condition for its understanding is already 
to have understood what it is about?" Hermeneutics (Evan-
ston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 25. 
5211In defiance of the rules of traditional logic, 
circular arguments are the normal method of producing 
documentary evidence. 
"An historian who consults his documents in order to 
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whether it is a "Vicious" or closed circle in which one 
does not advance beyond the initial standpoint but merely 
unfolds what it implicitly contains. In order to handle 
this problem, we take a clue from Heidegger's analysis of 
the hermeneutical circle. The ideal of presuppositionless 
analysis has been repeatedly proposed as a model for scien-
tific demonstration. However, those who have proposed this 
ideal have usually argued for the possibility of "pure see-
ing." That is, any prior understanding of what is analyzed 
is to be discarded lest one's observation be guided by some 
prior theory and not by what is there-to-be-seen. But the 
recommended procedure is actually an exercise in non-under-
standing. One is to stare and nothing more.53 Our preVi-
ous study of both Lonergan's horizon-analysis and of the 
actual procedures of historians indicates that such an 
exercise in non-understanding has nothing to do with intel-
ligent historical inquiry.54 
interpret some political event can judge the value of these 
documents only if he knows their place within the very same 
course of events about which he consults them." Edgar 
Wind, "Some Points of Contact between History and NR-tural 
Science," in Philosothy and History, edited by R. Kliban-
sky and H. J. FatonNew York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 256. 
53"When we merely stare at something, our just-having-
i t-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it 
an: more. This grasping which is free of the 1as 1 , is a 
privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely under-
stands." Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 190. The 
sarcasm of the "merelf' is justified on the supposition 
that inquiry is an in elligent way to seek understanding. 
54It also has nothing to do with scientific inquiry 
if one is to believe those contemporary philosophers of 
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The H~ideggerian clue, then, is that interpretations 
proceed from prior understanding. This prior understand-
ing, or forehaving," is one of the essential conditions 
for interpretations. Hence, the apparent circularity of 
historical understanding cannot be labelled "vicious" be-
cause what makes understanding possible in the first place 
cannot be the basis for arguments that understanding does 
not occur or does not develop.55 
Besides the question of a "vicious circle," there is 
also the question of precontainment: Is understanding.lim-
ited to the unfolding of what is already implicit in the 
standpoint of the inquirer? An affirmative response is 
likely to proceed from a confusion of deduction with the 
process of understanding which is termed "insight." A de-
duction occurs among concepts and propositions when a tran-
sition is made from a general formula or premiss to some 
science who argue that all observation is theory-laden. 
Patrick A. Heelan summarizes some of the fundamental issues 
which belong to this contemporary debate, in "The Logic of 
Framework Transpositions," Language, Truth and Meaning, pp. 
93-96. Heidegger's position apparently is that both scien-
tific and historiographical interpretations operate from a 
prior understanding of their data and topics. Hence, the 
ideal of presuppositionless inquiry is alien to both the 
natural and human sciences. For the source of this comment 
and for Heidegger's warning about misunderstanding the "cir-
cularity" of human understanding, see Being and Time, pp. 
194-195. 
55"But if we see this clrcle as a vicious one and 
look out for wa s of avoidin it even if we ·ust •sense• 
is an inevita le imperfection, t en he act of under-
standin has been misunderstood from the Nar-
n Heidegger, Being and rime, p. 
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implication.56 But historical understanding develops in a 
circuit from prior historical understanding and selected 
materials to inquiry, from inquiry to tentative schemes and 
discoveries, from limited contexts to an overview which 
must be verified first in its parts and then as a coherent 
whole. Along the way new discoveries are made which chal-
lenge earlier hypotheses. Revisions are therefore intro-
duced. And the basis for these revisions is the occurrence 
of a sudden insight which grasps in a new way how partial 
discoveries fit into the broader context. Thus, in our 
example of the pre-Civil War cotton trade, the conclusion 
about twenty-year trends of healthy market conditions was 
not deduced from any general statement about economic laws. 
Our hypothetical example envisioned a gradual learning pro-
cess in which initial hunches could be revised as the in-
quiry advanced. As two and three-year periods were isolated 
and understood, they could be related to other segments of 
the larger twenty-year period. Gradually an overview was 
built up out of our understanding of the segments. 
Now logically this process is a circle. The over-
view is reached only by understanding the parts. But at 
the same ttme the significance of the two and three-year 
periods was revealed by actually reaching an overview of 
56Lonergan contrasts deduction and scientific in-
sights. The latter account for those "leaps" which leave 
behind what is insufficient in old positions and introduce 
more satisfactory posittons thereby marking a scientific 
advance. See Insight, p. 166. 
~ ! . 
' 
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the twenty-year period. However, the achievement-of under-
standing was not a logical deduction. Prior historical 
understanding allowed the historian to frame intelligent 
hypotheses about cotton trading in the antebellum South, 
but the conclusion was not necessarily grasped in those 
initial hypotheses. They onlyJaunched and guided a pro-
cess of discovery which hypothetically could have turned 
up unexpected results. So, to learn about that trade and 
its economic health was a matter of understanding each 
segment of the period. Then one used that understanding 
to correct or to fill out the understanding of other seg-
ments as well as the prior historical understanding with 
which one began the inquiry.5? The learning process breaks 
out of any hermeneutical circle which is construed as a 
closed system confining the subject to what he already 
~ .. 
implicitly knows. 
Before closing this second section of the chapter, 
we need to consider a special case of the hermeneutical 
circle. This special case is linguistic in nature. Words 
are meaningful within the context of a language. One un-
derstands them by knowing how to use the language to which 
they belong. But obviously one only knows a language in-
sofar as one knows the words and the rules governing their 
use--hence another circle presents itself. Given Hayden 
White's emphasis on the linguistic structure of historical 
5?Method in Theology, p. 159. 
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works and gi.ven his thesis that historical paradigms are 
effectively closed systems of thought,58 this special case 
is worth consideration. 
First, the problem is twofold. If methodical inquiry 
is limited to linguistic formulations, then the language 
employed in the inquiry will be a closed context, and dis-
coveries will be limited by what that linguistic context 
allows to be spoken.59 The second aspect of the problem 
involves the historian's use of ordinary language. He bor-
rows his terms from a public context that has settled ·on 
the meaning of the terms. Consequently, the meanings which 
he is capable of expressing will be derived from that pub-
lic context of meaningfulness. 
Both aspects of this problem are referred to in Lon-
ergan' s discussion of ordinary and original meaningfulness. 60 
Ordinary meaningfulness is the public consensus on word-
meaning evident in a group's common use of everyday 
58Metahistory, p. 432. 
59w~ have in mind here a variant on epistemological 
conceptualism. The historian, through a poetic choice, 
adopts a linguistic framework for his subsequent inquiries. 
Other historians use different linguistic frameworks (i.e. 
one of the other tropes of poetic speech), so that subse-
quent narratives will be formulated in diverse and some-
times conflicting modes of speech. Given a linguistic 
position which denies the possibility of a preconceptual 
insight havtng critical implications, these differences 
will be .fundamental. There will be no way of criticizing 
them since whoever attempts such-a critique will already 
presuppose the privileged status of his own linguistic 
framework. 
60Method in Theology, pp. 255-25?. 
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language. Individuals acquire knowledge of the ~oup's 
language by learning how it is used on an everyday basis. 
But original meaningfulness is apparent when new uses are 
found for existing words or when new words are developed 
and communicated to a wide audience. 61 Eventually a public 
may grasp the meaning of new ways of speaking and may adopt 
them as a part of ordinary language. 
Now both a precondition to the preceding distinction 
and the basis for a solution to the twofold problem we are 
considering is the occurrence of mental acts which precede 
linguistic formulations. If one denies that mental acts 
occur or if one labels them "occult entities" which dis-
tract philosophers with pseudo-problems, then the preced-
ing distinction will be overlooked. 62 Similarly, a denial 
of mental acts will leave one with only linguistic formu-
lations. And these formulations are relative to the lin-
~istic context in which they occur. Other formulations 
occurring in different linguistic contexts may be incommen-
surable with each other even though they supposedly refer 
to the same set of events. 
However, the work of the third chapter focused on 
61The ongoing rev1sion of dictionaries is proof 
enough that original meaningfulness can be distinguished 
from ordinary meaningfulness. 
62Method in Theology, pp. 256-257· Apparently Loner-
gan is making an oblique reference to ordinary language 
philosophers who consider all philosophic problems to be 
linguistic problems and who limit basic philosophic dis-
course to the usage of ordinary language. 
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cognitional acts and established the pattern of their occur-
rence. Our analysis was not of "occult entities" but of 
empirical events, the data of consciouness. So mental acts 
do occur. Their occurrence need not be explicitly linguis-
tic,63 but an appropriation of cognitional structure re-
quires a linguistic statement of the distinctions and in-
terrelations of human intentional acts. This statement may 
not be adequate; but the subject's performance continues 
just the same, and repeated efforts to explain it may yield 
improved accounts. 64 
The implication of all this is that methodical in-
quiry is not limited to a juggling of linguistic formulae. 
There can be insights into intentional acts, and, accord-
ing to the intentionality analysis of Chapter Three, these 
insights may reveal the structure of critical consciousness.· 
What is then made available is a basis for analyzing how 
new terms are invented to express a developing understand-
ing. Also made available is a formal theory of the 
63That is, a conscious act of human sensibility (e.g. 
touching) can occur without a ljnguistic component. By it-
self the act is a conscious expression which occurs as part 
of a larger flow of expression having both linguistic, bod-
ily, and interpersonal components. Lonergan remarks that 
mental acts occur only within a sustaining flow of expres-
sion. He cites the work of ~rnst Cassirer (The Philosophy 
of S~bolic Forms) as evidence for the interrelation of 
spee~, knowledge, and action. See ibid., Method in Theol-
.2SZ' p. 255. ~ 
64Recall the distinction made in Chapter Three be-
tween the pattern of cognitional performance itself and the 
formulation of it. The former is invariant; the latter is 
open to change though not to a radical revision of its 
basic terms. 
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performance presupposed by every h:i.storical paradigm. 
While paradigm-followers adopt ·their common terms and 
areas of interest much in the way that the 1ndividual 
learns about the ordinary meaningfulness of the group's 
speech, there are also the originators of paradigms who 
break through common usage to new ways of understanding 
and speaking. 65 This latter group bears wj_tness both to 
the distinction between ordinary and original meaningful-
ness and to the occurrence of mental acts which produce 
discoveries outdistancing the given linguistic frameworks 
of the day. 
In summary, this second section of Chapter Five 
treated specific problems confronting claims to historical 
objectivity. We envisioned a strategic need to handle 
these problems before proceeding to a complex notion of 
objectivity in the third section. 
The first problem concerned the determinatton of his-
torical data. A negative conclusion was easily reached: 
historical data are not ready-made items simply g:i ven for 
historians to inspect. An affirmative conclusion was not 
so easily reached. Even prior to our clarificatton of the 
relation between the historian and his object of inquiry, 
there is a problem: What types of entities are historical 
65The distinction between paradigm-followers and orig-
inators of paradigms is made by F. Lawrence in his article, 
"Self-knowledge in History in Gadamer and Lonergan," Lan-
guage, Truth and Meaning, p. 199. -
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objects? OUr proposed answer was limited. We argued not 
what must be excluded or what all must be included in the 
field of historical ·objects. Rather, we argued only that 
there are strong reasons for counting constitutive rela-
tionships as primary historical objects. One benefit of 
this viewpoint is the light it throws on what can first 
seem rather strange: historians treat themselves as his-
torical objects in writing a history of history. 
Further efforts were made to clarify the relation 
between the historian and his data. Our earlier arguments 
for the relativity of data to subjective interests had to 
be clarified if we were not to give the impression that 
historical research is wholly a matter of personal pref-
erence. First, we countered this impression by noting a 
potential relation of data to researcher--the historian 
does not create his materials. Second, we took note of the 
work of the fourth chapter. The relation between data and 
historian contai.ns a critical element: the historian him-
self who can be intellectually responsible. His cultivated 
detachment stands in contrast to a purely arbitrary use of 
historical materials. 
Our next move was from historical data to historical 
facts. The distinction was argued on the basis of the ear-
lier conclusion that human knowing is a compound activity. 
We added the argument that the procedures outlined in Chap-
ter Four would not make much sense if there were no 
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distinction. The transition from data to facts is guided 
by anticipatory hypotheses and heuristic frameworks--this 
much is assumed after the Copernican Revolution in histori-
ography. But this assumption is sometimes challenged: 
there must be observational historical givens which are 
independent of prior interests and constructs. If not, 
what objective checks can there be on an arbitrary con-
struction of historical events?66 We replied to this ques-
tion in a preliminary way. Part of the work of the previ-
ous chapters was to find limits to the variables which 
might groun19arbitrary historical procedures. Particularly 
the fourth chapter emphasized the non-preferential check 
available in transcendental method. Hypotheses and other 
constructs can be useful devices for guiding a developing 
understandi.ng. Should they become blocks to understanding, 
the historian's own intelligence, certain public controls, 
and accumulating evidence can provide remedies. 
The denial of observational historical givens and the 
affirmation of historical construction present another 
problem. Heuristic models may be closely identified with 
the cultural heritage of the historian. Basic assumptions 
about historical processes and about science may be part 
of those models--so much so that the historian does not 
think of them as constructs at all. Instead, they are 
66we should note that this question cannot be satis-
factorily answered before we explicitly develop the topic 
of historical objectivity. 
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part of that given understanding which forms the .individ-
ual's climate of opinion. !n handling this problem we made 
use of our earlier study of Carl Becker's work. !f it is 
possible to reach behind various "worlds of meaning" to 
the performance which produced them, then there is a basis 
for intelligently criticizing different historical con-
structs. 
However, we went beyond that earlier study of Chap-
ter Three to consider the problem of the hermeneutical cir-
cle. We argued against the thesis of presuppositionless 
history and the confusion of insight with deduction, both of 
which supported the charge of a "vicious circle" in histor-
ical understanding. Our response to this charge consisted 
in a descriptive analysis of the self-correcting process 
of learning. Finally, a special case of the hermeneutical 
circle was considered. Language forms a context of meaning-
fulness for expressions of preconceptual insights. If men-
tal acts are denied or ignored in favor of linguistic for-
mulations, then one is left with different linguistic 
frameworks containing irreconcilable propositions about the 
same events. But previous work already established that 
there are mental acts and that access can be gained to a 
performance invariant across differences in linguistic for-
mulation. With these variables clarified, we can turn to 
the main topic of objectivity in the next section. 
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EVIDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY 
The second goal of Chapter Five is to provide epis-
temological arguments justifying a conception of histori-
cal realism. 67 This goal will be reached in two stages. 
This third section elaborates Lonergan's epistemology 
which he derives from his cognitional theory. The follow-
ing, fourth section, uses this epistemology to criticize 
the "realism" of different opinions about historical facts. 
Throughout both sections we will maintain the distinction 
between surface and ·deep structures in the historical text. 
Our previous work has established that an appropriated cog-
nitional structure provides access to, as well as grounds 
for criticizing, precritical elements of the deep level. 
That same work has supplied reasons for holding that the 
bias infecting surface procedures is neither unavoidable 
nor irreducible. A single thesis remains to be proved: 
an epistemology which incorporates cognitional structure 
offers a test of the realism of historical perspectives. 
The topic of objectivity belongs to an epistemologi-
cal study of realism. Dissenting opinions about the possi-
bility of historical objectivity require that the topic 
67such an epistemological justification was not pro-
vided in any compelling way by nineteenth-century histori-
ans. (Metahistory, p. 26.) However, our starting point 
in cognitional structure may succeed in offering more than 
simply another epistemological argument having a pref eren-
tial and, hence, variable basis. 
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be a centra~ issue of this chapter. The complex notion of 
objectivity which will eventually emerge will have not 
only a specific reference to historical issues but also an 
implicit reference to problems of relativism in whatever 
field they may occur. 
Evidence and Verification 
Discussions of objectivity usually involve the topics 
of evidence and of verification. Our study of these two 
topics presumes earlier conclusions: that knowing is a com-
pound activity and that distinctions can be maintained 
among potential, formal, and actual evidence. 68 
Given the discussion in the preceding section on his-
torical data and their relation to an inquiring subject, 
we must agree with Collingwood that the notion of poten-
tial historical evidence is misleading. 69 Lonergan's no-
tion of potential evidence serves a negative function: it 
poses a limit to the claims of solipsism. But when one 
speaks of ·historical evidence, there is already a 
68Method in Theologz, p. 186. 
69see The Idea of History, pp. 280-281. Perhaps our 
point is too subtle. Historical data (or temporally past 
achievements) stand in a potentiar-re1ation to historical 
consciousness--this much must be granted to avoid solipsism. 
But data and evidence are not equivalent or interchangeable 
concepts. Evidence is data as attended to and at least 
tentatively connected to some inquiry. Pri~understand­
ing guides that inquiry, so that any evidentiary materials 
will already be classified in a preliminary way as fitting 
this or that problem area. Thus, to use Lonergan's termin-
ology, historical evidence will always be at least formal 
evidence. 
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classification or interpretation of some entity as histor-
ical. The mode of preliminary interpretation is likely 
to be a specific question which anticipates how data and 
a problem under study are interconnected. The historian 
asks a specific question because he thinks he can answer 
it. And he directs his question to selected evidence 
which he tentatively supposes will help to answer his ques-
tion. Therefore, to adopt Lonergan's terminology, though 
not his position--all historical evidence is at least for-
mal evidence.70 So we are qualifying earlier statements 
about Lonergan's triple classification of evidence. This 
qualification was postponed until after the preceding dis-
cussion of how historical interests constitute a field of 
historical objects. A very strong argument can be made 
for our thesis that potent;_al historj cal evidence functions 
solely as a negative concept. If it were a positive con-
cept, then everything in the world would be evidence for 
70strictly speaking, formal evidence for Lonergan is 
not only data as used in asking a question but also as 
used in answering a question. (Method in Theology, p. 186.) 
Our use of his term, within the above limits, is defensible 
since a precise question anticipates possible answers. 
Such is the meaning for Lonergan of the "unknown known" 
which a question intends. One commentator puts the same 
point this way: " ••• in every question there is a hidden 
structure directing implicitly the search for answers, 
and prior even to the formulation of the answer and impos-
ing a structure upon the answer even before it is formu-
lated. This hidden structure is the domain of intent1-on-
ali ty and, like the nine-tenths of an iceberg below water, 
it lies perilously below the level of our cognitive activ-
ities." Patrick A. Heelan, @uantum 1'1echanics and Objectiv-
ity (The Hague: Martinus Nij off, 1965), p. 156. 
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historical c.onsciousness.71 But this conclusion would 
undercut the thesis of historical questioning as construc-
tive. It would also make nonsensical the debates over 
what limited field of entities is properly termed "histor-
ical.1172 
The precedtng comments imply a correlation between 
historical questioning and formal historical evidence.73 
A question is an anti.ctpation of insight. If it is a pre-
cise question, it already supposes how an answer might 
shape up. That is, the question proposes a structure-or 
organization for handling the anticipated intelligibility 
71R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 280. 
72rn defense of our denial that "historical evidence" 
is a predicate belonging to objects independently of his-
torical questioning, we can construct an imaginative scene. 
A hunter walks through a dried-up African river bed. He 
hears a noise coming from nearby bushes. Eager to flush 
out some prey, he looks for an object to throw into the 
bushes. He finds a stone and hurls it. Sometime later a 
paleontologist walks along the same river bed. He knows 
that the river which once flowed here cut out what is now 
called the Olduvai Gorge. He too hears noises. Wanting 
to scare off an.y predators, he looks for an object to throw. 
By chance he picks up the same stone as the earlier hunter. 
But he stops to examine markings on it. The stone has been 
shaped by some human f orce--this much his earlier training 
and purposeful wandering allow him to detect. Suddenly, 
for this trained investigator, the object is no longer a 
natural entity but an item of historical interest. It be-
comes part of the paleontologist's world of meaning in 
which antecedent classifications stand ready to receive 
items of significance. What was not si_gnificant for the 
hunter is a historical puzzle for the paleontologist be-
cause he already understands how to perceive objects in a 
historical way. 
73R. G. Collingwood, The ~dea of History, p. 281. 
Henri Marrou concurs in the conclusion that historical en-
tities do not exist prjor to the intervention of the his-
torian's curiosity. See his The Meaning of History, p. 311. 
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of partially. understood materials. The inquirer's prior 
understanding and his heuristic hypothesis may or may not 
be compatible with fully considered eVidence. If they are 
compatible, then the question was well put and the hypo-
thesis is reinforced. If they are not, then the question 
does not cease to have a degree of intelligibility; it 
rather appears to be irrelevant to the investigated prob-
lem. 74 A precondition for either outcome is an insight 
which grasps a possible organization of the selected evi-
dence. 75 
The emphasis is on a "possible" organization because 
there is still a need for verification. Is the possible 
organization actually relevant to the evidence? Does the 
evidence actually warrant an assent to this tentative or-
ganization? At stake is what is usually referred to as 
the "sufficiency" of evidence. Lonergan provides important 
insights into what is meant by the sufficiency of evidence. 
First, what is historical evidence for one school of 
thought may not be consi.dered evidence by another. There-
fore, by itself evidence does not compel assent. rt sup-
plies a reasonable basis for assent only if it is understood 
to be sufficient. Lonergan's distinction between acts of 
74cr. our remarks in Chapter Four on inverse insights. 
75"What is grasped in insight, is neither an actually 
given datum of sense nor a creation of the imagination but 
an intelligible organization that may or may not be rele-
vant to data." Method in Theology, p. 10. 
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direct understanding and acts of reflective understanding 
is crucial here. The former provide the tentative connec-
tions which are usually formulated in a hypothetical prop-
osition. But the reflective act of understanding grasps 
not only the meaning of the proposition but also the rela-
tions among it, the events of which it may be affirmed, 
and the initial reasons for affirming it.76 !n other 
words, a pre-judgmental reflection determines how well a 
tentative understanding, one's formulation of it, the 
available evidence, and the events under study correlate 
with one another. This reflective act yields a determina-
tion of the sufficiency of evidence, and this determination 
is the basis for a reasonable judgment. 
The Virtually Uncondttioned 
The preceding remarks rather hastily summarized a 
complex position. But they do form an introduction to 
Lonergan's notion of the virtually unconditioned.?? The 
term "virtually" refers to the fact that the judgment made 
has conditions which are in fact fulfilled. That conditions 
76.F.dward M. MacKinnon, Truth and Expression (New York: 
Newman Press, 1971), pp. 53-54. 
??The basic text for this notion remains Chapter X 
of Insi~ht, pp. 279-316. The particularly relevant pages 
for his orical judgments are pp. 280-289, and 299-301. 
Other sources include "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," 
in Collection, pp. 160-163; and David Tracy's discussion 
of the notion in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, pp. 
128-132. 
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are involved in the judgment is evident through the mere 
asking of a question: Is this interpretation.correct??8 
What this question seeks is the evidence (the conditions) 
upon which the prospective answer w~ll depend. So the 
question is conditioned (or dependent); and what it is con-
ditioned by (or dependent on) is evidence. Now, in a 
judgment of historical fact, the initial historical ques-
tion (the conditioned) is linked to the known evidence (the 
conditions), and an act of reflective insight grasps the 
fulfillment of the conditions.?9 Put more concretely, his-
torical problems and relevant pieces of evidence are linked 
by intelligent questions yielding accumulattng insights. 
This i1nkage grows stronger as the pertinent questions are 
asked and answered. Finally, if there are no further per-
tinent questions, then the conditions are fulfilled, and 
it is reasonable to assert one's conclusions. 
In our introductory remarks to the virtually uncon-
•• ditioned, we noted that by itself evidence does not compel 
assent. So a determination of the "sufficiency" of evi-
dence requires more than knowledge of accumulated evidence. 
What is added to the known evidence is the reflective 
?8Another way of putting this--a question or hypothe-
sis will be conditioned if arguments and/or evidence are 
required to prove it. 
?9The basic formal components of a histor:tcal judg-
ment are threefold: (1) the judgment is the conditioned; 
(2) its cond1tjons are known; (3) the conditions are ful-
filled. This formal structure applies not just to histor-
ical judgments but to all reasoned assertions. Insight, 
p. 280. 
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insight which grasps how the conditioning evidence "fits" 
the conditioned hypothesis. In historical judgments this 
"fit" is usually only approximate. This is so because 
historical information is incomplete, and the historian 
cannot rule out the possibility that further relevant 
questions may yet arise. But if his research has been 
thorough and his procedures intelligent, he will be making 
more than a stab in the dark when he asserts some conclu-
sion. What he asserts is usually termed a probable judg-
ment of fact. 80 Why is it labelled "probable" rather than 
"certain"? Some expectation is present that the judgment 
and actual facts to which it refers may diverge. This ex-
pectation arises because the historian recognizes how in-
complete his knowledge is. But he does not suspend judg-
ment simply because his knowledge is incomplete. What was 
previously described as the self-correcting process of 
learning allows him to know when he is on the right track. 
At least it allows him to claim a mastery of the relevant 
issues and, therefore, to speak as one who can provide the 
8011 0n the other hand, the probable judgment results 
from rational procedures. Though it rests on incomplete 
knowledge, still there has to be some approximation towards 
completeness. Though it fails to reach the v;rtually un-
conditioned, still it has to be closing in upon that exi-
gent norm. Thus, one may say that guesses are probably 
true only in the statistical sense of diverging non-system-
atically from true judgments; but probable judgments are 
probably true in the non-statistical sense of converging 
upon true judgments, of approaching them as a limit." 
llli·' p. 300. 
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best available opinion of his day. 81 
In beginning this section we noted that two topics are 
usually associated with the broader issue of objectivity: 
evidence and verification. While both topics are treated 
above in our discussion of the virtually unconditioned, 
the topic of verification deserves a more explici_t state-
ment. Verification is usually said to be of propositions, 
i.e. of formulations of insight. But the act of verifica-
tion comes at the end of a process which also includes 
previous adjustments of terms to understanding, and of 
understanding to accumulating evidence. Cognitional pro-
cess contains these adjustments in various stages of devel-
opment prior to the judgments which conclude that the con-
ditioned and its conditions are linked and that the condi-
tions are in fact fulfilled. 82 To illustrate these stages 
81
"In probable judgments the link is that insights 
are correct when there are no further pert;nent questions 
and the fulfillment is some approximation of the self-
correcting process of learning to its limit of familiarity 
and mastery." Ibid., p. 315. Our reference to historical judgments as pr'C5'0a'Dle judgments is not meant to be an iden-
tification. Certatn judgments are possible, even likely, 
when uncomplicated topics are studied or when studies aim 
only to provide negative conclusions. But usually histor-
ical judgments belong to approximate jnterpretations of 
complex issues; hence, they are most often probable judg-
ments. 
8211But judgments are the final products of cognitional 
process. Before the link between conditioned and conditions 
appears in the act of judgment, it existed in a more rudi-
mentary state within cognitional.process itself. Before 
the fulfillment of conditions appears in another act of 
judgment, it too was present in a more rudimentary state 
within cognitional process. The remarkable fact about 
reflective insight is that it can make use of those more 
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of development and, thereby, to clarify how historical 
judgments approximate to the virtually unconditioned, let 
us return to our earlier example of a historical monograph 
on the pre-Civil War cotton trade. The following stages 
in the production of this hypothetical monograph mark ad-
vances in the process of verification. 
The monograph topic is usually entered into by way 
of a general question: "What was the economic condj_ ti on of 
the cotton trade in these years--prosperous or in decline?" 
Further questions break down the general problem area.into 
manageable segments: "How heavy were exports in 1850?"; 
"What market fluctuations have been preserved from the 
Charleston Exchange, and what do they reveal?" What these 
specific questj_ons set up is a link between the narrowed 
segments and available materials. 83 Tn an anticipatory way, 
these questions are already forging a link between the 
general problem area and studied materials. 
On the basis of prior knowledge of antebellum econ-
omics, the historian may hypothesize that the cotton trade 
rudimentary elements in cognitional process to reach the 
virtually unconditioned." Ibid., p. 281. 
83These links are formed in a rudimentary or tenta-
tive way. The historian intelligently anticipates that 
records of the Charleston Exchange will be important to his 
topic. However, the link is only tentative. Inverse in-
sights may occur revealing that no relevant link exists. 
For example, recall our earlier question about levels of 
cotton production in newly planted areas west of the Missis-
sippi. The materials relevant to thjs question were even-
tually uncoupled from the basic problem of an economic 
slump in 1850 because they d i.d not help to explain why the 
slump occurred. 
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was basical~y sound and probably showed signs of continued 
advance. This tentative position will influence the his-
torian's selective use of questions put to his materials. 
Stable or climbing prices paid both to producer and to 
exporter are a sign of prosperous economic conditions. 
So the historian's questions will be directed to evidence 
of price levels. Now the fact that his questions have 
this direction reflects an anticipation of how the fulfill-
ment of conditions will occur. That is, he is at least 
expecting that, if the trade was economically prosperous, 
this is the way to prove it; namely, by charting price 
levels over a twenty-year period. Of course, verification 
requires that the price levels actually be stable in the 
short run and climbing in the long run. Exceptions which 
can be accounted for as isolated in their effects and 
short-term in their endurance will not require a major re-
vision of the hypothesis. To discover and to estimate 
these exceptions is part of the self-correcting process 
of historical learning. 
That self-correct~_ng process involves coordinating 
with one another the insights into different yearly market 
conditions. Judgments have to be made on each year's econ-
omy, and then further judgments have to be made on the rela-
tion between yearly conditions and trends over two and 
three-year periods. 84 All the judgments must be carefully 
84That is, judgments not only link condi. tions to the 
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formulated s.o as not to claim more than the evidence war-
rants. Careful formulation is not automatically guaranteed; 
so, the historian must reflectively study his own expres-
sion. Does it correlate with his advancing understanding? 
Thus, another judgment is called for if the whole enter-
prise is not to falter over careless wording. 
~radually insights accumulate; market conditions 
for individual years are understood; the yearly reports 
are interrelated; and by now the histori_an is faniliar 
with the evidence which grounds his understanding of both 
indi_vidual years and long-term trends. If he has made a 
competent study of relevant materials, his evidence may 
seem quite conclusive. The original question reappears: 
nWhat was the economic condition of the cotton trade in 
this twenty-year period--prosperous or in decline? 1185 The 
historian's conViction is that the preponderance of eVidence 
points to long-term economic prosperity. Then his ques-
tion for reflection is, "Was the cotton trade in fact pros-
.... 
perous?" ·His previous work has linked the conditions (e.g. 
price levels and yearly market results) to the conditioned 
(i.e. the original question). He has understood the 
conditioned (e.g. price levels are a means of evaluating 
economic growth or decline), but they also link condit:ions 
to one another (e.g. the economic health of the cotton 
market in 1848 is matched by that of the previous year). 
85 . In order to avoid the complaint of a false disjunc-
tion, we should add, "or a period of mixed advances and 
declines?" No matter--the self-correcting process will 
allow for such indecisive results. 
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conditions and judged his grasp of them to be accurate 
since he has answered the relevant questions they suggested 
to him. The act of reflective understanding is spontaneous-
ly appropriate at this point. Do these known conditions 
provide a sufficient basis for the thesis that the cotton 
trade enjoyed economic health during these two decades? 
To this question for reflection the historian will reply, 
"Yes." H~ knows that price levels are essential indicat-
ors of economic health or decline, and he knows that the 
indicators point to his conclusion (i.e. the conditions 
of the conditioned are in fact fulfilled). 
The key moment of verification lies in this move 
from the known indicators to the affirmed conclusion. The 
presupposition for actually effecting this transition is 
human rationality. This rati.onality is apparent in the 
immanent demand that the evidence be sufficient to support 
the conclusion. 86 This demand (Or inner exigence) comes to 
expression in the question for reflection. It is satisfied 
only when the questioner judges that his historical con-
clusion is probably true or is probably not true. By both 
asking and answering his question, the historian is per-
forming as a rational subject. And what Lonergan's notion 
of the Virtually unconditioned explains is how rational 
performance occurs. This notion provides an explanatory 
thematization of the formal elements of both verification 
86navid Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 
p. 129. 
process and rational judgment.8? 
.. 
Critical Realism 
33? 
·After working out the relation between the virtually 
unconditioned and historical judgments, we are ready to 
elaborate the epistemology which is based on Lonergan's 
cognitional theory. Our starting point remains the same: 
the spontaneous performance of the subject. The notion of 
the virtually unconditioned both clarified the rational 
component of that performance and provided some guidelines 
for discussing claims to objective historical knowledge. 
The starting point in cogni.tional performance is 
specifically curiosity. For our purposes, the starting 
point in historiographical performance is curiosity con-
cretized in the question for histor::i.cal intell:l.gence. Chap-. 
ter Three went to some length to prove that this question 
is the first stage of a formally dynamic process. To ques-
tion is not an end in itself but a means to the end of 
acquiring.knowledge. Questions yield insights which may 
or may not be relevant to what one is curious about. An 
act of reflecti.ve understandtng is required to determine 
B?Ibid., pp. 127-128 and 130. The term "rationality" 
has had iilun'iple meanings in the history of Western philos-
ophy. One benefit of Lonergan's virtually unconditioned 
is to explicate the form of rattonal performance which oc-
curs prior to the development of theories about human rea-
son. By relating the virtually unconditioned to various 
types of judgments, Lonergan argues the accuracy of this 
explanatory account of reason-in-act. Insight, pp. 281-315. 
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if one's understanding actually "fits" the topic i.mder 
study. Eventually historical curiosity is satisfied about 
the particulars of a topic, i.e. the historian has managed 
to answer to his satisfaction all the questions for intel-
ligence which occur to him. But there remains the possi-
bility that his understanding of the whole is based on an 
arbitrary arrangement of the parts. So what is understood 
and formulated as a general interpretation must be analyzed 
for defects. The process which began with simple curiosity 
has taken many twists and turns. As a result, the verify-
ing act of judgment has to be built out of numerous subor-
dinate judgments affirming that the correlation of under-
standing, expression, and evidence is adequate. 
As distinct from our previous cognitional issues, 
" the key epistemological question now is, What is the his-
torian affirming when he replies "Yes" to a question for 
reflection? Simply from a surface analys:is of how histor-
ians speak, we can say that what is affirmed is the truth. 
The question for reflection is explicitly a question about 
truth: Is my interpretation of economic indicators true? 
To reply "Yes" is consequently to say, "I am affirming the 
truth of this interpretation." But since, as Aristotle 
remarked, the "true" can be said in many ways, we must be 
more precise in responding to the previous epistenological 
question. 
In the first place, the historian's original questions 
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for intelligence ·were acts of intending, and what was in-
tended was some content of his historical experience.88 
His questions will suggest an imaginative scheme for relat-
ing the selected elements of his expertence.89 The in-
sights which are rudimentary in such an imaginative scheme 
will grow more precise as he continues to inquire. At 
some point he will attempt to formulate as a concrete sup-
position the direction which his insights have been taking. 
His thinking takes a turn then; what he intends is a for-
mulated interpretation, and an exigence for reflection 
intervenes to ask, Is it true? Directly intended is the 
formulated interpretation and the evidence which grounds it; 
but indirectly, through the formulation and evidence, is 
intended a past reality, namely, the events which are inter-
preted. 
88As noted in the earlier analysis of how historical 
facts are related to historical data, components of the 
historian's historical experience are the historical "facts" 
which critical exegesis establishes. For example, the 
historian may accept another scholar's conclusion that cer-
tain documents bearing Lincoln's signature are authentic. 
His acceptance both makes those documents part of his pro-
fessional experience and expresses his confidence and be-
lief in a colleague's intellectual honesty and competence. 
For the role of belief in historjcal practices, see Mar-
rou's The l1eanin5 of Historl, pp. 301-316; Lonergan's In-
sight, pp. 703-7 6; and Metnod in Theology, pp. 43 and~33. 
89we have in mind here both the spontaneous curiosity 
of the historian (which Lonergan analyzes) and the poetic 
prefiguration of a historical field (which Hayden White 
analyzes). The collusion of these two basic processes 
yields an imaginative scheme of how events might have taken 
place. ;nitially the interconnections among events are 
vague and require more careful study. 
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\olhat w.e learn from this process of historical intend-
ing is that historians do not reflectively posit the truth 
of historical data, nor do they affirm the validity of 
mere suppositions. Cognitional acts occur in a formally 
dynamic pattern. Historical curiosity moves historians 
from a study of authenticated materials to an understanding 
of how these materials fit into a larger context.90 The 
events referred to in the understood materials become an 
object of thought. That is, their occurrence and conse-
quences are understood in relation to other components of 
the historian's accumulated knowledge. This adjustment of 
prior historical knowledge to new understanding shows up 
in the care with which the historian formulates a tenta-
tive conclusion or prospective judgment. Now the curiosity 
which moved him from limited contexts to an overview inter-
relating the parts into an intelligible whole expresses 
itself anew in a question for reflection. Presupposed is 
a rational commitment to affirm objects of thought for 
which there is reasonably compelling evidence. So his 
question is actually an intending of an object of thought 
which may or may not be true, i.e. may or may not be a 
historical fact. 
90Again, we are presupposing that the task of the 
critical historian is not merely to grasp the meanings 
conveyed by authors through written reports, but to un-
derstand how these reports belong to the broader context 
of "what was going forward" at some time in the past. 
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We began with the question, "What does the historian 
affirm when he replies 'Yes' to a question for reflection?" 
Prior to his affirmation, he is intending (in the question 
for reflection) an object of thought ~ the evidence which 
prospectively "fulfills" or establishes the thought object 
as a historical reality. Note that what is intended is 
not merely an object of thought. The question for reflec-
tion intends both the conditioned (the histor~_an' s formu-
lated interpretation) and the conditions (the known evidence 
about a past series of events). This act of intentionality, 
thus, transcends the questioner, i.e. it at least intends 
~ may be understood and not simply the h:i.stor:tan' s pre-
sent understanding.9l Now the "what" which is intended is 
only indirectly the past series of events. It is the char-
acter of past events to be past and therefore not present. 
Evidence (or "traces") constitutes what is present. But 
also present is the object of thought or formulated inter-
pretation. In critical history, this thought object is 
not some thing but a meaningful reconstruction of events: 
their occurrence, consequences, and significance for the 
... 
group. Thus, the question for reflection directly intends 
the thought object and the supporti_ng evidence. But, if 
9lAn argument from historjcal language can support 
this claim. Questions asked by a historian are said to be 
"histortcal" questions, i.e. questions about what has been. 
If those questions only intended his present understanding, 
they would not be historical questions because there would 
be no reference, direct or indirect, to the past. 
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the thought .object is affirmed to be true, then the act of 
judgment intends the series of events.92 This intending 
of the past is mediated by what the historian has under-
stood by means of historical traces. 
Our previous remarks on the virtually unconditioned 
help to clarify the mediating functions of both historical 
materials and historical understanding. A prospective 
judgment or proposed interpretation is the conditioned. 
!t formulates the new discoveries and prior knowledge of 
the historian. The conditions are the evidence as under-
stood and as judged relevant to the proposed interpreta-
tion. By judg:i.ng them relevant, the histor5_an has reflec-
tively linked conditions to conditioned. So historical 
materials mediated his understanding of past events, and 
his understanding of the materials mediated his judgment 
that the materials supplied appropriate evidence about 
those past events.93 To reach the virtually unconditioned, 
92How else would it be possible to make an erroneous 
historical judgment? Formulati.ons or interpretations which 
had no reference beyond themselves could be neither true 
nor false. But historlcal interpretations refer directly 
to evidence or "traces." An incompetent use of evidence is 
likely to yield inadequate or even false h~storical judg-
ments. Are historical errors then a matter of misunder-
standing or misinterpreting evidence? But evidence is evi-
dence of or about something other than itself. So inter-
pretatIOns of evidence are answers to questions about past 
events, and those answers are mediated by the evidence. 
:Errors occur because one affirms answers to the wrong ques-
tions (i.e. the fallacy of the misplaced proof) or because 
one affirms answers which known or yet-to-be-known evidence 
refutes. 
93The "circularity" of these mediating moments of 
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another act of reflection must grasp the sufficiency of 
the known conditions for support:lng the conditioned. Or, 
in other words, the known evidence must mediate an under-
standing that the formulated hypothesis is in fact veri-
fied by the amassed evidence. Then follows the judgment 
which affirms the correctness of the historian's under-
standing. What the judgment effects is a transformation of 
a tentative correlation of materials and understanding into 
a factual correlation. 
What, then, is the historian affirming when he an-
swers "Yes" to this last question for reflection? The con-
clusion we have arrived at is simply put: he is affirming 
a historical fact. But as in the case of the terns "intro-
spection" and "detachment," many opinions have been expressed 
on what constitutes a historical "fact." Thus, we must be 
more explicit about the fact which is affirmed by historical 
judging. 
Our earlier remarks on historical data and historical 
facts have covered some of the ground already. Historical 
facts are neither "givens" which historians find ready-made 
nor are they arbitrary constructs of historical imagination. 
historical understandi_ng must be qualified by our earlier 
remarks on the hermeneutical circle. The historian learns 
something about pas~events by understanding the traces of 
those events; he learns something about the traces by un-
derstanding the events. But in the self-correcting process 
of learning, questions about past events can gradually iso-
late the pertinent materials, and those materials will sug-
gest further questions which qualify or correct the prior 
historical understanding of past events. 
Instead, they are constituted through multiple cognitional 
acts. Historical facts (for critical history) have the 
concreteness of an object of experience.94 They have the 
clarity of an object which is understood and precisely 
described.95 Finally, they have the conditional necessity 
of what approximates the virtually unconditioned, i.e. they 
might have been otherwise, but as historical events turned 
out, the facts cannot now be altered.96 Consequently, 
historical facts are past events and their consequences 
which are known through multiple intentional acts. Again, 
these past events and consequences are mediated by the evi-
dence which the historian understands, by his formulation 
of that understandi.ng, and by his rational affirmation that 
the meaning of his formulation is true. 
These conclusions about historical facts presuppose 
an intrinsic relation of historical knowing to historical 
"'. 
94For example, newly discovered notebooks of Leonardo 
da Vinci were proved authentic by testing the age of the 
paper and ink, and by establishing the correlation of 
handwriting in the new works with previously accepted 
works. These notebooks, then, are materials which the 
critical historian may take as concrete historical data. 
95The historian answers questions until the loose 
ends of his interpretation are tied down. He formulates 
his clarified understanding into a descriptive statement 
of what may have been the case. 
96For the notion of "conditioned necessity," see 
Insi~ht, p. 331. The levels of intentional acts which 
yiel compound facts are treated.in Method in Theology, 
p. 202. 
reality. M~ltiple intentional acts go beyond historical 
data to an intelligible arrangement and account of them. 
A further act of reflective understanding goes beyond what 
may be an accurate interpretation to an interpretation 
which is in fact true. That is to say, spontaneous cog-
nitional acts which are self-assembling into compound acts 
of knowing are likewise a series of intendings which cor-
relate historical materials, historical understanding (the 
object of thought or the historical interpretation), and 
historical events as what is known to have been the case. 
This process of correlation has two sides: cognitional acts 
assemble themselves into coupound acts of knowing; cogni-
tional intendings assemble their partial objects (what is 
intended) into a single compound object.9? The act of 
judgment which terminates the cognit;onal acts is a judgment 
about historical reality which is not s;mply gi_ven or 
merely supposed, but which is grasped through the med:tat:ton 
of traces, of formulated interpretations, and of the reflec-
tive act which links them. 
What the preceding remarks imply is that the structure 
of knowing historical facts is similar to the structure of 
known historical facts. Lonergan's term for this similar-
ity of structure (or of the relations among components of 
knowing and the known) is "isomo~phism." The similarity 
9?"Cognitional Structure," Collection, p. 228. 
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lies in the relations among components of different sets 
of terms.98 In our study of cognitional structure, the 
relations among intentional acts (or terms) were threefold. 
The assumption of isomorphism is that the threefold struc-
ture of knowing will be reproduced in a similar way as a 
threefold structure of the known. Is this assumption to 
remain merely an assumption or can it be justified? 
Let us place arguments supporting this notion of 
isomorphism within a historical context. As Hayden White 
establishes, historians must make use of heuristic models 
if they are to approach intelligently the jumbled remains 
of past ages. He goes on to argue that the models are as-
sumed as a matter of preference and are not theoretically 
justified in any compelling way. Consequently, if two his-
torians operating with different models come to different 
conclusions about the same events, then they cannot resolve 
those differences. Relativism is unavoidable since there 
9B"Isomorphism, then, supposes different sets of 
terms; it neither affirms nor denies similarity between the 
terms of one set and those of other sets; but it does assert 
that the network of relations in one set of terms is simi-
lar to the networks of relations in other sets." "Iso-
morphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," Collection, p. 
142. 
Philip McShane contrasts Lonergan's notion of isomor-
phism with other views in the history of philosophy. "This 
isomorphism is a far cry from that of logical atomism or 
that of Spinoza's ordo idearwn. est ordo rerum: it is not an 
isomorphism of propositional structure and fact or of ideas 
and fact; it is an isomorphism of the structured anticipa-
tion of knowing with the real as its object." Randomness, 
Statistics, and .Emergence (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 19?6), pp. 144-145. Cf. also ibid., pp. 252-
255. -
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is no basis .for mediating the differences. 
But the notion of isomorphism poses a serious chal-
lenge to such a relativistic outlook. This notion makes ex-
plicit what is presupposed by every intelligent inquiry 
and reasonable argument. Ea.ch of the differing historians 
has an intepretation to propose and to defend as true. Ea.ch, 
therefore, presumes that intelligent arguments and reason-
able judgments will produce a convincing proof of what ac-
tually happened in some segment of the past. But this pre-
sumption is precisely what is implied in the notion of 
isomorphism. 
Ea.ch historian "means" what he says, and he means 
that what he says is a true account of past events. Now 
each historian's meaning is doubly-structured since it ex-
presses what he understands about the past through the 
available traces. His meaning may be wrong, but it still 
is doubly-structured. And if cognitional process spontan-
eously moves through experience and understanding to judg-
ment, this doubly-structured meaning will be either affirmed 
or denied by an answer to the question: Is this interpreta-
tion true? Hence, the performance of both historians has 
the same structure and what they ~ has the same struc-
ture. That is, they mean to say that their understanding, 
based on the evidence, correspon4s to what in fact was the 
case. The prospective historical fact is what they mean 
by their differing conclusions. Perhaps both conclusions 
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are not correct, but the notion of isomorphism scarcely 
requires that correctness. What the notion does make ex-
plici ~ is how the pattern of relations between t.he acts 
leading to a conclusion is similar in form to the pattern 
of relations between the contents of those acts, contents 
which constitute what is concluded, namely, the historical 
fact.99 Further, the notion of isomorphism provides 
99Insi~ht, p. 399. In terms of the historical prob-
lem mentione above, this structural similarity refers not 
to the variable historical models but to the way in which 
the contents of models are, first, anticipated and, then, 
actually achieved. 
We stop short of investigating the metaphysical im-
plications of the thesis of isomorphism. These implications 
are worked out in Tnsight as part of the transition from a 
latent to an explicit metaphysics. (Cf. pp. 399-401, 444-
451, 502-509.) Our methodological interests do not require 
that we go beyond the earlier position quoted j_n footnote 
98, i.e. isomorphism neither affirms nor denies similarity 
between the terms of one set of related acts and the terms 
of another set of related contents. This problematic and 
controve~ial area cannot be adequately explored without a 
lengthy inquiry carried out within an explicit metaphysics. 
Such an inquiry would carry us too far afield. However, 
in the diagram on the following page, we do take a metaphy-
sical position. Our arguments for the thesis of isomor-
phism establish the similarity between the structural ar-
rangement of one set of terms and the network of relations 
in other sets. Our diagram indicates this by means of un-
broken vertical lines. In addition, broken horizontal lines 
indicate that there may be a similarity between the terms 
of one set and those of other sets. But we draw an unbroken 
horizontal line only in regard to the virtually unconditioned 
in relation to historical fact. We mean to indicate that 
the grasp o~ the virtually unconditioned (and not sim~ly an 
approximation to it in a probable historical judgment) in-
volves an identity between the knower and the known. In 
other cases (i.e. instances which fall short of the virtu-
ally unconditioned), this identity tay be reached; at least 
such an identity cannot be ruled·ou until disconfirming 
evidence is available, is understood, and is affirmed. 
Also in the diagram we indicate that the self-correct-
ing process of human intelligence occurs between the empir-
ical and intelligent levels of human interiority. This pro-
cess moves in two directions (as symbolized by our arrows): 
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part of the basis for comparing the two ways in Which two 
historians experienced, understood, and judged a historical 
interpretation to be correct. If they differ sharply in 
, their conclusions, perhaps the origins of their differences 
can be uncovered by reviewing the interrelated acts and the 
interrelated contents yielding the two different claims to 
historical fact. 
The argument for an isomorphism between knowing and 
the known can be briefly summarized. The basic assumption 
is that historical reality is what is reached through·an 
affirmation of correct understanding. What would a denial 
of this assumption require? First, one would have to crit-
icize the assumption for a failure to understand something 
either about the way historical events are accessible to 
us or about what historical facts are. Second, an alternate· 
way of intelligently grasping historical knowing and his-
torical facts would have to be proposed. Third, the alter-
nate position and, hence, the denial of the former assumption 
would have to be affirmed as a reasonable conclusion. But 
this is to say that the assumption of isomorphism cannot be 
deni.ed w5_ thout an implicit contradiction between the denier's 
performance and his statements.100 So the assumption of 
new experiences may challenge established opinions, new in-
sights may make a difference in what one notices j_n the fu-
ture. 
lOO"Briefly, if the assumption that what is real is 
what is intelligently affirmed to be the case is to be chal-
lenged, it is to be challenged by an intelligent alterna-
tive or an intelligent criticism and the reasonable 
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isomorphism.is justified; to deny it one must assume it. 
The subheading for this part of Chapter Five was "cri-
tical realism." The previous analyses of the virtually un-
conditioned and of the isomorphism between.knowtng and the 
known entail an epistemological position which has been 
termed "critical realism." The basic epistemological posi-
tion of critical realism is to identify the real with the 
true, the affirmed. In the history of philosophy, the real 
has also been identified with the sensible, the concrete 
body of external experience, the imaginable, the understood, 
the coherently hypothesized object of thought. 101 But if 
cognitional process has its terminus in knowledge, and if 
knowledge is of the real, and if cognitional structure is 
a dynamic unity which is irreducible to one of its parts; 
then the real cannot be identified with anything short of 
the truly affirmed. Again, the isomorphism between knowing 
and the known enta1ls that known realities be more than the 
sensed, the supposed or the understood. Rather, the cog-
nitional acts of the knower assemble their partial objects 
(i.e. the intended sensible and intelligible objects) into 
single compound objects (i.e. the realities which are 
conclusion, 'therefore it is not so•: inevitably, then, the 
challenger assumes the position he challenged." Philip 
McShane, Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence, p. 255. 
101Lonergan relates these alternate philosophical 
positions to his epistemological stance, in Insight, pp. 
411-425. Cf. also "Cognitional Structure," in Collection, 
pp. 231-236. 
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affirmed). 
What does this epistemological position contribute 
to a study of historical realities? In the first place, 
our previous remarks on historical data and historical 
facts have obviously presupposed this position.102 But 
that is not to say that those remarks were made in advance 
of any proof. Both the above epistemological position and· 
our remarks on historical facts are based on a theory of 
human cognition. If that theory is proved, and we take it 
to have been demonstrated in Chapter Three, then histori-
cal facts are not to be confused with data or hypotheses or 
some unrecoverable events of the past ("unrecoverable" be-
cause they are no longer observable). Historical facts are 
affirmed answers to questions for reflection--answers which 
approximate to, and in some cases reach, the virtually un-
conditioned. 
In the second place, the identification of the real 
with what is or can be verified (i.e. the rationally af-
firmed) is based not on precritical preferences but on in-
variant cognitional structure. Thus, as opposed to Hayden 
102Those remarks did not identify historical facts 
with the given materials of historical experience. Nor did 
they label as "facts" the formulated hypotheses or imagina-
tive reconstructions of the historian. Rather, both mater-
ials and formulated insights were termed "means" to histor-
ical knowledge. Historical facts emerge when answers are 
given to questions for reflection. Since these answers are 
mediated by available materials and formulated meanings, 
they united prior cognitional acts and their contents into 
the affirmed historical reality. 
, 
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White's position, we do not hold that this critical realism 
is a surface feature of our work which is predetermined by 
prior subjective variables. Instead, the argument for iso-
morphism links an already established cognitional theory 
to an epistemological thesis which, in turn, has implica-
tions for understanding how historical realism is prac-
ticed on the surface level.l03 This link is rationally 
based since the denial of isomorphism presupposes it as 
part of human knowing.. And the thesis is affirmed because 
the conditions for it are fulfilled. 104 
In the third place, the identification of the real 
with the true, the affirmed, allows us to conceive histori-
cal knowledge in a critical way. The implication is that 
other ways of conceiving historical knowledge can be criti-
cized on adequate theoretical grounds. More important, the 
accepted epistemological position provides access to the 
sources of divergent views of historical knowledge and 
allows us to discaver how mistakes were made. 105 Part of 
l03section four of this chapter will work out these 
implications. There our effor,ts will be directed toward the 
use of this epistemological position to criticize the "real-
ism" of different historical perspectives. 
l04Those conditions are the following: cognitional 
process assembles elementary acts of knowing into compound 
acts of knowing; acts of knowing, properly speaking, are 
irreducible to their component (elementary) parts; know-
ledge is of the real; there is an isomorphism between know-
ing and the known. 
l05Given the assumption of isomorphism, the perform-
ance of the subject, both as intending and as knowtng the 
real, is the standard for views of historical knowledge. 
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this process of criticizing divergent viewpoints will be 
attempted in the following subsection on historical objec-
tivity. 
1'ypes of Objectivity 
The purpose of this subsection is to relate view-
points and problems of historical objectivity to the epis-
temological position of the precedi_ng subsection. For an 
epistemology based on cognitional structure, objectivity 
will be envisi..oned as an explication of the patterned set 
of cognitional acts. Those acts occur in a self-correcting 
process which is both cyclic and01Inulative. Accumulated 
insights serve as a basis for the refinement and adjustment 
of an individual's expression to the many-sided meaning 
which he supposes. Still, he can do better than merely to 
suppose. He intelligently argues and affirms that an inter-
pretation is more than a supposition, it is historical fact. 
The claim, then, is to have established something that is 
independent of the individual's own personal likes or dis-
likes. Given the same evidence, critical techniques, and 
professional competence, he expects colleagues to come to 
the same conclusion. 
This expectation is implicit :in the indi..vidual's pub-
lication of his conclusions. He. usually does not expect 
The application of this standard is what Lonergan means 
by "dialectics." See Method in Theolog;y;, Chapter 10. 
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immediate agreement on all his points. He did not arrive 
at his conclusions in a s;_ngle step. So in publicizing his 
results, he is subject;_ng his claims to renewed inquiry and 
critical judgment. This time the test of objectivity has 
a broader base. Others are likely to raise questions 
which he overlooked and which may be pertinent to his topic. 
Both he and his critics must answer them and evaluate their 
effect on earlier conclusions. So the verification process 
is repeated: new materials may be considered, new discover-
ies linked to original positions, and questions asked-about 
how well the revised interpretation correlates with the 
evidence. What this indicates is that objectivity (or the 
public acceptance on critical grounds of some position) is 
parallel to the complexity of human knowing. 106 
Because of this complexity and because there have 
been so many conflicting opinions on objectivity, we must 
approach the complex notion of objectivity by way of con-
trasts. First, historical judgments which are purportedly 
objective are judgments about histor:i.cal objects. !n sec-
tion two of this chapter we argued that the pr:.imary histor-
ical objects were constitutive relationships or meanings. 
What becomes apparent, then, is that the term "object" has 
more than one meaning. In a world of lived immediacy, ob-
jects are simply encountered without puzzlement, without 
questions. The infant who reaches toward the bright 
106rnsight, p. 375. 
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ceiling lig~t and the exhausted runner who collapses on the 
grass after a race are encountering these immediate objects. 
But in order to talk about them, we must step back from 
this lived immediacy. Originally the objects are neither 
named nor described. To name and to describe them, we 
must understand them and reconstitute them as meanings. 
Then our expressions signify that an immediate object is 
what is already-out-there-now-real.lO? The immediate ob-
ject is what is meant by these expressions. In contrast 
to its primary status as what-is-simply-encountered, the 
immediate object as signified as an object in a world med-
iated by meaning. 
The object as mediated by meaning is what is puzzled 
over and questioned. It is what becomes understood, af-
firmed, and settled as a matter-of-fact by answers. The 
questioner is related to it immediately by his question 
and only indirectly or mediately by the procedures which 
yield answers to questions. Thus, in historical inquiries 
past events are intended by questions, but answers are 
reached by studying the traces of those events. The answers 
lO?"But in the world med:tated by meaning one can re-
collect and reconstitute the object of the world of immed-
iacy. Tt is already, out, there, now, real. It is already: 
it is given prior to any questions about it. It is out: for 
it is the object of extraverted consciousness. It i~here: 
as sense organs, so too sensed objects are spatial. It is 
now: for the time of sensing runs along with the time of 
what is sensed. It is real: for it is bound up with one's 
living and acting and somi:ist be just as real as they are." 
Method in Theology, p. 263. 
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are directly based on the evidence, but indirectly they 
refer to the past events because they are answers to ques-
tions .108 Historical objects are, therefore, objects 
mediated by meanings. 
Just as there are at least two meani.ngs for the term 
"object," so there are at least two meanings :for the term 
"objectivity." The standard for objectivity in a world of 
lived immediacy is the successful satisfaction of animal 
needs. Food satisfies hunger, the ingestion o:f edible ob-
jects lying ready-to-hand fills that need. But things be-
come more complex in a world mediated by meaning. There 
is the experiental objectivity of monuments, artifacts, and 
documents which survive from the temporal past ;_nto the 
temporal present. Their objectivity depends on their "giv-
enness," i.e. they are not created by individuals in the 
present but are inherited from past generations. 
There is the normative objectivity of historical evi-
dence and of historical understanding developed on the basis 
of research and of intelligent procedures.109 This type of 
lOBibid., .PP• 262-263. 
1090ur inclusion of historical evidence under the 
topic of normative objectivity presupposes our earlier ar-
guments in regard to the determination o:f the historical 
character of "given" materials. To say of something that 
it is "historical evidence" is already to classi.fy what is 
given and to anticipate how j_t will be related to other 
historical pieces o:f information. Therefore, the selecti-
vity process has already begun, and the question can be 
raised: Has the historian been attentive and intelligent 
in his selectivity? 
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objectiv:tty is constituted by the spontaneous desire to 
know. That desire produces methodical procedures which 
specify how one can achieve knowledge in a particular 
field. The developed procedures and canons are the publicly 
available standards for the indiVidual's performance. 
Failure to ask the relevant questions, misuse or oversight 
of pertinent materials, proposals which express private 
wishes rather than solidly based insights--these invite 
public censure. And the basis for this censure is the ex-
pectation that there is a right way (a normative way) of 
proceeding with investigations. 
There is the absolute objectivity achieved by reach-
ing the virtually unconditioned. In this third instance, 
the results of experiential and normative objectivity are 
combined. Experiential objectivity supplies the fundamen-
tal limits within which historical evidence is selected 
and understood. Normative objectivity supplies the intel-
ligible connections between evidence and the historical 
thesis. This combination produces a thesis which in fact 
has its conditions fulfilled or which most probably has 
its conditions fulfilled.llO 
A further complexity must be introduced. Not only 
insights but also judgments accumulate. Spontaneous curi-
osity can be attentive to a limitless number of problems--
llOMethod in Theolo~, p. 263. Other sources for 
these distinctions among ~pes of objectivity are Insight, 
pp. 377-383; and "Cognitional Structure," in Collection, 
PP• 229-231. 
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but not at the same time. A shifting attention which is 
intellectually motivated does not simply discard past ex-
periences and insights in a concern to "see" the latest 
novelty.111 Instead, the attentive subject moves to new 
experiences with a wealth of past experiences, acts of 
understanding, and judgments. Particularly these past 
judgments provide a reservoir of reliable positions from 
which to develop new insights and modes of investigation. 
Thus, for example, the scientist develops competence in his 
laboratory techniques. His past experiences and achieved 
understanding guide his present work. Techniques which he 
has found useful and results which he has confirmed as 
highly probable under controlled circumstances are the 
basis for new experiments. This collection of sedimented 
understanding and affirmed conclusions is trusted by the 
scientist. He makes use of it without repeating all the 
earlier tests and calculations. Consequently, his scien-
tific performance presupposes a patterned context of prior 
judgments~ Lonergan locates the primary notion of objectiv-
ity within such a context.112 This fourth distinction in-
troduced into the notion of objectivity can be both defended 
and exemplified in historiographical procedures. 
111Martin Heidegger has analyzed the curiosity of the 
everyday conversationalist. His concise and devastating 
descriptions of idle talk (Gerede), curiosity (Neu~ier), 
and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) are presented in Being and 
Time, pp. 211-219. 
112Insight, pp. 3?5-3??., 
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In a ~umber of places, we have argued that historians 
do not come to their work empty-headed. What they do bring 
with them is likely to be an assortment of prejudices, un-
tested opinions, and gleanings from the works of other his-
torians. This uneven collection of resources belongs to 
the relative horizon of the historian.113 But continued 
research and inquiry can produce replacements for these 
initial presuppositions. Throughout his professional car-
eer the historian accumulates a vast array of technical 
and not so technical information. Along the way he makes 
many judgments which fUture inquiries will presuppose and 
go beyond. What does he say about his earlier conclusions? 
Does he say they are merely more opinions piled on top of 
the opinions which he held at the start of his career? 
No, he repeatedly makes cross-references between present 
projects and past conclusions. For the most part the 
latter are settled and provide a test for new results. 
But this is to affirm that new conclusions--as individual 
historical judgments--are usually subordinated to the ac-
cumulated and interrelated judgments referred to by the 
primary notion of objectivity.114 
ll3we do not want to imply that a basic horizon could 
not evidence an equally varied assortment. Typically the 
undifferentiated basic horizon will contain a mixed collec-
tion of vague opinions about human knowj_ng and about what 
can be known. 
114we say "usually subordinated" because new discov-
eries and new sources of information may require revisions 
within that context of earlier judgments. Again, historical 
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The vcµue of the preceding distinctions in the term 
"objectivity" becomes apparent when one confronts less 
complex views of objectivity. Hayden W'b.ite notes that nine-
teenth-century historians proposed conflicting· accounts of 
historical knowledge. 115 ~nvolved in these conflicting ac-
counts were varying opinions about historical objectivity. 
Eager to place history on the high plateau of the natural 
sciences, some historians identified historical objectivity 
with the experiential type.116 In doing so, they manifested 
a misunderstanding of the performance of the empirical sci-
entist and confused one aspect of historical objectivity 
with the whole complex notion. Historians of an idealist 
school of thought supposed that objectivity was a matter 
of coherence in one's system of thought. They recognized 
that one could not "see" the past. Rather, there were the 
data recorded in documents and the historical interpreta-
tions constructed upon them. These constructions were prod-
ucts of the mind, a mind which developed coherent symbolic 
judgments in most cases approximate to but do not reach the 
virtually unconditioned. Further relevant questions may 
have been overlooked, and so probable historical judgments 
are just that--probable--and not certain. 
ll5Metahistory, pp. 21 and 26. 
116For example, Fustel de Coulanges wrote, "'History 
is a science; it does not imagine, it only sees •••• '" 
'"The historian ••• seeks facts and attai..ns them by the min-
ute observation of texts, as the chemist finds his in the 
course of experiments conducted t-li th minute precision.'" 
Quoted in c. v. Langlois and c. Seignobos, Introduction to 
the Study of History (New York: Henry Holt, 19~5), p. 216, 
?ootnote !. 
I 
!· 
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universes but was not capable of grasping past events. 117 
Here the idealist mistakes normative objectivity for the 
complex notion of objectivity. 
How is the complex notion of objectivity related to 
these alternate views of historical objectivity? First, 
because it is a notion parallel to the complexity in human 
kn.owing, it allows one to determine in what sense these 
alternate epistemological views are correct and in what 
sense they are false. What they affirm is correct: there 
is an experiential component and there is a normative com-
ponent in historical objectivity. Historical data provide 
a field within which evidence is selected; the immanent 
demand for a coherent correlation among evidence, insights, 
and expression produces an imagtnative reconstruction of 
past events. But these views are mistaken in what they 
exclude. Just as knowing is not simply a matter of sens-
ing, so objectivity is more than careful observation. Just 
as knowing is not simply a matter of understanding what is 
experienced, so objectivity is more than expressing insights 
into available materials. The historian has to determine 
whether or not these insights are plausible; he not only 
links them together in a coherent fashion, he also wants 
to know whether his elaborate reconstruction is true. So 
this complex notion of objectivi~y is a critical standard 
for the alternate views of objectivity. 
ll?Method in Theology, p. 239. 
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But objections will be forthcoming. To the experi-
ential component of objectivity one may object that there 
is no independently given historical datum. Now, depending 
on how one conceives the givenness of historical data, one 
will either accept or qualify this objection. Quite liter-
ally there is no isolated given which is reached through a 
pure sensible receptivity, i.e. a receptivity which wholly 
precedes interpretative processes.118 But equally so, the 
118This point is argued at some length by Israel 
Scheffler in Science and Subjectivit~, Chapter 2, pp. 21-44. 
Our earlier arguments against the possibility of pre-
supposi tionless history are applicable to the radical view 
of a pure historical given. Historical data which stand in 
more than a purel;y potential relation to a subject (i.e. are 
yet to be noticed) are already classified as "historical, 11 
and their connections with the subject's prior framework 
and prior historical understanding are already drawn in an 
anticipatory way (i.e. the anticipatory way in which speci-
fic questions probe for certain possible answers). 
Our previous arguments for the qualification of Lon-
ergan' s concept of potential historical evidence presupposed 
that one could distinguish between data and evidence. Poten-
tial data are the given as given, e.g. a patnting is observed 
when we enter a room, but we must approach it in order to 
discern what it is a painting of. By noticing the paint-
ing in the first place, we have organized a field of vision 
which also may include furniture, lamps, other wall hang-
ings. But by a conscious ef.fort we focus our attention on 
a particular item and proceed to discern the .features of the 
given item.. Our attention is selective, and so the surround-
ing furniture, etc., "recedes" as a given but undisting-
uished environment. 
Evidence, however, refers not to the intended object 
alone but to the constellation of questions and of prior 
knowledge w!lich we bring to our selective inspection of the 
painting. Before we are interested in it and ask about its 
origins or historical significance, it is not evidence--
even in a potential way. The basic argument remains the 
same.: historical evidence presupposes (1) the selectivity 
process, and (2) the basis .for selectivity; namely, a sub-ject's interests and inquiry originating in historical con-
sciousness. Given data are not potential histori.cal evi-
dence because what makes them "historical" is not a poten-
tial but an actual relation to historical interests and in-
quiries. 
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historian does not create the materials which he finds al-
ready preserved in archives. 
Unless one identifies historical research with star-
ing at archival stacks, the· historical objects of research 
Will be more than simply given. As noted in Chapter Two, 
history is a problem-solving discipline. Therefore, his-
torical research is always about something; indiscriminate 
potential data are always differentiated when they belong 
to historical projects. Prior to that differentiation (i.e. 
the selectivity process), potential historical data are 
diffuse. The archival stacks (i.e. the undifferentiated 
field of givens) contain differences, but insofar as the 
materials simply lie there and are not part of some present 
project, the differences are unnoticed. Now just as his-
torical research is always about something, so too histor-
ical evidence is always evidence f2!: some problem or ques-
tion of historical interest. Ye must conclude, then, that 
the given as given is first of all a negative concept, i.e. 
it is the basis· for avoiding solipsism; and, second, it is 
a residue which remains after one subtracts from the pre-
cise question about the given: (1) the descriptive terms 
used to indicate the given, (2) the categories or classi-
fications expressed by those terms (e.g. historical entity); 
(3) the insights on which one's classification is based. 119 
ll9"Again, the given is residual and, of itself, dif-
fuse. It is possible to select elements in the given and 
to indicate them clearly and precisely. But the selection 
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Yhat ~his subtraction leaves is an "object"-of the 
world of immediacy. If it remains in that world, such an 
object is neither named nor described. But this indicates 
that historical objects always belong to a world of medi-
ated meanings. Marks on paper, papers on shelves, stones 
on top of stones--these are not given historical objects. 
But set an intelligent historian to work on them, and he 
will constitute them as historical by classifying them in 
relation to other historical objects. His classification 
depends on his antecedent framework of adopted concepts and 
modes of explanation,120 but that framework requires content. 
Only experience provides that. Consequently, there is a 
dist~_nct place for the notion of experiential objectivi ty. 121 
and indication are the work of insight and formulation, and 
the given is the residue that remains when one subtracts 
from the indicated 
(1) the instrumental act of meaning by which one indi-
cates, 
(2) the concepts expressed by that instrumental act, 
(3) the insights on which the concepts rest. 
Hence, since the given is just the residue, since it can be 
selected and indicated only through intellectual activities, 
of itself it is diffuse; the field of the given contains 
differences, but in so far as they simply lie in the field, 
the differences are unassigned." :rnsight, p. 382. 
120rsrael Scheffler has aptly sWDDarized the relation 
between categories of meaning and experiential content. 
"Categorization does not, in other words, decide the forms 
of distrjbution which items will in fact display, nor does 
it, in itself, determine the categorial assignments of any 
particular item or class of items yet to be encountered. 
Such special anticipations may, however, be expressed by 
suitable hypotheses. Categorization provides the pigeon-
holes; hypothesis makes assignments to them." Science and 
Subjectivity, p. 38. 
121The content of historical experience is identified 
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Objections may be voiced against the normative compon-
ent of objectivity. Historjans are often dependent on the 
preserved statements of contemporaries to past events. 
Those statements are based on actual observations of past 
events. So long as there is no reason to suspect decep-
tion, those statements are the objective standard for the 
subsequent works of historians. In the absence of trust-
worthy eyewitness accounts, historical objectivity is im-
possible.122 
A twofold reply can be made to this objection. First, 
the meaning of any preserved statement depends on the con-
text in which it was made. 123 Eyewitnesses to a Pharoah's 
with neither an undifferentiated, sensibly confronted given 
nor a wholly constructed datum. Rather, historical frame-
works provide antecedent guidelines for distinguishing and 
correlating h:i.storical data. At the same time, they do not 
supply the data, nor do they determine what particular ten-
tative connections will be made. :&cperience supplies the 
data, and the process of discovery leads to hypothetical 
arrangements of historical materials. 
122J. w. I-Ieiland radicalizes this line of argumenta-
tion. Objective historical conclusions are reached by cor-
relating evidence in the present with events in the past. 
But one can establish a correlation only by observing those 
past events. Since this is no longer possible, historical 
objectivity is imposs;ble. The obvious presupposit:ion here 
is that historical judgments must be based on "seeing" the 
past. J. W. I1eiland, Scelticism and Historical Knowledge 
(New York: Random House, 965), pp. 113-120. 
123n. H. Fischer cites some obvious examples of this 
truism. "The statement that a Norman army defeated a 
Saxon army at Hastings in 1066 is mean:ingless without ref-
erence to a map of England, and also to our calendar. For 
a I1oslem, the same event has the different date of 459." 
Historians• Fallacies: Toward a Lo ic of Historical Thou ht, 
p. • 
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conquest have left inscriptions which exaggerate enormously 
the numbers of the vanquished and the amount of plunder 
taken. There is a literal meaning to these inscriptions 
and a figurative one. Both have a historical significance. 
The historian must draw upon his prior knowledge and his 
sense of the plausible to distinguish the two. And this 
discriminating process requires something belonging to the 
second part of our reply. To assume that primary histori-
cal sources provide the major standard of objectivity, 
simply because they preserve eyewitness accounts, compounds 
a basic confusion of knowing with seeing.124 
.Primary sources may contain factual statements, but 
not merely because the writers were eyewitnesses. They had 
to be attentive to what was going on; they had to under-
stand not every detail of the events but those aspects 
which then appeared significant. They had to formulate 
124Lonergan works out the steps through which this 
basic confusion develops until one reaches the point where 
objectivity appears to be a matter of knowing-through-
looking. In "Cognitional Structure," Collection, pp. 232-
233. 
A further example of this basic confusion occurs in 
an article by John Brooke, "Na.m.ier and Namierism," in Stud-
ies in the Philosophy of History, pp. 108-109. The autE:Or 
draws an analogy oetween our observations of constellations 
among stars and the patterns of historical "facts" woven 
by the historian. Just as constellations are relative in 
appearance to the place of the observer, so patterns of 
historical interpretation are relative to the standpoint 
of the historian. Consequently, historical objectivity is 
impossible. The thesis of perspectivism accounts for rel-
ativity in historical interpretations without excluding 
the possibility of objectivity. The cited example does 
exclude this possibility because it presupposes historical 
knowing is like seeing. 
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·their recoll.ections. All this requires more than a look. 
So, too, critical history makes a discriminating use of 
prtmary sources. What did the writers mean? What were 
they capable of witnessing and what is interpolation? How 
well does what they say correlate with what is already 
known about the reported events? What consequences have 
occurred after those events which were not reported by the 
same eyewitnesses but certainly altered the significance 
of the events? These questions proceed from a dynamic in-
telligence seeking to understand materials and to relate 
them to a broader context. Both the original production 
of those materials and a subsequent critical use of them 
required the operations of direct and reflective understand-
ing. Thus, there is a distinct place for the normative 
component of objectivity. It is not identified with an 
experienced there-ness (the observable) but with the dis-
tinct level of cognitional acts termed "intelligence." 
To the absolute notion of objectivity, one may ob-
ject that.historical procedures are never carried out in 
isolation from prior preconceptions and values. Historians 
have no set rules to follow which guarantee unbiased re-
sults. They must be selective, and, hence, implicit preju-
dices can affect what use is made of materials and of pro-
fessional techniques. The historical understanding which 
is achieved will be too incomplete, too thoroughly rooted 
in individual preferences to be considered objective. Any 
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judgments p~ssed on such understanding will be merely re-
assertions of the basic preferences which guided the inquiry 
from the start. 
Two responses can be made to this loosely knit set of 
objections. First, there is the response which disting-
uishes between the psychology of historical interpretation 
and the logic of historical interpretation.125 There is 
no denial that, in order to be selective, the historian 
must evaluate and the basis .for his evaluation may be var-
iable preferences, even distorting biases. This predeter-
mined selectivity affects what questions he asks, but it 
does not necessarily affect how well he answers them. 126 
Moreover, the answers that he does achieve have yet to be 
trans.formed .from hypothesis to .fact. So psychological 
blocks to correct understanding must not merely be possessed· 
by the historian, they must be applied at different levels 
of his work. They must interfere not only with the ques-
tions he asks but also with the procedures which clarify 
125ttorton White makes use of this distinction to crit-
icize the historical relativism of Charles Beard. Cf. 
"Can History Be Objective?" in The Philosophy of History 
in Our Time, p. 199. 
126
"\.lhen we ask whether historical inquiry is value 
free, however, our chief concern should not be with this 
kind of variability. For the different evaluations of his-
torians :i.nvolved in their decision to ask different ques-
tions will be ingredient, not in their inquiry, but in their 
choice of it. It is when historians give different answers 
to the same questions that the problem of objectivity with-
in the inquiry can be said to arise." William H. Dray~ 
Pnilosophy of History, p. 30. 
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and interrelate and finally pass judgment on answers to 
those questions.127 Given the.conclusion of Chapter Four 
on the possibility of detachment from bias, we may conclude 
that such a recurrence of blocks to historical understand-
ing and to rational thinking may turn up, but that it will 
not happen of necessity. Broadly used, the logic of his-
torical interpretation is concretized in both internal and 
external restraints on perduring distortions of intelli-
gence. 
For example, the historian's education involves·a 
process of internalizing techniques for checking the reli-
ability of materials. Such a technique may be manifested 
in the simple question: Does what this author say in his 
autobiography seem suspiciously self-serving? Now the his-
torian may initially be suspicious of his subject's ex-
pressed motivation; however, suspicions have to be con-
firmed, and the historian must be careful not to allow any 
personal antipathy to hasten his judgment. Even if antip-
athy does· get in the way, there are external restraints 
on its effects in the individual's work. Once published, 
that work will be liable to the criticism of other histor-
ians more sympathetic to the author of the autobiography. 
127Lonergan cites a number of authors who agree that 
there are critical procedures which caeteris tartbus lead 
to objective historical knowledge. These pub ic proced-
ures off er a measure of control over the variables of per-
sonal preference. iience, it is easier to locate and to 
remedy mistakes. Cf. Method in Theology, p. 196. 
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They may be able.to marshal evidence and arguments against 
the individual historian's negative judgments. 
There is the objection that absolute objectivity is 
a notion foreign to historical work. ·because that work is 
always incomplete. The presupposition here is that one 
cannot know anything until one knows everything.128 .An 
ideal of the unconditioned is thus set up: an objective 
judgment is one based on a grasp of all there is to be un-
derstood. This ideal can only be reached through a total 
understanding which leaves no further questions. Short of 
this total comprehension, there is only partial understand-
ing joined with partial incomprehension.129 Historical in-
terpretations are open to revision, and hence, are never 
objective, i.e. definitive. 
But our second response points out that absolute ob-
jectivity has been conceived in terms of the virtually un-
conditioned. That is, a judgment of historical fact af-
firms, not the whole of history, but a single conditioned 
hav~ng a finite number of conditions which are in fact ful-
filled. Histori_cal judgments are, thus, limited commitments 
to specific problem areas.l30 It is enough that other 
128
.Ernest Nagel finds a corollary to this presuppo-
sition in the metaphysical doctrine of the internality of 
all relations. Applied to history, this doctrine condemns 
every historical work as a mutilation of past events. But 
the same condemnation will have to be extended to science 
also. "The Logic of Historical Analysis," The Philosophy 
of History in Our Time, p. 209. 
129rnsight, pp. 342-343. 
130Ibid., p. 345. 
, 
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historians can go over the same evidence, can mak~ the same 
connections between evidence and thesis, and can judge the 
results. Historical events are contingent and, for the 
most part, unique occurrences. But a true affirmation of 
them is not relative to the one who affirms. All of which 
is a wa:y of saying that the virtually unconditi.oned is a 
basis for the public nature of historical knowledge. 131 
Thus, the absolute objectivity of the unconditioned is part 
of historical work. 
, Before concluding this section of the chapter, we 
should comment on the issue of objectivity in relation to 
ethical commitments. Hayden White considers this issue 
under the heading of "ideological implications of one's 
view of historical knowledge." Burckhardt's view of know-
ledge as "pure seeing" is cited as an example of reaction-
ary political thinking. 132 Charles Beard was aware of sim-
ilar ideological implications in the "scientific" school 
of historiography founded by Ranke. "Written history that 
was cold,. factual, and apparently undisturbed by the pas-
s:tons of the time served best the cause of those who did 
not want to be disturbed."l33 What are the implications of 
l3libid., p. 378. 
132Metahistory, pp. 233-237. 
l33charles A. Beard, "Written History as an Act of 
Faith," The ?hiloso of Risto · in Our Time, p. 142. 
Hayden ' i te arrives at a si_mi ar conclusion. "But objec-
tive history, like impressionist art, was a bourgeoise 
phenomenon, the history of the middle class; and in refusing 
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the complex notion of objectivity? Does the notion of the 
virtually uncond:itioned serve party interests? 
First of all, the complexity of the notion of objec-
tivity is parallel to the complexity of human knowing. 
Therefore, this notion has a basis in the performance pre-
supposed by every developed school of thought. The basic 
epistemological position (namely, that the real is reached 
by intentional acts terminating in an affirmation of the 
true, the verified) is likewise derived from an analysis of 
cognitional performance. The major implication of all this 
is that historical objectivity is not derived from some 
external criterion or control which, when accompanied by 
a passionless devotion or a pure seeing, guarantees fac-
tual conclusions. Rather, historical objects belong to a 
world mediated by meaning and motivated by value. As a 
result, objective historical judgments are reached only 
through a subjectivity which develops and adheres to its 
own spontaneous attentiveness, intelligence, reasonable-
ness, and· responsibility. Put another way, objectivity is 
a consequence of authentically developing subjectivity.134 
to judge the past, the objective historian begged, like 
Burke, to escape a judgment of himself." Translator's In-
troduction, "On History and Historicisms," in Carlo Antoni's 
From History to Sociology, p. xxiii. 
134Nethod in Theolo~y, p. 265. The criterion of au-
thenticity applies to bot surface and deep levels. It is 
the absence of contradictions between what a person says 
about his performance and what that performance actually 
is. Therefore, intellectual conversion is required. It 
is the willingness of the person to conform his procedures 
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The no~ion of the virtually unconditioned as_ the 
basis of objectivity does not imply necessary truths in 
history but only judgments of fact. Historians operate 
on a number of levels of factualness. There are recommen-
dations that historians confine themselves to an exact 
description of what happened. Given this limitation, his-
torical facts are the reconstruction of what actually hap-
pened. But, as argued previ.ously, critical history con-
structs narratives explaining what was going forward in 
the past. Therefore, evaluative interpretations are made; 
significant acts and their consequences are isolated on 
the basis of criteria consistent with the historian's view 
of historical advance or decline. The employment of such 
evaluative criteria presupposes a speculative philosopbJr 
of history. Though we cannot digress from the analytic 
and methodological concerns of this dissertation in order 
to elaborate such a speculative system, we can briefly 
to the precepts made explicit through intellectual conver-
sion. Therefore, intellectual responsibility or moral 
conversion is required. 
Since our concern is for the methodological aspects 
of historical practice, we do not take up the issue of 
moral responsibility in the non-technical areas of every-
day liv~ng. However, what is said of intellectual respon-
sibility in regard to the scholar can also be applied to 
his decisions concerning non-specialized courses of action. 
Authentic subjectivity is not isolated in a single area of 
a person's life. Therefore, the same formal maxim applies 
in both technical and non-technical areas of human living: 
What one knows should guide one's decisions, so as to make 
one's doing consistent with one's knowing. We will return 
to this maxim later in this chapter. 
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indicate that previous chapteis contained two implications 
for such a speculative philosophy. 
First, the reactionary conservatism of Burckhardt's 
view of human knowing is shown to be misguided. Historical 
facts are not si.mply given, but require the intelligent 
and rational intervention of the historian. So, too, the 
theory of history which denies the possibility of objective 
,, 
historical knowledge usually contains a basic confusion 
about historical knowing. This confusion breeds a suspi-
cion that historians are only the artists of a past age and 
that they contribute no useful insights for contemporary 
decisions and actions.135 But a differentiated basic hor-
izon reveals criteria for evaluating the historical acts 
of past figures. Not only oversights but also the stubborn 
maintenance of obscurantist positions become manifest. 
And, in terms of what cognitional performance ought to be, 
these historical positions are negatively criticized and 
their future repetition is warned against. 
Second, some criteria of historical progress and of 
historical decline can be proposed. !f human authenticity 
is envisioned as a responsible commitment to the desire to 
know, then cultures which favor intellectual adventures 
can be said to be advancing in at least part of their life. 
On the other hand, closed societies (particularly totalitarian 
l35Burckhardt shared this suspicion with others, and 
felt no obligation to participate actively in efforts to 
change his society. Cf. Metahistory, p. 243. 
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states) can be criticized for thwarting the spontaneop.s 
intellectual life of their members~ There are many fac-
tors to social prosperity besides intellectual freedom. 
But the absence of intellectual maturity guarantees a les-
sening ability to respond to the crises encountered by 
every society. Eventually favorable military, economic, 
geographical, and agricultural factors will be offset by 
the unwillingness of subjects or citizens to respond to 
crises in a cooperative and rational way. 
Previous compromises of intellectual responsibility 
can gradually compound their effects until objectivity is 
labelled a "myth" and prejudice is said to be all-pervas-
ive and unconquerable. Then the willingness of individuals 
to respond to social crises in a cooperative way will be 
rationalized by a widespread belief that human planning and 
decisions cannot affect the outcome of onrushing events. 
All of which is a way of saying that the issues of objec-
tivity and critical thinking are not abstruse problems fit 
only for the classroom or scholarly journal. Rather, their 
social and ethical implications turn up as part of contem-
porary problems. 
In summary, this third section has taken the first 
step in supplying an epistemoiogical basis for determining 
the realism of different conceptions of history. A basic 
epistemological position has been derived from human cogni-
tional structure. Tn the following section, it will be 
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used to criticize claims to historical realism. 
Central to our epistemological study was the issue 
ot historical objectivity. Ye approached this complex 
issue by first treating the component issues of histori-
cal evidence and verification. Historical evidence is 
usually proposed as a bulwark against solipsism and arbi-
trary reconstructions of the past. But what is meant by 
historical evidence is not immediately clear. rn clari-
fying its meaning, we indicated certain preconditi.ons to 
historical evidence: the classifying function of historical 
intelligence, the specific question which anticipates an 
:intelligibility in the evidence. These preconditions were 
the basis for our thesis that historical evidence is always 
formal evidence. An understanding of the evidence is usu-
ally formulated in a hypothetical proposition requiring 
verification. The process of verifying statements is usu-
ally said to require a "sufficiency" of evidence. However, 
this is another term which is not immediately clear. 
Since evidence by itself does not compel assent, 
there must be another element to the verification process. 
Lonergan's distinction between acts of direct understand-
ing and acts of reflective understanding allows this other 
element to become manifest. Direct insights provide ten-
tative organizations of historical events; reflective in-
sights determine how well direct insights, their expres-
sion, and the known evidence correlate with one another. 
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But the cone.apt o.f"correlation"needs more precision. That 
precision is supplied by an explanatory thematization of 
reason-in-act: the virtually unconditioned. We worked 
through the various steps by which historical judgments 
approximate to the virtually unconditioned: the conditioned, 
the known conditions, the links between them, and the act 
o.f reflective understanding which grasps the fulfillment 
of the conditions. So that this explanatory .form of the 
verification process would not seem purely formal, we 
exemplified how it might work in a hypothetical instance. 
Among other functions, the notion of the virtually 
unconditioned gives a clear insight into the rational com-
ponent of cognitional performance. This insight was cru-
cial for making the transition from cognitional theory to 
epistemology. Rational performance occurs in the question 
for reflection, and the epistemological concern is for what 
an answer to such a question affirms. We gradually deep-
ened our analysis of the "af.firmed." On the level of or-
dinary speaking, the affirmed is the true. But what is 
true is, in the first place, a formulated meaning and, in 
the second place, one's grasp of the interpreted events. 
Historical affirmations do not take as their object histor-
ical data or historical suppositions. What is affirmed is 
historical fact. 
Again, we have a concept requiring clarification. 
Historical facts are neither givens nor arbitrary constructs 
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(i.e. purel~ imaginative descriptions). They emerge when 
answers to questions establish a correlation between an 
object of thought (the conditioned meaning) and known evi-
dence (the conditions). And since the questions intend 
past events, the answers are mediations of past events and 
their consequences. There are two poles to every media-
tion. Tn regard to historical facts, there is the side of 
the knower: cognitional acts assemble themselves into com-
pound acts of historical knowing. There is also the side 
of the known: cognitional intend:ings assemble partial ·ob-
jects (what is intended) into a single compound object. 
What is the relationship between these two poles? The 
thesis of isomorphism is Lonergan's response: the struc-
ture of historical knowing is similar to the structure of 
known historical facts. 
The thesis if isomorphism is an explicit link between 
Lonergan's cognitional theory and his critical realism. 
The validity of the thesis is established by a rather sim-
ple argument: to deny it, one must presume it. This conclu-
sion entails the basic epistemological position of criti-
cal realism, namely, the real is to be identified with the 
true, the affirmed. In respect to historical questions, 
historical reality is what is reached through an affi.rma-
tion of correct understanding. .Put another way, historical 
facts are affirmed answers (meanings) to questions for re-
flection--answers which a~proximate to and sometimes reach 
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the virtually unconditioned. That same virtually .uncondi-
. 
tioned was exemplified implicitly by the steps taken to 
reach this point. The basic position of critical realism 
was the conditioned; its conditions belonged to the "deep 
structure" of cognitional performance. The thesis of iso-
morphism linked the two, and our argument for the validity 
of the thesis proved that the conditions were fulfilled. 
The affirmed epistemological position was crucial to 
our clarification of historical objectivity. Tt allowed us 
to form a notion of objectivity parallel in its complexity 
to the complexity of human knowing. Just as there is more 
than one meaning for the term "object," to too "objectiv-
ity" has multiple meanings. The primary meaning remains 
that of a patterned context of judgments, and we exempli-
fied this in both scientific and historical learning. The 
experiential, normative, and absolute meanings or types of 
objectivity were clarified. More significantly, we argued 
the usefulness of these distinct types by contrasting them 
with less complex views of objectivity. Arguments or objec-
tions based on these less complex views were made against 
the complex notion of objectivity. Since a basic epistem-
ological thesis has been affirmed, our responses to the ob-
jections were more than tentative. But in a sense the re-
sponses were only introductory to the more complex problems 
of the following section. Those responses exemplify an 
application of critical realism to problems of objectivity. 
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The next sec.tion extends that application to issues of 
historical realism, a science of history, and a strategy 
for resolving the theoretical impasse of the crisis of 
historicism. 
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HISTORY AND SCIENCE 
The primary goal of this section is to manifest how 
an epi·stemology based on cognitional structure of:fers a 
test of historical realism. The discussion will be con-
ducted initially in terms of the relation of history to 
science. This way of proceeding is justified because claims 
of superiority for one historical perspective over others 
" have usually been phrased in terms of a science of history. 
That is, one conception of history is superior to or ~ore 
"realistic" than others because it approximates to scien-
tific methods and results. 136 This phrasing of the issue 
will eventually be qualified. What will remain intact is 
-the basic assumption that historical realism can be deter-
mined only on the basis of a critical method. Because of 
fundamental differences between science and history, the 
needed critical method cannot be "borrowed" from the natural 
sciences. But, as argued already in Chapter Three, there 
is an explanatory technique which is not derived from but 
rather grounds scientific methods. Thus, the initial prob-
lematic will be rephrased: How does transcendental method 
136rn Chapter Three, we noted how some schools of 
historical thought attempted to model their own procedures 
upon methods in the natural sciences. We also noted the 
revolt initiated by Dilthey against this imposition of an 
extraneous ideal. The relationship between history and 
science, even if it is not one of imitation, must be clar-
ified. Hence, the problem of historical realism will first 
be placed within the context of this relationship. 
p 
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function as a critical hermeneutical measure of historical 
realism? 
History and Science: Similarities and Differences 
Hayden White's study of nineteenth-century historians 
outlines the troubled relationship between history and sci-
ence. In the first place, even among those who advocate a 
scientizing of history, there is no consensus on what a 
science of history would be.13? Multiple conceptions of 
scientific history were advanced in the nineteenth century, 
but no compelling theoretical reasons established the super-
iority of one or more conceptions over the rest. 138 Some 
historians concluded that the search for a scientific his-
tory was misguided in the first place. White's own conclu-
sion is that the demand for the scientizing of history is 
but the statement of a prior, precritical preference. 139 
l37Metahistory, pp. 12-13. Although Hayden White em-
ploys the term "scientization" to describe the process of 
modeling historical procedures on scientific practice, we 
prefer the term "scientizing." Our reasons are twofold: 
first, to avoid an unnecessary neologism, and second, to 
indicate that the "modeling process" is an ongoing process 
of assimilation--at least as an ideal. 
l38Hegel, Marx, Ranke are mentioned as representative 
figures of different schools of scientific history. Tbid., 
pp. 432-433· 
l39In his own words: "the demand for the scientization 
of history represents only the statement of a preference for 
a specific modality of historical conceptualization, the 
grounds of which are either moral or aesthetic, but the 
epistemological justification of which still rema:tns to be 
established." Preface to ibid., p. xii. J. Juizinga has 
argued similarly for a preferential basis to the desire for 
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And even amqng those who "prefer" to do scientific his-
tory, there will be different conceptions of what consti-
tutes a science of history--different conceptions again 
manifesting different preferences. 
A study of nineteenth-century historiography, there-
fore, yields contrasting viewpoints about both the relation 
of history to science and the determination of historical 
realism. White identifies one of the key underlying prob-
lems to both of these disputed areas. No agreement has 
been reached over what should count as a specifically.his-
torical datum. Those who sought to make history a science 
recognized that historians did not investigate the same 
things as scientists studied. rnstead, they hoped to study 
their own field in a scientific way, i.e. they were to bor-
row methods and not objects from the scientific field. But 
what was not forthcoming was a consensus on the proper 
field of objects for methodical historical investigation. 
So, the preliminary step to be taken is to distinguish his-
torical objects from the objects of other sciences. Obvi-
ously such a distinction cannot be made from within the 
historical field. \rib.at is needed is a metahistori.cal basis 
for distinguishing natural and peculiarly historical phenom-
ena.140 We can advance toward such a distinction by 
scientific history, in "A Definition of the Concept of His-
tory," Philosophy and History, edited by H. J. Paton and R. 
Klibansky (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 9. 
14011The resolution of this problem requires a meta-
theory, which will establish on metahistorical grounds the 
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considering in more detail the differences between history 
and the natural sciences. 
Specific differences between the two fields of in-
quiry emerged because of a controversy. One party to the 
controversy was represented by J. B. Bury's confident dec-
laration: "history is a science, no less and no more; ••• 11141 
The other party took as its motto Goethe's maxim, "!ndivid-
uum est ineffabile. 11142 The latter group argued for the 
--
primacy of individualizing description over the generaliz-
ing classifications of the natural sciences. Human activi-
ties of h:l storical signifi.cance were unique events and not 
the expression of a constant ahistorical human nature.143 
The implications of this ineffable individuality were, first, 
a distinct subject matter for history and, second, a method 
distinctions between ~erely 'natural' phenomena and speci-
.fically 'historical' phenomena." Ibid., Metahistory, p. 429. 
This problem and the need to resolve it, lest history be 
tied to nothing in particular, was recognized earlier. See 
Langlois and Seignobos, !ntroduction to the Study of History, 
p. 215. 
141rnaugural lecture, "The Science of History," reprin-
ted in The Varieties of History, p. 210. 
142Meinecke placed this maxim at the front of his 
study of this second party. Cf. Historism, p. vi. 
14311 The essence of historism is the substitution of 
a process of ind:tvidualisin~ observation for a generalising 
view of hUIJan forces {n his ory." Friedrich Meinecke, in 
."Preliminary Remarks" to ibid., p. lv. G. G. Iggers summed 
up the historicist thesis-:mus way: "There is no constant 
human nature; rather the character of each man reveals it-
self only in his development. The abstract, classificatory 
methods of the natural sciences are therefore inadequate 
models for the study of [the] human world." The German 
Conception of History, p. 5. 
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different from, but hopefully no less accurate than, sci-
entific method. A question mark hung over historical pro-
cedures as a result ·or this controversy. History was un-
avoidably less precise than science, but in what way was 
it more than fiction? 
To answer this question, the differences and the sim-
ilarities between history and science will have to be stud-
ied. As mentioned previously, a long-standing problem has 
been how to distinguish between natural and historical ob-
jects. On the basis of earlier conclusions, we can propose 
a solution to this problem. To begin with, the distinction 
must be the result of an empirical analysis. The natural 
sciences result from patterned activities (methods) which 
repeatedly and cumulatively grasp insights that are imman-
ent, not in what is imagined, but in what is observed. 
Similarly humanistic disciplines advance by methodical pro-
cedures which focus on empirical data (e.g. monuments, rec-
ords, art works). Now the common empirical field which 
science and history both presuppose is human interiority. 144 
The data of consciousness are not the ex2licit subject mat-
ter for either discipline. But the data of consciousness 
are empirjcal, and our proposal is to base on them a meta-
historical distinction between scientific and historical 
objects. 
144Another way of saying this--both science and his-
tory are constructed in part through acts of conscious in-
tentionality. 
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The third section of the chapter clarified the no-
tions of object and objectivity. Empirical data, whether 
they be data of sen5e or data of consciousness, belong to 
theoretical enterprises. Scientists, historians, philos-
ophers talk about data as experienced. They dist:i.nguish 
what is empirical from what is merely imag-ined, and in do-
ing so they set up a series of classifications and hypothe-
ses which guide their exper-ience. That is, they mediate 
their experience through acts of meaning. Among these acts 
are various ways of denoting the contents of their experi-
ence (e.g. !! empirical, problematical, measurable). In 
contrast, "objects" in the lived world of immediacy are the 
merely encountered, i.e. what is ~ attended to for empir-
ical-theoretical purposes.145 The implication is that both 
scientific and historical data are objects in a world medi-
ated by meaning. 146 
145we have in mind here the difference between two 
experiences. In one case, a person accidently trips over 
a stone in his path. In the other case, an archaeologist 
picks up the stone to examine it. The latter shows a the-
oretical interest guided by an object which for him is an 
empirical datum. 
146It would not be inappropriate to speak of "worlds" 
of meaning instead of a single world of meaning. We choose 
the singular here to force an issue tnto the open. Previ-
ous discussions of closed systems of thought have referred 
to them as closed "worlds" of meaning. This characteriza-
tion is intended to explicate one consequence of limiting 
human intelligence to the level of expressions. Multiple 
historical perspectives, as Hayden White indicates, mani-
fest prior preferences for different modes of historical 
conceptualization. These different modes are chosen in ad-
van9e of historical research; they will determine the ways 
in which historical data are understood and expressed. Now, 
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The world mediated by meaning is not identified with 
the content of anyone's immediate experience. Nor is it 
identified with the totality of all individuals' worlds of 
in the light of two different modes ·or conceptualization, 
and on the supposition that meaning is identified with ex-
pression, the understood data will not be the same in both 
historical perspectives. With a variance in modes of con-
ceptualization, there will be a variance in what is under-
stood. Consequently, those who use different perspectives 
will not be able to talk to one another about the same 
events. Their speech will be about events in different 
worlds. 
One way out of this conclusion is to insist on the 
distinction between sense and reference. While the sense 
of one's terms is dependent on the context in which they 
are used (e.g. the term "abnormality" will have different 
senses depending on who is using it, psychologist, biolo-
gist, doctor), the referrents of the terms maintain a rela-
tive constancy. That is, different meanings in different 
perspectives still can have a common referrent in what is 
observable. (Israel Scheffler uses the distinction between 
sense and reference to argue along this line. Science and 
Subjectivity, pp. 54-63.) 
However, the distinction between sense and reference 
is not adequate by itself. The basic issue is one of lo-
cating a common norm for different ways of speaking about 
the same events. Reference is to an empirical datum for 
which there may be many senses. But, on the basis of our 
previous discussion of objectivity, what is normative will 
be found not in empirical consciousness (which contains 
the referrent) but in intelligent and critical conscious-
ness. Consequently, it is the intelligent pursuit of in-
sight which can mediate between referrents and multiple 
senses, between the "same events" and different ways of con-
ceiving and talking about them. (Without repeating earlier 
arguments in section three of this chapter, we are here pre-
suming that understanding and conceptualization, while mu-
tually dependent, are not identical. Rather insight pre-
cedes expression.) Our earlier conclusion (cf. section 
three) bears repeating: critical consciousness which devel-
ops systems of meaning can also transcend the inherent lim-
its of its thought-products. 
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immediate experience. Meanings are, in the first. pla.ce, 
acts which not only refer to what is experienced but also 
express an understanding of' the experienced. And usually 
such meanings belong to a context broader than the indi-
vidual' a lived experience (e.g. insofar as meanings are 
linguistic, they participate in a common language which 
the individual does not create but shares). As part of' 
this larger context, meanings do not require the presence 
of "objects'' in an immediate world.147 Memories are mean-
ings which mediate what is absent; literary works relate 
an author's past thoughts and experiences; historical nar-
ratives relate events which once were lived but now are 
past. 
In a world mediated by meaning, what difference is 
there between scientific objects and historical objects? 
Scientific meanings have a basis in experience (e.g. the 
nuclear physicist tests a thesis against the observable 
traces provided by an electron microscope); historical 
meanings have a basis in experience (e.g. the historian 
takes pains to find evidentiary materials which challenge 
his interpretation). However, the biologist or the physi-
cist is concerned with objects that have a natural origin. 
The amoeba is not created by human actions; the structure 
of DNA is not created by an artist with a flair for complex 
symmetry (though the imaginative model of' a twisting ladder 
l 4?"Dimensions of Meaning," Collection, p. 253. 
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is a construct). · The scientific meanings which mediate 
these "objects" are constructed by human intelligence striv-
ing to understand and to explain how objects function irre-
spective of human intentions or actions. 
On the other hand, historical objects are constituted 
by human acts of meaning. For example, where once stood 
jungle, now stand the remains of a great Aztec ctty. His-
torical actions transformed a natural enVironment into a 
human world. Laws were made to regulate human communica-
tion; roads were built in all directions to unite single 
cities into an empire. Hierarchies of officialdom were set 
up and preserved to guarantee that the order won at hard 
labor would survive the founders. The components of these 
institutions and rules are acts of meaning which themselves 
have a history.148 Institutions, laws, roles in society 
develop through ti..me. Changes in them are not alterations 
of physical properties but changes in meaning. An empire 
is radically altered if it loses the loyalty of its sub-
jects. An institution may grow stronger as laws guarantee 
that every social class have access to its benefits. 
!n a previous discussion, we proposed that constitu-
tive relat'ionships can be consi..dered primary historical 
objects. That proposal gains added support from our dif-
ferentiation of historical and scientific objects. 
148rbid., pp. 253-254. Peter Berger and Thomas Luck-
mann devote-a chapter to social institutions as realities 
composed of acts of meaning and sedimented relationships. 
Cf. The Social Construction of Reality, Chapter II, pp. 47-
128. 
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Historical objects are both mediated (i.e. understood) by 
acts of meaning and are constitUted by (i.e. composed of 
and by) acts of meaning. For example, the Magna Carta is 
more than ink spots on parchment. It is a historical ob-
ject composed of expressed intentions to regulate the rela-
tionship between king and subjects. And the historian 
grasps those expressed intentions not by simply looking at 
the docUiilent but by his own acts of meaning which interpret 
what was meant by the writers. 
The question invariably arises: Are not the referrents 
of meanings the realities? The meanings themselves are men-
tal constructs which help to clarify what is "really real," 
namely, the concrete objects of experience. Our previous 
work allows us to penetrate this ordinary way of thinking. 
The presuppositton is that known objects are the entities 
of the lived world of immediacy, i.e. the already-out-there-
now-real.149 Since meanings, or better, s~nce objects con-
stituted by meanir.@3are not these concrete immediate enti-
ties, knowledge of the former is not knowledge of the real 
but an understanding of mere thought-objects.l50 On the 
149This presupposition is manifest among historians 
who speak o:f a term, e.g. "England" or a "Constitution," as 
a convenient way o:f speaking but not as a term referring to 
anything real. What is real are all the concrete objects 
which are English or all the concrete practices which are 
constitutional. 
l50we take this conclusi.on.to be a restatement o:f the 
thesis o:f idealism. Within this position, the distinction 
between natural and human sciences will be based on the dif-
ference between external and jnternal experiences. Sciences 
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basis of previous conclusions, this ordtnary way Qf think-
ing can be criticized. 
First, besides objects merely encountered, there are 
objects mediated by meanings. In science, there are the 
meanings (or intelligible relationships) immanent in nat-
ural processes which scientific investigation discovers, 
formulates, and attempts to verify. Tn history, there are 
the meanings which historical beings constitute. 151 His-
torians proceed from traces to a recovery of meaning. They 
work out the intelligible relationships which contemporar-
ies of past actions may not have known even though they 
initiated those relationships. And like the scientist, the 
historian formulates and seeks to verify his organization 
of past events and consequences. Therefore, the world of 
lived immediacy does not provide the "really real" which 
science or history investigates. The world mediated by 
meaning is the sphere of scientific and historical opera-
tions. 
Second, the presupposition is that known objects are 
the entities already-out-there-now-real. But knowing is a 
consider objects-out-there; humanistic disciplj_nes grasp 
introspectively that which is part of our inner experienc-
ing--an internal empirical content. .Matthew Lamb finds 
that Dilthey bases his distinction between the natural and 
human sciences on this difference. For Lamb's comments 
and critique, see "Wilhelm Dilthey's Critique of Histori-
cal Reason and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Lan-
guage, Truth and Meaning, pp. 146-147. 
151 ~., p. 330, footnote 188. 
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compound actiVity, and what is known is parallel in complex-
ity to human knowing. Consequently, known objects are what 
is correctly understood--in our case, hypothesized arrange-
ments of constitutive relationships which, in fact, have 
their conditions fulfilled. The ordinary way of thinking 
contuses one component of the known with the compound ob-
ject known. This is its empirical prejudice: to View its 
knowledge claims as basically direct experiences of what is 
empirically given. If the ordinary way of thinking rec.og-
nizes complexities in its achievement of understanding, these 
complexities are ·usually said to be subjective additions. 
To ~ow is to grasp what is simply there-to-be-seen; any 
other operations and their products are ideation and thought-
objects. Meanings are, thus, secondary matters; what is 
important is the meant. But historical objects are mean-
ings constituted by human activities. Those meanings can 
be correctly understood (i.e. known); and since the real is 
identified with what is correctly understood, the ordinary 
way of thinking manifests its own incomprehension.152 
152W'hat we have tried to synthesize under a single 
heading (i.e. "the ordinary way of thinking") is really two 
positions. First, objects are what is already-out-there-
now-real; and, second, human meanings are.constructs which 
do not reach the "real." If the first posi-eion is stressed, 
~hen knowing will be a matter of mere observation. If the 
second is emphasized, then what we understand is not the 
real but the ideal products of human intelligence. Loner-
gan speaks of these two positions as the "horns" of a rath-
er complex philosophical dilemma. "From the horns of that 
dilemma one escapes only through the discovery (and one has 
not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling 
strangeness) that there are two quite different realisms; 
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In summary; we began this discussion of historical 
objects with a wtdely recognized problem: How does one 
distinguish between natural and historical objects? Given 
Hayden White's analysis of the problem, the required dis-
tinction must be based on some metahistorical position. 
First, we suggested that common grounds for both history 
and science are found in the empirical data of conscious-
ness. Both fields of inquiry presuppose the patterned ac-
tivities of conscious intentionality.153 Second, since 
both fields are theoretical (though not exclusively so), 
their intentional objects belong to a world mediated by 
meaning. But here a difference in objects emerges. Nat-
ural sciences intend meanings immanent in natural processes 
while historical studies intend meanings which historical 
beings constitute. Human decisions and actions transform 
both a natura~ world and man himself. The transformations 
have a historical meaning which is the relationship between 
event (or act) and consequence (or expression). 154 Finally, 
that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and half 
human, that poses as a half-way house between materialism 
and idealism and, 9n the other hand, that there is an in-
telligent and reasonable realism between which and mater-
ialism the half-way house is idealism." Introduction to 
Insight, p. xxviii. 
l53Because of this common presupposition, the dis-
tinction cannot be drawn along the lines of inner and 
outer experience. 
l54The peculiarly human character of such relation-
ships becomes evident when one considers an example offered 
by Lonergan. Scientists could take measurements, note 
activities, and count participants in a legal process but 
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we noted how some basic epistemological confusions can gen-
erate an oversight of the reality of historical meanings. 
Our distinction between natural and historical objects, 
thus, rests proximately on an epistemological realism and 
ultimately on a metahistorical, cognitional theory. 
The difference between natural and historical objects 
is one of a number of differences between science and his-
tory. A second difference is apparent in the way that dis-
coveries are expressed in each of the two fields. Scien-
tific discoveries must be expressible as parts of an in-
ternally coherent system. The individual discovery must be 
valid across a set or series of particular cases. This 
is the characteristic notion of generality or universality 
applied to scientific results. If an individual discovery 
is incompatible with a s:ingle relevant case, it is refuted.155 
On the other hand, historical discoveries are formulated 
as parts of narratives. They fit into descriptive accounts 
of particular persons, places, and times. Usually there is 
no attempt made to generalize from the particular instance 
to a larger number of historical instances. In contrast to 
scientific generality, there is a historical admission of 
uniqueness.156 
never conclude, purely as scientists, that they were in a 
court of law. "Existenz and Aggiornamento," in Collection, 
p. 244. 
l55Method in Theology, pp. 179-180 and 229. 
l5Gibid., p. 180. The "uniqueness" of historical 
r 
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A thi~d and major difference between history and the 
natural sciences lies in the former's use of ordinary lan-
guage. Hayden White's delineation of multiple modes of 
historical conceptualization presumed that historians had 
not developed a s:ingle mode for express~ng their insights. 
Scientific insights may be formulated initially in ordinary 
language, but professional consensus requires a reformula-
tion of them into a technical vocabulary. The difference 
events is sometimes contemned when contrasted with the gen-
erality (and presupposed sameness in instances) of sci-enti-
fic results. The classic statement is Aristotle's remark 
in the Poetics (?.5): "Hence poetry is something more phil-
osophic and of graver import than history, since its state-
ments are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those 
of history are singulars." (Quoted from The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, New York: Random House, 
1970, P· 1464). 
Two remarks are in order. First, the uniqueness of 
historical events is never absolute. On the one hand, his-
torical knowledge is not isolated from the common-sense 
living of the historian and of his audience. What is 
learned about past events may be of use in the present. 
Or what is learned about one historical era may shed light 
on another era which the historian subsequently investi-
gates. This is not to say that the events of a past era 
are repeatable in any exact way in a subsequent era. How-
ever, the analogous connections drawn by common sense be-
tween experiences widely separated in time do not require 
exactness. Ordinary language is not bound to univocal 
terms in.the same way as the natural sciences. Nor are its 
generalizations required to have the same degree of exact-
ness as usually is demanded in the natural sciences. On 
the other hand, the term "unique" is not applied in a vac-
uum. It is used to characterize the distinctively individ-
ual traits of a historical person, place, or time. But 
those individual traits are called "differences," and dif-
ferences are only noted on the basis of similarities. Thus, 
the defeat of the Spanish Armada was a unique event both in 
time and place. But other foiled invasions share a common-
ality with this particular defeat. At least linguistic 
classification requires this coIJIIlonality since many partic-
ular instances can be labelled 11 attem:pted invasions." Pat-
rick Gardiner discusses a number of misconceptions about 
historical uniqueness in The Nature of Historical .ExPlana-
~' pp. 43-46. 
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here is not just one of expression but also one of object. 
Scientific inquiries seek to formulate the intelligibility 
of natural regularities. In contrast, historical inquiries 
usually pursue not the regular or the routine but the ex-
ceptional. A series of past events is usually investigated 
because the events and their consequences marked a depar-
ture from previous routines. .Even if the abnormal is not 
the main topic, still the historian recognizes some unique-
ness in his topic. What he reconstructs is a past that 
most probably will never be repeated. 157 
Differences in expression and in objects yield differ-
ences in knowledge. Scientific explanation is systematic, 
and its formulations have a generality which allows pre-
dictability in regard to individual cases. Historical ex-
planations are similar to common-sense knowledge. Both fo-
cus on the particular and the concrete.158 Their results 
express an understanding which may be of use in future 
l5?Ibid., Method in Theology, p. 230. 
158w. H. Walsh states this widely held position: His-
tory "is not an abstract but a concrete science, and it ter-
minates not in general knowledge but in knowledge of indi-
vidual truths." Philoso h of Histor : An Introduction, p. 
43. Given our ear ier remar s on uniqueness in is ory, 
this distinction between general knowledge and knowledge of 
individual truths cannot be pushed too far. Generalizations 
about governmental policy during a particular period are 
made by historians. However, the generalizations are sec-
ondary to the determination of individual facts. Perhaps 
Collingwood takes the wisest course when he argues that no 
precise separation of history from natural sc~ences can be 
made in terms of generalizations in the latter and individ-
ual facts in the former. See The Tdea of History, pp. 166-
16?. 
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inquiries, but that use cannot be predicted or assumed. 
Rather, a new insight will be needed to determine the rele-
vancy of past results to new problems.159 It is also 
the case that a historian's own common-sense opinions can-
not be used indiscriminately to guide his study of past 
ages. Other peoples and other times had a different common 
sense. Therefore, the historian's own accumulated insights 
into human motivation, reactions to crises, and rationali-
zations of mistakes may be foreign to an earlier period. 
Again, the self-correcting process of learning may gradu-
ally introduce him to another way of ordinary thinking and 
speaking. Then his historical understanding will still 
not be systematic in any scientific sense, but it will con-
tain the incomplete common-sense wisdom of some former 
time.160 
l59we have in mind here the incompleteness of common-
sense knowledge. Chapter Two considered how a new insight 
into a present situation must occur before prior cor:u:n.on-
sense opinions can be applied to it. Similarly, in history, 
the study of one revolution does not produce results which 
can be automatically applied to other revolutions. Relevant 
similarities would first have to be discovered before pre-
Vious conclusions about how a single revolution began could 
be said to be applicable to other political upheavals. 
This is a basis for Lonergan's thesis that historical ex-
planations are sophisticated extensions of common-oense un-
derstanding. (Method in Theology, p. 230.) Our discussion 
in Chapter Two of relative horizons drew the connections 
between these two modes of understanding, but then we were 
not concerned with differences between history and science. 
160rbid., Method in Theolo5y, p. 305. The difference 
between scJ.ence and history that emerges from the distinc-
tion between theoretical expression and common-sense expres-
sion is sufficiently apparent that Lonergan proposes to base 
a terminological distinction upon it. "Science" is the term 
r 
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Given the preceding differences between history and 
science, some co.I!llilentators have concluded that a scientif-
ic mode of explanation is superior to coI:UD.on-sensical his-
torical explanation. In the n!neteenth century, demands 
for the scientizing of history were in some cases based on 
just such a value judgment. However, the preceding differ-
ences indicate that history cannot be a science in any com-
plete sense. Its proximity to common-sense knowledge is 
perhaps the most solid barrier to an:y complete scientizing 
of history. Are the demands, therefore, to remain complete-
ly unfulfillable? 
In the first place, the presupposed superiority of 
science over history must be qualified. The fields of in-
• • quiry are not the same for both. We have already indicated 
that history is primarily a study of constitutive relation-
ships. The implication of this is that history has a much 
wider existential fjeld than, for example, mathematics. At 
the same time, the doing of history presupposes a wider 
existential commitment on the part of the historian; his 
relative horizon is more obviously at work in historical 
interpretations than it would be were he a mathematician. 161 
for knowledge contained in laws or pr'5_nciples and either 
verified universally or else revised. "Scholarship" is the 
term for learning about the coI:lilon sense of former times. In 
the latter case, the learning process results in the incom-
plete knowledge which characterizes common sense. See ibid., 
pp. 233-234. 
161Martin Heidegger notes this difference but argues 
that each of the fields of inquiry has its own proper 
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So in di.f .ferent .fields of inquiry there will be different 
demands placed upon the investigator. In history there is 
a demand .for common-sense explanations because the content 
o.f the field is made up o.f unique instances and because 
the historian seeks to understand the common-sense think-
ing, speaking, and acting o.f a .former time. 
Second, the supposed superiority o.f science over 
history is sometimes based on an oversight of diversity 
in modes of verification. A scientific hypothesis can be 
tested by repeatable experiments. But a historical hypo-
thesis about fairly unique events cannot be tested by re-
peating the sequence of decisions and actions leading to 
those events. Instead, historical verification proceeds 
by way of inference from preserved and understood materi-
als to a reasonable approximation of what in fact was the 
case.162 Now this different mode of verification cannot 
be labelled "unscientific" or "inferiorn (1) because, again, 
it is the proper way of proceeding for a distinct discip-
line, and (2) because among the sciences there are fields 
o.f inquiry which work in the same way, e.g. geology and 
some specializations within astronomy. Our conclusion is 
controls (methods) and is not to be judged superjor or in-
ferior to the other. "Mathematics is not more rigorous than 
historiology, but only narrower, because the existential 
foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range." 
Being and Time, p. 195. 
162The inferential character of historical verifica-
tion is discussed by R. G. Collingwood in The Idea of His-
tory, p. 176, and pp. 251-252. 
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that the natural sciences are not "superior" to hi,story but 
are merely different enterprises with different fields of 
inquiry and different modes of explanation. Both history 
and the sciences have distinct purposes, and to charge that 
history is not scientifically rigorous in its results is 
to confuse the purposes of history with the purposes of 
the sciences.163 
A contemporary debate among philosophers of history 
shows a continuing confusion of such purposes. The debate 
generally focuses on causal analysis in history. The ~en­
tral issue is whether in determining causes of historical 
events, the historian is either implicitly or explicitly 
making use of laws.164 We have already noted that histori-
cal inquiry into supposedly unique events is not wholly sep-
arate from generalizing and classifying ways of thinking. 
lG3"It is mistaken, for example, to claim for scien-
tific explanation a superiority over commonsense explana-
tion: both have their use. We do not want to be scientists 
all the time. Indeed to quarrel with a co:m.oonsense explana-
tion on the ground that it lacks the precision and compre-
hensiveness of an explanation occurring in one of the sci-
ences is to complain that it should perform a different 
function froIJ the one it in f'act performs, ••• " Patrick 
Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation, p. 25. 
164The literature of this ongoing debate is extensive. 
C. G. Hempel's work is of'ten cited as the start;ng point 
tor the contemporary discussion of laws in historical ex-
planations. See his article, "The Function of General Laws 
in History," reprinted in Theories of HistoH, edited by 
Patrick Gardiner, pp. 344-356. The same an ology contains 
valuable articles on this topic ~y Morton White, Alan Dona-
gan, and Michael Scriven. William Dray has produced a thor-
ough study of the issues covered by both sides in the con-
troversy. See his Laws and fJ:lanation in History (London: 
Oxford University Press, 195 • 
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But the qualification must be added that, like common-sense 
knowledge, historical knowledge is not primarily a series 
of generalizations. Rather, an explanation of the causes 
of particular historical events rema~ns confined in its 
application to those events until further insights into 
different events yield some basis for finding the earlier 
explanation relevant to the different events. 
This incompleteness of historical explanations across 
different situations implies that one cannot deduce the 
causes of one set of events (e.g. a revolution) simply by 
knowing the causes of a prior set of events (e.g. an ear-
lier revolution). !ndeed, the term "cause" is not used in 
the same way in both science and history. For scientists, 
' 
"causal connections" refer to required conditions of events, 
e.g. given chemical mixtures of x, y, and z, phenomenon A 
will be observed. But for historians, "cause" has the 
loose, nontechnical meaning of everyday speech. "Event B 
occurred because two people were afraid to trust each 
other. 11165 This use of "cause" first appears in the 
child's curiosity about events around him. The common 
sense of adults contains multiple uses of the term which 
165Henri Marrou, along with others, recommends that 
this loose use of "cause" be dropped from historical lang-
uage. His reasoning is that even scientists have found 
more precise ways of speaking about connections between 
events. (The Meaning of HistofY, p. 191.) However, the 
ordinary language of historica explanation will most 
likely continue to include this and other terms of impre-
cise but flexible meaning. 
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make up in flexibility what they lack in precision. 
One may argue that historians' performance rather than 
a scientific ideal of explanation should guide discussions 
about how historians explain events.· A strong support for 
such an approach is surely the absence of any convincing 
example of a historical law other than a truism.166 What 
historical performance manifests is a constant awareness 
that generalizations require proof, and usually the more 
cases that are studied the more watered-down become the gen-
eralizations. Truisms will result, but then common-sense 
generalizations are usually truisms or else principles 
which can only be applied to specific cases after a further 
insight into those cases. 
So far we have noted a number of differences between 
history and science. There are differences in objects, in 
the expression of discoveries, in the use of technical lang-
uage, in the priority of generalizations, and in the modes 
of explana~ion. The study of these differences followed 
upon two questions. First, history is unavoidably less pre-
cise than the natural sciences, but in what way is it more 
166w. H. Walsh strikes at the basic weakness of the 
theory of historical laws by noting the absence of a sin-
gle reputable example. See his article "'Meaning' in His-
tory," in Theories of Histort' edited by Patrick Gardiner, 
pp. 303-304. 1Je might add t at the imposition of a deduc-
tive model of historical explanation may well proceed from 
that basic confusion of deduction with insight studied in 
section three. 
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than fiction? Second, are the demands for the scientizing 
of history completely unfulfillable? .Answers to these ques-
tions can be r~ached by turning from the differences be-
tween history and science to their similarities. 
An obvious similarity lies in the methodical investi-
gation of subject-matter. Both history and science pro-
ceed in a discriminating and cumulative way. As opposed to 
collections of random bits of information (the building 
blocks of some future as-yet-unknown theory), both history 
and science are guided (1) by commonly accepted procedures 
and (2) by specific problems which may be studied for' any 
number of reasons. Just because historians speak in the 
language of everyday living, it does not follow that the 
everyday man can do competent history. At least one pre-
requisite is mastery of the procedures relevant to some 
historical specialty.16? There are professional, public 
controls over these procedures in both fields of inquiry. 
These controls (e.g. the critique of works through book re-
views, the questioning which follows delivery of a paper at 
a convention) are the mark of scientific and scholarly dis-
ciplines. 
Although history is scientific in the sense that it 
16?w.· H. Walsh, Philoso h of Histor : An Introduction, 
pp. 38-39. John Higham s wor , iis or~: ro essiona Sc o -
arship in America, narrates the historical development in 
~his country from histories written by amateurs (often ex-
tremely competent ones) to histories produced by a profes-
sional community. 
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is guided by method, sttll the results yielded by methods 
will not be the same in history and in science. Cumulative 
results in science fill out well-defined systems while 
cumulative historical results fill out a narration of par-
ticulars. What remains true of both ways of proceeding is 
that the results are public and can be tested by others. 168 
However, the modes of testing are more numerous in the sci-
ences than in history. Usually a critic of some historical 
interpretation will arrive at his counter-conclusions only 
by going over the same evidence and through the same inves-
tigation that the other historian made before him. 169 
If both history and science yield verified results 
and if those results are publicly verifiable, then there is 
no difference in their results insofar as truth values are 
concerned. A nineteenth-century school of historical posi-
ti Vism assumed that historical knowledge, like scientific 
168The emphasis on public control of individual re-
sults is evident in Peter Gay's description of a qualified 
scientific history: "history is a discipline with its own 
criteria of excellence; it is public, self-corrective, never 
complete, and in this sense, sctent:ific. And in its charac-
ter of science, history is a progressive discipline--that 
is to say, a discipline capable of progress as well as re-
gression." A Loss of Maste : Puritan Historians in Colon-
ial America, p. • e simi ari y ere o science ies 
in the possibility of cumulative verification. That is to 
say, the bias or errors of the individual historian can be 
corrected by other investigators who readily admit evidence 
and form hypotheses preViously overlooked or willfully dis-
carded. 
169Method in Theologt' p. 219. Again, the inferential 
nature of historical insig ts limits the ways in which his-
torians can arrive at conclusions. Scientists can devise 
many different experiments yieldin~ the same results. His-
torians can reconstruct different imaginative schemes of 
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knowledge, resulted from a careful exa.I:lination of observ-
able data; in the case of history, the data were preserved 
materials. Our previous work has indicated the mistaken 
exclusions involved in such an assumption. Both history 
and science use hypotheses and organizing frameworks which 
go beyond what is given. Both disciplines subject these 
intelligible schemes to verification processes. For a 
classical ideal of science, what was verified in science 
was a general truth which was not a matter-of-fact but a 
necessary law governing particulars. Since history recog-
nized that its primary concern was for the concrete and 
particular, the superiority of science with its apodictic 
and necessary principles was assumed. However, the demise 
of the classical conception of science elioinates this bas-
is for judging science to be superior to history.l?O What 
remains is that in both fields results are verified in de-
grees of probability and only infrequently are said to be 
certain. 
History then is different from the natural sciences, 
but it is similar in that both employ methodical procedures 
sanctioned by professional communities and both yield 
how certain events might have occurred. But ultimately a 
limited evidentiary base will allow only some results to be 
highly probable. 
l?OMatthew Lar:ib notes that the classical dist4_nction 
between episteme and ~hronesis was the basis for this value judgment. "Wilhelm D1lthey's Critique of Historical Reason 
and Bernard Lonergan's Meta-methodology," Language, Truth 
and Meaning, p. 158. 
407 
verifiable results. While these two similarities .bring his-
tory closer to the sc:i.ences, they move it away from liter-
ary fiction. Collingwood proposed three general areas in 
which historical narratives differed from literary fictions. 
Historians are not interested in possible or imaginary 
worlds but in events which can be spatially located and 
temporally dated within one world. Novelists need not re-
spect such limits. In addition, since there is only one 
historical world, historical interpretations ideally should 
be compatible with one another. No such ideal governs 
literary narratives about fictional people, places, and 
times. Finally, historians are concerned with verifying 
the results of thejr methodjcal procedures. The question 
for reflection asks, Is it true? Such a question would 
only be asked of a fictional work if the questioner sus-
pected the author of writing a disguised biography. When 
the question is asked by historjans, it is a question 
about the sufficiency of evidence. Literary fictions need 
no more basis than the imagjnation and good style of their 
authors. 171 It is especially this concern for evidence 
which makes history something more than fiction. 
The question of whether demands for the scientizing 
of history are completely unfulfillable can now be answered. 
Some of the differences between history and science rule 
171R. G. Collingwood, The Jdea of. History, p. 246. 
Lonergan summarizes these three differences, in Method in 
TheologJ, p. 219. 
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out a complete scientizing of history. These differences 
are simply the result of the proper tasks of history which 
are not shared with the natural sciences. More important, 
in view of our promise to supply a metahistorical basis 
for distinguishing history and science, they are also dif-
ferences which are established within human intentionality. 
Particularly the distinction between common sense and the-
ory has a prior origin in human consciousness. Our distinc-
tion between historical and natural objects is similarly 
rooted in human intentionality which constitutes a world 
of meanings. But besides these differences, there are the 
similarities of methodical inquiry and verifiable results. 
To the extent that the natural sciences have led the way in 
formulating critical techniques for checking hypotheses, 
history, in an imitative way, is scientific.172 Historians 
will continue to adapt scientific advances to historical 
needs, but the adaptation will never be total because of 
the basic differences between the two fields. 
One purpose of this discussion was to prepare a re-
ply to Hayden 1Jhite•s thesis that demands for the scientiz-
ing of hlstory were merely statements of a precritical 
preference. His thesis also extended to those who rejected 
172The evidence for a partial scientizing of history 
is found in the adaptation of scientific discoveries for 
historical purposes, e.g. chemical tests for dating manu-
scripts, statistical principles for evaluating voting trends 
in local populations, computerized bibliographies which 
facilitate research. 
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these demands: their non-scientific historical models were 
also the products of precritical preferences. Now our 
study of the differences between natural sciences and his-
tory, ·and subsequent conclusion that no complete scientiz-
ing of history is possible, have had a critical basis.173 
The distinctions between common sense and theory, and be-
tween mediated meanings and constituted meanings proceed 
from a metahistorical analysis of the subject's basic hor-
izon. A differentiated basic horizon allows us to make 
the first distinction. An analysis of the intentional 
forms of that horizon (i.e. the relations among cognitional 
acts) allows us to make the second distinction. Therefore, 
the limits we place on a possible scientizing of history 
derive from more than precr:itical preferences. Similarly 
the scientific aspects of historical work can be noted and 
defended on grounds other than personal likes or dislikes. 
The previous work of this chapter has prepared us to 
take a final step toward the central goal of this disserta-
tion. That step involves the determination of how one can 
decide on the realism of various historical perspectives. 
This problem was initially formulated in terms of a science 
l73we can also point out that demands for a total sci-
entizing of history proceeded, whatever their preferential 
grounds might have been, from an uncritical acceptance of 
scientific ideals. An appropriation of one's own basic 
horizon allows one to return to the world of theory more 
aware, not only of the differences between theory and com-
mon sense, but also of the proper functions which each 
should be allowed to fulfill in its own way. 
f' 
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of history. Our study of both the differences and the sim-
ilarities between the natural sciences and history requires 
that the problem be formulated in a new way. Within limits, 
i.e. as a methodical discipline the results of which are 
publicly verifiable, history is scientific. But, because 
of basic differences, history and its inherent problems 
should be considered distinct from the natural sciences and 
their inherent problems. Thus, the problem of historical 
realism is better phrased in terms of an explanatory her-
meneutical position which cuts across all differences in 
historical perspectives. 
Explanatory Breakthrough to a Basic Hermeneutical Position 
To begin with, let us restate the problem of histor-
ical realism. The recognized fact is the presence of mul-
tiple conflicting historical perspectives. Among other 
points of conflict, these multiple perspectives contain 
incompatible claims about historical realj_sm. According to 
Hayden White's reading of the problem, there are no compel-
ling theoretical grounds for arbitrating among the incom-
patible claims. None is more scientific or "realistic" 
than another. 174 All that can be said is that the different 
174Preface to !1etahistori, p. xii. The leap from the 
absence of "compelling theoretical grounds" to a denial that 
any perspective is more realistic than the rest is made on 
the basis of an argument •. The grounds for adopting a par-
ticular perspective/paradigm are moral or aesthetic, not 
epistemological. Hence, any claim to provide a more realis-
tic analysis than ~ will simply reflect variable 
r· 
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interpretative :frameworks are different. The dif~erent 
views of historical realism which they espouse are rela-
tive to their authors and approving audiences. Two his-
torians with incompatible notions of historical realism 
can only agree to disagree. 
What is required to resolve this theoretical impasse? 
There are at least two intellectual requirements and one 
moral requirement. First, if the differences among histor-
ical perspectives are not to remain merely uncriticized 
differences, there must be a critical method for elaborat-
ing the development of diverse perspectives on the past. 
Second, if this method is to cut across all differences in 
perspectives, it must be shown to escape relativity to par-
ticular audiences and to an author's variable preferences. 
Third, if the discovery of this basic hermeneutical method 
is to achieve some breakthrough in regard to the impasse, 
it must be possible for one to alter a prior position on 
historical realism for the sake of consistency with this 
discovery. 
The first two requirements or conditions imply a uni-
versal viewpoint which would allow one to pass in a criti-
cal way from one historical perspective to another. This 
preferences for a particular type of analysis. That is to 
say, one's epistemological position will have a prior, 
precritical basis. In section three of this chapter, we 
have already provided a counter-argument to this position. 
Critical real:ism, as based on cognitional structure and 
the assumption of isomorphism, has a non-preferential 
basis. 
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universal viewpoint would embrace the multiple co~flicting 
perspec.ti ves and would be the basis for critically evaluat-
ing how realistic they were. The third requirement implies 
that, if such a universal viewpoint is attainable, then 
one who attains it can, if needed, modify his own position 
to conform his historical work to his determination or his-
~orical realism. 
These requirements or conditions anticipate the steps 
to be taken in the following paragraphs. We can also anti-
cipate the content of those steps. The main thesis is· that 
the potential totality of all historical perspectives lies 
in the dynamic structure of cognitional activity. 175 The 
key argument for this thesis has already appeared. Every 
intelligible historical perspective is elaborated by acts 
of an intelligent and reasonable subject. :-row it would be 
naive to suppose that historical perspectives were elabor-
ated in the absence of bias, aesthetic preferences, personal 
values. Eaqh intelligible historical perspective presupposes 
not only a potentially reasonable and responsible subject 
but also a subject liable to errors, omissions, and short-
sighted values. Tnsofar as bias lies at the heart of a 
particular perspective, we can say that the discovery of 
a universal viewpoint may prompt its remova1. 176 Insofar 
l?5rnsight, p. 568. 
l?GThe conclusion of Chapter Four on the reducibility 
and avoidability of bias is the basis for this claim. 
' j ·.~ 
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as a historian's perspective suffers from what we shall 
call "moral irresponsibility," ·we will have to prove the 
possibility of moral conversion--hence, the reasoning be-
hind our third requirement. Our strategic goal is to link 
these three conditions in proving how it is possible to 
evaluate incompatible_ claims about historical realism. 
What evidence is there for the envisioned universal 
viewpoint? We can argue that the paradigm theory of his-
tory itself provides evidence. That theory concludes that 
historical paradigms, or perspectives, are discontinuous. 
They do not !all into a series of increasingly more accur-
ate and comprehensive accounts of a single historical 
field. Tn short, there is nothing cumulative about them 
as distinct and sometimes incompatible models of.the past. 
The implication is that no critical comparison of different 
perspectives is possible. They are simply different. How-
ever, Hayden White does present a comparative study of his-
torical paradigms. Althoµgh he limits himself to a formal, 
non-evaluative study of nineteenth-century paradigms, he 
still provides a comparison of different conceptions of 
history. What does such a formal comparison imply? 
First, it implies a higher viewpoint which can em-
brace two different perspectives at the same time, note 
their differences, and appreciate the relativity of those 
differences. The situation is much the same for the anthro-
pologist on a field trip. He attempts to immerse himself 
414 
in an alien culture and to understand that culture in its 
own terms. In avoiding the "sin" o:f ethnocentricity, he 
is care:ful not to evaluate that alien culture in terms o:f 
his own prior cultural background. But then the anthro-
pologist is holding on to both cultural systems at the 
same time. He cannot eliminate his own cultural heritage, 
:first, because it is too much a part o:f him and, second, 
because his anthropological study only makes sense given 
the scienti:fic concerns o:f that heritage.177 The native 
culture itself does not, in most instances, produce anthro-
pologists. So the work of the anthropologist implies a 
higher viewpoint which is not identified with either cul-
tural system but is something distinct. 
A dist1-nctively historical example can manifest the 
presence of a higher viewpoint. A frequently voiced opin-
ion is that Gibbous history of Rome reflects the preconcep-
tions of his own eighteenth century rather than those o:f 
the centuries of the Roman Empire. What do such opinions 
imply? First, those who voice such a criticism indicate 
that they know what the thoughts, values, and judgments 
were of both the eighteenth century and the Roman age. In 
effect, they are comparing two different periods. More 
important, they are implying that they are not blinded by 
or trapped within the preconceptions (the "climate of 
l??Peter Berger stresses this latter reason, in A 
Rumor of Angels (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 197U), 
p. 8. 
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opinion") of their own age. 178 If they were in fact con-
fined to a s:ingle per-iod, then ·they could not know that 
Gibbon's work reflected his own age more than it did an 
earli~r one.179 Consequently, they are affirming a higher 
viewpoint which can embrace multiple historical perspectives. 
The preceding examples do not speak d:i.rectly to the 
issue of whether an implicit higher viewpoint permits an 
evaluative comparison of different historical or cultural 
perspectives. However, the paradigm theory of history im-
plies that a higher viewpoint does have a critical aspect. 
According to that theory, historical paradig:ns are not only 
discontinuous, they are also incompatible. But that is to 
imply they are in conflict; they present rival conceptions 
of h:i.storical processes. Now what such rivalry presupposes 
is some common framework in which, first, a comparison of 
different paradigms is possible and, second, a discovery 
can be made of their incompatibility. ·What that discovery 
presupposes is that the common framework contai.ns both 
comparative and evaluative grounds. How else would it be 
possible to say that two different perspectives not only 
were different but also were at odds? Consequently, the 
178This implication can serve as an argument for our 
previous conclusions about the transcendence of closed 
worlds of meaning by human intelligence. 
l?9Sidney Hook employs thi$ exanple and argument in 
his article, "Objectivity and Reconstruction in History," 
Philoso~hy and History, edited by Sidney Hook (New York: 
New Yor University .Press, 1963), p. 259. 
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higher viewpoint ·must provide a basis for reasonable com-
parison and _criticism of different perspectives. Even if 
the higher viewpoint does not decide clearly on all the 
issues over which there is disagreement, still there must 
be such a critical basis over and above the different per-
spectives.180 
In Chapter Three, an argument for a universal view-
point was implicitly developed. Historical perspectives 
are elaborated, revised, sometimes even replaced. Such de-
velopment and revision presupposes a principle of develop-
ment or revision which is continuous from one position to 
the next developed or revise~ position. In particular, the 
cognitional pattern of developing or self-correcting under-
standing is presupposed throughout the changes in meaning 
and in conceptual order. Since this principle of develop-
ment or revision persists throughout these changes, it is 
the a priori condition for such chanBes. In Chapter Three, 
there were arguments to the effect that this a priori con-
dition was invariant, i.e. it was not subject to radical 
revision itself. We can now add that it is also anticipa-
tory of the totality of potential reVisions in meaning and 
in conceptual order.181 Th~t is, as the invariant, a priori 
180rsrael Scheffler develops this line of argumenta-
tion in regard to the paradigm theory of science. Science 
and Subjectivity, p. 82. 
181Philip McShane, Randomness, Statistics, and Emer-
gence, pp. 1-2. 
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condition for every revision, it anticipates how each re-
vision will be carried out. This claim will have to be 
clarified and defended. 
What needs to be clarified is the "higher viewpoint" 
implied in the preced:5.ng arguments. However, the clari.fi-
cation must ultimately be in explanatory terms. The alter-
native is to account for this higher viewpoint in descrip-
tive terms; but, then, the resulting description takes its 
place alongside historical perspectives which are also for-
mulated in descriptive terms. As a result, there would be 
nothing definitive about this higher viewpoint; 182 it 
would be a metahistorical position curiously formulated in 
the same way as historical perspectives are formulated. 
What we are proposing, then, is an explanatory account of 
how a higher viewpoint both permits a transition between 
(i.e. a comparison of) different historical perspectives 
and provides reasons for modifying them (i.e. the higher 
Viewpoint has a normative function in regard to lower view-
points). 
The normative function of transcendental method has 
already been discussed. 183 It is the basic method ground-
ing all specialized methods and procedures. The basis for 
transcendental met~od lies ultimately in the desire to know 
182navid Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 
p. 141. 
183cf. Chapter Three, section four. 
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which spontaneously moves through component acts t_o the 
known. Our account of this development of knowing and of 
the known through cognitional acts has been both descrip-
tive and explanatory. The descriptive approach was evi-
dent in the examples we used of historical procedures. 
The explanatory approach was evident when we related those 
component acts together in an account of the formally dy-
namic structure of human knowing. It was this explanatory 
account which marked a breakthrough beyond description to 
definition-by-relation. "But such def1nition-by-relatton-
of-things-not-to-me-but-among-themselves is exactly what 
explanation as distinct from description means."184 
An explanatory thematization of cognitional structure 
and the formulation of the normative and critical a.spects 
of that structure were carried out in Chapter Three. It 
was proposed that an affirmation of this structure and of 
its intentional correlates was the mark of intellectual 
conversion. Tn section three of this chapter, we further 
explicated the terms of this conversion. From the side of 
the knower, there is the invariant pattern of cognitional 
acts. From the side of the known, there is the compounding 
of partial objects into single complex objects. The links 
between these two sides are reason-in-act (which was also 
explanatorily thematized as the virtually unconditioned) and 
184navid Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 
p. 142. 
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the thesis of isomorphism. Our conclusion was that the 
real is to be identified with the intelligently conceived 
and rationally affirmed. 
·This epistemological conclusion and its basis, cogni-
tional structure, are components of the envisioned higher 
viewpoint. Both represent how human intelligence and rea-
son proceed in the development and rev:ision of meanings. 
A methodical grasp of the structured and normative process 
of achieving, revising, and verifying human understanding 
is the first step in attaining the higher viewpoint. .What 
is methodically comprehended is the prjnciple of develop-
ment or revision which is presupposed by all the shifts 
from one perspective to another. 
What does this comprehended principle mean for the 
work of historians? The initial position is that intellect 
itself (or better, the patterned activities of the desire 
to know) is what is common to all elaborated historical 
perspectives. Transcendental method formulates the func-
tions of this common framework. But at least initially 
one is left with a rather .formalistic understanding of how 
historical positions are developed. The relationshi.p be-
tween the common principle and historical procedures needs 
to be exemplified. In Chapters Three and Four we were at-
tempting to do just that by showing the relationship be-
tween the transcendental precepts and historical procedures. 
Lonergan discusses this relationship in terms o.f a metaphor: 
,II 
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the two blades of a pair of scissors. 185 
The upper blade of historical interpretation is the 
subject's appropriated cognitional structure which pro-
Vides self-knowledge having universal implications. That 
is, the act of appropriation is a personal achievement 
which reveals the a priori pattern of developing understand-
ing in any human consciousness. Therefore, the elaborated 
meanings which compose any historical interpretation were 
developed according to this pattern. However, an under-
standing of a particular historical theory or interpre-ta-
tion cannot be reached solely by knowing how hum.an cogni-
tion proceeds. Besides the upper blade of cognitional the-
1 
ory, there is the lower blade of historical method reveal-
ing the historical meanings which can be organized by the 
upper blade. Consequently, historical results are reached 
in neither a purely a priori nor a purely a posteriori fa-
shion. Rather, for the subject who grasps the universal 
viewpoint, historical knowledge is the result of a contin-
uing inquiry which moves back and forth between a trans-
cultural base and increasingly organized historical data. 186 
The transcultural base is the a priori scheme or cog-
nitional theory which anticipates how any possible set of 
historical acts of knowing were reached irrespective of 
place or time. Such a scheme is made possible by the 
185rnsight, pp. 577-578. 
186Method in Theology, p. 293. 
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immanent and invariant structure, transcendental norms, and 
procedures of the human mind. T~ese are presupposed by 
every speculative development, e.g. the elaboration of 
historical perspectives. This transcultural base is put 
to use only in an a Posteriori manner when competent exe-
gesis supplies materials for historical analysis. These 
materials are made accessible through inductive lower-blade 
procedures of historical method. 187 
Some qualifications should be entered here. First, 
the envisioned universal viewpoint is not some complete 
grasp of all that historians do know or can know. A single 
indiVidual cannot comprehend all present historical know-
ledge, and what future discoveries will be made is not yet 
determinate. But the universal viewpoint does provide an 
anticipatory framework for what is known and what remains 
to be known. 188 That is, while there is no universal (i.e. 
complete) historical knowledge, there is a universal order 
which is determinate in regard to how historical knowing 
has occurred and will occur. Second, the universal view-
point does not dictate what steps must be taken to acquire 
historical knowledge. To know the appropriate steps, one 
must learn the accepted procedures of the historical pro-
f~ssion and then follow them (i.e. the lower-blade methods) 
18?DaVid Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 
p. 42. 
188rnsight, p. 483. 
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in a more or less trial-by-error approach. Third, the 
application of the upper blade will not reveal all the 
steps in the development of a particular historical theory 
or interpretation. The author of a theory perhaps strug-
gled for years to develop it. Unknown influences may have 
slowed his work at one time and pushed it forward at ano-
ther. These and other facets of his developing understand-
ing are unrecoverable.189 
Since these qualifications are formulated as negative 
restrictions, it remains to specify the positive content of 
the universal viewpoint. The meaning which Lonergan assigns 
to it will have to be clarified in a series of steps. By 
"universal viewpoint" he means a "potential totality of 
genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints."l90 We 
have already indicated that the potential totality is the 
anticipated order of historical theories and interpretations. 
More specifically, it is the framework which contains in a 
virtual way all possible historical perspectives. But this 
virtual content only becomes determinate through interac-
tion with historical procedures and materials. 
The totality is of viewpoints or of what historians 
elaborate as meaningful contexts for their partial discov-
eries. The focus of the universal viewpoint is directed 
189Lonergan treats these unrecoverable aspects of a 
development of meaning under the heading of a "canon of 
residues." See ibid., pp. 590-594. 
l90ibid., p. 564. 
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beyond the elaborated viewpoints to the acts of meaning 
which occur in understanding and judging something about 
the past. These are the acts which are components of cog-
nitional process. Thus, for the subject appropriating the 
universal viewpoint, there is the opportunity to move from 
his reflective awareness of his own cognitional acts to the 
acts presupposed by someone else's historical theory. The 
other person's developed meanings may differ from his own, 
but the cognitional process "behind" the differences has the 
same form. The critical point here is to recognize t~at 
historical meanings are developed through human intention-
ality, and the basic outline of that development can be 
known at least in part.191 
The totality of viewpoints is an ordered totality. 
The ground for this ordered totality is the subject's dif-
ferentiated basic horizon. Horizon analysis yields know-
ledge of genetically distinct levels of meaning (common 
sense, theory, interiority), and this knowledge can be used 
in retros~ect to order the discoveries which have accumula-
ted as present knowledge. On the basis of one's own self-
knowledge, one can locate in the discussion of these 
l9libid., p. 565. This conclusion is opposed by 
the expec~on that historical meanings are "givens" which 
a simple process of intending grasps immediately. However, 
arguments in both Chapter Three and in this chapter have 
shown the epistemological faults of this expectation. On 
the contrary, sources of meaning·are located in the intel-
ligent subject (this is not to deny that external mater-
ials supply potentially intelligible data for the subject~ 
The immanent sources of meaning in the subject wi_ll have a 
variable content but an invariant structure. 
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discoveries various confusions or distinctions among the 
genetically different levels.192 What makes these confu-
sions or distinctions convincing to an audience can be 
analyzed on the basis of one's own cognitional self-aware-
ness.l93 
The universality of the higher viewpoint lies in 
its potential completeness. This potential completeness 
can be considered both from the side of the historian and 
from the side of the historical field. From the side of 
the historian, there is an element of necessity in how 
all possible perspectives can be developed. Historical 
interpretations may be interpretations of different objects, 
but the different interpreters must be multi-levelled sub-
jects operating on empirical, intelligent, and rational 
levels. ·1 And, when a"historian investigates the expressed 
meaning of another subject, he shares this multi-levelled 
subjectivity with him. The recorded meanings of the ear-
lier subject have a material basis in the preserved mark-
ings on paper or monuments. But, for meanings to be as-
signed to these markings, the historian must derive that 
meaning from the interaction between his subjectivity and 
the expressed (objectified) subjectivity of the other. 194 
l920ur critique of the imposition of scientific ideals 
on historical works exemplifies this type of analysis. 
l93rnsight, p. 565. 
l94"There are no interpretations without interpret-
ers. There are no interpreters without polymorphic unities 
of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. 
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From the side of the historical field, historical 
interpretations conducted within the profession of critical 
history are proposed as approximate accounts of what actu-
ally happened and as probable explanations of what hap-
pened. Insofar as they are intent upon settling matters-
of-fact, critical historians seek to recover the fixed con-
tent of the past and to express their understanding of it 
in narrative forms which are likely to vary from historian 
to historian. The assertions expressed in their works pro-
ceed from various judgments about historical reality •. 
As argued previously, the real is identified with 
whatever is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed. 
Previous arguments also located historical realities in a 
world mediated by meaning. Consequently, there is a paten-
tial totality of historical meanings, and four dimensions 
of that potential totality will exhaust the number of pos-
sible combinations yielding affirmed historical meanings. 
There will be combinations (1) of experiences and lack of 
experiences (e.g. an oversight of crucial materials); (2) 
of insights and lack of insights (e.g. a failure to grasp 
There are no expressions to be interpreted without other 
similar unities of consciousness. Nor has the work of 
interpreting anything more than a material determinant in 
the spatially ordered set of marks in documents and monu-
ments. If the interpreter assigns any meanings to the 
marks, then the experiential component in that Eeaning 
will be derived from his experience, the intellectual com-
ponent will be derived from his intelligence, the rational 
component will be derived from his critical reflection on 
the critical reflection of another." Ibid., pp. 566-56?. 
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how two events are interconnected); (3) of judgments and 
of failures to judge (e.g. a lack of critical reflection 
on one's own work); (4) of the different orientations of 
a complicated human consciousness (e.g. an implicit bias 
against one party in a historical dispute). 195 
These four dimensions of the potential totality of 
historical meanings are not arbitrarily presented. Rather, 
they express the a priori structure of intentional acts 
which lead to affirmed historical meanings. If that struc-
ture is a precondition to the elaboration of historical 
perspectives, then the four dimensions express how that 
precondition can be fulfilled in constructing historical 
perspectives. And to grasp this range of possible combina-
tions is to anticipate the totality of contexts which can 
be set up as frameworks for historical studies. Again, 
the frameworks become determinate only when one consults 
particular autho~s and their works, but, in advance of 
that specific inquiry, there is an a priori scheme for or-
ganizing the different perspectives. Quite briefly, once 
one grasps the invariancy of cognitional structure and 
works out the epistemological impljcations of it, a uni-
versal viewpoint becomes possible. 196 
The preceding sketch of the universal viewpoint has 
not exhausted all the content which Lonergan ascribes to 
l95Ibid., p. 56?. 
l96Ibid., pp. 567-568. 
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it.197 We settle for a partial account because our pur-
pose is limited. This chapter is concerned with the prob-
lem of historical realism. For the sake of avoiding leng-
thy additions to an already lengthy.chapter, we have not 
made explicit mention of the metaphysics contained in the 
universal viewpoint. Similarly we will not attempt a 
thorough application of the universal viewpoint to any 
specific historical perspective. Such an application would 
require a full hermeneutical study of some historian's work. 
In attempting that study, we would have to provide a more 
extensive treatment of historical valuing--a topic appro-
priate to a speculative philosophy of hj_story.198 So we 
propose to consider the application of the universal view-
point to only one facet of historical perspectives, namely, 
their epistemological positions on historical facts. 
The universal viewpoint envisions not only a genetic 
sequence of levels of meaning (i.e. common sense, theory, 
interiority, and the specializations of each), but also 
dialectically opposed meanings. Some account of dialectical 
differences was already provided in Chapter Two. The mutual 
repudiation existing between two. d:i.alectically opposed hori-
zons was noted. rt remains to account for such dialectical 
l9?The universal viewpoint which Lonergan studies at 
length in Tnsight (pp. 562-594), becomes the functional 
specialty named "dialectic" to which Chapter 10, of :Method 
in Theology is devoted. 
198Lonergan locates this topic in the functional 
specialty of dialectic. See Method in Theology, pp. 245-246. 
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opposition in terms of the universal viewpoint. 
The four dimensions of the potential totality of 
historical meanings can be combined in various ways. Cer-
tain combinations will yield dialectical oppositions. For 
example, a failure to understand what it is to understand 
may be combined with an experience of historjcal research 
to yield the thesis that historical understanding is a 
matter of closely observi.ng the meanings given in preserved 
materials. 199 In contrast to this thesis, other historians 
may take note of the constructive and critical aspects of 
historical procedures. For them, historical understanding 
is reached not solely by an attentiveness to preserved ma-
terials but in conjunction with intelligible reconstruc-
. 
tions of historical events. But this group may itself 
split into dialectically opposed parties. On the one hand, 
some historians may consider their hypothetical constructs 
to be the terminus of historical understanding. The con-
structs arrange historical records in a coherent fashion, 
but, because the actual events can no longer be directly 
experienced and because subjective bias guides the elabora-
tion of historical constructs, these constructs are not 
truly reflective of the past. On the other hand, some 
l99we have already cited Fustel de Coulanges as a 
representative of this thesis. In another sense, Charles 
Beard is also representative of the thesis. He operated 
under the expectation that historical objectivity should 
be a matter of strict attention to given facts. Since he 
realized this ideal could not be reached, he concluded to 
a moderate relativism in historiography. 
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historians may operate with a notion of objectivity which 
requires coherence between data and interpretations while 
not excluding or ignoring the possibility of affirming that 
true historical meanings mediate past events. The latter 
group argues that a verified historical interpretation is 
probably true and that it thus refers to what was probably 
the case. 
The dialectical oppositions in the preceding posi-
tions become manifest when one asks what the different 
groups take to be the objects of histo~ical understanding. 
For the first group, historical objects or events are what 
is given in historical experience. To understand these 
objects, one need only exclude extraneous interests and 
carefully examine the presented materials. For the first 
party of the second group, historical objects or events 
are indirectly preserved in documents, monuments, art 
works, and so on. They are not presented in any direct way, 
so one must reconstruct their occurrence through the intel-
ligent and critical use of the available materials. But, 
for the reasons listed above, what this party produces are 
not true interpretations mediating the past to the present. 
Rather, they produce, or assume that they produce, inter-
pretations which reflect the needs and preconceptions of 
the present instead of what was actually the case. 200 
200Pragmatic theories of history are likely to repre-
sent this party. As an example, see Karl Popper's "Has 
History Any !'leaning?" reprinted in The Philosop~ of His-
tory in Our Time, edited by Hans Meyerhoff, pp. 00-304. 
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These two positions on historical objects or events 
do not refer to the same things. The first group refers 
to "given" meanings ·in historical remains; the second refers 
to the mental constructions of historical imagination. In 
an earlier section, we developed even a third position. 
For the critical realist, historical facts are past events 
mediated by true acts of meaning. 201 Is it possible to 
mediate these dialectical differences over what historical 
facts are? The basic problem, again, is one of historical 
realism. As argued previously, no appeal to historical 
evidence by itself can settle these disputes. The deter-
mination or ~he historical field and of historical objects 
belongs to a prior perspective/paradigm adopted for vari-
able reasons. Consequently, the mediation of dialectical 
differences cannot be grounded within any privileged his-
torical perspective without prejudicing from the very be-
ginning the attempted reconciliation of differences. 
However, besides the specialized horizons termed 
historical perspectives, there is the basic horizon which 
was sketched in Chapter Two. rn successive chapters we 
have worked out the content of this basic horizon. Gradu-
ally a universal viewpoint has taken shape. Can this uni-
versal viewpoint mediate the previous dialectical differ-
ences'? The answer is a qualified "Yes." It is qualified 
because the universal viewpoint itself only uncovers the 
201Method in Theology, p. 239. 
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sources of the dialectical differences, it does not automa-
tically mediate them. ,Such differences originate in radic-
ally different perspectives, and proofs of an epistemolog-
ical sort will not automatically be·accepted as disconfirm-
ing parts of the developed perspectives. What is required 
is the radical change in basic assumptions and values 
which is appropriately named a "conversion." 
Care must be taken in relating a radical change, or 
conversion, to the reasons for that change. Hayden White 
proposes that a basic shift from one paradigm to another 
involves a prior change in moral or aesthetic convictions. 
The implication is that paradigm changes do not occur be-
cause of the discovery of new evidence or as the result 
of reasonable arguments which prove that a change is need-
ed. 202 They occur because of a dramatic shift in one's 
2020n this point there is an affinity between White's 
paradigm theory of history and the paradigm theory of sci-
ence presented by Thomas s. Kuhn, in The Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions. The latter argues that the transfer of 
allegiance from one paradigm to another is the result of a 
conversion experience. (p. 15~) Prior to that conversion, 
the two paradigms may be in competition, but their differ-
ences are not resolved by proofs. (p. 14S.) Lonergan remarks 
that the history of scj_ence supports the view that new sci-
entific positions do not often win over their opponents 
as the result of reasonable proofs. He cites Max Planck 
to the effect that radical changes win acceptance only when 
those who have opposed them have retired from their p:>si-
tions of authority within the scientific profession. (In-
sight, p. 526.) However, for Lonergan, the fact of opposi-
tion is not identified with the thesis that conflicting 
scientific positions are unavoidabl~ closed to rational 
mediation. The more likely explana:ion is that established 
positions are invested with years of effort and familiarity, 
and hence, are not changed without reluctance. Given an 
habitual way of conceiving certain problems, a scientist 
r 
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precritical preferences. To some extent this is an accept-
able account of the radical changes which mark transitions 
between historical or scientific paradigms. Antecedent 
frameworks which organize a field of inquiry proceed from 
the complex content of relative horizons. Among that 
content one can find moral expectations and aesthetic pref-
erences. Thus, a change in those expectations and prefer-
ences may be reflected in a change of frameworks. 
However, is this all that is involved in paradigm 
changes? There is some eVidence that more than precriti-
cal preferences are involved. That eVidence is found in 
the debates among followers of different paradigms. Such 
debates are not conducted with appeals to intuitions or 
personal experiences or private revelations. Instead, ar-
guments are formulated by the different parties both to jus-· 
tify positions and to convince opponents. This way of pro-
ceeding implies at least the belief that reasonable argu-
ments can be the basis for changes in paradigms. 203 This 
implication expands the number of elements 1.nvol ved in 
paradigm changes. But, perhaps, paradigm debates imply a 
belief which actually is only a delusion; namely, reasonable 
is unlikely to be receptive to new contrary conceptions. 
That is to say, the exercise of intelligence and reasonable-
ness is routinized in the older conceptions and will not 
automatically be extended to the newer conceptions. (Ibid., 
pp. 525-526.) 
203rsrael Scheffler develops this line of argumenta-
tion, in Science and SubjectiVity, p. 79. 
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proofs cannot a.f.fect the basic assumpti_ons of an C?PPOSed 
school of thought. 
This possibility can be treated in two steps. First, 
the possibility that .followers of different paradigms are 
deluded in their concern for reasonable defenses of their 
positions would involve the collapse o.f a distinction be-
tween the psychology and the logic of intelligible frame-
works. The preferences, expectations, and variable choices 
which ground the maintenance o.f one paradigm against others 
belong to the psychological origins of thought-systems. 
Seemingly alien thought-systems will derive from different 
preferences, and so on. At this point one has differences 
which appear to be relative to precritical grounds. Given 
multiple conflicting thought-systems, it will be difficult 
for one party to understand the historical or scientific 
conceptions of another party. But a question .for reflec-
tion addresses not this difficulty but the factualness of 
those alien conceptions. That is, one asks if' they are 
valid even if they seem foreign to one's way of thinking. 
By asking such a question, one places ltmits on the rela-
tivity of historical positions to psychologi_cal differences. 
The question for reflection intends the truth value which 
escapes these relative differences. 204 
Still, there is a possibility that such a question 
204Peter Berger argues along these lines, in A Rumor 
of' Angels, p. 42. 
r 
cannot be answered without simply restating the question-
er's own personal preferences. A second step must, there-
fore, be added to the previous step which distinguished 
between the psychology and the logic of intelligible frame-
works. 
This second step has in effect already been taken. 
The universal viewpoint is independent of one's personal 
likes and dislikes. !ts independence derives fron the ! 
priori status of cognitional structure which does not vary 
from framework to .framework. As previously argued, the 
dynamic structure of cognitional performance can be .formu-
lated in transcendentai method. That .formulation makes 
explicit the normative aspects of human intelligence in 
regard to all speci.alized interests anddebates. As a re-
sult, the belief that differences a.oong opposed frameworks 
are subject to intelligent criticism has a firm basis. In 
other words, one is not deluded in thinking that rational 
debate can play an effective role in settling disputes 
over paradigms. There is the upper blade of transcendental 
precepts which requires that debates be intelligently and 
reasonably conducted. There is the lower blade of histor-
ical procedures which provides· the specifi!! content for the 
debates. 205 
205The use of the word "debates" serves a purpose 
here. Debates are often trtals for rhetorical skills; to 
confound one's opponent takes precedence over the attain-
ment of the truth about some issue• • Even outside such 
rhetorical exercises, debates are often conducted in ways 
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These remarks were an attempt to clarity the relation 
between conversions and the reasons for such rad:tcal chan-
gese Admittedly the presence of ethical, aesthetic, and 
routinized ways of thinking·makes the background to these 
changes quite compiicated. However, our basic point is 
that there are rational grounds for the debates among fol-
lowers of different paradigms. Tn this chapter we have 
chosen to exemplify these grounds in regard to the issue 
oi historical realism. Dialectical differences occur in 
respect to this issue. ·What, then, are the rational grounds 
for sorting out these differences? 
The basic epistemological position and its implica-
tions for historical objectivity which were worked out in 
section three, provide these rational grounds. Tn particu-
lar, the complex notion of objectivity provides a basic 
standard for evaluating the adequacy of historical views 
on objectivity. The justification of this standard is a 
matter of appropriati..ng the structure of human knowing. 
·:rhus, if a historical vi..ew of objecti..vity overlooks one of 
that approximate to verbal brawls. No effort is made to 
understand one's "opponent;" ins.tead, the objective is to 
demolish his arguments with any means available. Usually 
such a proceedi.ng descends to sophistry. However, if a 
universal viewpoint can be formulated to embrace the possi-
ble range of positions on the issue, tnen it is possible 
to discover the sources of differences prompting the debate. 
Again, in keeping with the conclusion of Chapter Four, 
we presume that it is possible to reject bias and forms of 
obscurantism and so "to close the blades of the scissors" 
in a critical way. 
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the elements of the complex notion (whether it be .the ex-
. . 
periential, normative, or absolute element), that over-
sight can be traced to a prior failure to understand some 
element of cognitional performance. Charles Beard has 
already been cited as a historian whose confusion over 
the use of hypotheses in science and in history can be 
accounted for in terms of a cognitional mistake. That 
mistake was to confuse the logic and psychology of histor-
iography and, thus, to collapse judgment into understand-
ing. 206 
This move from an explicit theoretical or epistemol-
ogical position to an underlying cognitional assumption 
is made possible by the universal viewpoint. It allows 
one to objectify part of the horizon (in this case, the 
basic horizon) of another thinker. And if the basic jus-
tification for this move lies in one's appropriation of 
his own dynamic intelligence, then the subsequent objecti-
fication eliminates the relativity of the historical inter-
preter to ·his own relative horizon. !t also eliminates the 
relatiVity to a relative horizon of the one whose epistem-
ological posit;on is criticized.207 Both subjects, again, 
share a common, structured performance. That performance 
206Morton White presents this criticism of Beard's 
theoretical studies of historiography, in "Can History Be 
Objective?" reprinted in The Philosolh~ of History in Our 
Time, edited by Hans Meyerhoff, pp. 8 -202. 
~
20?rnsight, p. 58?. 
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can be objec.tified; and the objectification can be made in 
explanatory terms. Consequently, a statement of the under-
lying differences in dialectically opposed viewpoints about 
. . 
historical facts or about historical objectivity can be 
exact and can be defended independently of the preferences 
of either party. 
Two qualifications have to be entered. The upper 
blade of transcendental method is not a series of formulae 
which, when applied to historical procedures or interpreta-
tions, automatically registers a "plus'' or a "minus" in 
regard to the worth of those procedures or interpretations. 
OUr discussion has been of the subject's appropriation of 
his own critical consciousness and not of the acquisition 
of propositions which are guaranteed to expose bias or 
failures to understand. The basic method is, thus, falli-
ble because human beings are fallible. 208 However, the 
strength of the method lies in its derivation from the 
spontaneities or human cognition which occur prior to any 
deliberate obscurantism. The subject who reflectively 
acknowledges his own spontaneous desire to know may later 
deviate from that self-understanding, but his failure to 
understand is not final. Further questions.are likely to 
occur, so that he again challenges himself to correct past 
mistakes. 
Besides the qualification which recognizes human 
208Method in Theology, p. 254. 
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fallibility, there is a qualification which reco~izes the 
historicity of the critical subject. ~he universal View-
point does not, so to speak, rise above history either to 
reveal the meaning of historical processes or to predict 
future hi.storical or intellectual developments. Rather, the 
universal viewpoint has its foundation in the dynamic cur-
iosity which becomes specialized in humanistic and scien-
tific disciplines. These disciplines have a history of 
development and differentiation. And the universal view-
point permits access to the dynamic consciousness which 
actually differentiates itself through these specialized 
modes of inquiry. As a result, the achievement of the uni-
versal viewpoint contains both the a priori basis provided 
by cognitional structure and the a posteriori content pro-
Vided by actual historical developments, e.g. the Greek 
differentiation of common sense and theory. 
Given our first qualification, intellectual conver-
sion becomes not.so much a fixed achievement as a continual 
reaffirmation, in thought and word, of the basic dynamism 
of human intelligence and its consequent epistemological 
realism. That such a conversion does not occur automatic-
ally and is not a single event becomes obvious when one 
investigates conflicting opinions about human knowing. 
Even before one turns to consider human knowing as a topic 
tor investigation, the so-called natural standpoint is 
. I 
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firmly entrenched. 209 That standpoint involves nzy-ths about 
reality, objectivity and human-knowledge. The ordinary 
assumptions are that knowing is similar to looking, that 
objectivity is a matter of seeing what is given without 
adding extraneous subjective variables, and that the real 
is what is "out there now" to be seen. 210 These assump-
tions are not easily changed. Even when one begins to 
recognize the difference between a world of immediacy and 
a world mediated by meaning, it is quite easy to slip back 
into old ways of thinking. So intellectual conversion re-
quires that these assumptions be made e:xplic:l.t, their :tn-
completeness recognized, and the various myths eliminated. 
But all of this is no single achievement. There is a grad-
ual discovery of the complexity of human knowing. Such a 
discovery corrects past misconceptions, but what replaces 
them is the product of thinking upon one's own thinking, 
and this is no simple task.211 
A large part of our previous work has worked out the 
cognition~l and epistemological content which, through 
intellectual conversion, replaces the assumptions of the 
209The id~es fixes of the natural standpoint become 
apparent in introductory epistemology courses for under-
graduates. The teacher's experience is likely to resemble 
the gradual process of correction first illustrated in 
Socrates' conversation with the young Theaetetus. 
210Method in Theology, p. 238. 
211some of the steps in thfs task were indicated in 
Chapter Three. Our discussion of introspection pointed up 
at least one of the problems involved in thinking upon 
one's thinking. 
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natural standpoint. But to expand one's basic horizon in 
recognizing genetically distjnct levels of meaning and in 
appreciating the complexity both of knowing and of the 
known, is to present a new set of p~oblems for the criti-
!. cal subject. The basic issue is one of intellectual re-
I 
I 
1 
sponsibility. For it is likely that some bias or distor-
tion of human intelligence has been present in the subject's 
previous work. Intellectual conversion requires that these 
sources.of misunderstanding be rooted out. This is the 
requirement; the actual transformation requires that the 
theoretic change of intellectual conversion be matched by 
the willingness of moral conversion. 212 
Again, our discussion has not been of universal prop-
ositions and what can be deduced from them, but of the sub-
ject's appropriation of his own critical consciousness. 
This appropriation is, in the first place, a series of per-
sonal discoveries. Whether the subject will proceed to 
operate on the basis of his acquired self-knowledge is a 
question of moral freedom. 213 That is, it is a question of 
212Garrett Barden, "The Tntention of Truth in Mythic 
Consciousness," Langg.age, Truth and Meaning, p. 17. 
213The issue of human freedom is usually raised (in 
the analytic tradition of the philosophy of history) as 
part of a discussion of the relation between science and 
history. Our previous discussion of that relation did not 
digress on this issue. However, even without an explicit 
mention of the problem of freedom versus historical deter-
minism, that earlier discussion indicated how we would han-
dle such a problen. We argued that historical explanation 
is a developed form of common-sense explanation both because 
of the language it uses and because of the particular 
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whether the self-constituting subject will choose to make 
his intellectual statements and procedures consistent with 
his awareness of what human knowing is all about. Put 
another way--the universal viewpoin~ embraces the differen-
tiations of human consciousness and the potential totality 
of combinations among cognitional acts. But the universal 
viewpoint does not select from among the potential frame-
works and cognitional positions those which adequately 
express the self-knowledge of the critical subject. That 
selection or decision is made by the subject. Thus, the 
question of consistency between self-knowledge and self-
consti tuting activities belongs to the fourth level of 
human consciousness, the level of responsible delibera-
tion and decision. 
rn Chapter Four our arguments for the possibility of 
avoiding or eliminating bias led up to this question of re-
sponsible decisions based on intellectual conversion. 
objects it seeks to understand. Common-sense speech and 
explanation presuppose human responsibility, e.g. everyday 
expressions of gratitude, praise, and blame presume that 
human subjects deserve to be commended or censured. In 
turn, this presupposes that their deeds could have been 
otherwise. So common sense cannot dispense with the no-
tions of human freedom and moral· responsibility without 
losing its ordinary way of speaking. Similarly, historical 
speaking and explaining cannot entirely suppress these no-
tions without losing their ordinary way of speaking histor-
ically. Isaiah Berlin develops these arguments in a more 
thorough way, in Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1954). See the selection reprinted from 
this work, in The Philosoph~ of History in Our Time, edi-
ted by Hans Meyerhoff, pp. 49-271. · 
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Chapter Three had already drawn the connection between 
human knowing and doing, first, by including as part of 
intentionality structure the level of human deciding, and 
second, by formulating this· fourth l·evel in the transcen-
dental precept: Be responsible. What does all this imply? 
To begin with, the basis of moral conversion lies neither 
in universal principles nor in particular judgments. Ra-
ther, it lies in that same dynamic structure which is the 
pattern of developing understanding. Just as understand-
ing develops in the subject's operations which advance 
through their own inherent exigency, so too the subject 
who passes judgment on a particular situation is spontan-
eously faced with the operation of deci.ding.. That is--Now 
that :r understand what human knowing is, what am T going 
to do about it? The fourth level of human intentionality, 
thus, completes the process which began spontaneously. 214 
The content of acts of deliberation and of deciding 
will vary with different individuals, different cultures, 
different contexts. Therefore, an element of relativity 
is unavoidable in responsible decisions. But the relativ-
ity is primarily attached to what the decider knows and 
has previously done. The child and the adult, the unedu-
cated and the educated, the private individual and the. pub-
lic leader do not bring the same backgrounds to the moment 
214Michael Novak, "Bernard Lonergan: A New Approach 
to Natural Law," The Nature of Philosophical InquiXA, edi-
ted by George F. McLean and Valerie Voorhies, p. 2 • 
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of decision. However, what remains the same for .all of 
them is the spontaneity of both deliberation and the impli-
cit precept guiding that deliberation: In the light o:f 
what you know, be responsible for what you do.215 
What implications does this precept have for a his-
. ·- -
torian's procedures? Given the unity of consciousness, the 
historian who seeks understanding and is acquainted with the 
professional techniques which promote clarity and discourage 
obscurity will spontaneously put those techniques to work. 
For a specialized consciousness, the desire to know extends 
~rom the i"ield of technical understanding and expression to 
2l5An argument for the effective presence of this 
precept can be constructed out of examples of inconsistency 
between knowing and doing. The war criminal whose defense 
rests on the appeal to orders received from a superior, 
pleads innocent (1) because the presumption is that super-
i-0rs have reasons for their orders and these need not be 
told to subordinates, (2) because the subordinate is not 
expected to deliberate but to follow orders, and (3) any 
moral hesitation can be put aside in the belief that what 
is problematic for the subordinate may make sense to super-
iors. The plea then is to a consistency between knowing 
and doing, but that consistency is supposed (at least for 
the sake·of a defense argument). It is supposed either 
that superiors have reasons unknown to subordinates or else 
that the duty to obey orders takes precedence over private 
scruples. 
The response of the courts to this defense can exem-
plify the implicit precept. Human responsibility is pre-
.supposed and deliberation is expected from the mentally 
competent. The individual cannot abrogate this responsi-
bility even if he is under orders. The judgment of the 
courts will reject the defense argument. However, i:f the 
subordinate can show that he was unaware of the consequen-
ces of his actions, then his charge is lessened. How many 
pled ignorance of what actually -Was going on in "those 
camps"? Were they not trying to preserve at least a sem-
blance of consistency between what they did (or failed to 
:do) and what they knew? 
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the field of technical and deliberate practice. Thus, the 
empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject 
is also an intellectually responsible subject. 216 
Of course, there are obstacles both to historical 
understanding and to historical practice. The multiple 
forms of bias are instances of potential hindrances of 
efforts to make practice consistent with knowing. However, 
those hindrances are neither insurmountable nor unavoid-
able. 217 Therefore, intellectual responsibility is possi-
ble. The transcendental precept, Be responsible, expres-
ses the immanent imperative to criticize one's practice in 
the light of one's knowing. Intellectual responsibility 
is measured by this immanent norm, and moral conversion is 
the explicit decision that the desire to know shall be 
matched by one's willingness to act according to what one 
knows. 218 
Again, as in the case of intellectual conversion, 
this decision is not a fixed achievement. Flight from 
self-understanding and rationalization of failures to act 
responsibly are not forever banished by a single decision. 
Just as the pursuit of knowledge can engage a subject 
through years of study, so too moral conversion is a life-
216Insight, p. 599. 
217The arguments for this assertion form the final 
section of Chapter Four. 
218Insight, PP• 691-692e 
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long process. Thus, competence in historical pro~edures 
can increase over many years of practice. That increased 
competence involves ·an increased understanding of how one 
should proceed with technical labor if the results are to 
be in keeping with known standards. But to know how one 
should proceed does not guarantee how one will proceed. 
However, years of historical study have already of-
fered multiple opportunities to criticize bias in oneself 
and in others. Tf the historian has used those opportuni-
ties to transcend his own fa;_lings and to avoid those -of 
others, his present practice is likely to shun the same er-
rors. !n other words, facility in solving theoretical prob-
lems will likely be matched by a concomitant facility in 
deciding on the responsible course of action. This facil-
ity in his doing and in his knowing may win public recog-
nition. Then his intellectual responsibility is not simply 
presumed by his peer group. On the basis of his past per-
formance, that group will not be quick to charge his mis-
takes to any deliberate obscurantism. Such a bond of trust 
among professionals is a witness to intellectual integrity 
which has been demonstrated time and again. Implicitly it 
·is a recognition of moral conversion since the group acknow-
ledges the efforts of the individual to propose only what 
meets the immanent norm of consistency between historical 
knowledge and histor;cal practice. 
In summary, this fifth section has taken the final 
r 
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series of steps in resolving the problem of historical real-
ism. This problem is central to the theoretical impasse 
of the crisis of historicism. Our strategy has been to 
show a way around that impasse by resolving the problems 
of objectivity, of a science of history, and of historical 
realism. Previous chapters prepared the groundwork for the 
resolution of these complex problems, and in this chapter 
the resolutions have been presented, clarified, and defen-
ded. 
The question of historical realism could not be ·han-
dled satisfactorily unless there were compelling theoreti-
cal grounds for resolving the dialectical differences over 
historical objects and historical knowing. We anticipated 
the content of the needed grounds in two intellectual con-
ditions and one moral condition. There must be a critical 
method for investigating how diverse historical perspectives 
are developed. That method must cut across all the differ-
ences in historical theories in such a way as to escape 
relativity to particular audiences and their preferences. 
Finally, the discovery of this basic method will only lead 
to a resolution of the crisis if it can be implemented in 
an unbiased way. The first two conditions were fulfilled 
in the notion of a universal viewpoint which embraces the 
potential totality of diverse historical perspectives. The 
third conditton can be fulfilled by a critical effort to 
make one's historical practice consistent with what is known 
r 44? 
about human intelligence and rationality. 
Summary of Chapter V 
A repeated theme of this dissertation has been that 
Hayden 'White's "solution" to the crisis of historicism was 
insuf'ficient on a number of counts. If a more promising 
solution were to be offered, certain obstacles to White's 
attempt would have to be overcome. This fifth chapter 
concentrated on two of those obstacles: that paradigms are 
closed systems of thought and that paradigm changes merely 
reflect changes in precritical preferences. To the first 
obstacle (as formulated in the problem of the hermeneuti-
cal circle), we opposed both the self-correcttng process 
of learning and the universal viewpoint derived from Lon-
ergan' s cognitional theory. To the second obstacle (as 
formulated in the thesis that no epistemologicaljlstifica-
tion is available for a view of historical realism), we 
contrasted epistemological positions on knowing and objec-
tivity which were critically grounded in cognitional per-
formance. 
The problem of historical realism turned up in our 
consideration of both obstacles. Different views of his-
torical realism marked the conflicts among nineteenth-cen-
tury historical paradtgms. Likewise, claims about the su-
periority of one view over others (i.e. it was a more 
"scientific" or "realistic" view) were not explicitly based 
r 
I ( on critical grourids. Hence, the claims appeared gratui-tous to those not sharing the same paradigm. Clearly the 
problem of historical realism requires a metahistorical 
standpoint beyond the different paradigms. This stand-
point must allow a critical mediation of their differences 
while at the same time being itself defensible against con-
trary epistemological positions. 
The question of historical objectivity provided a 
.focus for incompatible epistemological viewpoints, and, 
hence, a .focus for arguments in defense of a particular 
conception of historical realism. Tn section two of the 
chapter, we offered some preliminary clarifications of 
historical objectivity. Special attention was given to 
the relations between data and the inquiring subject, be-
tween data and .facts, and among data, facts, and heuristic 
.frameworks. The relations among the last group are current-
ly discussed as the problem of the heroeneutical circle. 
The problem of circularity in interpretations can be viewed 
in such a way that one accepts the thesis of closed thought-
systems. However, we argued that there is a self-correct-
ing aspect to developing understanding which, in effect, 
refutes that thesis. Moreover, correctly understood, the 
hermeneutical circle does not entail that thesis. We sug-
gested that the belief in such an entailment could origin-
ate in three ways: through the thesis of presuppositionless 
history, through a con.fusion of insight with deduction, 
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through a denial of mental acts. 
The clarifications of obaectivity begun in section 
two were continued in section three. The component issues 
of evidence and of verification had to be clarified. His-
torical evidence has its preconditions in the classifying 
function of historical intelligence and in the use of 
hypotheses. Such formal evidence is connected to the prob-
lems of verification by questions about the "sufficiency" 
of evidence. What is meant by the sufficiency of evidence 
can be explanatorily expressed in the notion of the virtu-
ally unconditioned. This notion is crucial for two rea-
sons: it formulates reason-in-act and thematizes the ra-
tional connection between Lonergan's cognitional theory 
and his epistemology. 
This rational connection was further clarified in 
noting what was affirmed in answers to question for reflec-
tion. To affirm that a historical interpretation is true 
is to affirm that, on the basis of the known evidence, the 
object of .thought corresponds to past events and their con-
sequences. The clarity of this type of correspondence was 
not simply assumed. The thesis of isomorphism was presen-
ted, clarified, and defended as explaining how through in-
tentional acts the subject transcends himself toward in-
tended objects. A basic argument for the thesis ("to deny 
it, one must assume it") also proved the validity of an 
epistemological thesis identified as critical realism: 
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the real is .the truly affirmed. This epistemological posi-
tion implies multiple meanings .for the terms "object" and 
"objectivity." These multiple distinctions manifest their 
usefulness and validity when contrasted with less complex 
notions o.f knowing, of objectivity, and o.f the real. 
The complex notion o.f objectivity and the basic epis-
temological position o.f section three provide the .founda-
tion .for the work o.f section four. There the purpose is 
to manifest how one can evaluate claims o.f historical real-
ism. Those claims are usually .formulated in terms o.f a 
science o.f history. Thus, we had to clarify the relati_on I between the natural sciences and history. Because o.f fun-
damental differences, that relation will not be one of 
identity or o.f thorough imitation. Still, stnce both sci-
ence and history proceed in methodical ways, have public 
checks on the individual's work, and yield verifiable re-
sults, one can speak o.f scientific history. Our main con-
tention is that the scientific aspects of historical work 
can be defended on non-preferential grounds. Similarly, 
the non-scientific aspects of historical work can be noted 
and evaluated without reducing history to fiction and with-
out conceding that historical explanation is inferior to 
scientific explanation. 
The question of historical realism is thus removed 
.from its usual context of a proposed scientizing of history. 
\.Jh.at context is to replace the usual one? White's 
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comparative .study of historical paradig:I!ls, the cul.tural 
interchange of anthropologists, and a traditional criticism 
of Gibbon's work provide evidence for a higher viewpoint 
beyond historical perspectives. If there is such a higher 
viewpoint, does it allow evaluative comparison of different 
perspectives? The fact that historical paradigms are said 
to be "incompatible" implies a coomon framework having com-
parative and evaluative criteria. 
Chapter Three had supplied the fundamental principle 
of development and revision in different thought-systems: 
cognitional structure is the a priori condition for changes 
in meaning. Therefore, it is also the coI!lID.on framework 
containing the potential totality of changes in meaning and 
in conceptual order. The work of Chapters Three and Four 
had provided explanatory and descriptive accounts of how 
human intelligence and rationality proceed in the develop-
ment and revision of meaning. Hence, the common framework 
was not left mysterious but was comprehended in a methodi-
cal way. Transcendental method formulates the evaluative 
criteria of the higher viewpoint, yet it is not immediately 
apparent how its formal criteria apply to historical prac-
tice. 
Chapter Four had already related the fornal criteria 
(i.e. the transcendental precepts) to historical procedures. 
Chapter Five further clarified the relation between precept 
and practice by means of the image of two blades of a pair 
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of scissors. The· upper blade of appropriate4 cognitional 
structure gives access to the development of understanding 
presupposed by every intelligible historical conclusion. 
The lower blade of historical materials and procedures 
gives specific content to which the upper blade can be 
applied. 
The application of the upper blade has an a posteriori 
aspect since historical inquiry must supply the materials 
to be organized. However, there is also an a priori aspect, 
and this can be formulated as a universal viewpoint cutting 
across differences in historical perspectives. The univer-
sality of the viewpoint derives from two .facts: the struc-
ture of human intentionality is the same for every histor-
ian, and the meanings developed through cognitional acts 
reflect a limited number of coobinations of' those acts. 
That is to say, historical conclusions will re.fleet how 
· thejr proponents f'ulf'illed the precondition of' cognj.tional 
structure in coming to know something about the past. This 
process of developing understanding can be reconstructed 
in part, and the normative function of' transcendental method 
allows one to criticize conclusi·ons in terms of the steps 
taken to reach them. 
This universal viewpoint was used to study dialec-
tical dif'ferences of opinion about historical facts. These 
differences belong to the debates over historical realism 
and are representat~ve of incompatible differences belonging 
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to the crisis of historicism. Disputes which could n.ot be 
mediated from within the historical field can be mediated 
once the universal viewpoint is grasped. However, the uni-
versal viewpoint only locates the solirces of surface dif-
ferences in the combinations of cognitional acts and in the 
distinctions (or absence of them) among levels of meaning. 
The elimination of confusions and oversights on a deep level 
can only be effected by a radical change termed "conver-
sion. 11 
Since the need is for a critical mediation of his-
torical disputes, conversions must reflect more than shifts 
in precritical preferences. What evidence is there for 
rational criteria prompting conversions? Debates among 
followers of different historical paradigms provide some 
evidence. These debates involve exchanges of arguments, 
so the belief is that rational criteria can make a differ-
ence in one's conclusions. Are the debaters deluding them-
selves? A negative reply is required if at least some dif-
ference is allowed between the psychology and the logic of 
historical inquiry. A stronger basis for a negative reply 
is provided by the universal viewpoint. '~he normative 
function of transcendental method supplies explicit criteria 
for reasonable debate. Tn addition, the intelligent criti-
cism of opposea conclusions has a distinctively non-prefer-
ential base if it is guided by what is known about cogni-
tional performance. 
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'We exemplified this intelligent criticism in regard 
to differences of opinion about historical facts. The 
rational basis for the criticism derived from the epistem-
ological position and complex notion of objecti_vity devel-
oped in section three. One author's difficulty with facts 
and objective interpretations was traced back to a prior 
misunderstanding of cognitional performance. Thus, this 
exercise in criticism from a universal standpoint objecti-
fied part of the basic horizon of an author. What was ob-
jectified was then criticized on rational grounds, and the 
critique was ultimately justified on the basis of a correct 
understanding of human-knowing. Consequently, the critique 
in its origins and conclusions escaped relativity to a par-
ticular historical perspective or to a particular set of 
variable preferences. 
Finally, all of these strategic moves around the ob-
stacles to White's attempted solution would be useless if 
intellectual responsibility were impossible. OUr preceding 
work has pointed out the need for both clarifications and 
corrections in various historical positions. -will this need 
be met? Actually we limited ourselves to the question, Can 
this need be met? Chapter Four argued that a negative 
reply was not necessitated by unavoidable or irreducible 
bias. A more positive approach was taken in this chapter. 
Just as one and the same person is both thinker and 
actor, so the spontaneity of cognitional performance merges 
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with the spontaneity of deliberation and decision.- we 
spontaneously guide our practice by our prior learning. 
In the technical practice of a scholarly enterprise, that 
prior learning includes norms for how one should carry out 
a professional inquiry. Implicitly it is expected that 
practice should be consistent with what is known. Of 
course, this expectation is not necessarily fulfilled. 
But that is only to admit that intellectual and moral re-
sponsibility is asked of free individuals. Given the self-
knowledge attained through the previous reflection on human 
knowing, an individual would have difficulty in holding, 
without qualification, those theses which introduced each 
of the last four chapters. 
r 
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If the theses with which Chapters Two through Five 
began can no longer be held without qualification, is the 
way clear for resolving the crisis of historicism? The 
four theses formulated certain basic difficulties confront-
ing historians and philosophers of history. These formu-
lated difficulties were in turn categorized under the head-
ings of problems concerning historical objectivity, the 
relation of history to science, and historical realism. 
In a series of arguments culminating in the lengthy dis-
cussion of Chapter Five, we concluded that the aforemen-
tioned problems could be resolved in terms of Lonergan's 
transcendental method. By proving the counterproposals of 
each chapter, we showed that the diffjculties formulated 
by Hayden White and falling within the more general problem 
areas could also be cleared up through the same methodolog-
ical approach. Thus, it would seem that the way is clear 
for resolving the crisis of historicism. 
However, our claims for the successful outcome of 
this dissertation are more modest. !n the first place, our 
focus has been limited to the three problem areas, and we 
have borrowed an understanding of the subordinate issues 
in those areas from the work of a single author, Hayden 
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White. Seco~d, we have centered our attention on Lonergan•s 
transcendental method without claiming that other schools 
of thought have nothing to add to what Lonergan says. rn-
deed, in citing works by historians and philosophers alike, 
we have admitted that the crisis-problems can be treated 
in multiple ways. But the narrowed focus we have adopted 
is not without merit. Hayden White's I1etahistory was shown 
to be a brilliant, if not wholly satisfactory, study of 
the underlying problems of the crisis period. !n addition, 
our successful resolution of certain long-standing issues 
proves the worth of Lonergan's transcendental method. 
A more cogent justification of our narrowed focus is 
available. The crisis of historicism continued in the 
absence of critical metahistortcal grounds for mediating 
disputes over historical processes and historiographical 
procedures. Both White and Lonergan seek the needed meta-
historical grounds--the one in terms of a linguistic deep 
structure, the other in terms of the a priori structure of 
human cognition. Both authors move beyond purely descrip-
tive accounts of historical perspectives and historiograph-
ical procedures to explanatory positions accounttng for 
those differen~ perspectives and practices. White's lin-
guistic-structuralist approach yields an explanatory frame-
work composed of modes of poetic speech and strategies of 
explanation. However, he ultimately grounds his explana-
tory framework in the subjec~•s moral and aesthetic 
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opinions. S.ince, as noted before, the measure of .an explan-
-
atory posi ti_ on is the definition of things in their rela-
tions, not to the subject, but among themselves, White's 
explanatory framework does not ultimately rest on an ex-
planatory foundation. 
This foundational weakness in White's analysis is not 
insignificant. On a descriptive level, he investigates the 
origins of diverse historical perspectives--perspectives 
already classified under explanatory categories. In point-
ing out the variables at the root of diverse perspectives, 
he describes how different paradigm-choices are made. 
However, his descriptive account offers no basis for com-
paring or criticizing either the perspectives or their var-
iable predeterminants--they are simply different and, in 
some cases, exclusively so. This inadequacy shows up in 
_ his recommended solution to the sceptical outcome of the 
crisis, i.e. in his advocacy of a "will to believe" in 
accordance with moral and aesthetic aspirations. An ex-
planatory foundation must offer more than this. The crisis 
of historicism originates in radically opposed beliefs, 
and the assertion of one more belief is scarcely the way 
to resolve the crisis. 
On the other hand, Lonergan's transcendental method 
does have an ex?lanatory foundation in cognitional struc-
ture. Throughout the last three chapters, we have devel-
oped the implications of Chapter Two's discovery of a 
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cognitional element in the subject's basic horizon. The 
strength of this discovery became apparent when we gradu-
ally elaborated the critical elements within developing 
historical perspectives and·their subordinate meanings. 
In Chapter Five, this gradual process culminated in an 
abbreViated discussion of the universal viewpoint. We 
argued that such a viewpoint escapes relativity to partic-
ular audiences because it rests on the a priori grounds 
presupposed by all the different ways of viewing and of 
doing history. Thus, a metahistorical position has been 
presented which not only is explanatory but also does not 
owe its validity to any single perspective or to any of the 
variables "beneath" particular perspectives. 
But to discover and defend this metahistorical posi-
tion is not the same as actually to mediate the disputes 
of the crisis period. We have indicated a strategy of 
mediation, an approach which offers compelling theoretical 
grounds in place of variable preferences. To do more than 
this would greatly expand the dissertation. !n particular, 
the topics of moral conversion and of the aesthetic ele-
ments in historical narration would have to be given con-
siderable space. For our limited purposes these topics 
were sufficiently investigated. Moreover, even after a 
second or third dissertation on moral and aesthetic prob-
lems, the actual mediation of the disputes of the crisis 
would remain to be carried out. A historical work written 
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in conjunction with the developed universal viewpoint would 
. 
be the actual test for successfully resolving the crisis 
of historicism. Such a work would not retain the limits 
of this dissertation. It would easily move into areas 
proper to the speculative tradition in the philosophy of 
history. But we have avoided those areas, and hence, we 
have not attempted to evaluate historj_cal perspectives 
in their entirety. 
An additional limitation was j_ndicated in Chapter Two. 
We did not undertake a special inquiry into human hist·ori-
city (Geschichtlichkeit). The additional problems raised 
by such an inquiry into the histor-ical being of man him-
self would add an excessive number of pages to our already 
lengthy work. Such an inquiry is not easily foresworn. 
Human historicity is the everyday experience from which 
arise all the diverse types of historical writings. As such 
it is basic to the critical type of history upon which our 
methodological discussions focused. But although we did 
not speak at length of historicity as the fundamental con-
text of spec:talized inquiry, we did contribute some insights 
into that context. The elements of relative horizons 
treated in Chapter Two could be used to specify some of 
the content of human historicity. Nore important, the cog-
nitional structure defended in Chapter ~hree specifies an 
intellectual and critical aspect of hUrJan histor~city. The 
transcendental method derived from that a priori aspect is 
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the norm f'or later specializations aris:i_ng in historical 
consc:i.ousness. Consequently, even within the limits of 
the dissertation, a key element of' human historicity has 
been explored in detail. 
Still, because of' the preceding limi tat;_ons in our 
work, we can only claim to have shown a way beyond the 
theoretical impasse of' the crisis of' historicism. This 
impasse is composed of' certain basic problems, and we have 
indicated how these p~oblems can be resolved. This impasse 
can be considered insurmountable--such was one implication 
of TJhite's various thesese But we have shown that his the-
ses must be qualified. In effect, the three basic problems 
of the crisis have not remained unresolved nor have the 
mentioned obstacles remained unsurmounted. So, we can 
assert that our strategy has reached its goal, and further 
studies may build on what we have accomplished. 
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